Collins v. State
Latoris DeWayne COLLINS, Appellant v. STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee
Attorneys
James Hughes, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, OK, attorney for defendant at trial., Jimmy Harmon, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, attorney for the state at trial., Marva A. Banks, Assistant Public Defender, Oklahoma City, OK, attorney for appellant on appeal., W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Donald D. Self, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for appellee on appeal.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
T1 LaToris DeWayne Collins was tried by jury and convicted on two counts of Rape in the First Degree, in violation of 21 0.$.Supp. 2006, §§ 1111 & 1114 (Counts I and IV); and two counts of Kidnapping, in violation of 21 O.8.8upp.2004, § 741 (Counts III and V), all After Two or More Previous Felony Convictions, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2006-6326.
2 C.M. first met LaToris Collins outside an Oklahoma City night club, in the early morning hours of August 26, 2006. C.M. was in her van, smoking marijuana laced with crack cocaine. C.M. testified that at some point her lighter ran out of fluid, and she approached a white Cadillac and asked to borrow a lighter. Collins and a man identified as his cousin were in the car and invited C.M. inside to smoke crack cocaine with them. The cousin eventually returned to the club, leaving Collins and C.M. in the car.
T8 After an alert from Collins' radar detector, Collins suggested the pair circle the block in order to avoid the police, and C.M. agreed. Rather than going around the block, however, Collins drove straight ahead and on to I-85. Noting the change in course, C.M. twice asked Collins to pull over and let her out of the car. Collins refused and began driving faster.
T4 Collins eventually pulled off the interstate and parked at a convenience store, because his car was overheating. While Collins was in the store, C.M. remained in the car. C.M. testified that she could have left, but that she stayed because she hoped to get more drugs from Collins. They eventually arrived at Collins' house, and C.M. followed Collins into his bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, Collins told C.M. that she owed him for the drugs she had already used. Collins also told C.M. that he had been to prison, that he had a gun, and that he would use it if she did not comply with his demands. Collins then told C.M. to remove her clothes.
115 After C.M. removed her clothes, Collins performed oral sex on her and ordered C.M. to perform oral sex on him. At this point C.M. reached for a curtain above the bed, in an attempt to escape through the window, and Collins responded by punching her in the nose. C.M. then performed oral sex on Collins, at one point biting his penis in an effort to end the sexual assault. After that, Collins forced C.M.'s legs open and vaginally raped her. During the rape, C.M.'s husband called her on her cell phone, which C.M. had concealed near her head in hopes of dialing 911. When he heard the ringing, Collins took C.M.'s phone, bent it so that it no longer worked correctly, and threw it in a nearby basket.
T6 After raping C.M., a more docile Collins offered to drive her back to the club where her van was parked. As the two walked off Collins' porch, however, C.M. bolted to a neighbor's house and asked to use the phone. There C.M. called her husband to come and get her. When her husband arrived, she relayed to him the story of what had happened. C.M.'s husband then called the police, and the couple waited outside Collins' home until officers arrived.
T7 C.K. first met Collins on September 2, 2006, one week after the rape of C.M., at the Oklahoma City apartment of an acquaintance known to C.K. only as "Therman." CK. went to Therman's apartment to meet her friend, April, for a shopping trip to the mall. Shortly after being introduced, Collins asked C.K. if she could help him with some grocery shopping, as he had recently had prostate surgery and needed assistance. After C.K. got into Collins' car, Collins told C.K. that he had to go back to his house to get some money. When they arrived at Collins' house, C.K. stood in the doorway while Collins retrieved his money. Rather than going to the grocery store, however, Collins then drove to a nearby liquor store and ordered C.K. to go in and buy him a bottle of Kentucky Deluxe bourbon.
18 After the trip to the liquor store, Collins told C.K. that he again needed to return to his home, to get more money for the grocery store. C.K. grudgingly agreed. Upon arriving at the house, C.K. entered, and Collins invited her into his bedroom to see his collection of suits. C.K. went into the bedroom to look at the clothes, and after briefly listening to Collins brag about his fashion collection, C.K. asked to be returned to her car. Instead, Collins locked the bedroom door. Collins then showed C.K. an old picture of himself, wearing what appeared to be a prison uniform. Collins bragged that he had been in prison for murder and asked C.K. how much she would charge to allow him to "eat [her] pussy." C.K. was shocked and confused by this request and declined, saying she would only do such things with her boyfriend or husband. Collins then accused C.K. of "playing him." After C.K. attempted to answer a call from her thirteen-year-old son, Collins took C.K.'s cell phone, laying it on the floor behind him. CK.'s phone would continue to ring while Collins sexually assaulted her.
T9 Now acutely aware of her situation, C.K. began to ery and told Collins again that she wanted to leave. In response, Collins called C.K. a "stupid bitch" and threatened
{10 After the rape, Collins asked C.K. to get him a glass of water. C.K. complied, and Collins politely thanked her.
T11 Collins appeals from his convictions and sentences, raising three propositions of error.
112 In Proposition I, Collins claims that the joinder of all the charges against him in a single trial was improper and unfairly prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Collins entered a plea of "not guilty," without objecting to the joinder of the charges or filing a motion to sever, waiving all but plain error review.
{13 Collins contends that joinder of the crimes involving C.M. with those involving C.K. into a single trial did not meet the criteria for joinder set out in Glass v. State.
He claims that this joinder prejudiced him, because the State used testimony from an arguably more credible witness, C.K., to bolster the testimony of an arguably less credible witness, C.M.
114 In Gloss, this Court held that joinder is permitted when the offenses arise out of the same criminal act or transaction or are part of a series of criminal acts or transactions.
15 Collins first argues that the offenses did not all occur within the "relatively short period of time" required by Glass. This Court has previously upheld joinder where the crimes were separated by as much as four months.
16 Collins also argues that there is insufficient evidence of a "common scheme or plan." Collins contends that while the facts of the C.M. and C.K. cases are arguably similar, similarity alone is not sufficient to indicate a common scheme or plan. Yet there are more than "arguable similarities" between the two cases. The striking commonality of these cases begins with the undisputed satisfaction of two of the other ele
T17 Collins plan of attack against these women was also quite similar. Both women agreed to go somewhere with Collins in his car, but were then brought to his home instead. C.M. left with Collins ostensibly to avoid the police. C.K. went with Collins as a Good Samaritan, under the false impression that Collins was somehow incapacitated. After getting the women into his car, Collins changed the plan and drove to his home. Both women also entered Collins' home and his bedroom under false pretenses. CM. entered with the expectation that Collins was getting her more drugs. C.K. was brought to Collins' home (twice) so he could get money and was later lured into his bedroom to look at his clothes.
18 Once Collins had the women inside his bedroom, he began employing force and fear. Collins told C.M. that she owed him for the drugs and told C.K. that she had been leading him on, "playing him." Collins intimidated both women by informing them that he had been to prison, even showing C.K. pictures of himself in a prison uniform; and he threatened both with an unseen gun. Collins kept the women in his room, after they displayed a desire to leave, by threatening them and later even physically assaulting them.
119 Requiring overlapping proof of a "common scheme or plan" contemplates that there be a relationship or connection between/among the crimes in question, such that proof of one becomes relevant in proving the other/others. Here, both encounters, taken together, display Collins' unique predatory pattern and common plan of attack. Evidence of this pattern and common plan is relevant to proving both kidnappings and both rapes. We soundly reject Colling' claim that there is no overlapping proof suggesting a common plan.
¶20 We further find that Colling' claim of prejudice is unsupported by the record. While C.M.'s testimony about what happened to her was arguably reinforced by C.K.'s testimony, nothing in the record indicates that the jury was unable to independently assess the credibility of each woman and arrive at independent verdicts on each count.
T21 Collins committed the same types of crimes, only one week apart, at exactly the same location, and the proof of the crimes overlapped significantly. Collins cannot demonstrate that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joinder, and the interest of judicial economy was well served by joining these two eases. This proposition is rejected accordingly.
122 In Proposition II, Collins argues that that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion in limine to exclude any mention of C.M.'s history of prostitution.
23 Collins claims that Oklahoma law permits attacking witness credibility with crimes of moral turpitude. This overbroad claim is patently incorrect. The crime of prostitution does not meet the requirements for admissibility as impeachment evidence under 12 O.S.Supp.2004, § 2609. Looking to the statute, § 2609(A)(1) permits impeaching witness credibility with evidence of felony convictions within the last ten years."
{24 The "moral turpitude" language invoked by Collins comes from § 2609(B). This section provides that any conviction of a felony or "a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude," within the preceding ten years, can "revive" previous convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving dishonesty, which would otherwise be outside of the ten-year window.
¶25 Collins also submits that the exclusion of C.M.'s history of prostitution evidence limited his right to confrontation and to present a defense. Collins acknowledges that evidence of past instances of sexual behavior is inadmissible to support a defense of consent under Oklahoma's rape shield law.
126 At trial, defense counsel waffled between arguing that C.M.'s prostitution convictions and admitted acts were admissible to support Collins' defense of consent, since Collins maintained that the encounter with C.M. was essentially a consensual act of prostitution, where sex acts were traded for drugs, and arguing that the convictions were admissible as impeachment evidence against C.M. These two theories, i.e., consent and credibility, are consistent with the two major justifications by which defendants have historically been allowed to present evidence that a complaining witness is or was a prostitute.
€27 Oklahoma's rape shield statute contains no exception allowing for a complainant's history of prostitution, either acts or convictions, to be brought out at trial.
T28 This Court notes that in comparison to the federal rape shield statute and those of many other states, Oklahoma's rape shield law is notably broad and robust.
1129 Here, Collins totally fails to establish that the exclusion of the evidence regarding C.M.'s history of prostitution amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights. In particular, it must be emphasized that the prostitution evidence that Collins desired to introduce was quite remote, i.e., no convictions within the past ten years and C.M.'s testimony that she had not engaged in prostitution within the preceding seven years. Collins could not point to any outside evidence of recent prostitution activity by C.M.; nor could he point to outside evidence of prostitution activity by C.M. that was similar to the facts brought out at trial. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Oklahoma's rape shield law did not prevent Collins from arguing that the cases on trial were, in fact, examples of sex-for-drugs prostitution, which is precisely what he did at trial.
130 Furthermore, the exclusion of the history of prostitution evidence did not impact Collins' ability to thoroughly cross-examine and impeach C.M. with admissible evidence. C.M. testified that she was a married woman, at a club, late at night, without her husband, and that she approached Colling' car to ask for a lighter. C.M. stated that she willingly got in Collins' car and moved to the front seat when Collins' cousin went back into the club. C.M. openly testified that she was a drug addict and that she did not try to escape Collins' vehicle when he stopped at the convenience store, because she hoped she would receive more drugs. She also testified that she went into Collins' bedroom willingly, still hoping to get more drugs. This direct testimony was more than adequate to allow Collins to argue, quite forcefully, that C.M. had agreed to consensual sex in exchange for drugs and was now lying to avoid problems with her husband, which was the heart of Collins' defense relative to C.M.
131 Collins totally fails to explain how admitting evidence of C.M.'s history of prostitution would have demonstrated her bias or her motive or propensity to lie. Although Collins' contention that his sexual encounter with C.M. was an act of prostitution (in exchange for drugs) might have been strengthened if he could also have presented evidence of her actual history as a prostitute, Oklahoma's rape shield statute, on its face, clearly
€ 32 In Proposition III, which purports to be a cumulative error claim, Collins asserts three new substantive claims, including a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and two claims of improperly admitted evidence. Under our recently revised Rule 8.5(A)(5), combining multiple issues in a single proposition is clearly improper and constitutes waiver of the alleged errors.
133 After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find that relief is not required by law or evidence.
Decision
{34 Collins CONVICTIONS for two counts of First-Degree Rape (Counts I and IV) and two counts of Kidnapping (Counts III and V) are AFFIRMED. The SENTENCES announced by the trial court on these convictions are also AFFIRMED. Nevertheless, this case is REMANDED to the district court for correction of the Judgment and Sentence document, through an order nune pro tune, to reflect that all four of these convictions were found to be After Two or More Previous Felony Convictions. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2009), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
. Collins was also charged, but acquitted, on two counts of Forcible Oral Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2006, § $88 (Counts II and VI). Counts I, II, III, and VI involved female victim "C.M.," while Counts IV and V involved female victim "C.F." The State presented evidence during the second stage of the trial that Collins had prior convictions for Felony Larceny of Merchandise from a Retailer (1986), Concealing Stolen Property (1994), First Degree Burglary (1996), Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (1996), and Domestic Abuse (2003). The Judgment and Sentence document in this case fails to note that all four conviction counts were found to be After Two or More Previous Felony Convictions and must be corrected accordingly.
. Although Collins threatened to use a gun on both victims, neither victim reported actually seeing a firearm.
. At trial, Doctor John Yuthas testified that in during her initial rape examination, C.K. reported that Collins performed oral sex on her before vaginally raping her. At trial, however, C.K. denied being forced to engage in any sexual activity other than the vaginal rape.
. C.K. testified that she specifically remembered that this "thank you" had struck her as surreal and odd at the time, considering what Collins had just done to her.
. Huddleston v. State, 1985 OK CR 12, 112, 695 P.2d 8, 10 (plea to information waives all defects except those that go to jurisdiction).
. Id. at T8, 701 P.2d ai 768. This Court also noted, in Glass, that "[mJere similarity of offenses does not provide an adequate basis for joinder." Id. at 19, 701 P.2d at 768.
. Id.; Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, 123, 157 P.3d 1155, 1165.
. See Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, 135, 98 P.3d 318, 333-34 (upheld joinder on rape and murder of two elderly women where crimes separated by four months); see also Pack v. State, 1991 OK CR 109, T8, 819 P.2d 280, 283 (upheld joinder on burglaries that occurred eight weeks apart).
. Collins punched C.M. in the nose and forced C.K. onto the bed by pushing her on the throat.
. Collins argues that the jury's acquittals on Counts II and VI, the forcible oral sodomy counts involving C.M., show that the jury did not believe C.M., and only convicted Collins of kidnapping and raping her due to the bolstering testimony of C.K. We disagree.
This Court notes, in particular, that the acquittals on those counts may well have been the result of the following instruction, which was given to Collins' jury:
No person may be convicted of forcible oral sodomy unless the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime.
These elements are:
First, penetration;
Second, of the mouth of the defendant;
Third, by the mouth or vagina of the defendant or victim;
Fourth, by threats of force or violence accompanied by the apparent power of execution.
You are further instructed that any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.
This instruction was based upon an attempt to tailor OUJI-CR (2d) 4-128 to the facts of this case, but this particular adaptation was ultimately confusing, misleading, and inaccurate. Although there were discussions of this instruction during a pre-trial conference, the final instruction, which was drafted later, was not objected to at trial by either party.
Regarding OUJI-CR(2d) 4-128, this Court notes that in cases involving separate counts of forcible oral sodomy, where the crimes alleged involve different factual theories, it is advisable to instruct the jury with separate instructions. In particular, such instructions should make clear whether the crime alleged is forcing the victim to perform oral sex on the perpetrator (penetration of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the defendant) or forcing the victim to endure oral sex performed by the perpetrator (penetration of the vagina of the victim by the mouth of the defendant). Furthermore, this Court also notes that the Fourth Element of this crime should be modified to read "which is ac*1019 complished by means of force or violence, or threats of force or violence that are accompanied by apparent power of execution." This language would be more clear and would better track the language of 21 0.$S.Supp.2006, § 888(B)(3), for cases of forcible sodomy that do not depend upon the age of the victim. We refer this instruction and the Notes on Use regarding it to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (Criminal) Committee for the committee's assistance in this matter.
. See Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, 137, 157 P.3d 1155, 1168.
. C.M. admitted at the preliminary hearing than she had been a prostitute for 18 years and that she had prostitution convictions in several states. She also testified that she had not been a prostitute for 7 years.
. Collins also argues, in passing, that exclusion of this evidence deprived him of the right to compulsory process. Collins totally fails to show how his right to compulsory process was infringed, and this claim is rejected accordingly.
. Dill v. State, 2005 OK CR 20, 15, 122 P.3d 866, 868.
. See 12 O.S.Supp.2004, § 2609(A)(1) & (B) (10-year period measured from date of conviction or release from confinement, whichever is later; 10-year period can sometimes be expanded through giving of prior written notice and court finding that probative value of conviction, within particular case, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect).
. 12 0.S.Supp.2004, § 2609(A)(2) & (B).
. 12 0.S.Supp.2004, § 2609(B).
. Collins asserts that the idea of using crimes of moral turpitude for impeachment purposes is "ingrained in Oklahoma jurisprudence." He supports this with citations to Cowan v. State, 1911 OK CR 83, 5 Okla.Crim. 313, 114 P. 627, and Nelson v. State, 1910 OK CR 46, 3 Okla. Crim. 468, 106 P. 647. Both of these cases were decided early in the twentieth century, long before the 1978 adoption of the Oklahoma Rules of
. Oklahoma's "rape shield" law, like other such laws, applies in rape and other sexual offense prosecutions and is intended to "shield" the alleged victim from being forced to endure, at the trial of the defendant, the improper use of evidence regarding her (or his) own sexual history and reputation. The basic provisions of Oklahoma's law are as follows:
A. In a criminal case in which a person is accused of a sexual offense against another person, the following is not admissible:
1. Evidence of reputation or opinion regarding other sexual behavior of a victim or the sexual offense alleged.
2. Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior of an alleged victim with persons other than the accused offered on the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to the sexual offense alleged.
See 12 0.$.2001, § 2412(A).
Oklahoma's law provides for only three limited exceptions to this rule of inadmissibility, namely, (1) "[slpecific instances of sexual behavior if offered for a purpose other than the issue of consent, including proof of the source of semen, pregnancy, disease or injury," (2) "[flalse allegations of sexual offenses," and (3) "[slimilar sexual acts in the presence of the accused with persons other than the accused which occur|[ ] at the same time of the event giving rise to the sexual offense alleged." 12 0.$.2001, § 2412(B). If a defendant purports to have evidence that fits one of these exceptions, this issue must be resolved at an in-camera hearing, prior to use at trial, according to the procedure established in 12 0.8. 2001, § 2412(C).
. Before rape shield laws began to be enacted in the 1970's, the two main justifications for allowing complainants (nearly always women) to be interrogated at trial about their own prior sexual history were the issues of consent and credibility. Under the consent rationale, sometimes described as the "yes/yes inference," it was held that a woman who had previously consented to some sexual activity outside of marriage was more likely to have consented to the sexual activity at issue at trial, i.e., to any sexual activity. Under the credibility rationale, it was held that a woman (though not a man) who had engaged in sexual activity outside of marriage was less credible than a woman who had remained chaste. A third but related justification for the admission of such evidence in some rape trials was the idea that if a woman's history of sexual activity was known to the defendant at the time of the acts alleged, this knowledge was relevant to the defendant's reasonable belief that the woman had consented. See Clifford S. Fish-man, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 Cath. U.L.Rev. 709, 713-18 (1995). For a victim with a history of prostitution, the consent and credibility rationales worked powerfully, and "in tandem," to justify the broad admission of this evidence, since a prostitute was considered to be even more likely to have consented to the activity alleged and also more likely to be untruthful about it. See Karin S. Portlock, Note, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting Prostitution Evidence Under Rape Shield Legislation, 107 Colum. L.Rev. 1404, 1409-12 (2007). Note: The word "victim," as used herein and also in many state statutes, refers generally to the complaining witness in a sexual offense case.
. New York is rather unique in its treatment of prostitution convictions, since its rape shield statute contains an explicit exception for prostitution convictions that are within three years prior to the sexual offense alleged, making such convictions always admissible. N.Y.Crim. Pro. Law § 60.42(2) (McKinney 2004). (Commentators note, however, that New York courts have applied this exception to New York's rape shield law quite strictly. See Portlock, 107 Colum. L.Rev. at 1419-20 (discussing cases).) In most states, the admissibility of evidence that a victim has a history of prostitution would be evaluated under the state's general rape shield statute.
A few states have rape shield statutes which specifically provide that sexual history evidence can be admitted to attack the victim's credibility. See, eg., Cal. Evid.Code § 1103(a)(1) & (c)(5) (West Supp.2009); Del.Code Ann. tit 11 §§ 3508, 3509(d) (1998); see also People v. Chan-dier, 56 Cal.App Ath 703, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 690-91 (1997) (noting that "credibility exception" to California rape shield statute "has been utilized sparingly, most often in cases where the victim's prior sexual history is one of prostitution") (listing cases). In a few other states, rape shield statutes specifically provide that sexual history evidence can be admissible to show the victim's consent, so long as certain procedures are followed and standards are met. See Nev. Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 48.069 (West 2009) (accused may present "evidence of any previous sexual conduct of the victim of the crime to prove the victim's consent," in compliance with statutory procedures); Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.44.020(3) (West 2009) ("victim's past sexual behavior ... is admissible on the issue of consent," in compliance with statutory procedures, including finding that exclusion of evidence "would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant"). Nevada's approach to prostitution is unique, since, while it continues to allow for legal prostitution, in "licensed house[s] of prostitution," see Nev.Rev.Stat. Aun. § 201.354 (West 2009), the Nevada Supreme Court has held that acts of illegal prostitution are simply not covered by that state's rape shield law. See Drake v. State, 108 Nev. 523, 836 P.2d 52, 55 (1992) ("Illegal acts of prostitution are not intimate details of private life. They are criminal acts of sexual conduct engaged in, for the most part, with complete strangers. The legislature could not have intended to afford special protection ... to acts of illegal prostitution just because those acts happen to involve sexual conduct."). In various other states the admissibility of a victim's sexual history evidence, including prostitution evidence, is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, who must make a case-specific determination regarding the admissibility of this evidence, based mainly on criteria such as relevance and prejudice. See, eg., Alaska Stat. § 12.45.045(a) (2006); Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101(c) (1999); Colo. Rev. State. Ann. § 18-3-407(2) (West Supp.2006); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3525(b) (Supp.2009); NM. R. Evid. 11-413 (2009); RI. R. Evid. 412 (2009); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-22-15 (2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312(a) (2007). In these states as well, the admissibility of prostitution evidence would presumably be established by demonstrating thai the evidence was relevant either to the victim's consent or the victim's credibility.
. See 12 0.$.2001, § 2412 (quoted supra in note 20). It is possible that an act of prostitution might fit one of Oklahoma's limited exceptions to the rape shield law, but the exception would not be based upon the fact that the specific act was an act of prostitution. See id.
. Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1)(c) (making exception to rape shield provisions for "evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant"); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-86{ (West 2009) D.C.Code § 22-3022(a)(1) (2001); Haw. R. Evid. 412(b)(1); Idaho R. Evid. 412(b)(1); 725 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/115-7(a)(2) (West 2009); Iowa Code Ann. Rule 5.412(b)(1) (West 2009); Miss. R. Evid. 412(b)(1); N.D. R. Evid. 412(b)(3); Or.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40.210(2)(b)(C) (West 2009); Tenn. R. Evid. 412(c)(1); Tex.R. Evid. 412(b)(@2)((E)); Utah R. Evid. 412(b)(3).
. The federal statute, along with that of states that are patterned after it, contains an exception for prior sexual activity between the defendant and the complaining witness. See Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(2)(b) (making exception for "evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person accused
. Cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311, 320-21, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1107, 1112, 39 LEd.2d 347 (1974) (reversing burglary and grand larceny convictions where defendant prevented from impeaching key State witness with prior juvenile delinquency adjudication-involving two burglaries-under state law protecting confidentiality of juvenile records). In Davis, the Supreme Court found that the defendant had been "denied the right of effective cross-examination" and that ''the right of confrontation is paramount to the State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender." Id. at 318, 319, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 1112; see also id. at 320, 94 S.Ct. at 1112 ("[Tihe State's desire that Green fulfill his public duty to testify free from embarrassment and with his reputation unblemished must fall before the right of petitioner to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself."). The decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico in State v. Stephen F., 144 NM. 360, 188 P.3d 84 (2008), presents an admirable example of the kind of careful, case-specific analysis that is required in the context of balancing rape shield laws with a defendant's constitutional trial rights.
. See Rule 3.5(A)(5), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008) ("Each proposition of error shall be set out separately in the brief. Merely mentioning a possible issue in an argument or citation to authority does not constitute the raising of a proposition of error on appeal. Failure to list an issue pursuant to these requirements constitutes waiver of alleged error.").
. This Court notes that these improperly presented claims have been reviewed on their merits and have been found to be non-meritorious.
. See Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42, 60 P.3d 1048, 1051. In light of his criminal history, Collins received the minimum sentence (20 years) on each count. Additionally, the trial court ran counts I and III, the crimes against C.M., as well as counts IV and V, the crimes against C.K., concurrently, though the crimes against the two victims were run consecutively, for an effective total sentence of 40 years.