State v. Goff

[Cite as State v. Goff, 

.]


                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  PICKAWAY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                :
                                              :
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :    Case No. 22CA13
                                              :
        v.                                    :
                                              :    DECISION AND
NICHOLAS W. GOFF,                             :    JUDGMENT ENTRY
AKA: NICHOLAS A. GOFF,                        :
                                              :    RELEASED 12/26/2023
        Defendant-Appellant.                  :

                                           APPEARANCES:

April F. Campbell, Campbell Law, LLC, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant.

Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecutor, and Heather MJ Carter, Assistant
Pickaway County Prosecutor, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.


Smith, P.J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Nicholas Goff, appeals the judgment of the Pickaway

County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of 20 counts of pandering sexually

oriented matter involving a minor, all third-degree felonies in violation of R.C.

2907.322(A)(5), and sentencing him to consecutive 12-month prison terms on each

count resulting in an aggregate prison sentence of 240 months. On appeal, Goff

raises five assignments of error contending: 1) that his sentences should be

reversed and that the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences should

be vacated; 2) that there is clear and convincing evidence that the trial court’s
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                                                            2

imposition of Goff’s sentences was contrary to law; 3) that the trial court erred in

failing to merge Goff’s offenses because he had one animus and engaged in one

course of conduct; 4) that his sentences should be reversed because trial counsel

was ineffective for failure to file a waiver of his fines despite a reasonable

probability that the trial court would have waived them; and 5) that his sentences

should be reversed because they were grossly disproportionate to similarly situated

offenders. However, finding no merit in any of the assignments of error set forth

for review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                     FACTS

         {¶2} We initially note that Goff has failed to provide hearing transcripts to

this Court.1 Although his appellate brief cites to various different hearing

transcripts, they are not part of the appellate record. Further, because this matter

ultimately resulted in the entry of no contest pleas, the facts forming the basis of

the charges herein are somewhat scant. However, it appears from the record that




1
  The record indicates that Goff filed a request for transcripts and sought an order from the common pleas court
directing that they be prepared at the State’s expense. Goff claimed that although his family had retained counsel
for him, he himself was indigent. The trial court denied the request, citing the fact that there was no affidavit of
indigency in the record. The record was thereafter transmitted to this Court on July 26, 2022, without transcripts. A
notation on the online docket indicates that a transcript was later filed in the clerk’s office on October 13, 2022,
however, only the cover page of the transcript was scanned into the online docket. There is a notation on the docket
that a copy of the first page of the transcript was placed into a folder and the original transcript was placed in the
“depo drawer.” There is no indication from the paper record on appeal nor the online docket maintained by the
Pickaway County Clerk of Court that Goff ever filed a motion to supplement the record with the transcript.
Moreover, it appears from the record that at least three hearings were held that may be pertinent to this appeal: 1) a
motions hearing; 2) a change of plea hearing; and 3) a sentencing hearing. There is no indication from the online
docket which hearing transcript was filed on October 13th. Thus, none of the hearing transcripts have been properly
made part of the record on appeal.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                                                  3

on May 6, 2021, Goff was indicted on 39 third-degree felony counts of pandering

sexually oriented matter involving a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(5).

He was also indicted on two fourth-degree felony counts of illegal use of a minor

in nudity-oriented material or performance in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(3).2

Counts 1 through 16 were alleged to have occurred on March 23, 2020, while

counts 17 through 41 were alleged to have occurred on February 12, 2021. These

charges stemmed from an investigation that began after Dropbox notified law

enforcement that it had identified images containing child pornography in its

database. The images were ultimately traced to Goff, which led to a further

investigation including a search of Goff’s residence and his eventual arrest.

        {¶3} Goff initially pled not guilty to the charges but later entered into plea

negotiations with the State which led to him entering “pleas of no contest, with a

stipulated finding of guilt” to 20 of the counts charging him with pandering

sexually oriented matter involving a minor, in exchange for the dismissal of the

remaining pandering counts and the two counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-

oriented material. Ten of the counts to which Goff pled no contest appear to have

been related to images and videos located within Goff’s Dropbox account. The

other ten counts appear to have been related to images and videos that were




2
 The degrees of these offenses were elevated because Goff had a previous conviction on May 15, 2014 for
attempted pandering sexually oriented matter involving a juvenile.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             4

subsequently found on Goff’s cell phone that was located in his house after the

execution of a search warrant.

      {¶4} Both Goff and the State filed sentencing memorandums prior to

sentencing and Goff also filed a pleading entitled “Fifth Amendment/Merger of

Counts.” In the latter pleading, Goff argued that his offenses should merge for

purposes of sentencing because his “multiple offenses were similar, they were not

committed separately, and they had one animus.” He also argued that his conduct

“did not victimize more than one person.” His arguments were grounded in his

claims that: 1) on March 23, 2020 “with one click of a mouse,” he “downloaded

one cache of suspected child porn and placed it into [his] drop box and viewed it

four times;” and 2) that on February 15, 2015 “on [his] cell phone with one click,”

he “downloaded one cache of suspected child porn which remained on [his]

phone.” He further claimed that at the time of the downloads, “it was not possible

to determine the number of photographs or the exact nature of the photographs.”

Goff also argued against the imposition of consecutive sentences in his sentencing

memorandum. The State argued in its sentencing memorandum that the offenses

to which Goff pled no contest did not merge and it further recommended that the

trial court impose 12-month prison sentences on each of the 20 counts, to be served

consecutively. A joint stipulation was filed below stipulating that the State “cannot
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            5

dispute” that the downloads into Dropbox and onto Goff’s phone were each

accomplished with “one click.”

      {¶5} After considering both sentencing memorandums and a psychological

evaluation performed on Goff, the trial court sentenced Goff to 12-month prison

terms on each of the counts and ordered that the prison terms be served

consecutively to one another, resulting in an aggregate prison sentence of 240

months. The trial court further imposed a fine of $10,000, determined that Goff

would be classified as a Tier III sexually oriented offender pursuant to R.C.

2950.01, and notified Goff that upon release from prison he would be subject to a

mandatory period of post-release control for five years. The trial court issued a

judgment entry of sentence on May 23, 2022, and it is from that order that Goff

now appeals, setting forth five assignments of error for our review.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     GOFF’S SENTENCES SHOULD BE REVERSED,
             BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DECISION TO
             IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES SHOULD BE
             VACATED.

      II.    THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
             THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S IMPOSITION OF
             GOFF’S SENTENCES WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.

      III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE
             GOFF’S OFFENSES TOGETHER BECAUSE HE HAD
             ONE ANIMUS AND ENGAGED IN ONE COURSE OF
             CONDUCT.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               6

      IV.    GOFF’S SENTENCES SHOULD BE REVERSED,
             BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
             FOR FAILURE TO FILE A WAIVER OF GOFF’S
             FINES DESPITE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
             THAT THE TRIAL COURT WOULD HAVE WAIVED
             IT.

      V.     GOFF’S SENTENCES SHOULD BE REVERSED
             BECAUSE    IT   WAS    [SIC]   GROSSLY
             DISPROPORTIONATE TO SIMILARLY SITUATED
             OFFENDERS.

                      ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I AND II

      {¶6} We address Goff’s first and second assignments of error in conjunction

with one another for ease of analysis. In his first assignment of error, Goff

contends that his sentences should be reversed and that the trial court’s decision to

impose consecutive sentences should be vacated. More specifically, relying on

statements made by the trial court during the sentencing hearing, Goff argues that

the trial court imposed consecutive sentences not for the specific course of conduct

that led to the commission of the offenses at issue in this case, but rather for the

general course of conduct of his life, which he claims included “fathering three

children through his wife, two of whom are autistic.” He further argues that his

conduct in committing the offenses at issue was “less serious than what normally

constitutes this offense” because he only possessed the images and videos at issue,

and did not produce or distribute them and because he did not “[reach] out to any

minors with sexual motivation.”
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             7

      {¶7} In his second assignment of error, Goff argues that the record contains

clear and convincing evidence that the trial court’s imposition of his sentences was

contrary to law. More specifically, Goff argues that the record does not support

“certain findings” made by the trial court during the sentencing hearing and thus,

his sentences were contrary to law. He contends that the trial court “considered his

marriage and his decision to father children as a sentencing factor[]” and that it

“admonished him for meeting his wife over the internet.” He argues that the trial

court considered factors related to his marriage and fatherhood “as a basis for

finding him not amenable to community control, and as a basis for sending [him]

to prison.”

      {¶8} The State responds by arguing that the trial court considered the

required sentencing factors and made the necessary findings before imposing

consecutive sentences. The State further argues that aside from any statements

made by the trial court regarding Goff’s marriage and decision to have children,

the imposition of consecutive sentences was supported by the record for a number

of other reasons, including the facts that Goff pled guilty to 20 counts of child-

related sexual crimes, that he had already been previously convicted of a similar

offense and thus, had already demonstrated that he is a repeat offender.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             8

                                 Standard of Review

      {¶9} “When reviewing felony sentences appellate courts must apply the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Johnson, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 19CA1082, 

, ¶ 7, citing State v. Marcum, 

, 

, 

, ¶ 1, 7. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states as

follows:

      [A]n appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and
      remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and
      convincingly finds either:

      (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
      findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
      (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
      2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

      (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. (Emphasis
      added.)

State v. Jordan, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1105, 

, quoting

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

      {¶10} “Clear and convincing evidence is ‘that measure or degree of proof

which * * * will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction

as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 

, 

, 

, quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 

, 

, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).

This Court has explained as follows regarding the review of felony sentences:
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            9

      “ ‘[R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)] does not say that the trial judge must
      have clear and convincing evidence to support its findings.
      Instead, it is the court of appeals that must clearly and
      convincingly find that the record does not support the court's
      findings. In other words, the restriction is on the appellate court,
      not the trial judge. This is an extremely deferential standard of
      review.’ ”

State v. Spangler, 4th Dist. Athens No. 21CA17, 

, quoting

State v. Pierce, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 18CA4, 

, in turn

quoting State v. Venes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98682, 

, 

, ¶ 20-21.

                               Consecutive Sentences

      {¶11} There is a statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences

pursuant to R.C. 2929.41(A). “In order to impose consecutive terms of

imprisonment, a trial court must make the findings mandated by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its

sentencing entry, but the court has no obligation to state reasons to support its

findings.” State v. Blair, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA24, 

, ¶ 52,

citing State v. Bonnell, 

, 

, 

,

syllabus. This Court explained as follows in State v. Cottrill regarding the findings

required to support the imposition of consecutive sentences:

      “Under the tripartite procedure set forth in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
      prior to imposing consecutive sentences a trial court must find
      that: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public
      from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            10

      sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
      offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
      public; and (3) that one of three circumstances specified in the
      statute applies.”

State v. Cottrill, 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3704, 

, ¶ 14, quoting

State v. Baker, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA18, 

. Further,

as we explained in Cottrill, the three circumstances are as follows:

      “(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
      while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
      sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or
      2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
      for a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
      of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
      or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
      unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
      committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
      reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

      (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
      future crime by the offender.

Cottrill at ¶ 14, quoting R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

      {¶12} Any findings required by the applicable statutory sentencing

provisions and made by the sentencing court, such as those contained in R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c), must still be supported by the record. State v. Gray, 4th Dist.

Scioto No. 18CA3857, 

.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                           11

      {¶13} In State v. Gwynne, -- Ohio St.3d --, 

, -- N.E.3d --, ¶

1-2 (“Gwynne IV”), a majority of the Court held that “the findings required by

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive prison sentences on an offender ‘must

be made in consideration of the aggregate term to be imposed.’ ” State v. Gwynne,

-- Ohio St.3d --, 

, -- N.E.3d --, ¶ 2 (“Gwynne V”), citing Gwynne

IV, supra. Additionally, in Gwynne IV, the Court concluded that

      appellate review of consecutive sentences did not require
      appellate courts to defer to the sentencing court’s findings;
      rather, this court explained that “appellate courts * * * review the
      record de novo and decide whether the record clearly and
      convincingly does not support the consecutive-sentence
      findings.”

Gwynne V at ¶ 2, quoting Gwynne IV at ¶ 1.

However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has since departed from its prior reasoning in

Gwynne IV and has now clearly held as follows:

      The plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate
      court to defer to a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings, and
      the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless those findings are
      clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.

Gwynne V at ¶ 5.

      {¶14} Thus, the Court has now clearly affirmed that an appellate court’s

application of a de novo standard of review to consecutive-sentence findings “is

contrary to the plain language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” Gwynne V at ¶ 16. This is

because “[d]e novo review of a trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings is
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                              12

simply incongruous with the deference that the legislature stated an appellate court

must give those statutory findings in the statutory language of R.C.

2953.08(G)(2).” Id.

                                   Legal Analysis

      {¶15} Again, we must note that this Court has not been provided with copies

of any of the hearing transcripts and importantly, it does not have a copy of the

change of plea and sentencing transcripts. Despite his failure to properly file the

transcripts, Goff’s arguments primarily hinge on statements allegedly made by the

trial court during the sentencing hearing. Goff’s reliance on portions of these

transcripts in support of his arguments is improper in light of his failure to make

these transcripts part of the appellate record. In Knapp v. Edwards Lab., 

, 

 (1980), the Supreme Court of Ohio held:

      “[w]hen portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of
      assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court
      has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned errors, the
      Court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower
      court's proceedings, and affirm.”

.

      {¶16} Based upon the authority of Knapp alone, we are authorized to simply

presume the regularity of the record and the trial court’s decision. However, we

will nevertheless endeavor to review these assignments of error to the extent

possible from the information that is properly before us.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                              13

      {¶17} It does not appear that Goff disputes that the trial court made the

findings required to impose consecutive sentences. However, he appears to argue

that his course of conduct in committing the offenses alone, eliminating any

consideration of his marriage and family situation, did not merit consecutive

sentences. As set forth above, the basis of his argument seems to be that the trial

court improperly admonished him for marrying and having children and used that

course of conduct as the basis for imposing consecutive sentences. Again, without

the benefit of the hearing transcripts, this portion of the argument cannot be

reviewed.

      {¶18} However, considering Goff’s course of conduct alone in committing

the offenses at issue, we conclude the record supports the imposition of

consecutive sentences. As noted by the State, Goff pled guilty to 20 different

counts of pandering sexually oriented material involving a minor. It appears from

the record that each charge was based upon a different image or video and that the

20 counts stemmed from conduct that occurred on 2 different dates and on 2

different devices. The Seventh District Court of Appeals has determined that

multiple images and videos uploaded on the same day can constitute a “course of

conduct” justifying the imposition of consecutive sentences. See State v. Bosley,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16MA0100, 

, ¶ 9-10 (which involved the

uploading of 97 files of child pornography on the same day that contained multiple
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            14

images of 4 different child victims ranging in age from 2 to 12), citing State v.

Lucicosky, 

, 

.

      {¶19} In reaching its decision, the Bosley court relied upon the reasoning set

forth in State v. Duhamel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102346, 

, which

stated: “ ‘[e]very video or image of child pornography on the internet constitutes a

permanent record of that particular child’s sexual abuse. The harm caused by these

videos is exacerbated by their circulation.’ ” Bosley at ¶ 11, quoting Duhamel at ¶

54. As observed in Bosley, “[i]mages depicting rape or abuse are far more harmful

than solitary photographs of nude children.” Bosley at ¶ 11, citing Duhamel at ¶

55. Further, in reaching its decision, the Bosley court rejected the appellant’s

argument that all 97 files were obtained “by means of a mass download” and thus

should merge for purposes of sentencing. Bosley at ¶ 12. The court reasoned that

“Appellant pleaded guilty to fifteen separate counts of pandering[,]” and

“[b]ecause he pleaded guilty to several separate counts, he cannot now argue that

his behavior did not give rise to those separate counts.” 

      {¶20} The 20 counts of the indictment to which Goff entered pleas of no

contest describe 20 different images and/or videos containing child pornography.

The 20 different images/videos depict children ranging in age from infancy to what

is described as “prepubescent.” The 20 different images/videos depict unspeakable

abuse, including both vaginal and anal rape, and involve both boys and girls,
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             15

sometimes with one another, sometimes with an adult or multiple adults, and at

least one image depicted a female child bound and gagged while she was being

raped by a hooded figure. The descriptions alone of the images and videos found

on Goff’s devices are the stuff of nightmares. Based upon the record before us,

including the facts that Goff possessed multiple images on two different devices

that appear to have been downloaded on two different dates, as well as the fact that

it appears the images/videos involve different victims all of differing ages being

subjected to different types of physical and sexual abuse, we find Goff’s actions in

committing the offenses at issue constituted a course of conduct sufficient to

justify the imposition of consecutive sentences.

      {¶21} Finally, we reject Goff’s argument that his conduct in committing

these offenses was “less serious” and thus did not constitute the worst form of the

offense. Although we do not have the benefit of the sentencing hearing transcript,

the sentencing entry states that the trial court considered the principles and

purposes of sentencing as required by R.C. 2929.11 and that it had balanced the

seriousness and recidivism factors as required by R.C. 2929.12. The entry further

states that the trial court determined consecutive sentences were necessary to

protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, that consecutive

sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct or the danger

Goff poses to the public, and the court also found that at least two of the offenses
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               16

were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct and that the harm

caused by the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term would

adequately reflect the seriousness of Goff’s conduct. The trial court also found

that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime

by Goff.

      {¶22} Considering the description of the child sexual abuse material found

in Goff’s possession, the volume of the materials, as well as the fact that Goff had

been previously convicted of a similar offense causing the felony level of each of

his current crimes to be elevated as a result, we cannot clearly and convincingly

find that the record does not support the trial court’s findings it made pursuant to

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c). Moreover, we believe the record supports the trial

court’s necessity and proportionality findings. Accordingly, we find no merit in

Goff’s first and second assignments of error and they are overruled.

                          ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

      {¶23} In his third assignment of error, Goff contends that the trial court

erred in failing to merge his offenses because he had one animus and engaged in

one course of conduct. Goff argues that his offenses were “closely related offenses

arising from the same occurrence[]” that were not committed separately. He

argues that he was only involved in one course of conduct and that he “possessed

the images for which he was [convicted] with one click.” The State responds by
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                           17

arguing that each offense caused a separate and identifiable harm and therefore

merger was not required. In support of its argument, the State directs this Court’s

attention to the fact that “Ohio Courts have found that child sexual abuse material

(CSAM) offenses are offenses of dissimilar import when each offense involves a

separate file or image.” For the following reasons, we agree with the State.

                         Allied Offenses of Similar Import

      {¶24} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence

to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” “This protection applies to Ohio

citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution * * *

and is additionally guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.”

State v. Ruff, 

, 

, 

.

“Regarding multiple punishments for the same offense, the Double Jeopardy

Clause prohibits ‘the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than

the legislature intended.’ ” State v. Pendleton, 

, 2020-Ohio-

6833, 

, ¶ 8, quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 

, 

, 

 (1983). “When determining whether multiple

punishments may be imposed for the same offense, our focus is on legislative

intent.” 

Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             18

      {¶25} “The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2941.25 to identify when a

court may impose multiple punishments[.]” State v. Fannon, 

, 

 (4th Dist.). R.C. 2941.25 states:

      (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
      constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
      indictment or information may contain counts for all such
      offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

      (B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more
      offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two
      or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed
      separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or
      information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the
      defendant may be convicted of all of them.

      {¶26} “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import

within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors—

the conduct, the animus, and the import.” 

 at paragraph one of the

syllabus. “Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple

offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the following is true:

(1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that

the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses

were committed with separate animus.” 

 at paragraph three of the syllabus.

Thus, “an affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions.”

State v. Stapleton, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA7, 

.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             19

      {¶27} Offenses are of dissimilar import “if they are not alike in their

significance and their resulting harm.” Ruff at ¶ 21. Additionally, “a defendant's

conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can support

multiple convictions if the harm that results from each offense is separate and

identifiable from the harm of the other offense.” Id. at ¶ 26. Thus, “two or more

offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when

the defendant's conduct constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the

harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.” Id. at ¶ 23. We

further note that the defendant bears the burden to establish that R.C. 2941.25

prohibits multiple punishments. See State v. Washington, 

,

, 

, ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 

, 

 (1987).

                                Standard of Review

      {¶28} The sentencing court has a mandatory duty to merge allied offenses of

similar import. See State v. Stapleton at ¶ 50. However, as set forth above, the

defendant has the burden to establish that R.C. 2941.25 prohibits multiple

punishments. Id. at ¶ 52. “We apply a de novo standard to review a trial court's

determination of whether offenses constitute allied offenses of similar import

requiring merger under R.C. 2941.25.” 

, citing State v. Williams,

, 

, 

.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                          20

                                   Legal Analysis

      {¶29} Here, based upon our review of the record, we cannot conclude that

the trial court legally erred in imposing multiple punishments for 20 counts of

pandering sexually oriented materials involving a minor. This Court explained in

State v. 

 as follows:

      Ohio courts have found that child pornography offenses are
      offenses of dissimilar import when each offense involves a
      separate file or image. “Each child pornography file or image
      that is downloaded is ‘a new and distinct crime.’ ” State v.
      Mannarino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98727, 

,
      

, ¶ 53, quoting State v. Eal, 10th Dist. No.
      11AP-460, 

, ¶ 93; accord State v. Davis, 8th
      Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105523, 

, 

, ¶ 42. “[M]ultiple convictions are allowed for each
      individual image because a separate animus exists every time a
      separate image or file is downloaded and saved.” State v.
      Mannarino, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98727, 

,
      

, ¶ 53, quoting State v. Hendricks, 8th Dist.
      No. 92213, 

, ¶ 35, citing State v. Stone, 1st Dist.
      No. C-040323, 

; State v. Yodice, 11th Dist.
      No.2001-L-155, 

; accord State v. Hipps, 7th
      Dist. No. 16 MA 0098, 

, 

, 

; State v. Pippin, 1st Dist. No. C-160380, 2017-
      Ohio-6970, 

, 

, ¶ 50; State v.
      Starcher, 5th Dist. No. 2015CA00058, 

, 

.

Stapleton at ¶ 54.

      {¶30} State v. Stapleton involved the sending and receiving of multiple

photos through text messages between the offender and one minor victim that all

occurred on the same date. Id. at ¶ 44. Stapleton argued that all of the pandering
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            21

offenses “were committed with one animus, involved the same victim, the same act

and occurred on the same date[,]” and therefore that they should have merged for

purposes of sentencing. Id. This Court rejected that argument, reasoning that

“[e]ach separate text message, photograph, and video resulted in a separate and

identifiable harm.” Id. at ¶ 59.

      {¶31} Although the facts in Stapleton are admittedly different in terms of

how the images were obtained and the volume of images, the facts sub judice lend

themselves to multiple punishments in a way that the facts in Stapleton did not and

are more egregious than the facts in Stapleton in some ways. For instance,

Stapleton involved similar acts in each image/video and involved a single victim.

Id. at 44. Here, the images/videos depict multiple different abusive acts against

multiple different children. Further, Goff obtained these sets of images on two

different dates and obtained them on two different devices.

      {¶32} Moreover, even assuming Goff did obtain each and every

image/video with a single click of the mouse, we find that the offenses were

committed separately and involved separate victims and thus, the trial court did not

err in refusing to merge them. See State v. 

 (finding that

“[e]ach child pornography file or image that is downloaded is ‘a new and distinct

crime’ ” and that “ ‘multiple convictions are allowed for each individual image

because a separate animus exists every time a separate image file is downloaded
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                           22

and saved’ ”), quoting State v. Eal, supra, at ¶ 93 and State v. Hendricks, supra, at

¶ 35; State v. Campbell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2014-06-137, 

(rejecting argument that 20 different child pornography images downloaded on two

separate dates should merge where each charge was “specific to different images”

and reasoning that “the mere fact that the images were obtained or possessed on

the same day, even in rapid succession, does not prove that the actions were done

with the same animus”); State v. Bosley, supra, (rejecting argument for merger in

case involving the mass download of 97 images of child pornography in light of

the fact that the appellant had pled guilty to 15 separate counts of pandering); State

v. 

 (holding offenses did not merge and finding that “each

downloaded file was a crime against a separate victim or victims”).

      {¶33} Further, the Seventh District Court of Appeals observed in State v.

Hipps:

      “As observed in Duhamel, the children depicted in the images or
      videos are the victims of the pandering offenses. 

 2015-Ohio-
      3145 [

], ¶ 61, citing State v. Meadows, 

, 

 (1986). Further, [e]ach video
      and image presents a different child or group of children.
      Individuals who view or circulate child pornography harm the
      child in several ways (1) by perpetuating the abuse initiated by
      the creator of the material, (2) by invading the child's privacy,
      and (3) by providing an economic motive for producers of child
      pornography. U.S. v. Norris, 

 (5th Cir. 1998). As
      previously stated, the dissemination of child pornography
      exacerbates and continues the exploitation and victimization of
      the individual child. [New York v.] Ferber, 

,
      

, 

 [ (1982) ]; See also U.S. v.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             23

      Sherman, 

 (7th Cir. 2001) (even a “passive
      consumer who merely receives or possesses the images directly
      contributes to this continuing victimization.”). State v. Duhamel,
      8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102346, 

 [

], ¶ 61.”

, quoting State v. 

.

      {¶34} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the offenses at issue are not

allied offenses of similar import despite the fact they may have been obtained with

one click of the mouse. On two separate dates on two different devices, each

image/video possessed by Goff was a crime against a separate victim or victims

and each image/video was possessed with a separate animus. Thus, we find no

error on the part of the trial court in imposing multiple punishments upon Goff for

these offenses. Accordingly, Goff’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

      {¶35} In his fourth assignment of error, Goff contends that his sentences

should be reversed because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

waiver of his fines, despite a reasonable probability that the trial court would have

waived them. More specifically, Goff argues that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to file an affidavit of indigency on his behalf prior to sentencing and for

failing to file a motion to address the fine that was imposed. He further argues that

he suffered prejudice as a result. He cites to the transcript in support of an
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                              24

argument that the trial court stated that it would consider a waiver of the fine, but

again, the transcripts have not been made part of the appellate record.

      {¶36} The State responds by arguing that even if we find the trial court

would have waived Goff’s fine had trial counsel requested the court to do so, such

a determination would not result in the reversal of Goff’s sentences. The State

notes that although Goff claims he is now indigent and was indigent at the time of

sentencing, an affidavit of indigency was never filed. The State further points out

that Goff had retained counsel during the pendency of his case, has retained

counsel on appeal, and that he posted a considerable appeal bond. Additionally,

the State notes that although Goff requested that a transcript be provided to this

Court at State’s expense, that the request was denied for failure to file an affidavit

of indigency. The State contends that Goff cannot now argue that a motion to

waive the fine would have been granted at sentencing when his indigency has yet

to be determined.

                                 Standard of Review

      {¶37} “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant ‘must

show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an

objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been

different.’ ” State v. Holdren, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA3, 

, ¶
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                                25

32, quoting State v. Short, 

, 

, 

, in turn citing Strickland v. Washington, 

, 

 (1984). Failure to demonstrate either prong of this test “is fatal to the

claim.” See State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 06CA3116, 

,

citing 

       {¶38} “A defendant ‘has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly

licensed attorney is presumed competent.’ ” 

, quoting State

v. Gondor, 

, 

, 

, citing State

v. Calhoun, 

, 

 (1999), in turn citing Vaughn

v. Maxwell, 

, 

 (1965). “In order to overcome this

presumption, the petitioner must submit sufficient operative facts or evidentiary

documents that demonstrate that the petitioner was prejudiced by the ineffective

assistance.” Holdren at ¶ 33, citing State v. Davis, 

, 

 (8th Dist.1999). To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant “must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               26

                                    Legal Analysis

      {¶39} Goff contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move

the trial court to waive the imposition of a fine. Underlying this contention is his

argument that his retained trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to file an

affidavit of indigency on his behalf. He asserts that there was a reasonable

probability that if trial counsel had done both of these things, the trial court would

have waived imposition of the fine.

      {¶40} R.C. 2947.23 provides for costs to be included in a criminal sentence.

In all criminal cases a judge must include in the sentence the costs of prosecution

and render a judgment against the defendant for such costs, even if the defendant is

indigent. R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a). However, a trial court retains jurisdiction to

waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs “at the time of sentencing or at

any time thereafter.” R.C. 2947.23(C). A trial court may waive court costs, but it

is not required, if a defendant is indigent. (Citations omitted). See State v. Hale,

5th Dist. Perry No. 19CA14, 

.

      {¶41} In State v. Davis, 

, 

, 

,

the Supreme Court of Ohio held that when an indigent defendant makes an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon counsel's failure to request a

waiver of court costs, a court must objectively consider the facts and circumstances

to determine whether the defendant established the necessary prejudice sufficient
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               27

to support that claim (i.e., but for counsel's deficient performance, a reasonable

probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different). See

. The Court also pointed out that a determination of indigency

alone does not rise to the level of creating a reasonable probability that the trial

court would have waived costs had defense counsel requested the court to do so.

For example, if a court finds that a defendant has the ability to work and pay court

costs in the future, the court may decide to not waive court costs. In Hale it was

observed that a court must look at all the circumstances that the defendant sets

forth in attempting to demonstrate prejudice and determine whether there is a

reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted a motion to waive

costs had one been made. Id. at ¶ 19. See Davis, supra, at ¶ 15.

      {¶42} Here, however, we are faced with an argument regarding the waiver

of fines, not costs. In State v. Webb, the Fifth District Court of Appeals observed

as follows:

      * * * Ohio law does not prohibit a court from imposing a fine on
      an “indigent” defendant. That is, the filing of an affidavit of
      indigency does not automatically entitle a defendant to a waiver
      of a mandatory fine. State v. Knox, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
      98713 and 98805, 

, [

], ¶ 36.
      Under Ohio law, a trial court must impose a mandatory fine
      unless (1) the offender files an affidavit of indigency prior to
      sentencing, and (2) “the trial court finds that the offender is an
      indigent person and is unable to pay the mandatory fines.” State
      v. Gipson, 

, 

 (1998). In
      making its indigency determination, the court must consider both
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             28

      the offender's present and future ability to pay the fine. R.C. §
      2929.19(B)(5).

      Additionally, the trial court need not make an “affirmative
      finding that an offender is able to pay a mandatory fine.” Id. at
      635 [

]. Instead, “the burden is upon the offender
      to affirmatively demonstrate that he or she is indigent and is
      unable to pay the mandatory fine.” 

 We review the trial
      court's decision to impose a fine on an indigent defendant for an
      abuse of discretion. State v. Ficklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
      99191, 

, [

], ¶ 5.

State v. Webb, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14-CA-85, 

. See

also State v. Warren, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 18-CA-42, 

.

      {¶43} R.C. 2929.19 states in section (B)(5) that “[b]efore imposing a

financial sanction under section 2929.18 of the Revised Code or a fine under

section 2929.32 of the Revised Code, the court shall consider the offender's present

and future ability to pay the amount of the sanction or fine.” As further noted in

 “[t]he Ohio Supreme Court, however, has held that even if an

affidavit of indigency is timely and properly filed, a defendant ‘is not automatically

entitled to waiver of that fine.’ ” Warren at ¶ 96, quoting State v. Gipson, 

, 

, 

. Instead, “[t]here must be a

showing that a defendant is unable to pay the fines, and there is no affirmative duty

on the trial court to make a finding that a defendant is able to pay.” Gipson at

syllabus.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                              29

      {¶44} Warren also explained that although ineffective assistance may be

found if the record reveals a probability that a trial court would have found the

defendant indigent and unable to pay the fine had trial counsel filed an affidavit of

indigency, “[b]ecause information regarding an appellant’s finances would most

often lie outside the record on direct appeal, the appropriate place to pursue this

question will generally be in a hearing for post-conviction relief under R.C.

2953.21.” Warren at ¶ 99, citing State v. Williams, 

, 

 (8th Dist, 1995); State v. Stearns, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71851, 

, *3 (Oct. 9, 1997), and State v. Booker, 

, 

 (2d Dist.1989).

      {¶45} Here, as noted by the State, the record before us reveals that Goff had

retained counsel at the trial court level and also has retained counsel at the

appellate court level. Further, he successfully moved for a stay of his sentence and

in doing so was able to satisfy the requirements of a $250,000.00 appeal bond.

Based upon the information that is in the record before us, we cannot conclude that

there was a reasonable probability that trial court would have granted a motion to

waive the fine had such a motion been made. Further, because Goff’s income and

financial information lies outside of the record on appeal, we have no information

from which to conclude that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an

affidavit of indigency. Thus, we reject Goff’s argument that his trial counsel was
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                                30

ineffective for failing to request waiver of his fine and, for lack of information in

the record, we cannot address his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to file an affidavit of indigency. Accordingly, Goff’s fourth assignment of

error is overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

      {¶46} In his fifth and final assignment of error, Goff contends that his

sentences should be reversed because they are grossly disproportionate to similarly

situated offenders. Goff argues that “the record demonstrated that the trial court

failed to consider Goff in comparison to similarly situated offenders, despite trial

counsel offering those comparisons to the Court.” Goff cites to a transcript which

has not been provided to this Court in support of this statement. The State

contends that the trial court considered the required sentencing factors and made

the requisite findings in imposing the sentences and it rejects Goff’s assertions that

the trial court failed to consider the sentences imposed upon similarly situated

offenders in light of the fact that both Goff and the State provided the court with

sentencing memorandums prior to sentencing.

                                 Standard of Review

      {¶47} We have already set forth the standard of review to be employed

when reviewing felony sentences. Building upon that, R.C. 2929.11(B) states that

a felony sentence should be “consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               31

committed by similar offenders.” This Court has observed that “ ‘ “[a]

consistency-in-sentencing determination * * * is a fact-intensive inquiry that does

not lend itself to being initially reviewed at the appellate level.” ’ ” State v. Taylor,

, 

, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Adams, 2016-Ohio-

7772, 

, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), in turn quoting State v. Montanez-Roldon,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103509, 

. We have further stated

that

       “ ‘[A]ny review must begin with the defendant producing a
       record for the trial court's consideration before the final sentence
       is imposed. As courts have long concluded, a “defendant must
       raise [the consistency-in-sentencing] issue before the trial court
       and present some evidence, however minimal, in order to provide
       a starting point for analysis and to preserve the issue for appeal.’
       ”
(Citations omitted.) Taylor at ¶ 29, quoting Adams at ¶ 46, quoting Montanez-

Roldon at ¶ 14.

       {¶48} Moreover, another court has concluded that “ ‘[a] list of child

pornography cases is of questionable value in determining whether the sentences

imposed are consistent for similar crimes committed by similar offenders since it

does not take into account all the unique factors that may distinguish one case from

another.’ ” State v. 

, quoting State v. Siber, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 94882, 

, ¶ 15. As in Starcher, one such unique

factor in the case sub judice is that Goff has a prior conviction for a similar

offense. Starcher at ¶ 39.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                             32

                                   Legal Analysis

      {¶49} Although we do not have any hearing transcripts and in particular, the

sentencing hearing transcript, Goff filed a sentencing memorandum prior to

sentencing which described himself as “a closet pedophile who likes to watch[]”

who “now understands these images depict real persons and his viewing of them

perpetuates the continued cycle of victimization of children.” Goff’s sentencing

memorandum requested that he be sentenced to an inpatient program, arguing in

part that his conduct was less serious than that normally constituting the offense

and because he was not likely to recidivate. Goff relied on the results of a

psychological report that was performed on him, as well as statistics demonstrating

that “[t]he sexual recidivism rate for all non-production child pornography

offenders was only 4.3%.”

      {¶50} Goff also provided the trial court with information related to two

similarly situated offenders. The first example provided by Goff involved a

defendant convicted for two second-degree felony counts of pandering and one

fourth-degree felony count of pandering who was ultimately sentenced to four

years, four to six years, and one year, respectively, to be served consecutively. The

second example involved a defendant who was convicted of one second-degree

felony count of pandering and 16 fourth-degree felony counts of pandering. That

defendant was sentenced to 8 to 12 years on the first count and 12 month sentences
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                               33

each on the other 16 counts, which were ordered to be served concurrently to each

other and concurrently to the 8 to 12 year sentence, for a total sentence of 8 to 12

years for 17 counts. Goff argued that “he is guilty of two counts of Pandering, one

possession for his drop box and one possession for his cell phone and that all other

counts should merge as one animus to possess on two different occasions existed.

One click, one cache, one drop box then viewed.”

      {¶51} The State’s sentencing memorandum noted Goff’s prior conviction as

well as the fact that each of the current charges were enhanced felonies in light of

that prior conviction. The State further noted that the sentencing range for each

offense to which Goff had pled was 12 months to 60 months, and it recommended

that Goff be sentenced to minimum prison terms of 12 months on each of the 20

counts, to be served consecutively. The State directed the trial court’s attention to

four different cases from four different appellate districts, all of which determined

that counts for pandering did not merge for purposes of sentencing because “each

file obtained constitutes a new and distinct crime” and that offenses should not be

merged where “each offense involves a separate file or image.”

      {¶52} Here, we have already determined that the trial court made all of the

requisite findings to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences and that the

record supports the imposition of those sentences. We have also already

determined that based upon the facts and circumstances in the record, the trial
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                            34

court did not err in refusing to merge these offenses for purposes of sentencing.

Further, despite the fact that we do not have the benefit of a sentencing hearing

transcript, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered the record in

imposing sentence, and the record included sentencing memorandums from both

Goff and the State as detailed above. For all of these reasons, we cannot conclude

that the trial court failed to consider the sentences imposed on other similarly

situated offenders, or that the sentences imposed upon Goff were grossly

disproportionate to other similarly situated offenders. Accordingly, we find no

merit to arguments raised under Goff’s fifth assignment of error and it is therefore

overruled.

      {¶53} Having found no merit to any of Appellant’s assignments of error, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. No. 22CA13                                                              35

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.
      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
      Abele, J., & Hess, J., Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
                                 For the Court,


                                 _____________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge


                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.