State v. B. Y.

364                           October 5, 2023                            No. 24

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                    In the Matter of B.Y.,
                           a Youth.
                   STATE OF OREGON,
                    Petitioner on Review,
                              v.
                             B.Y.,
                   Respondent on Review.
          (CC 19JU00173) (CA A172581) (SC S069640)

    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
  Argued and submitted March 3, 2023, at Willamette
University College of Law, Salem, Oregon.
   Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Also on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General,
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Christa Obold Eshleman, Youth, Rights & Justice,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent
on review.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett,
DeHoog, and Masih, Justices and Balmer and Baldwin,
Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.**
    GARRETT, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed in part and reversed in part.



______________
   * Appeal from Columbia County Circuit Court,Ted E. Grove, Judge.

, 

 (2022).
    **Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the deci-
sion of this case. Bushong and James, JJ., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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 (2023)   365
366                                                            State v. B. Y.

           GARRETT, J.
         The juvenile code provides a maximum amount of
time that a youth can be committed to the custody of the
Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for each type of offense that,
if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime. ORS
419C.501. However, the code does not explicitly address how
multiple adjudications affect the calculation of that period.
The issue in this case is whether, when a youth commits
a new offense while already in OYA custody, the juvenile
court’s disposition can impose a new period of commitment
to run consecutively to the period of commitment that the
youth has not yet completed.
         While on juvenile parole related to a commitment to
OYA in an earlier case, youth was adjudicated to be within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interfering with
a peace officer. Based on that conduct, the juvenile court
imposed a new disposition, which also committed youth to
OYA custody, to commence at the conclusion of youth’s exist-
ing commitment. Youth challenged that order, contending
that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose consecu-
tive commitments. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
agreed with youth and reversed the order of the juvenile
court. State v. B.Y., 

, 

 (2022).
        We allowed the state’s petition for review to con-
sider that question of statutory interpretation, and we now
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in part and
affirm in part.1
                           I. BACKGROUND
        The facts, which are undisputed on review, are taken
from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In 2017, youth was
committed to the custody of OYA for three and a half years.
That commitment was the result of a combined disposition
for multiple unlawful acts following a probation violation.
Youth was placed in a youth correction facility for much of
    1
      Youth raised a second assignment of error in the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the juvenile court committed plain error in imposing a “one-year” commit-
ment term when the statutory maximum was 364 days. The state agreed that
that constituted plain error, and the Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court
on the length of the commitment term. We do not disturb that aspect of the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals.
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that time. He was paroled to a residential placement, but
he ran away. When police attempted to apprehend him,
he refused to comply with an order to stop and get on the
ground. For that conduct, which at the time, if committed by
an adult, would have constituted the Class A misdemeanor
of interfering with a peace officer, former ORS 162.247(1)(b)
(2018), amended by Or Laws 2021, ch 254, § 1, the state
initiated a new delinquency proceeding. Youth admitted to
the conduct. As part of its disposition in 2019, the juvenile
court ordered that youth be committed to OYA for one addi-
tional year, to run consecutively to the existing commitment
period, which was scheduled to end in November 2020. In
other words, youth’s cumulative period of commitment was
extended from November 2020 to November 2021. Youth
served that additional period, was then released, and his
commitment to OYA was terminated in November 2021.
The juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over him.
         Youth timely appealed while he was still in OYA cus-
tody, arguing that ORS 419C.501 does not allow a juvenile
court to impose an additional commitment to run consecu-
tively to an existing commitment.2 A 1976 Court of Appeals
case had held that juvenile courts possess the authority to
impose consecutive commitment terms. State ex rel Juv. Dept.
v. T., 

, 

 (1976). The state argued
below that, although T. interpreted a former version of ORS
419C.501 (ORS 419.511 (1971)), the subsequent amendments
to the statute in 1999 had not disturbed the holding in T.
         The Court of Appeals majority agreed with youth.
Noting that the statutory text did not resolve the issue,
the court relied on the context and history of the statutory
scheme. B.Y., 

. The court first looked
to its prior case from 1976, T., 

, which
held that juvenile courts have the authority to impose con-
secutive commitments. It stated that T.’s holding had been
based on the premise that, at the time, the juvenile code had
expressly linked the maximum commitment term for a youth
     2
       The underlying incident in this case, youth’s interference with a peace offi-
cer, occurred in 2018. ORS 419C.501 was amended in 2019 and 2021. However,
those were not substantive amendments, and they do not affect our analysis.
Therefore, all references to ORS 419C.501 in this opinion are to the current ver-
sion of the statute unless stated otherwise.
368                                              State v. B. Y.

to the maximum sentence that an adult could serve for the
same conduct. The court then reasoned that, because crim-
inal courts in 1976 had broad statutory authority to impose
consecutive sentences for adult offenders, it had logically fol-
lowed in T. that juvenile courts had similar authority.
         However, as the court explained, the legislature
amended the juvenile statute in 1999 and severed that
“linkage” between a juvenile court’s authority and a crimi-
nal court’s sentencing authority in adult cases. In addition,
the court explained that intervening changes to the crimi-
nal sentencing statutes, following the T. decision and prior
to the 1999 amendments, had limited the authority of adult
criminal courts to impose consecutive sentences. As a result,
the majority reasoned, the premise for the court’s conclusion
in T. no longer existed. The majority ultimately determined
that, because of the conflict between the T. decision and the
1999 amendments, the legislature’s intent on the question
was “ambiguous.” The court concluded that, had the legisla-
ture considered the question, it would not have intended to
grant unlimited authority to juvenile courts to impose con-
secutive commitment terms in juvenile delinquency cases.
         In dissent, Chief Judge Lagesen reasoned that the
statutory scheme gives the juvenile court broad discretion to
determine the conditions and duration of an OYA commit-
ment and provides factors for the court to consider, including
other conduct by the youth. The dissent noted that the 1999
amendments did not address the consecutive-commitment
question. The dissent also explained that “juvenile courts
long have been understood to have [the] authority” to impose
consecutive commitment terms, and concluded that, “[a]bsent
a clear indication from the legislature that it intended to dis-
place that status quo,” the court should maintain it. Id. at 222
(Lagesen, C.J., dissenting) (citing T., 

).
        The state petitioned for review, which we allowed.
                       II. ANALYSIS
        Before addressing the interpretive question in this
case, we provide a brief description of juvenile delinquency
proceedings. When a youth engages in conduct that would
constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the state may
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petition the juvenile court to find the youth within its juris-
diction. ORS 419C.005 (providing juvenile courts with exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of delinquency proceedings); ORS
419C.250 (providing process for filing delinquency petitions).
         The court then holds a hearing, which constitutes
the “adjudication” phase. ORS 419C.001 (listing the three
phases of the juvenile justice system as “initiation, adjudi-
cation and disposition”). During the adjudication phase, the
state must prove the facts alleged in the petition beyond a
reasonable doubt. ORS 419C.400. If the juvenile court finds
that the youth did engage in the conduct alleged, it finds the
youth within its jurisdiction and enters a disposition order.
ORS 419C.411. The disposition order sets forth the require-
ments and conditions that the youth must complete as part of
youth’s rehabilitation. See ORS 419C.440 - 419C.510 (setting
out the types of dispositions and under what circumstances
a court may impose them). The disposition also includes
any changes in youth’s custody—guardianship, parental
custody, or OYA custody—when the court determines that
a change in custody is appropriate. See ORS 419C.446 (stat-
ing that the court may “direct” that the adjudicated youth
remain in parental custody or the court may place a youth
in the custody of a relative, foster home, or child care cen-
ter); ORS 419C.478 (stating that the court has authority to
place an adjudicated youth in the legal custody of OYA or
the Department of Human Services).
         The terminology used in the juvenile code is unique
to this context. Therefore, we clarify a few terms before
addressing the question in this case. “Commitment to OYA”
and “OYA custody,” as the state explained at oral argument,
are used interchangeably throughout the juvenile code and
are distinguished from the physical location where a youth
is “placed.” See, e.g., ORS 419C.478 (permitting juvenile
courts to commit adjudicated youths to OYA and place them
in “custody” of OYA for care, placement, and supervision);
ORS 419C.486 (requiring OYA to take recommendations
from the “committing court” to facilitate planning for “adju-
dicated youths committed to its custody”); ORS 419C.492
(allowing juvenile courts to review placements made by OYA
or the Department of Human Services and direct OYA or
370                                              State v. B. Y.

the department to “place” the youth in a type of “residential
placement” if the youth’s rights are being violated). The “dis-
position” is the judgment of the juvenile court that imposes
conditions on the adjudicated youth for the purpose of that
youth’s rehabilitation. ORS 419C.411. The disposition, like
the one in this case, may include a commitment to OYA cus-
tody. ORS 419C.478. When a juvenile court imposes a dispo-
sition, it must “fix the duration” of the disposition and, when
the court’s disposition includes a commitment to OYA cus-
tody, the commitment must be for an indefinite period. ORS
419C.501. The statute then limits that indefinite period for
specific types of offenses. 

         The question in this case is whether a juvenile court
may impose a commitment term that runs consecutively to
a previously imposed commitment term when the consec-
utively imposed commitment is the result of conduct that
occurred while youth was in OYA custody for the earlier
commitment. Youth argues that the juvenile court does not
have the authority to impose consecutive commitment terms
because ORS 419C.501 does not expressly grant that author-
ity. The state argues that the statute, in context, impliedly
authorizes consecutive commitment terms. For the reasons
below, we agree with the state.
A. Mootness
          We first address the fact that youth is no longer in
OYA custody nor under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. A
case becomes moot when a court’s decision will no longer
have a “practical effect on the rights of the parties.” Brumnett
v. PSRB, 

, 

 (1993). Often, that
occurs because an event “render[s] it impossible for the court
to grant effectual relief.” Hamel v. Johnson, 

,

 (2000) (citation omitted). A party moving for
dismissal bears the burden to establish mootness. State v.
K.J.B., 

, 

 (2018). ORS 14.175 is a
statutory exception that provides that a court “may issue a
judgment” notwithstanding mootness. It has three require-
ments: (1) the party had standing to commence the action;
(2) the challenged act is capable of repetition; and (3) the act
is likely to evade review. Couey v. Atkins, 

,

 (2015) (stating requirements of ORS 14.175).
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         While youth’s appeal of the juvenile court’s second
disposition was pending, he completed both the original com-
mitment term and the additional commitment term imposed
by the second disposition. Youth is no longer in OYA custody,
and that custody was terminated on November 5, 2021.3 The
parties agree that, as a result, this case is moot; our reso-
lution will have no practical effect on either party’s rights.
However, neither party has moved to dismiss the appeal.
          The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in April
2022. The parties did not provide a notice of probable moot-
ness to that court, and that court did not address mootness
in its opinion. After the state petitioned for review, we asked
the parties to submit briefing on mootness. We then allowed
review.
        The parties agree that this case is reviewable under
ORS 14.175, and that we should exercise our discretion to
review. As noted, that provision states that, notwithstand-
ing mootness, the court “may issue a judgment” if:
        “(1)   The party had standing to commence the action;
        “(2) The act challenged by the party is capable of rep-
    etition, or the policy or practice challenged by the party
    continues in effect; and
       “(3) The challenged policy or practice, or similar acts,
    are likely to evade judicial review in the future.”
ORS 14.175. When those three requirements are met, the
legislature has expressly stated that we may exercise dis-
cretion to review the case. Id.; Couey, 

.
         The parties both argue that all three of those
requirements are met, and we agree that they are. First,
youth had standing to challenge the juvenile court’s imposi-
tion of the consecutive commitment term because he was in
    3
      Youth has asked us to take judicial notice of the case registers in youth’s
other cases, and the state does not object. Eklof v. Steward, 

, 722 n 4,

 (2016) (explaining that OEC 201(b)(2) allows this court to take
judicial notice of “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,”
which included case registers of other cases). We therefore take judicial notice of
the fact that, in 2021, the juvenile court terminated OYA custody, ended youth’s
commitment term, and dismissed five pending petitions against youth, per the
judgment entered October 27, 2021, effective November 5, 2021, in case number
14JU03323.
372                                              State v. B. Y.

OYA custody at the time that he challenged it. Second, the
imposition of that term is capable of repetition in other juve-
nile delinquency cases involving subsequent misdemeanor
counts. See Penn v. Board of Parole, 

, 

 (2019) (explaining that the capable of repetition
requirement is satisfied by a showing that the challenged
act is “reasonably susceptible to repetition as to someone”).
Third, we agree with the parties that the imposition of con-
secutive commitment terms is likely to evade judicial review
in the future. See Couey, 

 (explaining that
“likely” means “probable that a similar challenge will evade
judicial review in the future”). That is so because many
youth commitment terms have a statutory maximum of less
than one year. ORS 419C.501(1) (setting maximums of less
than one year for acts that would constitute Class A, B, or
C misdemeanors if committed by an adult). Given that the
appellate process can typically take several years, it is fore-
seeable that many cases involving consecutive commitment
terms for misdemeanor-only cases will become moot on
appeal. And for juvenile dispositions involving serious felo-
nies with statutory maximums of 10-20 years, the fact that
most youth age out of OYA custody at age 25 makes it less
likely that youth in such cases would be subject to consecu-
tive commitment terms imposed by subsequent dispositions.
See ORS 419C.501(1)(f), (g); ORS 419C.501(2). Therefore, it is
likely that the imposition of consecutive commitment terms
is likely to evade review in the future. All three require-
ments of ORS 14.175 are met.
         We further conclude that we should exercise our dis-
cretion to review the issue in this case. Clarifying the scope
of the juvenile court’s dispositional authority is important
to the public and will have implications for future cases. See
ORAP 9.07 (setting forth factors to consider in determining
whether to allow discretionary review).
        It is true that, in some cases, we have remanded to
a lower court for consideration of whether it is appropriate
to adjudicate an otherwise moot case when that question
was not addressed below and when we conclude that the
claims are justiciable under ORS 14.175. See Couey, 

 (remanding to the circuit court for consideration of
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whether it should exercise its discretion to reach the merits
when it previously declined to do so), and Eastern Oregon
Mining Association v. DEQ, 

, 

(2016) (remanding to the Court of Appeals to decide whether
it should exercise its discretion to adjudicate the moot case
after that court determined that the issues did not raise ORS
14.175 considerations). But that is not always so. See Penn,

 (exercising our discretion to adjudicate the
case when the Court of Appeals reached the merits and the
case became moot during proceedings before this court). As
we explained in Couey, ORS 14.175 “leaves it to the court to
determine whether it is appropriate to adjudicate an other-
wise moot case under the circumstances of each case.” 

. The circumstances of this case—including that
the Court of Appeals has already reached the merits and
neither party has moved to dismiss the appeal as moot—
further persuade us to exercise our discretion to review this
issue.
B.    The Authority to Impose Consecutive Commitments
      Under ORS 419C.501
          The question in this case is whether ORS 419C.501
authorizes a juvenile court to impose a new, consecutive
commitment for an additional offense that occurs while a
youth is in OYA custody. That is a matter of statutory con-
struction, which we resolve by giving effect to the intent of
the legislature as demonstrated by the text, context, and
any helpful legislative history. State v. Gaines, 

, 

 (2009). In turn, we review the trial
court’s interpretation of the statute for legal error. See State
v. Ramoz, 

, 

 (2021) (“Questions
of statutory construction and a trial court’s authority to act
* * * are questions of law.”).
         We begin with the text. ORS 419C.501 governs the
duration of dispositions. It also sets specific limits on the
period of commitment that a juvenile court may impose for
an act. In full, it reads:
         “(1) The court shall fix the duration of any disposition
     made pursuant to this chapter and the duration may be
     for an indefinite period. Any placement in the legal cus-
     tody of the Department of Human Services or the Oregon
374                                                 State v. B. Y.

   Youth Authority under ORS 419C.478 or placement under
   the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board
   under ORS 419C.529 shall be for an indefinite period.
   However, the period of institutionalization or commitment
   may not exceed:
      “(a) The period of time specified in the statute defining
   the crime for an act that would constitute an unclassified
   misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(b) Thirty days for an act that would constitute a
   Class C misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(c) Six months for an act that would constitute a Class
   B misdemeanor if committed by an adult;
      “(d) Three hundred sixty-four days for an act that
   would constitute a Class A misdemeanor if committed by
   an adult;
      “(e) Five years for an act that would constitute a Class
   C felony if committed by an adult;
      “(f) Ten years for an act that would constitute a Class
   B felony if committed by an adult;
      “(g) Twenty years for an act that would constitute a
   Class A felony if committed by an adult; and
      “(h) Life for a young person who was found to have
   committed an act that, if committed by an adult would
   constitute murder or any aggravated form of murder under
   ORS 163.095, 163.107, or 163.115.
       “(2) Except as provided in subsection (1)(h) of this sec-
   tion, the period of any disposition may not extend beyond
   the date on which the young person or adjudicated youth
   becomes 25 years of age.”
ORS 419C.501.
          The text of the statute does not expressly address
the question before us. It instructs us that the juvenile court
must “fix the duration” of a disposition in its order and that
placement in OYA custody must be for an indefinite period.

 It limits the period of commitment for each offense level
by categorizing conduct that, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a crime. 

 It also prohibits the juvenile
court from imposing a disposition that extends beyond the
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adjudicated youth’s twenty-fifth birthday (other than in the
case of murder or aggravated murder). 

 We thus under-
stand the text to authorize the juvenile court to determine
the duration of a disposition, with two explicit limitations:
A disposition cannot extend past the youth’s twenty-fifth
birthday, and the term of commitment cannot exceed the
statutory maximum listed for “an act.”
         At issue in this case is the meaning of the latter
provision. The use of the indefinite article “an,” used with
the singular noun “act,” could be interpreted in two ways.
First, “an” can be used before an unspecified noun—synon-
ymous with “any.” See Lake Oswego Preservation Society v.
City of Lake Oswego, 

, 

 (2016).
Second, “an” can be used “quantitatively” to signal that
the noun is part of a class, whether that class is defined
expressly or implicitly in the context in which the indefinite
article appears. 

. Both interpretations indicate
that “an” refers to a single thing—here, a single act. In other
words, the statute provides that the juvenile court shall “fix
the duration of any disposition” for “an act,” but it does not
expressly address what should happen in a situation involv-
ing multiple acts. Finding limited evidence of the legisla-
ture’s intent in the text of ORS 419C.501, we turn to the
statutory context.
         As relevant to this case, the statutory context for
ORS 419C.501 includes other provisions of the juvenile
code and earlier versions of the statute. See Dept. of Human
Services v. S.J.M., 

, 

 (2018) (exam-
ining the juvenile code provision at issue in the context of
the rest of the juvenile code); Brown v. SAIF, 

, 

 (2017) (explaining that statutory context
includes the entire statutory scheme); State v. Haley, 

, 

 (2023) (noting that earlier versions of
the statute at issue are statutory context). We begin with
the juvenile code as a whole, and then turn to the earlier
versions of ORS 419C.501.
         The juvenile code has multiple provisions that gov-
ern a juvenile court’s disposition in a delinquency case. ORS
419C.411 lists numerous factors for the juvenile court to con-
sider when determining the appropriate disposition. ORS
376                                              State v. B. Y.

419C.446 and ORS 419C.453 provide authority to impose
a probation term and limit when detention is authorized.
ORS 419C.478 governs placement in OYA custody, listing
findings that the court must make before placing a youth
in OYA custody. Taken together, the juvenile code gives
juvenile courts broad authority to determine the appropri-
ate disposition in each individual case. As we explain below,
the statutory context indicates that juvenile courts have the
authority to impose, when appropriate, commitment terms
for subsequent offenses so long as the duration of each term
does not exceed the maximum for the offense for which it is
imposed.
         As noted, when determining an appropriate dispo-
sition, the court must consider numerous factors set out in
the statute. ORS 419C.411. Those factors include the gravity
of loss or injury from the youth’s act, the level of aggression
or willfulness, whether the youth was held in detention, the
need to protect the victim, and the youth’s previous juve-
nile court record. ORS 419C.411(3). In addition, the juvenile
court “may” consider the youth’s efforts toward reform, edu-
cational status, and employment history, the youth’s pro-
posed disposition, recommendations from the state, state-
ments from the victim, the youth’s mental, emotional, and
physical health, the results of substance abuse treatment,
and “[a]ny other relevant factors or circumstances raised by
the parties.” ORS 419C.411(4). In other words, the juvenile
court has broad authority to assess the unique needs of each
case and impose an appropriate disposition based on those
needs.
         Other provisions regarding dispositions further
support that understanding. The court has authority to
direct the youth to remain in the legal custody of the youth’s
parents, to be placed in the legal custody of a relative or a
foster home, or to be placed in the legal custody of a care
center when imposing a probation term. ORS 419C.446.
The court is charged with making that determination in
the “best interest and welfare” of the youth. 

 The court is
also authorized to commit a youth to OYA custody, and, in
specific circumstances, to detain a youth in a jail-like deten-
tion setting for specified periods of time. ORS 419C.478
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(commitment to OYA custody); ORS 419C.453 (authorizing
detention). The statutes give the court significant latitude
to determine what kind of supervision the youth should
be placed in, based on the youth’s conduct, and to fashion
appropriate conditions during a placement.
         The juvenile code instructs the juvenile court to
determine whether OYA custody is in the youth’s best inter-
ests, and to determine the services and conditions that the
youth must receive and adhere to during youth’s term of
commitment to OYA. As discussed above, when the juve-
nile court determines that OYA custody is appropriate, ORS
419C.501 requires the juvenile court to commit the youth
to OYA custody for an indefinite period. Thus, the statu-
tory scheme clearly contemplates a broad, holistic analysis
of the circumstances in the court’s determination of condi-
tions, treatment programs, and legal custody. The court’s
authority to make those determinations is subject to limits
that are expressly stated in the statute. Those limits include
a requirement that a youth’s period of commitment for “an
act” not exceed the statutory maximum sentence that would
apply to an adult who engaged in the same conduct. Nothing
in the statute suggests that the court’s authority to set the
duration of the commitment term is constrained beyond the
limits that the juvenile code explicitly provides. More to the
point, nothing in the text of the statute precludes a new
“act,” committed while a youth is already committed to the
custody of OYA, from being addressed in a new disposition
with its own, separate period of commitment.
         In short, the juvenile code entrusts the juvenile
court with broad authority to impose an appropriate dispo-
sition given the facts and circumstances of each case. The
limitations on that authority that the code does provide are
quite explicit. See, e.g., ORS 419C.478(5) (“[T]he court may
not make a commitment directly to any residential facility.”).
If the legislature had intended to limit the court’s authority
to impose dispositions for subsequent offenses in the man-
ner that youth contends, it could have done so. But nothing
in the text of the juvenile code suggests that it has done
that, or that it intended to do that.
378                                              State v. B. Y.

         In addition to related statutes, our inquiry into
the statutory context includes earlier versions of the same
statute. We now turn to the versions of ORS 419C.501 that
existed prior to the current version, which was last substan-
tively amended in 1999. As explained below, those earlier
versions demonstrate that the legislature has consistently
given broad discretionary authority to the juvenile courts to
determine the “appropriate” disposition in each case.
          The first juvenile code was enacted in 1959. Or
Laws 1959, ch 432. Former ORS 419.511 (1959), repealed by
Or Laws 1993, ch 33, § 373, provided broad authority for
the juvenile court to set an indefinite term of commitment,
limited only by the youth reaching 21 years of age. Or Laws
1959, ch 432, §§ 17, 19. The first substantive amendment rel-
evant to understanding maximum periods of commitment
was in 1971. The legislature amended the statute to pro-
vide that a youth’s indefinite term of commitment could not
exceed the statutory maximum sentence that an adult would
receive for the same conduct. Or Laws 1971, ch 571, § 1. In
making that determination, the legislature considered the
current practice of juvenile courts in addition to arguments
both for and against the bill, Senate Bill (SB) 138 (1971).
Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 138,
Mar 12, 1971, Tape 3, Side 2. According to testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, some cases had resulted
in a youth being committed to incarceration from age 15 to
age 21, when an adult would have been sentenced to 60 days
in jail for the same conduct. Id. Proponents of the bill under-
stood the proposed connection to the statutory maximums
in adult sentences to apply to youth in Corrections Division
custody (now OYA), and not to other types of dispositions.
Id.; see generally Commentary to Criminal Law Revision
Commission Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft
and Report §§ 74, 75 (July 1970) (stating the maximum
terms for indeterminate sentences under the revised crimi-
nal code). In keeping the mandatory indefinite term of com-
mitment, but providing an upper limit on that term of com-
mitment, proponents of the bill understood it to still provide
enough flexibility for the Corrections Division to release a
youth at the point in time that the youth was rehabilitated,
without committing a youth for months or years longer than
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an adult would serve for the same conduct. We could find no
discussion in the legislative history of SB 138 of consecutive
terms of commitment for subsequent offenses.
         We understand the 1971 amendment to reflect the
legislature’s intent to prevent youths from being committed
to the Corrections Division for a longer period of time than
adults would serve for engaging in the same conduct. The
concerns driving opposition to the bill were that, in some
circumstances, it might be in a youth’s best interest to be
committed to OYA custody for a longer period of time than
would apply to an adult. Tape Recording, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, SB 138, Mar 12, 1971, Tape 3, Side 2. The text
of the law, as passed, indicates that the desire to achieve
“equal treatment” between youths and adults for the same
conduct carried the day.
         Thus, the governing law beginning in 1971 was
that a disposition that placed a youth in the legal custody
of OYA (then, the Children’s Services Division and formerly
the Corrections Division) was required to be for an indef-
inite period not to exceed the maximum term of incarcer-
ation for an adult who engaged in the same conduct. The
legislative history of the 1971 version of the statute suggests
that the legislature understood the juvenile court’s disposi-
tional authority to be broad—it could impose any disposition
it determined was appropriate unless the legislature pro-
vided an express limitation.
         In 1976, the Court of Appeals decided a case inter-
preting that statute, former ORS 419.511(1) (1971), and
answered a question similar to the one presented here. T.,

. In that case, the youth was adjudicated in
a single hearing for two counts of unrelated conduct that, if
committed by an adult, would have constituted theft in the
second degree. 

 The juvenile court’s disposition committed
the youth to the Children’s Services Division for placement
in the juvenile training school for a period not to exceed one
year for each count. 

 The counts were imposed to run con-
secutively. The Court of Appeals held, without explanation,
that imposing consecutive commitment periods for multiple
offenses was not improper. 

380                                              State v. B. Y.

         Thus, prior to 1999, the juvenile code granted the
juvenile court the authority to impose an appropriate dis-
position, subject to an age limitation and a prohibition on
committing a youth to custody for a longer period of time
than an adult would be incarcerated for the same conduct.
That authority, as illustrated by T., was understood to
encompass the ability to impose consecutive periods of com-
mitment for multiple acts. The legislature made no amend-
ments to the statute to change that practice. Consequently,
from 1971 through 1999, controlling law was that the legis-
lature’s grant of broad authority to juvenile courts included
the authority to impose consecutive commitment periods. In
1999, the legislature again amended the statute, enacting
the text in its current form.
         The 1999 legislature removed the text that tied
the statutory maximum for juvenile commitments to the
statutory maximum for adult criminal sentences. Or Laws
1999, ch 964, § 1. It replaced that text with a specific list of
durational limits per offense, which remain in the current
version of the statute. Id. The legislative history illustrates
that the impetus for the 1999 amendment was a pend-
ing Court of Appeals case. Exhibit B, House Committee
on Judiciary, HB 3047, May 4, 1999 (testimony of Oregon
Juvenile Department Directors’ Association Larry Oglesby).
The question in that pending case was whether the maxi-
mum period for a youth’s commitment was to be determined
by the statutory maximum for an adult, or by the actual
maximum time that an adult would serve under the sen-
tencing guidelines. Id. According to the proponents, the
purpose of the bill was to “make certain that the practice
that has been in place successfully for decades would con-
tinue,” so that a youth would not be released back into the
community “prematurely” based on calculations applicable
to adults under the sentencing guidelines. Id. In the House
of Representatives, the bill was described as a “technical
fix” to “make certain” that a youth can be “kept” in commit-
ment up to the statutory maximum for an adult, regardless
of the effects of the sentencing guidelines in adult cases.
Tape Recording, House of Representatives, HB 3047, May
19, 1999, Tape 139, Side B (comments of Rep Prozanski).
The bill was passed without further discussion. Id.
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         It is therefore clear that the legislature’s intent in
1999 was to maintain the status quo regarding juvenile
courts’ authority to impose periods of commitment, in the
face of a pending appellate case that might have disrupted
that status quo. That status quo included the juvenile
court’s authority to impose consecutive periods of commit-
ment, as expressly allowed by the Court of Appeals’ 1976
decision in T. The 1999 amendment contains no text bear-
ing on that specific issue. And, nothing in the context or
legislative history suggests that the legislature intended to
disturb the juvenile court’s authority to impose consecutive
commitments in a single disposition, or to otherwise limit
the juvenile court’s authority to impose consecutive commit-
ments when subsequent offenses are involved, adding the
maximum term for the subsequent offense to the maximum
term for the earlier offense for purposes of determining the
new appropriate disposition.
         The majority in the Court of Appeals concluded
otherwise. It similarly examined the prior versions and the
legislative history, but it concluded that this case presented
“an issue of ambiguous legislative intent.” 

-
17. It explained that T.’s rationale was rooted in the inher-
ent authority of criminal courts. However, it concluded that
that authority had later been limited in the criminal con-
text by ORS 137.123 in 1987. Or Laws 1987, ch 2, § 12. ORS
137.123 provided, and still provides, that consecutive sen-
tences are authorized only in the circumstances provided by
that statute (e.g., where multiple offenses “do not arise from
the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct,”
ORS 137.123(2)). The majority then reasoned that, because
the enactment of ORS 137.123 “reflected an intent to impose
limitations on a court’s authority to impose consecutive
sentences in the adult context,” B.Y., 

, an
underlying premise of T.’s rationale no longer existed. The
majority ultimately determined that the legislature’s intent
on the question presented here was “ambiguous.” Id. at 216.
Invoking a maxim of construction that asks what “result the
legislature would have most likely wanted had it thought
of the specific issue,” it concluded that the 1999 legislature
would not have intended for juvenile courts to have author-
ity to impose consecutive commitments. Id.
382                                              State v. B. Y.

         We reach a different conclusion. As noted above,
the statutory text neither expressly permits nor expressly
prohibits the imposition of consecutive commitments. The
statutory scheme does, however, confer broad authority on
the juvenile court to fashion appropriate dispositions; that
stands in contrast to the criminal code, where courts’ sen-
tencing authority is more circumscribed. Given that con-
trast, the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide
for consecutive commitments in a circumstance such as this
is unsurprising. In light of the wide latitude that the legisla-
ture has chosen to give juvenile courts, it is more reasonable
to expect that if the legislature had intended to limit the
juvenile court’s ability to impose consecutive commitments
in this circumstance, the legislature would have indicated
as much.
         The legislature did impose limits on criminal
courts’ ability to impose consecutive sentences in adult
cases. Those limits were created in 1987, as noted above.
By then, it had been established law for 11 years, since the
Court of Appeals’ 1976 decision in T., that juvenile courts
could impose consecutive commitments. We presume that
the 1987 legislature was aware of that rule, yet it took no
action to extend the new restrictions it was creating in the
adult criminal context to the juvenile code. See Blachana,
LLC v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 

, 

 (2014) (“We presume that the legislature was aware
of existing law[.]”).
         More significantly, when the legislature next
amended the juvenile code in 1999, it did so without indicat-
ing any intent to limit the authority recognized in T. or have
any bearing on the authority to impose consecutive commit-
ments for subsequent dispositions. Rather, it reveals that
the legislature’s concern at that time was that youth com-
mitments should not be shortened based on a rationale that
the Court of Appeals was considering in a pending case.
        We conclude from the text, context, and legislative
history that the legislature did not intend to prevent juve-
nile courts from imposing consecutive periods of commit-
ment in circumstances like those here, where a youth was
adjudicated for conduct that occurred while he was already
Cite as 

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in OYA custody. Although the text of ORS 419C.501 does not
expressly grant that authority, we are persuaded that this
interpretation is most consistent with the purpose and oper-
ation of the juvenile code, as expressed in statute and pre-
viously articulated by this court. See State ex rel. Juv. Dept.
v. Reynolds, 

, 

 (1993) (“Juvenile
courts are concerned with rehabilitation, not punishment.”).
The code was “founded on the principles of personal respon-
sibility, accountability and reformation within the context
of public safety.” ORS 419C.001. The discretionary authority
that we recognize in this case is not in furtherance of addi-
tional “punishment,” but rather in furtherance of ensuring
that the juvenile courts retain the authority that the leg-
islature intended them to have—discretionary authority to
determine the appropriate disposition based on the specific
circumstances and rehabilitative needs of the youth in each
case.
         We also find youth’s arguments to the contrary
unavailing. Youth’s primary argument is that the juvenile
code is “sui generis”; therefore, if the legislature did not
expressly grant the juvenile court the authority to impose
consecutive commitments, the juvenile court does not
have that authority. Stating that a statutory scheme is sui
generis, or “of its own kind,” implies no specific legal conse-
quence. Here, it is a description of the statutory scheme that
conveys the idea that the juvenile delinquency code is nei-
ther purely civil nor purely criminal. See Reynolds, 

 (explaining that the juvenile code changed the way
juveniles were treated and created a proceeding that is “sui
generis”). It does not follow that every aspect of a juvenile
court’s authority must be explicitly delineated in statute;
some specific powers can be reasonably inferred.
         Because we conclude from the text, context, and
legislative history that the legislature’s intent is clear, we do
not address youth’s remaining arguments invoking substan-
tive maxims of statutory construction. Coos Waterkeeper v.
Port of Coos Bay, 

, 

 (2018).
         The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The judgment of the circuit court
is affirmed in part and reversed in part.