State v. Farr

[Cite as State v. Farr, 

.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ALLEN COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 1-23-10
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

        v.

HILLARY B. FARR,                                          OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



                   Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. CR 2022 0281

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: December 26, 2023



APPEARANCES:

        Chima R. Ekeh for Appellant

        John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee
Case No. 1-23-10




ZIMMERMAN, J.

          {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Hillary B. Farr (“Farr”), appeals the February 15,

2023 judgment entry of conviction and sentencing of the Allen County Common

Pleas Court after Farr was found guilty (by a jury) of failure to comply with an order

or signal of police officer and felonious assault. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

          {¶2} This case stems from law enforcement’s high-speed pursuit of Farr

(following a traffic violation) wherein Farr drove his vehicle (leaving his lane of

travel) at peace officer, Patrolman Zachary Carpenter’s (“Ptlm. Carpenter”)

vehicle.1

          {¶3} On October 13, 2022, Farr was indicted by the Allen County Grand Jury

on two criminal counts: Count One, failure to comply with an order or signal of a

police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), (C)(5)(a)(ii), a third-degree felony

and Count Two, felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), (D)(1)(a), a

first-degree felony. On October 20, 2022, Farr’s trial counsel filed a written plea of

not guilty.

          {¶4} After a jury trial held on January 3, 2023, Farr was found guilty of both

counts in the indictment.


1
  During the pursuit, Farr was given audible and visual signals by Patrolman Michael Martinez to stop the
motor vehicle after which he accelerated to speeds ranging from 30mph to approximately 65mph engaging
in additional traffic violations along his flight path.

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       {¶5} On February 15, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing wherein

the trial judge found that Counts One and Two did not merge for the purposes of

sentencing. Thereafter, Farr was sentenced to a 24-month prison term on Count

One and a three-year minimum prison term up to a maximum prison term of four

and a half years on Count Two. The trial court ordered the prison terms in Counts

One and Two to be run consecutively to one another, for a total minimum prison

term of five years up to a maximum term of six and a half years.

       {¶6} Farr filed a timely notice of appeal on March 9, 2023 raising three

assignments of error for our review. We will address Farr’s assignments of error in

the order of presentment.     However, we will combine his second and third

assignments of error for ease of discussion.

                              Assignment of Error I

       Defendant-Appellant’s Conviction For Felonious Assault On A
       Peace Officer Was Not Supported By Sufficient Evidence (Tr. pg.
       191, tabs 12-16).

       {¶7} In his first assignment of error, Farr argues that his felonious-assault

conviction of Ptlm. Carpenter in Count Two is not supported by sufficient evidence.

Specifically, Farr asserts that it was not his intention to use the vehicle he was

driving as a weapon to attempt to cause Ptlm. Carpenter physical harm. Rather, Farr

argues that he was simply attempting to evade a traffic stop. Moreover, Farr argues

that in order to reach a guilty verdict on felonious assault that the jury engaged in

impermissible inference stacking.

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                                Standard of Review

       {¶8} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 

 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional

amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 

 (1997), fn. 4.

Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

. “In

deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor

assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of

fact.” State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-

4775, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams, 

, 

(1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 

 (“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or

weight of the evidence.”), citing State v. Thompkins, 

 (1997),

superseded by statute on other grounds, 

, quoting State v. Martin, 

 (1st Dist.1983).




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                                                  Analysis

         {¶9} The offense of felonious assault is codified in R.C. 2903.11, which

provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person shall knowingly * * * [c]ause or attempt

to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of a deadly weapon * * *.” R.C.

2903.11(A)(2).2 “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person

is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will

probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). “‘Physical harm to persons’

means any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its

gravity or duration.”             R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).              “‘Deadly weapon’ means any

instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, and designed or specially

adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C.

2923.11(A).

         {¶10} It is well-established that a motor vehicle can be classified as a deadly

weapon when it is used as a weapon, such a determination is a question of fact to be

determined by the trier of fact examining factors such as the intent of the user,

manner of use, and actions of the user. See State v. Sess, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2015-06-117, 

. See also State v. Allsup, 3d Dist. Hardin

Nos. 6-10-06 and 6-10-07, 

; R.C. 2903.11(D)(4).



2
  Pursuant to R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a) “[w]hoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault. Except as
otherwise provided in this division or division (D)(1)(b) of this section, felonious assault is a felony of the
second degree. If the victim of a violation of division (A) of this section is a peace officer * * *, felonious
assault is a felony of the first degree.” Ptlm. Carpenter’s status as a peace officer at the time of the offense
is not and has never been in dispute.

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       {¶11} Farr argues that the State’s evidence regarding his use of the motor

vehicle and evidence of his culpable mental state was only circumstantial.

Circumstantial evidence is that which can be “inferred from reasonably and

justifiably connected facts.” State v. Fairbanks, 

 (1972), paragraph

five of the syllabus.    Circumstantial evidence inherently possesses the same

probative value as direct evidence. State v. Lott, 

 (1990); see

also State v. Treesh, 

 (2001). Moreover, “[a] conviction can

be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone.” State v. Franklin, 

 (1991). Importantly, a jury’s finding of guilt is not based on

insufficient evidence merely because the evidence supporting it is circumstantial.

Jenks, 

, paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶12} Here, the State presented two witnesses at trial regarding Farr’s use of

the motor vehicle and his culpable mental state: Patrolman Michael Martinez (“Ptlm

Martinez”) and Ptlm. Carpenter. Ptlm Martinez testified that Farr swerved into the

southbound lane of Greenlawn Avenue forcing Ptlm. Carpenter to drive off the

roadway to avoid being struck. He further testified that there was nothing to cause

Farr to swerve or change direction and that Ptlm. Carpenter would have been struck

if he did not swerve to avoid Farr. Then, Ptlm. Carpenter testified that, after driving

his vehicle as close to the curb as he could, Farr made an abrupt change of direction

towards him. He testified that as Farr’s vehicle got closer, he took evasive action to

avoid being struck.

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       {¶13} Additionally, the State admitted Ptlm. Martinez’s and Carpenter’s

vehicle-dash-camera recordings into evidence, which were played for the jury, the

purpose of which was to corroborate both officer’s testimonies. (See State’s Exs. 2,

3).

       {¶14} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Farr

knowingly attempted to cause physical harm to Ptlm. Carpenter by means of a

deadly weapon by driving his vehicle directly at the officer. Thus, we conclude that

Farr’s felonious-assault conviction is based on sufficient evidence.

       {¶15} Accordingly, Farr’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                              Assignment of Error II

       The Court Failed To Make The Requisite Findings Required
       Under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) For Purposes Of Sentencing
       (Sentencing Tr. Pg. 17, tab 7-11; Tr. Pg. 17, tab 19-23, pg. 18, tab
       1).

                              Assignment of Error III

       Appellant’s Consecutive Sentences Were Improper (Sentencing
       Tr. Pg. 17, tab 7-11; Tr. Pg. 17, tab 19-23, pg. 18, tab 1).

       {¶16} In these assignments of error, Farr argues that his sentences are

otherwise contrary to law. Particularly, in his second assignment of error, Farr

asserts that the trial court failed to make the requisite-sentencing findings under R.C.

2921.331(C)(5)(b) for the statutory enhancement.           With respect to his third



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assignment of error, Farr challenges his consecutive sentences arguing that the

charges should have merged because they were allied offenses of similar import.

                                  Standard of Review

       {¶17} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 

, 

. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 

 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

                      R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) Findings Analysis

       {¶18} Here, Farr was convicted of failure to comply with the order or signal

of police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), (C)(5)(a)(ii). Because Farr was

eluding a police officer while violating division (B) of this section and the jury found

that division (C)(5)(a) applied, the trial court was mandated to consider the factors

listed under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b)(i-ix) along with the factors set forth in R.C.

2929.12 and 2929.13 in its determination of the seriousness of Farr’s conduct.

Those factors are as follows:

       (i) The duration of the pursuit;

       (ii) The distance of the pursuit;

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       (iii) The rate of speed at which the offender operated the motor vehicle
       during the pursuit;

       (iv) Whether the offender failed to stop for traffic lights or stop signs
       during the pursuit;

       (v) The number of traffic lights or stop signs for which the offender
       failed to stop during the pursuit;

       (vi) Whether the offender operated the motor vehicle during the
       pursuit without lighted lights during a time when lighted lights are
       required;

       (vii) Whether the offender committed a moving violation during the
       pursuit;

       (viii) The number of moving violations the offender committed during
       the pursuit;

       (ix) Any other relevant factors indicating that the offender’s conduct
       is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b)(i-ix). Hence, Farr argues that his sentence is contrary to

law. Importantly, Farr did not raise this argument in the trial court. Since Farr failed

to object in the trial court as to the perceived error, he has forfeited all but plain error

on appeal.

       {¶19} For plain error to apply, the trial court must have deviated from a legal

rule, the error must be plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the proceeding, and the error

must have affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” State v. Barnes, 

 (2002). “[T]o demonstrate that the trial court’s error affected a

substantial right, the defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability


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Case No. 1-23-10


that, but for the trial court’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

otherwise.” State v. Sutton, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-11, 

.

We take “[n]otice of plain error * * * with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long,

 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶20} In our review of the record, the factors set forth under R.C.

2921.331(C)(5)(b) are addressed in Ptlm. Martinez’s and Carpenter’s respective

testimonies. Even though the trial court did not affirmatively state that it considered

the factors listed under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) on the record (at the sentencing

hearing) or in its judgment entry, it is not required to do so. State v. Wingate, 3d

Dist. Hardin No. 6-20-07, 

. Since the trial judge was present

for both the officers uncontroverted testimonies (including the admission of their

dash-cam videos) and because the trial judge referenced to those videos at the

sentencing hearing, we conclude that the trial court considered the R.C.

2921.331(C)(5)(b) sentencing factors. Wingate at ¶ 23 citing State v. Tanner, 5th

Dist. Muskingum No. CT2003-0025, 

, ¶ 44 and State v. Banks, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 81679 and 81680, 

, ¶ 31-32. Thus, the trial

court did not commit any error, let alone, plain error under the facts presented. We

determine by clear and convincing evidence that Farr’s sentence is not otherwise

contrary to law. See Marcum, 

, 

.



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      {¶21} We now turn to address Farr’s allied-offenses-of-similar-import

argument.

                    Allied Offenses of Similar Import Analysis

      {¶22} “‘Whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import is a question

of law that this Court reviews de novo.’” State v. Jessen, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-

18-16, 

, quoting State v. Frye, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-30,

; see generally State v. Ruff, 

, 

.

      R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, states in pertinent parts:

      (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
      constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the
      indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,
      but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

      (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses
      of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
      offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
      separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
      counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of
      all of them.

      {¶23} In Ruff, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the following with regard to

determining allied offenses:

      1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar
      import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three
      separate factors–the conduct, the animus, and the import.

      2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning
      of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses
      involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense
      is separate and identifiable.


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       3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports
       multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of
       the following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar
       import, (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed
       separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed
       with separate animus.

Ruff at paragraphs one through three of the syllabus. The Supreme Court in Ruff

explained:

       At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of
       a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant’s conduct. The
       evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal
       whether the offenses have similar import. When a defendant’s
       conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm for each person is
       separate and distinct, and therefore, the defendant can be convicted of
       multiple counts. Also, a defendant’s conduct that constitutes two or
       more offenses against a single victim can support multiple convictions
       if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable
       from the harm of the other offense. We therefore hold that two or more
       offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C.
       2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct constitutes offenses
       involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense
       is separate and identifiable.

Id. at ¶ 26.

       {¶24} Farr argues that his convictions for failure to comply with an order or

signal of police officer and felonious assault should have merged at sentencing.

However, Farr did not object to the trial court’s failure to merge the convictions, so

we review the matter for plain error. Importantly, in State v. Bailey, 

, 

, the Supreme Court of Ohio revisited plain error in the context

of allied offenses cases, holding as follows:



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       Under the plain-error doctrine, intervention by a reviewing court is
       warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.
       State v. Long, 

 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus
       (“Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution,
       under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of
       justice”). To prevail under the plain-error doctrine, Bailey must
       establish that “an error occurred, that the error was obvious, and that
       there is ‘a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice,’
       meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” (Emphasis
       added in [State v.] Rogers[, 

, 

].)
       State v. McAlpin, [169] Ohio St.3d [279], 

,
       quoting Rogers at ¶ 22; see also State v. Wilks, 

,
       

, ¶ 52.

(Emphasis sic). 

.

       {¶25} As the Supreme Court of Ohio emphasized in Bailey, determining

whether R.C. 2941.25 has been properly applied is a legal question, “it necessarily

turns on an analysis of the facts, which can lead to exceedingly fine distinctions.”

Id. at ¶ 11. Further, the Supreme Court determined that to reverse for an error under

the plain-error test, the error has to be “obvious.” Id. at ¶ 14. Stated differently, the

plain-error doctrine is warranted only under exceptional circumstances to prevent

injustice. See Long, 

, at paragraph three of the syllabus; see also

United States v. Atkinson, 

, 

 (1936) (“In

exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the

public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has

been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”).



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          {¶26} With this in mind, we consider whether the trial court committed plain

error by failing to merge the convictions for failure to comply with the order or

signal of a police officer and felonious assault in this case for purposes of

sentencing. Farr contends that his convictions should have merged because the

single act of driving the car in a manner to evade apprehension resulted in a

conviction for the crimes of which he was charged. The State disagrees, arguing

that the victim of the failure to comply offense was the general public, while the

victim of the felonious assault offense was the officer. Thus, different victims from

different crimes would make the offenses of dissimilar import, and they would not

merge for purposes of sentencing. See State v. Ramunas, 

, 2022-

Ohio-4199, ¶ 23.

          {¶27} After our review of the record, we agree with the State. Under the

facts presented, this is not an exceptional circumstance warranted to prevent

injustice. Thus, we conclude there is no plain error present with respect to merger.

Accordingly, we determine by clear and convincing evidence that Farr’s sentence is

not otherwise contrary to law. See Marcum, 

, 

.

          {¶28} Therefore, Farr’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.




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       {¶29} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and HESS, J., concur.

/hls

** Judge Michael D. Hess of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by
Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.




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