La Spisa v. La Spisa

[Cite as La Spisa v. La Spisa, 

.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MELISSA LA SPISA,                                 :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee/              :
                 Cross-Appellant,                                    No. 111810
                                                  :
                 v.                               :

GREGG C. LA SPISA,                                :

                 Defendant-Appellant/             :
                 Cross-Appellee.



                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
                           PART, AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 28, 2023


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Domestic Relations Division
                                Case No. DR-17-367482


                                            Appearances:

                 Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A.
                 Cruz, for appellee.

                 Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, Carl A. Murway, and Mary
                 Kate McClain, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

               Defendant-appellant/cross-appellee Gregg C. La Spisa (“Gregg”) and

plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant Melissa La Spisa (“Melissa”) appeal the decree of

divorce issued by the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic

Relations. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I.     Introduction

               Gregg and Melissa met during college in 1993 and married on July

12, 1997. Four children were born of the marriage. Prior to the marriage, Melissa

was employed as a technical recruiter and briefly provided recruiting services at the

beginning of the marriage prior to the birth of the first child in 2000. The parties

agree that Melissa was the full-time caretaker for the children.

               Gregg has worked in the financial services industry since the

beginning of the marriage and, at the time of trial, served as an executive vice

president of a financial services firm where he performed business and financial

planning. Gregg’s income was seven figures with generous benefits and stock

options. Gregg’s employer handled various financial accounts for Melissa, her father

and brother, and the children. Gregg managed some of the accounts, controlled the

couple’s joint accounts, and handled all family finances. It appears from the record

that Gregg still handled the family’s accounts that remained with the firm at the time

of trial.

               The parties initially resided at Gregg’s home in Chicago and next

jointly purchased a home in Oak Brook, Illinois near Melissa’s family. In 2006, the
family relocated for Gregg’s career and purchased a home on Lake Avenue in

Lakewood, Ohio, and in 2014, purchased a home on Edgewater Drive, in Lakewood,

Ohio (“Marital Residence”). The children attended private schools, the family

belonged to an established country club, and Gregg, more so than Melissa, enjoyed

a lavish lifestyle and active social life.

                 Melissa testified that Gregg was unfaithful during the marriage and

in 2016 to 2017, became involved with coworker Alexandra Nakkache (“Nakkache”).

Gregg moved out of the home in 2017, and subsequently began residing with

Nakkache.

                 Melissa filed a complaint for divorce on June 13, 2017. Gregg

answered and counterclaimed on July 12, 2017. The trial court issued a temporary

support order on December 12, 2017. Mediation was unsuccessful. The Marital

Residence was placed on the market and ultimately sold. Melissa and the children

relocated.

                 In 2021, Gregg and Nakkache held a formal wedding ceremony,

reception, and honeymoon prior to the final divorce decree. Gregg claimed the

nuptials were faux and were held because Nakkache’s father was terminally ill.

                 Trial of this contentious divorce ultimately began on May 10, 2021,

and, due to a series of continuances, the 17-day trial concluded on March 11, 2022.1

The children were emancipated by the first day of trial.


       1 According to the judgment entry of divorce, trial was held on “May 10th-14th,

May 17th-18th, June 7th and 8th, 2021 and January 26th-28th, March 7th-11th, 2022.”
Journal entry No. 126093759, pg. 1 (July 11, 2022).
                 Gregg appeals. Melissa cross-appeals.

II.   Assignments of Error

      A.     Gregg’s direct appeal

                 Gregg advances eight assignments of error for this court’s

consideration:

      I.     The trial court erred in failing to find a de facto termination date
             of the marriage.

      II.    The trial court erred in its classification of property.

      III.   The trial court erred by failing to equitably divide marital assets
             pursuant to R.C. 3105.171.

      IV.    The trial court erred by failing to consider tax consequences
             when dividing stock awards that were taxed as wages as part of
             Gregg’s compensation and by considering such awards as both
             assets and income.

      V.     The trial court erred in awarding Melissa a distributive award for
             marital funds expended on Gregg’s faux wedding ceremony and
             “honeymoon.”

      VI.    The trial court erred in ordering Gregg to “reimburse” Melissa
             for the hypothetical income tax liabilities she incurred for the
             years 2018 through 2021.

      VII.   The trial court erred in failing to properly consider all relevant
             factors in determining the appropriate duration of its spousal
             support award.

      VIII. The trial court erred in awarding spousal support to Melissa in
            the amount of $25,000 per month.

      B.     Melissa’s Cross-Appeal

                 Melissa proffers four cross- assignments of error:

      I.     The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion
             in failing to retroactively modify the appellant/cross-appellee’s
             temporary support obligations.
       II.    The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion
              in failing to grant an indefinite award of spousal support.

       III.   The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion
              by prohibiting the appellee/cross-appellant from completing
              cross-examination of Alexandra Nakkache.

       IV.    The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion
              in failing to award appellee/cross-appellant an award of attorney
              fees.

III.   General Standard of Review

                The Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized that a trial court must

have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each

divorce case. Booth v. Booth, 

, 

 (1989). When

reviewing a trial court’s determination in a domestic relations case, an appellate

court generally applies an abuse of discretion standard. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 

, 

 (1989).

                “A court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts a decision to

a judge’s discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside of the legally

permissible range of choices.” State v. Hackett, 

, 2020-Ohio-

6699, 

. See also Johnson v. Abdullah, 

, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 

 (“[C]ourts lack the discretion to make errors of

law, particularly when the trial court’s decision goes against the plain language of a

statute or rule.”).
IV.   Gregg’s Direct Appeal

      A. De Facto Termination Date

                Gregg first assigns as error the trial court’s failure to find a de facto

marriage termination date of June 13, 2017, the date Melissa filed for divorce. We

find no merit to Gregg’s argument.

               As Gregg asserts, defining the duration of the marriage is a

prerequisite to formulating the equitable division of marital and separate property

under R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a)-(b). The duration of the marriage is one of ten factors

the trial court must consider in determining what is equitable under

R.C. 3105.171(F)(1). A trial court’s discretion to determine the appropriate marriage

termination date is broad and is a decision that should not be disturbed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion. Kobal v. Kobal, 

, 

(8th Dist.), citing Berish v. Berish, 

, 

 (1982).

               There is a presumption that the final hearing date serves as the date

of termination. Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 

. R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a). Under R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b), a de facto beginning

date, termination date, or both may be selected where the court finds it equitable.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b).

               “‘In general, trial courts use a de facto termination of marriage date

when the parties separate, make no attempt at reconciliation, and continually

maintain separate residences, separate business activities, and separate bank

accounts.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting O’Brien v. O’Brien, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89615,


. However, “‘courts should be reluctant to use a de facto

termination of marriage date solely because one spouse vacates the marital home.’”

 quoting 

 “‘[A] trial court may use a de facto termination of marriage date

when the evidence clearly and bilaterally shows that it is appropriate based upon the

totality of the circumstances.’” 

 quoting 

                Gregg argues the trial court abused its discretion and assets acquired

after that date should not be considered marital property. Gregg states he

permanently left the residence in February 2017, the parties lived separately after

that time, the Marital Residence was sold, the parties had separate bank accounts,

and Melissa’s June 2017 motion for a temporary restraining order stated the parties

had maintained separate residences since March 2017.2 Gregg attributes the

multiple delays in moving forward to counsel for Melissa.

                Melissa counters that requests by Gregg to advance the trial date

while being unwilling to do so are examples of the gamesmanship that the trial court

cited in its decree. Melissa testified there was no bilateral agreement to terminate

the marriage and that Gregg moved in and out of the house several times. Melissa

claims that she obtained a restraining order to stop Gregg from entering the house

without Melissa’s permission. Melissa emphasized that though she was not

employed and the children were not yet emancipated, Gregg failed to timely pay




      2 Gregg also testified that that he separated from Melissa in 2016 and that he “went

back and forth.” (Tr. 186-187.) (For ease of reference, PDF denotes the page of the
electronic transcript that contains multiple volumes.)
temporary support for Melissa and the children while Gregg and Nakkache lived

extravagantly.3

                  The trial court did not accept Gregg’s de facto termination request,

nor did it select the presumptive last day of the final hearing under

R.C. 3105.171(2)(a). Instead, the trial court selected the first day of trial as a de facto

termination date as indicated by the following finding:

      The Court finds this matter was filed on June 13, 2017. The matter was
      set for numerous settlement conferences as well as trial dates. Trial
      began on May 10, 2021, and was completed on March 11, 2022. Due to
      the gamesmanship from both sides regarding the length of time it took
      said matter to complete, the Court finds the duration of the marriage
      shall be from July 12, 1997, until May 10, 2021, the first day that trial
      commenced.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 1 (July 11, 2022).

                  In Keating v. Keating, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90611, 2008-Ohio-

5345, the husband had complete control of the family resources after the separation

of the parties. This court held that it is wholly within the trial court’s discretion to

select a more equitable date for termination based on the unique facts and

circumstances of the case “where one spouse remained financially dependent upon

the other through the separation.” Id. at ¶ 23, citing Abernethy v. Abernethy, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80406, 

; R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b).




      3 Melissa asserted the parties’ filed taxes jointly for 2017 but in 2018, Gregg began

filing separately purportedly without advising Melissa, which Melissa said was designed
to support Gregg’s position on the de facto termination date and to disadvantage Melissa
financially.
               Melissa was financially dependent on Gregg, and the case had been

pending for several years. The divorce decree cites the gamesmanship by the parties

and behavioral issues when it rendered its decision regarding attorney fees. “The

Court finds, based on the evidence and testimony from both parties, that neither

negotiated in good faith attempts to settle this matter.”            Journal entry

No. 126093759, p. 10 (July 11, 2022). “Both parties conducted themselves in such a

way to harass and intimidate the other to kowtow to their wishes. The Court finds

through this matter, neither party was credible with their testimony.” 

               “When there are two versions of events, neither of which is

unbelievable, we defer to the factfinder, who was best able to weigh the evidence and

judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Herrera v. Phil Wha Chung, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109793, 

, citing Ballinger v. Ballinger, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 100958, 101074, 101655, and 101812, 

, ¶ 28, citing

Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 

, 

 (1994), and

State v. DeHass, 

, 

 (1967).

               We do not find that based on the totality of the circumstances the

trial court abused its discretion in selecting an equitable termination date as it is

legally empowered to do. See Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-Ohio-

3831, ¶ 32, quoting O’Brien, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89615, 

.

               The first assignment of error is overruled.
       B.    Classification of Property

                Gregg assigns as his second error the trial court’s incorrect

classification of marital and separate property. When distributing property in a

divorce proceeding, the trial court must first determine what constitutes marital

property and what constitutes separate property. Comella v. Comella, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 90969, 

, citing R.C. 3105.171(B).                 The

characterization of the property as marital or separate is a mixed question of law and

fact that will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Kobal, 

, 

 (8th Dist.), citing Saks v. Riga, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101091, 

.

                “When conducting a manifest weight review, this court ‘weighs the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment]

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108854, 

, quoting State v. Thompkins, 

, 

 (1997).

                While the characterization of the property must be supported by the

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial court’s

distribution of the property absent an abuse of discretion. 

, citing 

.
                    “Property that is acquired during the marriage is presumed to be

marital property unless it can be shown to be separate.” Ockunzzi v. Ockunzzi, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86785, 

. Marital property does not include

separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). “Separate property” is not marital

property and includes any real and personal property or any interest in real or

personal property that was acquired by a spouse prior to the date of the marriage.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii).

                    “The commingling of separate property with other property of any

type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate property,

except when the separate property is not traceable.” R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). “The

party seeking to establish an asset as his or her own separate property has the

burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to trace the asset to the

separate property source.” Walpole v. Walpole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99231,

, citing Kehoe v. Kehoe, 

, 

,

¶ 11 (8th Dist.).

                     R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) mandates the equal division of marital

property, or “if an equal division is inequitable, the court must divide the marital

property equitably.” Neville v. Neville, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 5. To determine what is equitable, the trial court must consider the

factors outlined in R.C. 3105.171(F). 

 These factors include the duration of the

marriage, the assets and liabilities of the spouses, tax consequences of the property

division, any retirement benefits of the spouses, and “[a]ny other factor the court
expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.” R.C. 3105.171(F)(1)-(10); Kehoe, 2012-

Ohio-3357, 

, at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).

               A trial court is not required to enumerate each factor but must

address the relevant factors in sufficient detail to enable an appellate court to

determine whether the award is fair, equitable, and pursuant to law. 

, Kaletta v. Kaletta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98821, 

, citing

Kaechele v. Kaechele, 

, 

 (1988), superseded by

statute on other grounds.

               This court reviews a trial court’s property division “as a whole, in

determining whether it has achieved an equitable and fair division of marital assets.”

Tyler v. Tyler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93124, 

, ¶ 24, citing

Briganti v. Briganti, 

, 

 (1984).

               1. Marital Residence Sales Proceeds

                Gregg argues that the trial court’s award of the proceeds from the

sale of the Marital Residence held in Melissa’s counsel’s IOLTA account was in error.

The sale of the Marital Residence took place in 2019 while the case was pending.

The net proceeds were deposited in the IOLTA account of Melissa’s counsel.

               The trial court held:

      From the proceeds, [Melissa’s] father was repaid $175,000.00,
      $5,000.00 was used to retain an expert, Apple Growth partners, and
      $30,000.00 was used for the purchase of a vehicle for one of the
      parties’ children. There is approximately $142,460.61 remaining in the
      IOLTA.
      [Melissa] claims to have a separate property interest based on money
      she received from her father in lieu of her brother attending medical
      school. The parties used the $175,000.00 to purchase a home in 2000
      and said funds were subsequently rolled over into the Edgewater Drive
      property. Based on the evidence and testimony, the Court finds the
      marital homes purchased and sold during the entirety of the marriage
      were all funded from [Melissa’s] separate property. The Court finds the
      remaining monies in the IOLTA account are Plaintiff’s separate
      property, stemming from a gift made to her by her father.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 2 (July 11, 2022). The trial court decreed that the

IOLTA funds “in the amount of $142,460.61, or whatever amount is currently left in

the IOLTA, should it be a lesser amount, shall be awarded to [Melissa] as her

separate property.” Id. at p. 2.

               Gregg does not dispute the disbursements but argues: (1) the IOLTA

balance was $121,590.66 and not the trial court’s stated amount, (2) the trial court

confused the $175,000 loan with Melissa’s $150,000 from her father, and

(3) Melissa was not entitled to the award as her separate property.

                Gregg testified that he purchased the first house the couple

occupied, located in Lombard, Illinois, prior to their 1997 marriage. The second

home, located in Oak Brook, Illinois, was purchased with funds from the sale of the

Lombard house with money belonging to each party. Gregg could not recall the year

of purchase or the purchase price. (Tr. 84-85.) The parties moved to Ohio in 2006

and purchased a home on Lake Road in Lakewood. In 2014, the parties purchased

the Marital Residence on Edgewater Drive in Lakewood.

               Gregg confirmed during cross-examination that Melissa’s father

gave her $175,000 that the father referred to as a medical school equalizer because
he had given an equivalent amount to Melissa’s brother for medical school. Gregg

said the funds were expended in 2000.

                 Gregg was subsequently questioned about a ledger prepared by

Melissa’s father (ex. No. 166) that contained a list of funds the father provided. The

ledger included an entry labeled “medical school equalizer” for $150,000. Melissa’s

counsel inquired:

      Counsel:      Where is [the medical school] money now?

      Gregg:        It was in the house.

      Counsel:      In the house. Which house?

      Gregg:        It was in the house in Oak Brook.

      Counsel:      That one got sold, and the proceeds rolled over, right?

      Gregg:        To the house in Lakewood.

      Counsel:      So you would agree that the funds all got rolled over from
                    one home to the other, right?

      Gregg:        Correct.

      Counsel:      And now it sits in my escrow account?

      Gregg:        That is correct.

(Tr. 670.)

                 Despite Gregg’s testimony, Gregg argues that Melissa has not

demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the $150,000 rolled to the

Marital Residence and to the IOLTA account. See Walpole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 99231, 

, citing Kehoe, 

, 

, at ¶ 11 (8th Dist.). “‘Preponderance of the evidence simply means ‘evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in

opposition to it.’” Holliday v. Calanni Ents., 

, 

(8th Dist.), quoting In re Starks, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1646, 

,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th Ed.1998).

               Though Gregg initially testified that the amount was $175,000, both

parties testified that the $150,000 medical money fund rolled through the property

transfers to the IOLTA account. Gregg now asserts that the Lakewood residences

sold for less than the purchase price to the medical money proceeds did not roll

through the residential purchases after all.

               This court finds that the classification of the funds as separate is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence and the trial court’s distribution of the

funds to Melissa is not an abuse of discretion because entitlement to the proceeds

has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.

               As to the claim that the IOLTA account balance should have been

listed as $121,590.66, we find no error. The trial court awarded Melissa “the amount

of $142,460.61, or whatever amount is currently left in the IOLTA, should it be a

lesser amount, shall be awarded to [Melissa] as her separate property.” The record

reflects the stated balance of the IOLTA is comprised of the Marital Residence

proceeds less the $175,000 repayment to Melissa’s father, $5,000 for a legal expert,

and $30,000 for a car for the children.

               Gregg does not dispute the deductions but adds that, in addition to

the initial check for $331,590.66, a second check from the sale of the Marital
Residence in the amount of $20,869.95 was deposited into the IOLTA account that

was not disclosed to Gregg. As a result, Gregg claims that Melissa should be

sanctioned. Melissa advises that Gregg’s counsel represented Gregg in the

residential transaction and was aware of the deposits. Apparently, the trial court

was also aware as the proceeds of the two checks less the listed expenditures equal

the awarded sum of $142,460.61.

               We find that the trial court’s finding that the medical fund figure of

$175,000 is incorrect and the correct figure is $150,000 as supported by the record.

               2. Flood insurance

               Gregg challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the 2014 and

2020 flood insurance proceeds. The trial court held:

      Both parties testified regarding insurance proceeds from a [2014] flood
      at the Edgewater Drive property [Marital Residence] and a [2020]
      flood in Plaintiff’s current residence in Avon.

      Defendant testified he received insurance proceeds in the amount of
      $49,324.00, which were placed in the parties’ joint account and said
      monies have been spent down. Plaintiff testified she never replaced her
      personal property that was destroyed including items given to her by
      her parents.

      The Court finds the insurance proceeds from the Edgewater Drive
      property [Marital Residence] are marital funds and shall be divided
      equally among the parties. The Court further finds the proceeds from
      the flood occurring at Plaintiff’s residence are deemed to be her
      separate property.

      It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed [that] Defendant shall
      reimburse Plaintiff in the amount of $24,662.00 as her marital portion
      of the insurance proceeds [received by Gregg].

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 2-3 (July 11, 2022).
               The evidence establishes that a 2014 insurance claim was made for

personal property damage due to a flood at the Marital Residence. A 2020 insurance

claim was made for personal property damage for a flood that occurred at Melissa’s

current residence.

               Gregg argues that the insurance proceeds for the 2014 flood were

received in 2014, deposited into the parties’ joint account and used for marital

household expenses. He also states that the amount received for the 2014 flood was

$30,000 to $40,000 and the $49,324 figure is for the 2020 flood at Melissa’s

residence. Gregg further contends the trial court provided no explanation for its

decision, and cited no evidence that Gregg concealed or fraudulently disposed of the

proceeds pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) that would support the distributive award

of proceeds to Melissa.4

               Melissa responds that the foundation for the trial court’s findings is

Gregg’s testimony. During cross-examination regarding the proceeds from the sale

of the Marital Residence, Gregg was asked about the insurance payments for the

2014 flood claim. Gregg testified that the proceeds were approximately $35,000 to

$40,00 and were deposited in the joint account. Gregg agreed that none of the funds

were put into a separate account to compensate Melissa for damage to her separate

personal property. (Tr. 675, 681.)




      4 R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) empowers the trial court to make a distributive award
designed to compensate an offended spouse for financial misconduct.
               Counsel presented a packet of automobile and property insurance

claims by the parties’ insurer. Gregg remarked that there were “a lot of pages” and

accepted counsel’s offer to find the pertinent pages for him. Gregg confirmed that

the pages contained photographs and a list of damaged items.            The inquiry

continued:

      Counsel: And then if you look at this, they say what they’re going to
               pay, right?

      Gregg:     Correct.

      Counsel: And you go those checks, right?

      Gregg:     Right.

      Counsel: And let me find the dollar amount, total damage lost was
               $76,000 — I’m sorry, the line items was 71,000. It’s on page
               14 of the itemization listing.

      Gregg:     That is correct.

      Counsel: $76 — or, I’m sorry, $71,314, correct? Replacement value,
               $76,000, less depreciation, actual cash value — they take out
               some deductions, and they write a check — or they issue you
               a check in the amount of $49,324 on just this claim, right?

      Gregg:     That’s correct.

      Counsel: And that money is all gone?

      Gregg:     That would be correct.

(Tr. 684-685.)     Melissa states the testimony establishes that she was not

compensated from the claim proceeds for her personal property damaged by the

2014 flood.

                 Melissa was also cross-examined about the insurance exhibit.

Counsel stated that the claim detail previously presented to Gregg listed the date of
loss as August 28, 2020, and asked, “And that would have been the date of the flood

[at Melissa’s residence], is that right? Melissa responded, “Sure. Yep.” (Tr. 1169.)

Counsel also elicited testimony that the almost $50,000 in proceeds was received

by Melissa and deposited into her bank account, information that Gregg states had

not been previously disclosed by Melissa though Melissa testified she told Gregg she

received the money and used it to replace her personal belongings. Gregg denies

Melissa’s claim and, to that end, declares that Melissa should have been sanctioned

for financial misconduct.

               This court determines that the trial court’s findings regarding the

2014 and 2020 flood proceeds and resultant property allocation are against the

manifest weight of the evidence and constitute an abuse of discretion.

               The second assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in

part. The trial court’s award of the remaining funds in the IOLTA account to Melissa

is affirmed. The case is remanded for the limited purpose of correcting the decree

to reflect that the medical fund amount was $150,000. The trial court’s award for

the 2014 and 2020 flood proceeds is reversed and remanded pursuant to this

opinion.

      C.    Equitable Asset Division

                Gregg charges via the third assignment of error that the trial court

failed to divide the marital assets equitably pursuant to R.C. 3105.171.

R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) mandates an equal division of marital property, or “if an equal

division is inequitable, the court must divide the marital property equitably.”
Neville, 

, 

, 

, at ¶ 5. The trial court

must consider the factors outlined in R.C. 3105.171(F). 

 These factors include the

duration of the marriage, the assets and liabilities of the spouses, tax consequences

of the property division, any retirement benefits of the spouses, and “[a]ny other

factor the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.” R.C. 3105.171(F)(1)-

(10); Kehoe, 

, 

, at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).

                The trial court “‘must indicate the basis for its division of the marital

property in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the

award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law.’” Johnson v. Mills, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 102241, 

, quoting Franklin v. Franklin, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-713, 

, ¶ 4.

                Gregg makes a blanket claim that the trial court failed to make

findings that it considered the factors in R.C. 3105.171(F). That failure Gregg asserts

impacts this court’s ability to determine whether the division is equitable. Gregg

adds that the failure reveals the trial court’s disdain for Gregg. As a solution, Gregg

suggests that this court remand the case to the trial court to make specific findings

of fact and conclusions of law.

                This court finds that the blanket allegation of statutory

noncompliance does not comport with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under

App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7), an appellate court may disregard arguments where

the appellant fails to identify the issues and the relevant portions of the record to

support the argument. It is not this court’s role to scour the record to root out issues
and arguments. See Baxter v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101186, 2015-Ohio-

2148, Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91412, 

.

               To the extent the arguments are properly set forth for this court’s

consideration in the appellate briefs, they will be addressed.

               The third assignment of error is overruled.

      D.     Stock awards

               In the fourth assigned error, Gregg challenges the accuracy of the

trial court’s order that Gregg pay to Melissa $304,374 related to Gregg’s

employment stock awards.

               The trial court held:

      The Court finds that during the pendency of this matter, Defendant
      earned stock shares due to his employment, including One Thousand
      Eight Hundred and Nine (1,809) stock units on June 6, 2017; Seven
      Thousand Thirty-Five (7,035) stock units on May 17, 2018; Seven
      Thousand Four Hundred and Seventy-One (7,471) stock units on
      February 14, 2019; Three Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Six (3,236)
      stock units on February 26, 2020 and One Thousand Seven Hundred
      Ninety-Five (1,795) stock units on February 17, 2021. The Court finds
      Defendant received $127,142.00 for his vested stock in February of
      2022; $123,057.00 for his vested stock in 2021; $182,889.00 for his
      vested stock in 2020; $89,547.00 for his vested stock in 2019 and
      $86,113.00 in vested stock for 2018. The total amount received was
      $608,748.00. The Court finds the stock to be marital property as all
      options were received before the termination date of the marriage. The
      Court finds the monies received by Defendant shall be divided equally
      among the parties.

      It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed [that] Defendant shall pay
      the sum of $304,374.00 to Plaintiff for the equal division of the vested
      stock options within thirty (30) days from the journalization of this
      order.
Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 3-4 (July 11, 2022). The trial court treated the

vested stock as marital property. Gregg retained his restricted stock units free of any

claims by Melissa.

               Gregg participated in various stock programs with his employer.

Gregg testified that in 2018, there was a change in his employer’s corporate structure

that included a shift in compensation programs. Incentive stock options from the

former company had a grant price and upon sale, a strike price. Gregg received the

difference between the grant and strike price, minus taxes, that was not regular

income but subject to capital gains taxes.

               Beginning in 2018, annual performance shares were awarded and

paid as part of regular income over the subsequent three years at one-third of the

value per year. “Counsel: So for the year of 2018 — or the year of 2017, you’re paid

in 2018, 2019, and 2020?” “Gregg: Yes.” (Tr. 594.)

               Gregg also testified during cross-examination regarding the dates

and amounts listed in a portion of the trial court’s decree based on information

contained in an exhibit produced by Gregg:

      Counsel: There on February 14, 2019, the stock grants were granted —
               on the first one, 7,471.

                 Those were paid out on February 14, 2020, February 14,
                 2022, and February 14, 2022, correct?

      Gregg:     The first two, yes. The 2022 [payment] takes about 30 days
                 after it vests to pay out.

      Counsel: But you’re soon to have [$]77,000 gross, correct?

      Gregg:     In the next — yes, that is correct.
      Counsel: * * * And the stock grants from * * * February 26, 2020, 3,236
               grants or stocks were awarded you.

                  And then there was a payout on February 26, 2021 of an
                  amount, correct?

      Gregg:      Correct.

      Counsel: Then on February 26, 2022, there is 32,541 in dollars that is
               set to payout to you, correct?

      Gregg:      Correct.

      Counsel: So far we are up to $109,000 gross just on the two stock
               options so far, correct?

      Gregg:      That is correct.

      Counsel: And then on February 17, 2021, it indicates that you’re due
               to receive on February 28, 2022, $17,483, correct?

      Gregg:      That is correct.

      Counsel: So another $126,000 is soon-to-be-paid out to you in the
               next 30 days, correct? That is correct.

                  That’s in addition to the amounts we talked about yesterday.

      Gregg:      That’s correct.

(Tr. 594-595.)

                 Based on a review of the evidence, the trial court’s findings are not

against the manifest weight of the evidence nor did the trial court abuse its

distribution discretion.

                 Gregg next argues that the cited stock payments were included on

Gregg’s IRS Form W-2 as regular wages and the payments were used to pay personal

expenses as well as expenses required by the temporary support order. Thus, it is

Gregg’s position that the trial court counted the assets both as assets and income.
               Double dipping, also referred to as double counting, refers to

counting a marital asset in both the division of property and in the award of spousal

support under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Dean v. Dean, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95615,

, citing Heller v. Heller, 10th Dist. Franklin App. No. 07AP-

871, 

, and Chattree v. Chattree, 

, 

, ¶ 75 (8th Dist.) (division of marital pension as a property distribution that is

also included as income for spousal support obligations allows the recipient to

receive a portion of the pension in two different forms).

               Melissa responds that the exhibits relied on by Gregg were never

authenticated under Evid.R. 901 but does not assign the issue as error. She denies

that double dipping applies, adding that “[i]t is the future income stream, not the

marital asset, that is the subject of the doubling in the double dip.” Gallo v. Gallo,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-179, 

, ¶ 18.

               This case does not involve the division of marital property or transfer

of income-generating property that is subsequently counted again as income for

support purposes. The trial court divided the proceeds that Gregg received for stock

that vested during the marriage. The “goal of spousal support is to reach an

equitable result.” Kehoe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99404, 

.

               The fourth assignment of error is overruled.
      E.      Distributive Award For Faux Nuptials

               In the fifth assignment of error, Gregg contests the trial court’s

distributive award to Melissa for one-half of the sum that Gregg spent for the

“commitment ceremony” with Nakkache prior to the divorce.

               R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) provides that “the court may compensate the

offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award of marital

property” “if a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but not

limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent disposition of

assets.” 

 “‘The distributive award concept is consistent with the well-established

principle that trial courts have broad discretion when creating an equitable division

of property in a divorce proceeding.’” Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-

Ohio-3831, at ¶ 39, quoting Adams v. Chambers, 

, 

 (12th Dist. 1992), citing Teeter v. Teeter, 

, 

 (1985).

               The trial court held:

      In April 2021 Defendant participated in [a] ceremony with
      Ms. Nakkache and following the ceremony Defendant and
      Ms. Nakkache went to Hawaii for a “honeymoon.” The evidence and
      testimony demonstrated Defendant used marital funds to pay for the
      following: an engagement ring, valued at $13,300.00; wedding band
      and a Chanel bag, valued at $4,798.00; a rehearsal dinner, valued at
      $1,752.00; alcohol for the dinner, valued at $667.00; a rental house for
      the Defendant and his children, valued at $2,040.00; flights to Hawaii
      for a “honeymoon” valued at $3,319.68; travel voucher for flights,
      valued at $1,1511.96 [sic]; Ritz-Carlton room, food and beverage,
      valued at $9,659.00 and Marriott room, food and beverage, valued at
      $4,250.00 for a total of $42,724.64.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 5 (July 11, 2022).
                The court found that “[d]efendant improperly used marital funds

and in such [sic], Plaintiff is entitled to a distributive award of one-half of the marital

funds expended, in the amount of $21,362.32.” 

 “It is further ordered, adjudged,

and decreed Defendant shall reimburse Plaintiff in the amount of $21,362.32 for

marital funds expended on the aforementioned ceremony and honeymoon.” 

                Gregg argues that spending the funds for himself several years after

the parties separated is not financial misconduct. Our finding under the first

assignment of error negates Gregg’s argument that the festivities took place after the

termination date of the marriage. Gregg adds that the spouse must engage in

“wrongdoing” or must profit from the misconduct or acts with the intent to defeat

the interest of the other spouse in the assets. Cross v. Cross, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 102627, 

, 

, ¶ 16. Gregg also declares that the

statute not only requires wrongdoing but wrongful intent. Choi v. Choi, 2018-Ohio-

725, 

 (9th Dist.).

                 The record supports that Gregg spent approximately $50,000 for

the events while still legally married to Melissa. Information was posted on social

media. Melissa testified about the negative impact the events had on her and on the

children who were required to attend by Gregg. Gregg testified that the ceremony

was not a legal wedding but was held because Nakkache’s father was terminally ill

and he denied that the children had a problem with attending the events.

                Melissa also testified that while Gregg expended substantial funds on

Nakkache, his payment of Melissa’s rent and medical expenses for the children
pursuant to the temporary support order were unpaid. Melissa cites in support of

her argument Hall v. Hall, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013 CA 15, 

(husband misused marital assets to provide housing for himself and girlfriend while

allowing marital residence to go into foreclosure constituted intentional financial

misconduct) and Hoffman v. Hoffman, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 94APF01-48, 

 (affirming trial court’s distributive award to wife where

husband diverted marital resources to paramour and paramour’s business).

                “A trial court has broad discretion in a divorce proceeding to fashion

an award that compensates a spouse for the financial misconduct of the other

spouse.” Buskirk v. Buskirk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111399, 

,

citing Trolli v. Trolli, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 

.

               Based on the record before us and the unique circumstances of this

case, this court does not find that the trial court abused its broad discretion by

making a distributive award under these facts.

               The fifth assigned error is overruled.

      F.     Income Tax Liabilities

               In the sixth error assigned Gregg challenges the trial court’s findings

regarding income tax liabilities.

               The trial court decreed:

      The Plaintiff presented evidence and testimony regarding her
      estimated tax debts for the years of 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. The
      temporary support order was entered on or before December 31, 2018
      which created taxable income to Plaintiff and a tax deduction to
      Defendant. The Court finds that Defendant prepared Federal Tax
      Returns for the years of 2018, 2019 and 2020. Defendant testified he
      informed Plaintiff he would be filing separately in 2018. Plaintiff
      offered no rebuttal testimony regarding whether or not she was
      informed of his filing separately. The Court finds that neither party did
      their due diligence to clarify how the taxes would be dealt with,
      however, in light of the fact that Defendant has availed himself of the
      spousal support deduction, the Court finds he shall pay one-half of the
      estimated taxes due and owing in the amount of $103,080.00.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 5 (July 11, 2022).         The trial court ordered that

Gregg reimburse Melissa $51,540.00.

                Gregg agrees that the trial court’s statement that the temporary

support order was entered prior to December 31, 2018, supports the position that

he was entitled to a spousal support deduction and Melissa was required to report

the support as income.5 Thus, Gregg contests the trial court’s holding that Gregg

reimburse Melissa the sum of $51,540.00 for her tax debt. Gregg contends: (1) the

trial court’s finding is contrary to tax law; (2) trial evidence supports that Gregg

informed Melissa of his intention to file separately beginning in 2018; (3) Melissa

failed to call the accountant who prepared Melissa’s draft tax returns including

penalty and interest calculations as a witness; and (4) the debt is not marital debt

and constitutes financial misconduct under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). We need not

address the argument that the debt was not incurred during the marriage because

the assignment of error on that issue has been overruled.


      5 The United States Internal Revenue Code was amended in 2017 by the enactment

of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. P.L. 115-97 Sec. 11051, 

, repealed provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code “allowing a payor of ‘alimony’ to deduct that payment from
his or her income.” Rigby v. Rigby, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2020-07-005, 2021-Ohio-
271, ¶ 36, 26 U.S.C. 71. After December 2018, “[t]he spousal support payment is no longer
deductible from the payor’s gross income for tax liability purposes and the payment is not
includable as income for the spousal support recipient. Id. at 36, fn. 3.
               Gregg relies on this court’s holding in Gupta v. Gupta, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 99005, 

, for the debt is not a marital debt because it

was not incurred for a valid marital purpose. Id. at ¶ 49. In Gupta, we held that the

husband’s refusal to timely file income tax returns for four years constituted

financial misconduct under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). Gupta’s employer brought the

issue to Gupta’s attention and referred him to a major accounting firm to have the

taxes prepared free of charge. The husband did not accept the offer. Id. at ¶ 53.

Faced with a tax bill of almost $2 million, husband unsuccessfully attempted to

discharge the debt through bankruptcy. This court held that the husband’s refusal

to file the taxes though he was offered assistance constituted dissipation of marital

assets. This court also decided that the bankruptcy expenses were not incurred for

a valid marital purpose and affirmed allocation of the full amount of the debt to the

husband. We do not find that Gupta is determinative here.

               Gregg testified that the parties filed jointly through 2017 and that

Gregg’s accountant handled the income taxes. Gregg initially testified that he was

not familiar with the tax laws and could not confirm that he received a tax benefit

from filing separately, but later admitted the spousal support deduction may have

been advantageous. Gregg did not advise Melissa that he was filing separately by

phone, email, or text but claimed he informed her in person.

               Melissa denied that Gregg informed her about the separate filing,

stated that Gregg had always handled the finances and taxes and that she did not

know that spousal support was taxable.        (Tr. 1215.) During Melissa’s cross-
examination of Gregg, counsel introduced tax exhibits prepared by Apple Growth

Partners, a client of Gregg’s, who was hired by Melissa through counsel to prepare

the tax information. The documents demonstrated that Melissa’s tax liabilities for

2018, 2019, and 2020 totaled $103,080 as a result of Gregg’s unilateral decision to

file separately.

                   The record supports that Gregg handled the financial matters for the

parties including tax issues and Melissa was not involved.             The trial court

determined that neither party took the initiative to clarify how the tax returns would

be handled during the separation, but Gregg availed himself of the spousal support

deduction.

                   The debt was incurred during the marriage. The trial court divided

the debt equally under R.C. 3105.171. This court does not find that the trial court’s

finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court abused its

discretion, or that the evidence establishes financial misconduct on Melissa’s part.

                   The sixth assignment of error is overruled.

       G.     Spousal Support

                   “The award of spousal support lies within the sound discretion of the

trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Hloska v. Hloska,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101690, 

, ¶ 12, citing Holcomb v. Holcomb,

, 

 (1989).

                   “The goal of spousal support is to reach an equitable result,” and

“there is no set mathematical formula to reach this goal.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Kaechele,


, 

 (1988). The trial court must consider the

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors but is “not required to comment on each statutory factor.”

Chattree, 

, 

, at ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), citing 

.

               An appellate court will uphold the award where “the record reflects

that the trial court considered the statutory factors” and “the judgment contains

details sufficient for a reviewing court to determine that the support award is fair,

equitable, and in accordance with the law.” 

 citing Daniels v. Daniels, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 07AP-709, 

 (Mar. 4, 2008), *9, citing

Schoren v. Schoren, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-019, 

.

               R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) addresses

      (1) the parties’ incomes including, but not limited to, from property
      received under R.C. 3105.171; (2) the relative earning abilities of the
      parties; (3) the ages and physical, mental, and emotional conditions of
      the parties; (4) retirement benefits of the parties; (5) duration of the
      marriage; (6) inability of party to seek outside employment due to
      custody of minor child; (7) the standard of living of the parties
      established during the marriage; (8) the relative education of the
      parties; (9) the relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but
      not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties; (10) each
      party’s contribution to the education, training or earning ability of the
      other; (11) the time and expense necessary for the spouse seeking
      support to acquire education, training, or job experience to obtain
      employment; (12) tax consequences of an award; (13) lost income
      production capacity due to the party’s marital responsibilities; and (14)
      any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and
      equitable.

See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).
               1. Duration

               We address Gregg’s seventh assignment of error and Melissa’s

second cross-assignment of error together because each challenges the trial court’s

decision on the duration and amount of spousal support.

               The trial court awarded $25,000 per month for a term of 96 months

to Melissa. Gregg concedes that the trial court discussed the relevant factors but

argues the court drew the wrong conclusions on the amount and duration of the

award. Melissa cross-claims that the award duration should be indefinite.

               Gregg first takes issue with the trial court’s R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(c)

finding regarding the “physical, emotional and mental conditions of the parties.”

Gregg argues he was not given notice of Melissa’s mental health issues and no expert

testimony was provided. The trial court held:

      Plaintiff is currently 50 years of age and testified she suffers from
      dyslexia, depression and anxiety. No medical or expert testimony was
      offered as to the impact of her issues. Defendant is currently 48 years
      of age and has a myriad of heart conditions. No expert or medical
      testimony was presented as to the effect said issues impact his daily
      living.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 6 (July 11, 2022).

               Melissa is correct that it “‘is not necessary for a party to present

expert medical testimony substantiating certain medical problems where the

injured party testifies and is subject to thorough cross-examination.’” Ernsberger v.

Ernsberger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100675, 

, quoting

Gullia v. Gullia, 

, 

 (8th Dist.1994), citing
Denney v. Denney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 8667, 

(Jan. 25, 1985).

                   The parties were subject to cross-examination. The trial court

expressly noted the health conditions of both parties in the decree and stated that

neither party provided expert or medical testimony regarding the afflictions and

their impact on their respective lifestyles.

                This court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion.

                Next, Gregg contests the trial court’s R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(e) finding

that “the parties were married on July 12, 1997, and the termination date is May 10,

2021, resulting in a long-term marriage of twenty-four (24) years.” Journal entry

No. 126093759, p. 6 (July 11, 2022). Gregg advances that the support period would

have been limited to 80 months instead of the 96 months awarded if the trial court

had accepted Gregg’s proposed de facto termination date. This court overruled

Gregg’s first assigned error on the issue, which renders this argument moot.

                R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i) directs the trial court to consider the “relative

assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered

payments by the parties.” The divorce decree provided “see aforementioned division

of property.”      Gregg asserts the trial court failed to consider the duration of

temporary spousal support in arriving at the period of post-decree spousal support

as stated in the temporary order.

                Pursuant to the temporary support order, Gregg was directed to pay

$10,000 per month, plus a two percent processing charge. The order provided that
the temporary support order duration would be considered in determining the

duration of post-decree spousal support at final trial. The trial court indicated in the

decree under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) regarding the parties’ incomes from all sources

that Melissa “has been receiving $10,000.00 per month as support since December

2017.” Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 6 (July 11, 2022).

                The record reflects that the issue of temporary support was

considered during trial and in the final decree. This argument also lacks merit.

                Finally, Gregg points out that under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(l), listed

erroneously as (k) in the decree, the trial court decreed that spousal support is

taxable income to the wife but is not deductible to the husband. Gregg offers that

the directive is contrary to federal law. Melissa responds that Gregg’s reliance on a

typographical error is without merit and is harmless.

                As stated previously herein, under former 26 U.S.C. 71, separation

agreements and decrees issued prior to December 31, 2018, resulted in taxable

income to the obligee and a tax deduction for the obligor unless otherwise agreed by

the parties. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 removed the provision. The

temporary order in the instant case was issued prior to 2018, however the final

decree was issued on July 11, 2022, after the January 1, 2019 effective date of the

new tax law.

                In support of Melissa’s cross-appeal quest for an indefinite award

duration, Melissa cites cases by the Fifth, Eleventh, and Seventh Districts. Generally

in the cited cases, the marriages lasted more than 20 years, the husbands earned
substantial incomes, and the wives were the primary caregivers for the children and

had not been in the workforce for a substantial period. See Speece v. Speece, 2021-

Ohio-170, 

 (11th Dist.), Batten v. Batten, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 09-CA-

33, 

, Berger v. Berger, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0108, 2017-

Ohio-9329, Hutta v. Hutta, 

, 

, 

 (5th Dist.), Ballas v. Ballas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 MA 60, 2004-Ohio-

5128.

                   This court has also held that generally, where the marriage is one of

long duration of 20 years or more, a trial court may, under certain circumstances,

award spousal support of an indefinite duration. See, e.g., Mlakar v. Mlakar, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98194, 

, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 

, 

 (1990); Coward v. Coward, 5th Dist. Licking No. 15-CA-46,

. Duration is only a factor and cannot be viewed in a vacuum.

Smith v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245, and 110274, 2022-Ohio-

299, ¶ 42.

                   Gregg argues that, unlike the wives in Melissa’s cited cases, the trial

court held under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(b) regarding relative earning ability that 50-

year-old Melissa was a technical recruiter prior to having children.6 As compared to

Gregg’s salary in excess of $1 million, the trial court imputed minimum wage to

Melissa because she “testified she has numerous skills that presented during her




        6   The first child was born in 200o.
raising of the parties’ four children.” Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 6 (July 11,

2022).

                According to the record, Melissa testified that she served as the chef,

laundress, doctor, chauffeur, and everything else for the children, but testified that

those tasks did not translate into marketable skills. She also testified that though

the children are emancipated, there are expenses related to assisting them.

                The record reflects that the trial court considered the requisite

factors under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). “It is well settled that when testimony is in dispute,

we defer to the trier of fact’s credibility determination.” Smith v. Smith, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 110214, 110245, and 110274, 

, citing Fanous v.

Ochs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98649, 

.

                 A trial court has jurisdiction to modify a spousal support award

where the divorce decree expressly reserves that right. Morris v. Morris, 

, 

, 

; R.C. 3015.18(E). In the instant

case, we observe that the trial court reserved jurisdiction to modify the order where

the petitioner establishes a significant change of circumstances. Taylor v. Heary,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107474, 

, citing Mandelbaum v.

Mandelbaum, 

, 

, 

, paragraph two

of the syllabus; R.C. 3105.18(F).

                Melissa’s second cross-assignment of error is overruled. Gregg’s

seventh assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in part. The case is

remanded to the trial court to clarify whether the trial court’s intent was to maintain
the status quo or to direct that the award be governed by the tax law in effect at the

time of the final decree.

                2. Award amount

                Gregg argues as his eighth and final assignment of error that the trial

court failed to explain the grounds for the $25,000 award amount based on the

R.C. 3105.18(C) factors and the findings are contrary to the evidence.

                He states that the primary expenses considered in making the 2017

temporary spousal support award to Melissa no longer exist, particularly since the

Marital Residence was sold and the children are emancipated. Gregg also references

the $19,344 annual minimum wage income imputed to Melissa by the trial court.

Based on Gregg’s calculations, Melissa’s expenses are $16,350 per month at most.

Thus Gregg advances that the trial court’s $25,000 award is an abuse of discretion.

                 Melissa responds that Gregg purposely reduced his income for the

year the divorce was filed for purposes of support liability and that Gregg failed to

make all of the payments due under the temporary order. The trial court considered,

under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(g), that Gregg has been able to maintain the “exorbitant”

standard of living of the parties such as “luxury vehicles, million-dollar homes,

country club memberships and vacations.” Melissa “has had to resort to a more

modest lifestyle.” The trial court also added that the “amount includes all applicable

spousal support and payment towards arrearage.”

                Where the record evidences the trial court’s consideration of the

statutory allocation factors, and “the judgment contains details sufficient for a
reviewing court to determine that the support award is fair, equitable, and in

accordance with the law,” the determination will be upheld. Chattree, 2014-Ohio-

489, 

, at ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), citing Daniels v. Daniels, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 07AP-709, 

, 9 (Mar. 4, 2008), citing Schoren v.

Schoren, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-04-019, 

.

                We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion. The eighth

assignment of error is overruled.

V.    Cross-Appeal

      A. Retroactive Temporary Support

                Melissa’s first cross-assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to

retroactively rule on Melissa’s motion to modify temporary support filed on

November 13, 2020.

                The temporary support order was issued on December 13, 2017. On

February 20, 2018, Melissa requested the order be effective retroactive to the June

2017 date of her initial motion for support, spousal support of $15,000 per month,

$500 of child support per child, plus prior expenses ordered. On December 18,

2017, each party requested a hearing under Civ.R. 75(N). On February 26, 2018, the

trial court issued the following entry:

      This cause came before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a 75(N)(2)
      Hearing (#407094). Parties’ counsel agreed to brief the issues
      pertaining to modification of the temporary support orders. The
      Temporary Support order issued on December 12, 2017 shall remain in
      full force and effect until the final disposition of this matter.

Journal entry No. 102688361 (Feb. 26, 2018).
                Melissa’s November 13, 2020, motion cites a substantial change in

circumstances including an increase in Melissa’s expenses, the children’s expenses,

and a change in income of the parties.

                Temporary spousal support may be awarded under R.C. 3105.18(B).

The parties agree that the purpose of a temporary support order is to “maintain the

present financial status quo of the parties’ marriage” and “support the economically

disadvantaged party” while the case is pending. Dilacqua v. Dilacqua, 

, 

 (9th Dist.1993), Soley v. Soley, 

, 

 (6th Dist.1995). Melissa adds that a temporary support order

is a provisional remedy that may be retroactively modified to the date of filing, citing

Thorp v. Thorp, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2010-T-0038, 

, ¶ 55.

                Melissa argues that Gregg’s $936,000 income for 2017 was

intentionally suppressed because it averaged $1.2 million for 2016 and 2018 through

2021 and his direct expense payments regarding the former Marital Residence were

overstated. Spousal support was inadequate and unreasonable based on the facts

and circumstances. Melissa also argues that Gregg’s household income increased

“substantially” when he began cohabitating with Nakkache.

                Gregg responds that in addition to the $10,000 monthly spousal

support, he paid the expenses for the Marital Residence until it was sold during the

summer of 2019. Gregg then paid approximately $3,500 per month for Melissa’s

rent, storage fees, and renter’s insurance of approximately $750 per month, moving

expenses of $5,000 and a $4,000 rent deposit. Gregg contends that he also paid the
monthly family cell phone bill that included Melissa, and medical coverage included

Melissa.

                 The trial court stated that the $25,000 monthly sum and 96-month

duration of support in the final decree included “all applicable spousal support and

payment toward arrearage.” The trial set forth its findings, declared that “[a]ny

motion not specifically addressed in the following decision, is hereby denied,” and

retained jurisdiction to address modifications.

                “The goal of spousal support is to reach an equitable result.” Kehoe,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99404, 

, citing Kaechele, 

, 

 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. “While there is

no set mathematical formula to reach this goal, the Ohio Supreme Court requires

the trial court to consider all 14 factors of R.C. 3105.18(C) and ‘not base its

determination upon any one of those factors taken in isolation.’” 

 quoting 

                On the issue of child support under R.C. 3119.04, Melissa presents

similar arguments regarding disparities in income and argues that Gregg’s child

support obligation including cash medical support should have been $9,274.06 per

month effective November 13, 2020. The record reflects that Gregg paid child

support, tuition, and other child-related expenses. The trial court ordered that

Gregg pay any outstanding medical expenses. We reiterate that the trial court

denied motions that were not specifically addressed.

                The trial court considered the required factors in this case. We do

not find that the trial court abused its discretion.
                  The first cross-assignment of error is overruled.

      B.     Cross-examination of Nakkache

                  Having addressed Melissa’s second cross-assignment of error in

combination with Gregg’s seventh assigned error, we move on to Melissa’s third

cross-assignment of error that challenges the trial court’s refusal to allow additional

cross-examination of Nakkache. We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial

court’s cross-examination limitation.       State v. Edwards, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 87587, 

, quoting Calderon v. Sharkey 

,

 (1982), syllabus. As evidenced by the provisions of Evid.R. 611(A),

“‘[t]rial courts are given great deference in controlling their dockets, and therefore,

a reviewing court uses an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s

requirements in this area.’” In re A.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99040, 2013-Ohio-

5120, ¶ 14, quoting Mathewson v. Mathewson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 05-CA-035,

.

                  Melissa states that Nakkache was called in Melissa’s case in chief on

May 12, 2021, but the testimony was not completed. Nakkache’s counsel was

unavailable for the next day of trial. Nakkache appeared on June 8, 2021, for cross-

examination but failed to bring certain subpoenaed documents in the morning, and

returned in the afternoon with a portion of the documents.             The trial court

terminated cross-examination at the end of the next day with additional trial dates

to be selected.
               On October 5, 2021, Nakkache opposed Melissa’s September 23,

2021 motion to compel nonparty Nakkache to comply with discovery.                 The

subpoenas involved were issued directly to the financial institutions, yet Melissa

sought to compel Nakkache to supply her social security number to facilitate

securing the third-party records. The trial court held that Melissa could discover the

information without the social security number. “Further, the Court has already

heard, at length, testimony regarding Defendant and Ms. Nakkache’s wedding and

sharing of expenses.” Journal entry No. 119044804, p. 2.

               On March 3, 2022, Melissa subpoenaed Nakkache’s trial appearance

for March 7 through March 11, 2022. Nakkache responded with a motion to quash

where she argued the subpoena subjects her to an undue burden and does not

permit reasonable time to comply. Nakkache declared she had already testified

extensively, and the sole purpose of the subpoena was to harass and greatly

inconvenience her. The trial court ruled:

      The Court agrees with Ms. Nakkache. As this Court previously stated,
      it has already heard lengthy testimony from Ms. Nakkache regarding
      Defendant and Ms. Nakkache’s sharing of expenses. Requiring
      Ms. Nakkache to appear for an additional five (5) days of trial would
      clearly subject her to an undue burden.

Journal entry No. 121683524, p. 1 (Mar. 7, 2022).

                Melissa argues that cross-examination should not have been limited

because the evidence was relevant under Evid.R. 611, “[m]ode and order of

interrogation and presentation,” which provides in pertinent part:
      (A) Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over
      the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
      so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
      ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time,
      and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.

      (B) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination shall be permitted
      on all relevant matters and matters affecting credibility.

                This court has held: “‘Evid.R. 611 provides that the court “shall

exercise reasonable control” over the mode and manner of interrogation of

witnesses and presentation of evidence.’” (Emphasis omitted.) M.D. v. M.D., 2018-

Ohio-4218, 

 (8th Dist.), quoting Loewen v. Newsome, 9th Dist.

Summit Nos. 25559 and 25579, 

, citing Evid.R. 611(A). This

authority allows the court “‘to avoid a needless consumption of time and/or

harassment of witnesses, but also [to do so] in a manner that preserves the truth-

seeking function of the proceedings.’” 

 quoting 

 citing 

                In fact:

      Trial judges may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based
      on a variety of concerns, such as harassment, prejudice, confusion of
      the issues, the witness’s safety, repetitive testimony, or marginally
      relevant interrogation. Mueller v. Lindes, Cuyahoga App. No. 80522,
      

; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 

, 

, 

 (1986). Further, not all error pertaining to
      limitations on cross-examination is reversible error. State v. Long, 

, 

 (1978).

Edwards, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87587, 

.
               Based on this court’s review of the voluminous record, we do not find

the trial court abused its discretion.     The third cross-assignment of error is

overruled.

      C.      Attorney Fees

               Melissa’s rejects the trial court’s denial of attorney fees under her

fourth and final cross-assignment of error. Payment of attorney fees in divorce

proceedings is governed by R.C. 3105.73. A court may award fees where the court

deems the payment to be equitable under the circumstances. “‘[T]he court may

consider the parties’ marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal

support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems

appropriate.’” Walpole, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99231, 

, citing

Gourash v. Gourash, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 71882 and 73971, 

 (Sept. 2, 1999), R.C. 3105.73(A). “The decision to award attorney fees

rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be overturned on appeal absent

an abuse of discretion.” Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 

, citing Layne v. Layne, 

, 

 (2d

Dist.1992).

               The trial court decreed:

      The Court finds, based on the evidence and testimony from both
      parties, that neither negotiated in good faith attempts to settle this
      matter. Both parties conducted themselves in such a way to harass and
      intimidate the other to kowtow to their wishes. The Court finds
      throughout this matter, neither party was credible with their testimony
      and both should pay their own attorney fees.

Journal entry No. 126093759, p. 10 (July 11, 2022).
                  We do not conclude that the trial court’s denial of attorney fees was

an abuse of discretion.

                  The fourth cross-assignment of error is overruled.

VI.   Conclusion

                  We find the following:

      Gregg’s first assignment of error is overruled.

      The second assignment of error is overruled in part and sustained in
      part. The trial court’s award of the remaining funds in the IOLTA
      account to Melissa is affirmed. The case is remanded for the limited
      purpose of correcting the decree to reflect that the medical fund
      amount was $150,000. The trial court’s award for the 2014 and 2020
      flood proceeds is reversed and remanded pursuant to this opinion.

      The third assignment of error is overruled.

      The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

      The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

      The sixth assignment of error is overruled.

      Gregg’s seventh assignment of error is overruled in part and remanded
      for the sole purpose of addressing the R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(l) factor
      regarding whether taxation of the spousal support is to be governed by
      the tax law in effect at the time of the temporary support order or the
      tax law in effect at the time of the final spousal support decree.

      Gregg’s eighth assignment of error is overruled.

      Melissa’s first, second, third, and fourth cross-assignments of error are
      overruled.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee equally share costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


_______________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR