Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

Attirned by 20l) VT SH

(3120/11)
| FILED |
STATE OF VERMONT | MAY 08 2099 |
ORANGE COUNTY |
| ORANGE SU & SUPERIOR COURT 2 COURT |
)
In re: Estate of Orville Tucker ) Orange Superior Court
) Docket No. 248-12-05 Oecy
DECISION

Appellant’s Motion for Preliminary Ruling on Burden of Proof

The present question before the court in this probate appeal is whether the
presumption of undue influence potentially applies in a case where the proponent of the will
was both the daughter of the testator and his legally-appointed guardian.

The relevant facts for the purposes of this opinion are that (1) Orville Tucker’s 2004
will benefitted his daughter, appellant Valerie Hausmann, and (2) the 2004 will was executed
afier Valerie had been appointed by the probate court as Orville’s voluntary guardian.
Orville’s son, Stephen Tucker, has challenged the will on the grounds that the will was the
product of undue influence on the part of Valerie.

In the present motion, Valerie seeks a pretrial ruling that contestant Stephen will bear
the burden of proving undue influence during the upcoming jury trial. She contends that
under Vermont law, the burden of proof with respect to the issue of undue influence always
remains upon the contestant, and never shifts to the proponent, in cases where the proponent
is the child of the testator. She relies primarily on cases such as Jn re Estate of Rotax,
139 Vt. 390
 (1981), for this assertion.

Stephen contends that a presumption of undue influence may be appropriate in this
case because Valerie was both a beneficiary of the will and also the legally-appointed
guardian of Orville. In addition to these legal arguments, both parties argue that the
presumption of undue influence should or should not apply based upon the specific facts of
the case.

Courts seek to enforce the intent of the testator as it is expressed in the will. Eckstein
v. Estate of Dunn,
174 Vt. 575, 579
 (2002), In re Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. 478, 481
 (1989).
This general rule serves the purpose of honoring the testator’s wishes as to the disposition of
estate property, but application of the rule only makes sense insofar as the will actually
represents the testator’s intent. The doctrine of undue influence is designed to protect the
integrity of the general rule by invalidating wills when it is shown that the testator was
induced to execute an instrument that, in reality, represents the intent of someone else.
Landmark Trust (USA), Inc. v. Goodhue,
172 Vt. 515, 524-25
 (2001).

The burden of proving undue influence normally rests with the party challenging the
will. Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. at 481
. The elements of undue influence require the
contestant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator’s sound judgment and
free will were overcome by means of coercion, and that the will represents something
contrary to the testator’s true wishes. /d. (citing Estate of Rotax,
139 Vt. at 392
). The
influence of the allegedly wrongdoing party must have “destroy[ed] the free agency of the
testator at the time and in the very act of making the instrument,” Jn re Estate of Burt, 122 V1.
260, 264-65 (1961), and have been coercion sufficient to “work a substitution of the
dominant purpose of the defendants for the free expression of the will of the decedent.”
Kendall’s Adm’r v. Roseberry,
120 Vt. 498, 502
 (1958).

However, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of undue influence
sometimes shifts. A presumption of undue influence may arise in cases where (1) the
benefitting party was in a “confidential relationship” with the testator, and (2) there were
“suspicious circumstances” surrounding the preparation, formation, or execution of the will.
Eckstein,
174 Vt. at 579
; In re Will of Collins,
114 Vt. 523, 533
 (1946); Restatement (Third)
of Property—Wills and Donative Transfers § 8.3. The presumption is applied where it
appears that “a relationship of trust and confidence obtains between the testator and
beneficiary,” and that “the beneficiary has procured the will to be made or has advised as to
its provisions.” Will of Collins,
114 Vt. at 533
; In re Estate of Laitinen,
145 Vt. 153, 159-60
(1984). If the presumption applies, it establishes the prima facie existence of undue
influence, and is sufficient to defeat the will unless overcome by counterproof that no undue
influence attended the execution of the will. Will of Collins,
114 Vt. at 533
, Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. at 482
 n.2.

As to the element of a confidential relationship, courts may presume as a matter of
law that a relationship of trust and confidence exists when the beneficiary was in a fiduciary
relationship with the testator. Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. at 483
, This makes sense because
fiduciary relationships, like guardian and ward, are relationships “of trust and confidence in
which the temptation and opportunity for abuse would be too great if the beneficiary were not
required to make affirmative proof that he did not betray the confidence placed in him.”
Id.
(quoting Jn re Barney’s Will,
70 Vt. 352, 369-70
 (1898)).

On the other hand, Vermont law establishes that a mere parent-child relationship,
without more, does not give rise to a “confidential relationship” even when the child who
benefitted was “the adviser of the parent, and had the contro] and management of his affairs.”
Burton’s Adm’r y. Burton,
82 Vt. 12, 17
 (1909). This rule also makes sense because it is
common for a relationship of trust and confidence to arise between parents and their children,
and for adult children to begin to manage the affairs of their parents as they grow older. See
In re Estate of Sensenbrenner,
278 N.W.2d 887, 892
 (Wis. 1979) (explaining that it is
difficult for courts to determine “the point at which the amount and kind of assistance which
a child renders to its parent makes the child a confidential advisor”). In these circumstances,
Vermont law has expressed a preference against requiring children to “explain the gift” or
“show the fairness” of their parents’ actions. Burton,
82 Vt. at 17
. A number of cases have
explained this preference by stating that the presumption of undue influence does not apply
when the beneficiaries are children or grandchildren of the testator. Eckstein,
174 Vt. at 579
;
Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. at 484
, Estate of Rotax,
139 Vt. at 393
.

However, none of the aforementioned Vermont cases have involved a situation where
the beneficiary of a will was both the child of the testator and the testator’s legally-appointed
guardian. The closest match is Burton, where the child had become the “adviser” of the
parent, and “had the control and management of [her] affairs,” but there is no indication that
any fiduciary relationship existed, or that the legal relationship between the testator and
beneficiary was anything other than parent and child.
When a daughter is appointed as her father’s legal guardian, the atmosphere of trust
and confidence between parent and child does not arise solely from the parent-child
relationship and the natural inclination of children to tend to their parent’s affairs, but also
arises as a legal and fiduciary obligation by virtue of the guardian-ward relationship. In other
words, even if a confidential relationship should not be found solely by virtue of a parent-
child relationship, a bright line is crossed when the child actually assumes fiduciary
responsibility for her parent’s well-being—as when the child has been appointed a legal
guardian. Under those circumstances, the legal responsibilities attendant to the guardian-
ward relationship should prevail. Application of the presumption of undue influence 1s
appropriate when a fiduciary relationship is legally present because “the temptation and
opportunity for abuse would be too great if the beneficiary were not required to make
affirmative proof that he did not betray the confidence placed in him.” Estate of Raedel,
152 Vt. at 483
 (quoting Jn re Barney’s Will,
70 Vt. 352, 369-70
 (1898)).

In this case, Valerie was legally appointed as Orville’s guardian prior to the execution
of the will. Because the appointment gave rise to fiduciary obligations on the part of Valerie,
and because the provisions of the will benefitted her, the court concludes that a “confidential
relationship” existed between Valerie and Orville in this case.

This does not mean that any presumption of undue influence has arisen, or that the
burden has shifted. It is still necessary for the court to determine whether or not the will was
executed under “suspicious circumstances.” See, e.g., Will of Collins, 114 Vt at 533-34
(explaining that the presence of a “confidential relationship” alone is not sufficient to raise a
presumption of undue influence in the absence of “suspicious circumstances”). The question
of whether suspicious circumstances were present, and whether the burden of proof should
therefore be shifted, can only be determined by the court afler hearing the evidence presented
at trial. “Whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a presumption of undue influence must
be decided by the trial court on a case by case basis.” Estate of Raedel, 152 V1. at 482
(quoting Estate of Laitinen,
145 Vt. at 159
).

For the foregoing reasons, appellant Valerie Hausmann’s motion for a preliminary
ruling that appellee Stephen Tucker bears the burden of proving undue influence is denied.
The court reserves ruling on the factual question of whether suspicious circumstances are
present in this case. The determination as to who will bear the ultimate burden of proof on
the issue of undue influence will be determined by the court after hearing the evidence
presented at trial.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, appellant Valerie Hausmann’s Motion Regarding Burden
of Proof (MPR #14), filed Mar. 26, 2008, is denied.

Dated at Chelsea, Vermont this 8" day of May, 2009.
Vasu Yl deartunt

Hon. Mary Miles Teachout
Superior Court Judge