State v. Meeks

[Cite as State v. Meeks, 

.]



                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 GEAUGA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   CASE NO. 2023-G-0016

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

RICKEY L. MEEKS,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2021 C 000167
                 Defendant-Appellant.


                                            OPINION

                                    Decided: December 18, 2023
                                        Judgment: Affirmed


James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Alexandria R. Scheid, Assistant
Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).


Gregory S. Robey, 14402 Granger Road, Cleveland, OH 44137 (For Defendant-
Appellant).


JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Rickey Meeks, appeals his convictions from the Geauga County

Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

        {¶2}     On March 21, 2023, a jury found Appellant guilty of three counts of

Trafficking in Cocaine, fifth-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a),

and three counts of Possession of Cocaine, fifth-degree felonies in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a).
       {¶3}   On appeal, Appellant raises five assignments of error: (1) the state failed to

present sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s convictions; (2) his convictions were

against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred in “refusing” to allow

defense counsel to fully examine the criminal informant; (4) the trial court erred by not

giving certain jury instructions requested by the defense; and (5) text messages admitted

into evidence were not properly authenticated.

       {¶4}   After a review of the record and applicable case law, Appellant’s

assignments are without merit. A reasonable jury could, and did, find that there was

enough evidence to prove that Appellant committed three counts of Trafficking in Cocaine

and three counts of Possession of Cocaine. The trial court did not err in “refusing” to

allow defense counsel to cross-examine the criminal informant on his probation violation

to impeach him because he had already admitted that he occasionally drinks. The trial

court was not required to give jury instructions on the topics of “informant” and “drug

addict” because Appellant was not prejudiced by the instructions’ exclusion, the

informant’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence, and the trial court generally

instructed the jury on witness credibility.       Finally, the text messages admitted into

evidence were authenticated because the recipient of the messages testified that they

were between himself and Appellant.

                             Facts and Procedural History

       {¶5}   On March 1, 2021, Detective Andrew Humar and his narcotics unit were

executing a search warrant for drug trafficking at a Slyvia Drive residence in Chardon,

Ohio. Upon entering the residence, the detectives saw the subject of that investigation

(unrelated to this case) and several others. One of the people present was Andrew
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Case No. 2023-G-0016
Burzanko. Upon searching Mr. Burzanko, the detectives found a vial with white residue

in it and an article of drug paraphernalia. The white residue later tested presumptively

positive for cocaine.

       {¶6}   The detectives arrested Mr. Burzanko and charged him with possessing

drugs. Detective Humar asked Mr. Burzanko if he would be willing to cooperate with the

narcotics unit as a criminal informant to provide them with two names of people trafficking

in drugs and to assist in the investigation. In exchange, Detective Humar agreed to

recommend dismissal of Mr. Burzanko’s drug possession charges. Mr. Burzanko agreed.

He provided Detective Humar with two names, one of which was Appellant’s.

       {¶7}   Mr. Burzanko agreed to set up controlled buys with Appellant via text

message. Mr. Burzanko had known Appellant for years and had previously bought

cocaine from him.       The phone number Mr. Burzanko showed Detective Humar is

Appellant’s known phone number. The name card on Mr. Burzanko’s phone said “Tut.”

According to Mr. Burzanko, Appellant’s nickname is “Turtle.” When entering the name on

his phone, Mr. Burzanko said he forgot the “r” and wrote “t” instead.

       {¶8}   Mr. Burzanko arranged via text message to meet with Appellant on April 21,

2021. Detective Humar, along with his surveillance team, met with Mr. Burzanko at a

parking lot before the transaction. The detectives searched him and his vehicle for drugs,

finding none. They gave him $200.00 for the purchase and attached an audio recording

device to him. They then followed Mr. Burzanko to Appellant’s known residence at 12030

Nicki Lane, Chardon, Ohio. The detectives could not see farther than the driveway, but

did see a door open and Mr. Burzanko walk in. Detective Humar saw a 2003 Lexus

Sedan in the driveway. He identified it as Appellant’s known vehicle. Mr. Burzanko

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Case No. 2023-G-0016
returned to the parking lot after the transaction to meet with the detectives. He gave them

the cocaine he had purchased; he had no other contraband or the money. Mr. Burzanko

and Detective Humar repeated similar transactions the next two days on April 22 and 23,

2021. In one instance, Mr. Burzanko said that Appellant had left the cocaine on the

counter during the transaction. On the other two transactions, Mr. Burzanko said that

Appellant handed him the cocaine. During one transaction, Mr. Burzanko and Appellant

are heard (via audio recording) discussing their upcoming birthdays, which are one day

apart. After the third transaction, Detective Humar issued an arrest warrant and arrested

Appellant.

         {¶9}   Appellant was indicted on three counts of Trafficking in Cocaine, fifth-

degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a), and three counts of

Possession of Cocaine, fifth-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a). He

pled not guilty to all counts.

         {¶10} On March 20, 2023, a jury trial began. Detective Humar and Mr. Burzanko

testified to the above facts.    They were the only witnesses to testify.        On cross-

examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Burzanko if he was an addict and what his drug

of choice was. Mr. Burzanko replied “Yes. * * * Really it was cocaine. Really anything.

I don’t – except drinking.” Mr. Burzanko explained: “I have had four DUI’s for it and that’s

when I stopped. It was like I don’t drink. I have maybe one or two drinks now every so

often.” When asked when he stopped drinking, Mr. Burzanko said about twenty years

prior.   He then clarified that he no longer heavily drinks or goes to bars, but he

occasionally drinks.



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Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶11} Also during cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Burzanko if he

had a prior “conviction regarding the label of a pill bottle.” He said “yes” and that he was

sentenced to jail. Defense counsel then asked whether Mr. Burzanko was sentenced to

jail for the conviction or given probation. He replied “Yes. I was sentenced.” When asked

further about probation, the state objected. The court granted the objection based upon

an earlier discussion outside the presence of the jury. At that discussion defense counsel

argued to cross-examine Mr. Burzanko on the violation of probation in 2014 for testing

positive for alcohol.    Counsel asserted that the violation went to Mr. Buzanko’s

truthfulness and was admissible under Evid.R. 608(B). The court denied his motion and

asserted that the testimony was not relevant.

       {¶12} The state offered as exhibits: screenshots and photographs of the text

messages between Mr. Burzanko and “Tut”; the audio recordings at each transaction;

and photographs of the cocaine bought after each transaction. The state rested its case.

Appellant moved for acquittal under Crim.R. 29. The court denied his motion. The

defense objected to admitting the screenshots and photographs of the text messages into

evidence, arguing that they had not been authenticated. The court denied the motion.

The defense next offered criminal informant and drug addict jury instructions, relating to

Mr. Burzanko’s testimony. The court declined to give the jury instructions. The defense

rested its case. The jury found Mr. Burzako guilty on all counts.

       {¶13} On May 3, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to two months of community

control on each count to be served concurrently.

                                    Law and Analysis

       {¶14} Appellant timely appeals and raises five assignments of error.
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Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶15} His first two assignments relate and will be addressed together.

       {¶16} First assignment of error: “The state failed to present sufficient evidence to

support criminal convictions of Appellant, resulting in substantive and procedural due

process violations.”

       {¶17} Second assignment of error: “The convictions of Appellant are against the

manifest weight of the evidence presented, and said convictions must be vacated.”

       {¶18} “‘Sufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied

to determine whether the case may go to the [factfinder] or whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the [factfinder's] verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 

, 

 (1997), citing Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990)

1433. The appellate court's standard of review for sufficiency of evidence is to determine,

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, whether a rational

trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Jenks, 

, 

 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus.

       {¶19} When evaluating the weight of the evidence, we review whether the

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one

side of the issue rather than the other indicated clearly that the party having the burden

of proof was entitled to a verdict in its favor, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds,

the greater amount of credible evidence sustained the issue which is to be established

before them. “Weight is not a question of mathematics but depends on its effect in

inducing belief.” State v. Thompkins, 

, 

 (1997).



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Case No. 2023-G-0016
Whereas sufficiency relates to the evidence’s adequacy, weight of the evidence relates

to the evidence’s persuasiveness. 

       {¶20} The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses. State v. Landingham, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-103, 2021-

Ohio-4258, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Antill, 

, 67, 

 (1964). The

trier of fact may believe or disbelieve any witness in whole or in part, considering the

demeanor of the witness and the manner in which a witness testifies, the interest, if any,

of the outcome of the case and the connection with the prosecution or the defendant. 

quoting Antil at 67. This court, engaging in the limited weighing of the evidence introduced

at trial, is deferential to the weight and factual findings made by the factfinder. State v.

Brown, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0077, 

, citing Thompkins at

390 and State v. DeHass, 

, 

 (1967), paragraph two of

the syllabus. The reviewing court “determines whether * * * the [factfinder] clearly lost its

way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be

exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the

conviction.” State v. Martin, 

, 

 (1st Dist. 1983).

       {¶21} A finding that a judgment is supported by the manifest weight of the

evidence necessarily means the judgment is supported by sufficient evidence. State v.

Arcaro, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2012-A-0028, 

.

       {¶22} We begin by analyzing whether it was against the manifest weight of the

evidence for the court to find Appellant guilty of violating R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a).



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Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶23} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)(C)(4)(a), Trafficking in Cocaine, provides: “No person

shall knowingly * * * [s]ell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance

analog.”

       {¶24} A person acts “knowingly” when “he is aware that his conduct will probably

cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of

circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.”                  R.C.

2901.22(B).    Knowledge is generally not susceptible to direct proof, but must be

determined through inferences drawn from the surrounding facts and circumstances.

State v. Green 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-860791, 

, *4 (Apr. 20, 1988).

       {¶25} In this case, the state offered, as evidence, the text messages between Mr.

Burzanko and the cell phone number and contact commonly known as Appellant’s. In

those messages, Mr. Burzanko asked for drugs and stated that he was “jonesing.” On

each of the three instances, “Tut” replied that he would meet with him at the agreed

location, Appellant’s residence. On each of the three transactions, Mr. Burzanko returned

to the detectives directly after completing the purchase. Each time he provided the

detectives with the cocaine he had bought and did not have the marked money he used

to purchase it. Appellant asserts that his convictions are against the weight of the

evidence because the state did not introduce and admit video recordings of the

transactions nor Appellant’s phone records.        Yet, notwithstanding the lack of video

evidence and phone records, the remaining evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury

to conclude that Appellant knowingly committed Trafficking in Cocaine. Appellant also

asserts that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the

marked money the detectives gave to Mr. Burzanko to purchase the drugs was never

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Case No. 2023-G-0016
traced to Appellant. However, Detective Homar testified that marked money is rarely

traced back to the seller. Based upon the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could

find that Appellant knowingly sold cocaine to Mr. Burzanko on three instances.

      {¶26} Appellant also asserts that his convictions under R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a)

are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      {¶27} R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a) provides: “No person shall knowingly obtain,

possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.”

      {¶28} “‘Possess' or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance,

but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through

ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”

R.C. 2925.01(K). Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Haynes, 

, 

 (1971).         Although circumstantial evidence is

sufficient to support the element of constructive possession, constructive possession

cannot be inferred by a person's mere presence in the vicinity of contraband. State v.

Giles, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63709, 

, *2 (May 12, 1994). Constructive

possession requires some evidence that the person exercised or has the power to

exercise dominion or control over the object, even though that object may not be within

his immediate physical possession. State v. Wolery, 

, 

 (1976).

      {¶29} Here, Mr. Burzanko testified that Appellant sold him cocaine. Specifically,

he said that on one instance, Appellant left it for him on the counter as Mr. Burzanko

purchased it, and on the other two instances, Appellant handed it to him. A reasonable

jury could conclude, based upon this evidence, that Appellant possessed the cocaine

                                           9

Case No. 2023-G-0016
before selling it to Mr. Burzanko. This testimony is supported by the text messages

showing that Mr. Burzanko texted Appellant to purchase the cocaine and agreed on a

location, where they later met for the transaction. The evidence also showed that Mr.

Burzanko returned the cocaine to the detectives immediately after meeting with Appellant.

A reasonable jury could find that Appellant possessed and exercised control over the

cocaine before selling it to Mr. Burzanko.

       {¶30} Upon review, this is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction. Because Appellant’s convictions were not against the

manifest weight of the evidence, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

       {¶31} Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are without merit.

       {¶32} Third assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it refused to permit

defense counsel to fully cross examine the government informant, resulting in a denial of

due process and a fair trial.”

       {¶33} Appellant specifically asserts that defense counsel should have been

permitted to cross-examine Mr. Burzanko about his violation of probation in 2014. He

argues that Mr. Burzanko’s violation went to his truthfulness and is admissible under

Evid.R. 608(B).

       {¶34} While “‘cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right,’ the “‘extent of

cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound

discretion of the trial court.’” State v. Green, 

, 

(1993), quoting Alford v. United States, 

, 

, 

(1931). The determination to admit or exclude evidence lies within the discretion of the

trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 11th

                                             10

Case No. 2023-G-0016
Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0061, 

, ¶ 14. “‘The term “abuse of discretion”

is one of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason,

nor the record.’ State v. Underwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 

, citing State v. Ferranto, 

, [

] (1925).” State v.

Raia, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2013-P-0020, 

.

       {¶35} Stated differently, an abuse of discretion is “the trial court’s ‘failure to

exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” 

 quoting State v. Beechler,

2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 

, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11

(8th Ed.Rev.2004). “When an appellate court is reviewing a pure issue of law, ‘the mere

fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough to find error[.] *

* * By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the discretion of the trial

court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a different result is not

enough, without more, to find error.’” 

 quoting Beechler at ¶ 67.

       {¶36} Evid.R. 404(A)(3) contains an exception to the general prohibition on

character evidence, providing that “[e]vidence of the character of a witness on the issue

of credibility is admissible as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.”

       {¶37} Evid.R. 608(B) provides, in relevant part, that “[s]pecific instances of the

conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s character

for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, may not be

proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if clearly

probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the

witness (1) concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness * * *.”



                                             11

Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶38} Evid.R. 608(B) requires “a high degree of probative value of instances of

prior conduct as to truthfulness or untruthfulness of the witness before the trial court will

allow such cross-examination.” State v. Norwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-146, 

, *3 (Mar. 22, 2002); see 1980 Staff Notes to Evid.R. 608.

       {¶39} Appellant asserts that cross-examining Mr. Burzanko on his probation

violation was admissible because Mr. Burzanko was untruthful when he testified about

drinking alcohol. Mr. Burzanko said that he had stopped drinking alcohol twenty years

prior. Yet, Mr. Burzanko violated probation by testing positive for alcohol in 2014; roughly

nine years before he testified at Appellant’s trial. He later explained that when he stated

that he had stopped drinking, he meant that he stopped drinking heavily and going to

bars, but that he still occasionally drinks.

       {¶40} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing defense counsel

to cross-examine Mr. Burzanko on his probation violation to impeach him on whether or

not he drank alcohol. It was not arbitrary for the trial court to find that the testimony’s

probative value was low. More importantly, Mr. Burzanko was not untruthful. He had

already corrected his earlier statement and explained that he still occasionally drank

alcohol. Testifying that he violated probation by testing positive for alcohol, thus, had a

low probative value and did not go to his truthfulness on the matter.

       {¶41} Appellant also asserts that Mr. Burzanko was untruthful and denied violating

probation. A review of the record reveals that this assertion is not true. Mr. Burzanko

admitted to being sentenced to jail for his conviction and defense counsel was not

permitted to further examine him on the matter regarding probation.

       {¶42} Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.

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Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶43} Fourth assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it failed to give

instructions by the defense, resulting in a denial of due process and a fair trial.”

       {¶44} “A trial court is responsible for providing all jury instructions that are relevant

and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and determine the facts.” State v.

Jennings, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-70, 

, ¶ 59, citing State v. Moody,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-1371, 

, 

 (Mar.

13, 2001). A trial court's decision on jury instructions is treated with deference, and an

appellate court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Ament v. Reassure Am.

Life Ins. Co., 

, 

, 

 (8th Dist.),

citing Jaworowski v. Med. Radiation Consultants, 

, 327–328, 

 (2d Dist.1991). To show reversible error, the proponent of the instruction must

show both that the trial court's refusal to give the instruction was an abuse of discretion

and that he was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the proposed instruction. 

Thus, this court will not reverse unless an instruction is so prejudicial that it may induce

an erroneous verdict. Youssef v. Parr, 

, 

 (8th

Dist.1990).

       {¶45} Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in not giving the jury an

“informant” jury instruction. He contends that the instruction was relevant for the jury to

weigh the evidence because there is no dispute that Mr. Burzanko was an informant and

that he “was given consideration on his own criminal charges in exchange for his

assistance and testimony in this case.” Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in

not giving a “drug addict” jury instruction relating to Mr. Burzanko.



                                              13

Case No. 2023-G-0016
       {¶46} In State v. Oko, Cuyahoga App. No. 87539, 

, the Eighth

District Court of Appeals held that a special jury instruction on an informant is not

appropriate when the informant’s testimony is corroborated by other evidence, such as

audio recordings or detective testimony.

       {¶47} State v. Trapp, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85446, 

, ¶ 11 also

addresses when “informant” and “drug addict” jury instructions are not required. “Where

the trial court adequately covers witness credibility in its general charge to the jury, there

is no need for special comment or instruction.” “[A] trial judge may not single out a

particular witness or group of witnesses to discuss their credibility, since such discussion

exerts an undue influence on the jury.” 

 quoting State v. Group, 

, 

, 

.

       {¶48} In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not giving special

jury instructions on “informants” and “drug addicts.” The jury’s not being instructed did

not prejudice Appellant because Mr. Burzanko testified at length that he was a criminal

informant, that his criminal charges would be dismissed in exchange for his assistance,

and he admitted to being a drug addict. Mr. Burzanko’s testimony was also corroborated

by audio recordings and text messages between himself and Appellant.               Detective

Homar’s testimony also corroborated Mr. Burzanko’s. We further note that the trial court

generally instructed the jury on witness credibility. Under State v. 

 a special

jury instruction on Mr. Burzanko’s informant status or drug addiction would therefore be

impermissible.

       {¶49} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.



                                             14

Case No. 2023-G-0016
      {¶50} Fifth assignment of error: “The trial court erred when it permitted the

prosecutor to introduce text messages allegedly sent by defendant to the informant, which

were not properly authenticated.”

      {¶51} Appellant argues that the text messages and photographs of the text

messages were never authenticated because the detectives never seized Appellant’s

phone nor his phone records.

      {¶52} “A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally reviewed for

an abuse of discretion.” State v. Dotson, 11th Dist. No. 2017-T-0103, 

,

, ¶ 49. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by introducing “evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Evid.R. 901(A). This

threshold requirement for authentication of evidence is low and does not require

conclusive proof of authenticity. State v. Renfro, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-07-042,

, ¶ 30. Instead, the state only needs to demonstrate a “reasonable

likelihood” that the evidence is authentic. 

 Such evidence may be supplied by the

testimony of a witness with knowledge. Evid.R. 901(B)(1).

      {¶53} “Statements from text messages are properly authenticated and are

admissible as a party-opponent admission when the recipient of the messages identifies

the messages as coming from the defendant.”      Ellis v. Skinner, 11th Dist. Geauga No.

2022-G-0009, 

. Further, photographs of text messages sent from

a defendant are not hearsay, instead they qualify as a party-opponent admission under

Evid.R. 801(D)(2), as long as the statements are properly authenticated.         State v.



                                           15

Case No. 2023-G-0016
Bickerstaff, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2014-A-0054, 

; State v. Shaw,

, 

, ¶ 43 (7th Dist.).

      {¶54} Here, Mr. Burzanko authenticated the text messages when he identified

them as being exchanged between himself and Appellant. The photographs of the text

messages were also authenticated because Detective Humar had personal knowledge

that he took the photographs himself and that Mr. Burzanko identified Appellant as the

recipient of the messages.

      {¶55} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit.

      {¶56} The judgment of the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.



EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.




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Case No. 2023-G-0016