Gbortoe v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.

[Cite as Gbortoe v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

David Gbortoe,                                       :

                 Appellant-Appellant,                :
                                                                            No. 23AP-329
v.                                                   :                 (C.P.C. No. 22CV-8392)

[Director, Ohio Department                           :               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
of Job and Family Services],
                                                     :
                 Appellee-Appellee.
                                                     :


                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on December 29, 2023


                 On brief: David Gbortoe, pro se. Argued: David Gbortoe.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and David E. Lefton,
                 for appellee. Argued: David E. Lefton.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas


LELAND, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, David Gbortoe, appeals from a decision of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas affirming a decision by appellee, the Director of the Ohio
Department of Job and Family Services (“department”), denying appellant unemployment
benefits.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} Appellant worked for Charter Communications LLC (“employer”) from
April 16, 2018 until he resigned on July 6, 2022. After resigning from his position with
employer, appellant filed for unemployment benefits. On August 15, 2022, the director
disallowed appellant’s application on the basis that he quit his job without just cause. On
No. 23AP-329                                                                               2


September 5, 2022, appellant filed an appeal from the director’s decision. On September 7,
2022, the department transferred jurisdiction of the case to the Unemployment
Compensation Review Commission (“commission”).
       {¶ 3} On September 27, 2022, appellant and Jennifer Lindsay, the manager of
human resources and a witness for employer, testified in a telephonic hearing before the
commission. Appellant testified he resigned his position after “an incident regarding
another individual’s gender preferences.” (Dec. 20, 2022 Record of Proceedings at 107.)
In appellant’s telling, he had a phone conversation on June 1, 2022, in which he welcomed
a newly promoted member of the team. Appellant testified there was no discussion of
gender preferences during that call, and it was not until the following week that a different
coworker informed appellant about the newly promoted employee’s gender pronouns.
Appellant responded to this coworker’s comment, expressing he was “not interested” in
that topic and he “[does not] believe in that.” Id. at 110. That comment led to corrective
action meetings with company leadership on June 10 and 20, 2022. In the June 20
meeting, employer informed appellant he would receive a disciplinary warning for his
conduct. Appellant testified he never requested a leave of absence or any modification to
his position prior to resigning.
       {¶ 4} Lindsay testified next. She claimed employer received a complaint about
appellant after he audibly opined the newly promoted employee was not capable of
succeeding in their new role. The employer accused appellant of violating the code of
conduct by vocalizing his opinion loudly enough to be audible around the office. Lindsay
explained appellant was issued a written warning, but his job was not in jeopardy at the
time of his resignation. In part, the written warning admonished appellant as follows: “You
must demonstrate consistently appropriate behavior in the workplace going forward in
accordance with [employer’s] Code of Conduct. Failure to do so may result in further
corrective action, up to and including termination of employment.” Id. at 16.
       {¶ 5} On October 13, 2022, the commission’s hearing officer issued a decision that
found appellant quit his job without just cause and affirmed the director’s disallowance of
appellant’s unemployment benefits.      Appellant filed a request for further review on
October 22, 2022. The commission issued a final decision on November 2, 2022 which
No. 23AP-329                                                                               3


denied the request for further review. On December 1, 2022, appellant filed a notice of
appeal with the trial court. On June 1, 2023, the trial court affirmed the commission’s final
decision.
       {¶ 6} Appellant timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 7} On appeal, appellant’s brief does not comply with App.R. 16(A)(3) and (4), as
it fails to set forth a statement of the assignments of error and a statement of the issues
presented for review.     Instead, appellant’s brief combines his arguments with his
assignments of error in one “law and argument” section. In that combined section,
appellant asserts the following:
              I. The commission erred in ignoring evidences [sic] of unfair
              and unjust employer action.

              II. The commission ignored evidence that the employer
              harassed the appellant for his beliefs not his actions.

              III. The employer’s conduct created a hostile work
              environment which compelled the appellant to resign under
              constructive discharge.

Although not in compliance with the appellate rules, in the interest of justice, we will
construe appellant’s arguments as assignments of error.
III. Analysis
       {¶ 8} In construing appellant’s three assignments of error, it appears they
cumulatively argue his employer behaved in a manner appellant perceived as unfair
harassment that created a hostile work environment, compelling his resignation. Because
appellant’s three assignments of error raise related issues, we consider them together.
       {¶ 9} R.C. 4141.282 governs appeals from decisions of the commission to the court
of common pleas and provides as follows:
              The court shall hear the appeal on the certified record
              provided by the commission. If the court finds that the
              decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or
              against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse,
              vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the
              commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of
              the commission.
No. 23AP-329                                                                               4



R.C. 4141.282(H).
       {¶ 10} On appeal, a reviewing court at any level may reverse “just cause”
determinations by the commission only if unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Barrett v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No.
21AP-532, 

, citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp.
Servs., 

 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus; see R.C. 4141.282(H) and
Houser v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-116, 2011-Ohio-
1593, ¶ 7. Appellate courts in such cases focus their review not on the decision of the trial
court, but rather on the commission’s determination. 

 citing Houser at ¶ 7 and Carter
v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th Dist. No. L-07-1260, 

. The reviewing court
may not make factual findings or credibility determinations, nor may it substitute its
judgment for that of the commission on issues of fact. 

 citing Houser at ¶ 7, Tzangas at
696, McCarthy v. Connectronics Corp., 6th Dist. No. L-08-1293, 

, ¶ 16,
and Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 

 (1985). The reviewing
court instead determines whether evidence in the record supports the commission’s
decision. 

 citing Houser at ¶ 7 and 

. “ ‘Judgments supported by some
competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be
reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” 

quoting C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 

 (1978), syllabus. This court
must therefore affirm the commission’s finding if it is supported by “ ‘some competent,
credible evidence.’ ” 

 quoting Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 

, 

.
       {¶ 11} Claimants bear the burden of proving their entitlement to unemployment
compensation benefits. Id. at ¶ 22, citing Houser at ¶ 8 and 

. In the present
case, the commission denied appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits on the grounds
that he voluntarily quit his employment without just cause.
       {¶ 12} “[N]o individual may * * * be paid benefits * * * [f]or the duration of the
individual’s unemployment if the director finds that * * * [t]he individual quit work without
just cause.” R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). In other words, claimants who quit without just cause
are ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. Just cause “is that which, to an ordinarily
No. 23AP-329                                                                                   5


intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.” (Internal
quotations omitted.) 

, quoting Houser at ¶ 8, and 

. Because
determining “[w]hether just cause exists depends on the factual circumstances of each
case,” it “is primarily an issue to be resolved by the trier of fact.” 

 quoting Houser at ¶ 8
and citing Warrensville Hts. v. Jennings, 

 (1991), Stark Area
Regional Transit Auth. v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 5th Dist. No. 2009-CA-
00147, 

, ¶ 20, and 

.
         {¶ 13} “A just cause determination must be consistent with the purpose of the
Unemployment Compensation Act, which is to provide financial assistance to individuals
who become and remain involuntarily unemployed due to adverse business and industrial
conditions.” Brooks v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-414, 2009-
Ohio-817, ¶ 12, citing Tzangas at 697. “The act protects those employees who have no
control over the situation that leads to their separation from employment.” 

 citing
Tzangas at 697. Thus, under the just cause standard, “an employee is required to cooperate
with the employer to resolve work-related problems. * * * If the employee does not
cooperate or give the employer sufficient time to accommodate the employee’s needs [and]
concerns, that employee will usually not be found to have just cause if he or she quits.”
(Internal quotations omitted.) Boynton v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th
Dist. No. 21AP-481, 

, quoting Watkins v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job &
Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-479, 

, and Stapleton v. Ohio Dept.
of Job & Family Servs., 7th Dist. No. 04-MA-195163, 

, citing 

.
         {¶ 14} Here, appellant failed to prove he was entitled to unemployment benefits.
Although he contends his employer created a hostile work environment and threatened to
fire him, the record shows employer merely issued appellant a written warning
admonishing him for his behavior. Although the warning noted the employer could impose
future sanctions up to and including firing for continued inappropriate workplace behavior,
it did not threaten appellant’s employment status. The record also reveals appellant did
not request a leave of absence or any change to his employment situation prior to resigning.
The evidence, supported by appellant’s own testimony, qualifies as “some evidence”
No. 23AP-329                                                                              6


justifying the commission’s conclusion that appellant quit his job without just cause. While
we understand appellant’s discomfort in remaining at his previous position, he nonetheless
must comply with R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) before receiving unemployment benefits. The
record is clear that appellant could have continued working for employer but instead chose
to quit. As the evidence shows he voluntarily resigned his job without just cause, appellant
is not entitled to unemployment benefits.
       {¶ 15} Our review of the record reveals competent, credible evidence to support the
commission’s determination that appellant voluntarily resigned his employment without
just cause.    Accordingly, the commission’s decision denying appellant’s claim for
unemployment benefits is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the
evidence, and the trial court did not err in affirming the denial. Accordingly, we overrule
appellant’s three assignments of error.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 16} Having overruled appellant’s three assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

                      LUPER SCHUSTER and BOGGS, JJ., concur.