State v. Sanford

[Cite as State v. Sanford, 

.]


STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                          C.A. No.       2023CA0040-M

        Appellee

        v.                                             APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                       ENTERED IN THE
KYLE G. SANFORD                                        COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                       COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellant                                      CASE No.   22CR0726

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 29, 2023



        SUTTON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant Kyle Sanford appeals the judgment of the Medina County

Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms.

                                                  I.

                                  Relevant Background Information

        {¶2}     This appeal arises from an incident involving Mr. Sanford, a healthcare aide, and

M.C., a developmentally disabled adult. Mr. Sanford picked M.C. up from his home, where he

lived with family members, and took M.C. to his private residence for dinner and a movie. While

at Mr. Sanford’s residence, M.C. became upset when Mr. Sanford touched his penis over his

clothing. Mr. Sanford drove M.C. home, and M.C. told his grandmother what had happened. The

next day, M.C. brought a knife to work in case Mr. Sanford showed up and told one of his

supervisors what happened the prior day with Mr. Sanford.1 The supervisor called the Wadsworth



        1
            M.C. met Mr. Sanford for the first time at his place of employment.
                                                 2


Police who came to M.C.’s job, and M.C. reported the incident to the police. The police also

interviewed Mr. Sanford.

       {¶3}    Mr. Sanford was charged with one count of gross sexual imposition, in violation of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(5), a felony of the fourth degree. Mr. Sanford pleaded not guilty and the matter

proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court sentenced Mr. Sanford

to five years community control, with 180 days incarceration in the Medina County Jail. Mr.

Sanford must also register as a Tier 1 sex offender.

       {¶4}    Mr. Sanford now appeals raising two assignments of error for our review.          To

facilitate our discussion, we reorder Mr. Sanford’s assignments of error.

                                                II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE
       STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT
       EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR.
       SANFORD IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
       14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
       SECTIONS 1, 10 & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

       {¶5}    In his second assignment of error, Mr. Sanford argues his conviction for gross

sexual imposition is not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Mr. Sanford argues the

State failed to prove Mr. Sanford touched M.C. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification

of either person.

       {¶6}    “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 

, ¶

18, citing State v. Thompkins, 

 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the

prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction. 

 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this
                                                 3


Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in

favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 

 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it

allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

       {¶7}    Pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(5):

       No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender *
       * * when any of the following applies:

                                               ***

       The ability of the other person to resist or consent or the ability of one of the other
       persons to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical
       condition * * * , and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
       ability to resist or consent of the other person * * * is substantially impaired
       because of a mental or physical condition[.]

According to R.C. 2907.01(B):

       “Sexual contact” means any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including
       without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a
       female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.

“A person’s purpose or intention may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence.” State

v. Persinger, 9th Dist. Lorian No. 13CA010397, 

. “[I]n the absence of direct

testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification, the trier of fact may infer a purpose of sexual

arousal or gratification from the ‘type, nature and circumstances of the contact, along with the

personality of the defendant.’” State v. Edwards, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010274, 2013-Ohio-

3068, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Antoline, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008100, 

, ¶ 64,

quoting State v. Cobb, 

 (9th Dist.1991).

       {¶8}    Here, M.C. testified Mr. Sanford touched his penis stating:
                                                 4


       [W]e went to his house to watch the Spider-Man movie or whatever kind of movie
       that he put in * * * on his TV. * * * He fed me and gave me a couple cans of his
       pop, and I told him no. * * * But I ate his food though. * * * He slid over like that
       (demonstrating). * * * But I didn’t know what he was going to do after that. * * *
       He didn’t put his fingers all the way down in there, he just went like that. * * * Just
       kept on feeling it like that, like this (demonstrating). * * * [He] [p]ut his [] finger
       all over it, man, with his fingers. * * * I wish I could have trusted him, man. He
       was my big brother, dude. * * * That’s why probably [] he won’t look at me,
       because he knows. * * * He knows what he done.

(Emphasis in original.)

       {¶9}    Additionally, James Allenby, a detective with the Wadsworth Police Department,

testified that after he went over what Mr. Sanford was accused of, Mr. Sanford’s “demeanor and

emotions kind of were a bit of a roller coaster ride. At points he was crying, at points he was kind

of screaming at me, and at points he was joking and kind of laughing as well.”

       {¶10} After viewing the evidence contained in the record in a light most favorable to the

State, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence, if believed, that Mr. Sanford committed

the offense of gross sexual imposition. We further conclude that any rational trier of fact could

have found all of the essential elements of gross sexual imposition proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. Although there was no direct testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification, M.C.

testified Mr. Sanford took him to Mr. Sanford’s residence and touched his penis by feeling it over

his clothing and putting his “finger all over it[.]” Further, Detective Allenby testified about Mr.

Sanford’s personality and mood swings during his police interview. M.C. also testified Mr.

Sanford would not look at him because “[h]e knows what he done.” The evidence of the type and

circumstances of the sexual contact, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is

sufficient to infer the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. See Persinger, 

.

       {¶11} Accordingly, Mr. Sanford’s second assignment of error is overruled.
                                                   5


                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

        MR. SANFORD’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
        OF THE EVIDENCE [] IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
        OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND
        ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS 1, 10, & 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

        {¶12} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Sanford argues his conviction for gross sexual

imposition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mr. Sanford argues: (1)

M.C. gave conflicting “demonstrations” of the manner in which the alleged touching occurred, (2)

the evidence does not “demonstrate” there was any sexual arousal or gratification, and (3) the

evidence does not support M.C. is substantially impaired.

        {¶13} As this Court has previously stated:

        [i]n determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
        evidence an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
        all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine
        whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
        and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
        reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 

 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a

judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the

appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the

conflicting testimony.” Thompkins, 

, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 

 (1982).

        {¶14} Moreover, an appellate court should exercise the power to reverse a judgment as

against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. 

. “[W]e are

mindful that the [trier of fact] is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.”

(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Gannon, 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0053-M,

. “This Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight challenge
                                                 6


only because the [trier of fact] found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.” 

 “The

[jury] is best able to view witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,

and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” (Alteration sic.)

State v. Cook, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21185, 

, ¶ 30, quoting Giurbino v. Giurbino,

 (8th Dist.1993). Indeed, “the jury is free to believe all, part, or none of

the testimony of each witness.” Prince v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-

7184, ¶ 35.

       {¶15} Here, the jury saw M.C. demonstrate, both on direct and cross-examination, how

and where Mr. Sanford touched him, and M.C.’s testimony remained consistent that Mr. Sanford

touched his penis. Further, as to sexual arousal or gratification, the jury heard M.C.’s testimony

that Mr. Sanford felt his penis and put his “finger all over it[.]” The jury also heard testimony

from Detective Allenby that Mr. Sanford’s story changed from never going near M.C. on the couch

to possibly brushing up against M.C.’s leg when he handed M.C. a dish of pasta, and Mr. Sanford’s

emotions were greatly fluctuating during a police interview. Detective Allenby also indicated Mr.

Sanford’s explanation regarding the dish of pasta did not make sense because, according to Mr.

Sanford, he handed M.C. the dish of pasta and did not place the dish on M.C.’s lap. The jury could

also see Mr. Sanford’s demeanor in the court room, and M.C. indicated Mr. Sandford would not

look at him.

       {¶16} Moreover, as to whether or not M.C. is substantially impaired, the jury witnessed

M.C. testify first hand and also heard the testimony of M.C.’s father and grandmother. M.C. was

not able to spell his last name, could not remember how old he was, and did not know the year he

was born. M.C.’s father testified M.C. has a disability since birth and “has a mind between a two-

to a six-year old.” As a result, M.C.’s father explained M.C. receives services through Medina
                                                  7


County Board of Developmental Disabilities. M.C.’s grandmother testified M.C. does not know

how to read or write, other than he can write his first name. M.C.’s grandmother also testified they

have a “piece of paper at home that says [M.C.] is severely handicapped.” M.C.’s grandmother

stated M.C. “gets very confused.” See State v. Daniels, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25808, 2011-Ohio-

6414, ¶ 6 (“[A] substantial impairment may be proven by the victim’s own testimony, allowing

the trier of fact to observe and evaluate the victim’s ability to perceive the nature of or to control

[his] conduct, and by the testimony of others who have interacted with the victim.”).

       {¶17} Based upon this record, this is not an exceptional case that warrants reversal. The

jury, as factfinder, was tasked with determining the credibility of the witness’ testimony and

evidence in reaching its verdict. As such, the jury did not clearly lose its way and create such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that Mr. Sanford’s conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.

       {¶18} Accordingly, Mr. Sanford’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶19} For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Sanford’s two assignments of error are overruled.

The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                 Judgment affirmed.




       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
                                                 8


       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.




                                                     BETTY SUTTON
                                                     FOR THE COURT



CARR, J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.


APPEARANCES:

PAUL M. GRANT, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEPHANIE ZARANEC, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.