State v. Bowser
Citation2023 Ohio 4684
Date Filed2023-12-21
DocketOT-23-008
JudgeOsowik
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Syllabus
Trial court did not err when advising appellant of the potential consequences of post-release control violations. Judgment affirmed.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
[Cite as State v. Bowser,2023-Ohio-4684
.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
OTTAWA COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. OT-23-008
Appellee Trial Court No. 22 CR 083
v.
Samantha Bowser DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 21, 2023
*****
James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney and
Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.
*****
OSOWIK, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a March 14, 2023 judgment of the Ottawa County
Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a five-year total term of incarceration
following appellant’s convictions, pursuant to a plea agreement, on three counts of
making false alarms, in violation of R.C. 2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth degree, and one
count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), a felony of the third
degree. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant, Samantha Bowser, sets forth the following two assignments of
error:
“The trial court failed to properly advise [appellant] of all of the possible penalties
for a violation of PRC.
“The trial court’s failure to advise [appellant] renders her plea unknowingly,
involuntarily, and [unintelligently] given.”
{¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. This case arises
from a series of law enforcement investigations, at both the local and state level, triggered
by a series of allegations reported by appellant to law enforcement agencies, hospitals,
and homeless shelters serving abused women, maintaining that she had been sexually
abused, assaulted, and raped by multiple individuals on multiple occasions. Appellant had
become acquainted with the accused individuals in various ways, including co-workers,
mutual acquaintances, and via online dating applications for those seeking sexual
encounters.
{¶ 4} Ultimately, following extensive investigations and inter-agency
collaboration, it was uniformly determined that the evidence collected overwhelmingly
demonstrated that appellant had fabricated the entirety of the above-referenced claims,
going so far as to plant evidence, and self-inflict injuries designed to support her claims,
2.
such as severe bruising, cuts, and the internal placement of foreign objects. Appellant
ultimately conceded to the bulk of the deception.
{¶ 5} In addition, it was discovered that appellant had active warrants for her
arrest in at least six other states for similarly making false reports of alleged sexual
criminal offenses, as well as for identity theft, forgery, and receiving stolen property. It
was determined that appellant had utilized approximately 20 different aliases, and had
resided at least 11 different states in the last several years.
{¶ 6} On May 4, 2022, based upon the forgoing, appellant was indicted on a total
of 17 offenses; including five counts of making false alarms, in violation of R.C.
2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth degree, two counts of tampering with evidence, in
violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), felonies of the third degree, five counts of falsification, in
violation of R.C. 2921.13(A), misdemeanors of the first degree, and five counts of
obstruction of official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), felonies of the fifth
degree.
{¶ 7} On February 2, 2023, following completion of a mental health evaluation
assessment by the Court Diagnostic & Treatment Center, which determined appellant to
be legally competent, appellant withdrew her prior plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity, and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to three
counts of making false alarms, in violation of R.C. 2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth
degree, and one count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), a
3.
felony of the third degree. In exchange, the 13 remaining offenses were dismissed. A
presentence investigation was ordered.
{¶ 8} On March 13, 2023, the sentencing hearing was conducted. The trial court
emphasized at sentencing that, “The [untrue] allegations that you made were very serious
and certainly could ruin peoples[‘] lives. And that’s a very serious concern.” After
weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence and circumstances, the trial court
sentenced appellant to a five-year total term of incarceration, with credit for 262 days
served. This appeal ensued.
{¶ 9} In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court did not
properly advise appellant of the potential penalties for a post-release control violation.
Appellant argues that, “The trial court failed to inform [her] about all of the consequences
she faces for a failure to comply with PRC during her plea colloquy and at her sentencing
hearing.” Notably, appellant simultaneously concedes, “Admittedly, the trial court
advised [appellant] at sentencing that any violation of the terms of her PRC would subject
her to the [R.C. 2967.28] sanctions.” Appellant fails to cite any specific post-release
control violation consequence of which the trial court allegedly failed to inform
appellant. Appellant also acknowledges that the plea form executed by appellant
contained, “the full list of possible penalties for violating PRC.”
4.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2967.28(B) of the post-release control statute, establishes in
relevant part,
Each sentence to a prison term, other than a term of life imprisonment, for a
felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex
offense, or for a felony of the third degree * * * shall include a requirement
that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by
the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.
In conjunction, as held by this court in State v. Sprouse, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-
1230, 2023-Ohio-2893, ¶ 24,
[R.C. 2967.28(B)] requires the trial court provide notice of post-release
control at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry * * * State v.
Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21,2004-Ohio-6085
,817 N.E.2d 864
, ¶ 23,
overruled on other grounds, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-
Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 40. At both the sentencing hearing and in
the sentencing entry, ‘[t]he trial court must advise the offender * * * of the
term of supervision, whether post-release control is discretionary or
mandatory, and the consequences of violating post-release control.’ Id.,
citing State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19,2017-Ohio-2927
,85 N.E.3d 700
,
¶ 11.
{¶ 11} As applied to the instant case, the transcript of the February 2, 2023 change
of plea hearing irrefutably shows that the trial court stated to appellant in the course of
5.
the change of plea colloquy, “[Y]ou could be required to serve a two-year term of post-
release control following your release from prison. Post-release control is parole. If you
violate the terms of post-release control, you could be sent back to prison for up to one-
half of your original prison sentence * * * Do you understand?” Appellant replied,
“Yes.”
{¶ 12} Likewise, the transcript of the March 13, 2023 sentencing hearing
irrefutably shows that the trial court stated to appellant at sentencing, “[Y]ou may have a
two-year term of post-release control following your release from prison. The Adult
Parole Authority will administer post-release control pursuant to Revised Code Section
2967.28. And any violation of post-release control will subject you to the consequences
set forth in that statute.”
Lastly, the March 14, 2023 sentencing entry issued by the trial court states,
The court explained the concepts of post-release control and advised that
the defendant would be subject to a discretionary period of two years of
post-release control upon release from prison. APA will administer the
post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and any violation by the
offender of the conditions of post-release control will subject the offender
to the consequences set forth in the statute, including being sent back to
prison for up to one-half of the stated prison term or whatever time remains
on post-release control, whichever is longer.
6.
{¶ 13} Based upon the foregoing, we find that the record reflects that, in accord
with Grimes and Sprouse, the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences
of violations of post-release control, and did so in the change of plea hearing, in the
sentencing hearing, and in the sentencing entry.
{¶ 14} Appellant also cites State v. Heinzen, 2d Dist. Clark No. 19-CA-65, 2022-
Ohio-1341, in support of the first assignment of error. We have reviewed Heinzen and
find it to be materially distinguishable from the instant case. In contrast to the facts
present in this case, in Heinzen, the trial court did not advise the defendant of the
potential post-release control violation penalty of being imprisoned for up to one-half of
the stated prison term.
As held in Heinzen, ¶ 27,
The trial court, however, never advised Heinzen that she could receive a
prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed
* * * Although the trial court included this information in the sentencing
entry, it was not discussed at the sentencing hearing, as required by R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(f). For this reason, the post-release control portion of
Heinzen’s sentence is contrary to law.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, the above-quoted omission by the trial court of the
consequences of post-release control violations in Heinzen, which did not occur in the
instant case, required the defendant to be resentenced to remediate the omission.
7.
{¶ 16} We have carefully reviewed and considered the record of evidence. It
demonstrates that, in accord with R.C. 2967.28, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f), Grimes, and
Sprouse, the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences of violations of
post-release control. Wherefore, we find appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-
taken.
{¶ 17} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant similarly alleges that
appellant’s plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given, as required by
Crim.R. 11, also based upon appellant’s allegation that the trial court failed to properly
advise appellant of the consequences of violations of post-release control, the same legal
basis upon which appellant’s first assignment of error was premised. As such, the merit
of appellant’s second assignment of error is contingent upon the merit of appellant’s first
assignment of error.
{¶ 18} Given our determination in response to appellant’s first assignment of
error, finding that the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences of
violations of post-release control, we likewise find appellant’s second assignment of error
not well- taken on the same basis set forth above in response to the first assignment of
error.
8.
{¶ 19} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of
Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
9.