State v. Edwards

[Cite as State v. Edwards, 

.]




                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               UNION COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                         CASE NO. 14-23-11
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

ZACHERY LEE EDWARDS,                                     OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.



                  Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. 2021-CR-0196

                                     Judgment Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: September 11, 2023



APPEARANCES:

        Alison Boggs for Appellant

        Andrew M. Bigler for Appellee
Case No. 14-23-11


WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Zachery L. Edwards (“Edwards”) appeals the

judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to withdraw his plea. For the reasons set forth below,

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On September 30, 2021, Edwards was indicted on seven counts of rape

in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), felonies of the first degree, and two counts of

rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), felonies of the first degree. On August 11,

2022, Edwards pled guilty to two counts of rape in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b).    The remaining seven counts in the indictment were then

dismissed at the request of the State.

       {¶3} On October 28, 2022, Edwards appeared for his sentencing hearing and

made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. In response, the trial court

rescheduled the sentencing hearing. On February 23, 2023, the trial court held a

hearing on Edwards’s motion to withdraw. Neither party presented any testimony

at this hearing. On March 6, 2023, the trial court denied Edwards’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court issued its judgment entry of sentencing on

March 14, 2023.




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                                Assignment of Error

       {¶4} Edwards filed his notice of appeal on April 12, 2023. On appeal, he

raises the following assignment of error:

       The trial court erred when it overruled appellant’s oral motion to
       withdraw his plea before he was sentenced.

Edwards asserts that the factors courts are to consider in evaluating motions to

withdraw pleas weigh in his favor.

                                  Legal Standard

       {¶5} Under Crim.R. 32.1, a defendant may make a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea before his or her sentence is imposed.

       ‘A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and
       liberally granted.’ * * * A defendant does not, however, have an
       ‘absolute right’ to withdraw his or her plea, even when a motion to
       withdraw is made before sentencing.

State v. Barnes, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 

, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 13, quoting

State v. Xie, 

, 

 (1992). “Before ruling on a

defendant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court must conduct a

hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for

withdrawing the plea.” 

.

       {¶6} “The determination whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis

for the defendant’s request to withdraw his plea is ‘within the sound discretion of

the trial court.” 

, quoting Xie at paragraph two of the syllabus. For

this reason, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be

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reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 

 “An abuse of discretion is not

merely an error of judgment.” State v. Sullivan, 

, 

 (3d Dist.). “Rather, an abuse of discretion is present where the trial court’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.” State v. Howton, 3d Dist. Allen

No. 1-16-35, 

. “When the abuse of discretion standard

applies, an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”

State v. Richey, 

, 

 (3d Dist.).

                                     Legal Analysis

       {¶7} On review, appellate courts have typically relied upon a list of nine

factors to evaluate a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a plea. These

nine factors are as follows:

       (1) whether the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the
       representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of
       the hearing held pursuant to Crim.R. 11; (4) the extent of the hearing
       on the motion to withdraw the plea; (5) whether the trial court gave
       full and fair consideration of the motion; (6) whether the timing of the
       motion was reasonable; (7) the stated reasons for the motion; (8)
       whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and
       potential sentences; and (9) whether the accused was perhaps not
       guilty or had a complete defense to the charges.

State v. Bingham, 

, 

, ¶ 42 (3d Dist.). See State v.

Fish, 

, 

 (1st Dist. 1995), overruled on

other grounds by State v. Sims, 

, 

 (1st Dist.); State

v. Peterseim, 

, 

 (8th Dist. 1980).



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Case No. 14-23-11


       {¶8} However, in State v. Barnes, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that this

nine-factor analysis was not applicable in a situation where the defendant became

aware of new evidence that would have affected his decision to enter a plea. In the

wake of this decision, several of our sister appellate districts have concluded that

the nine-factor analysis continues to apply outside of the situations that are factually

similar to the distinct set of circumstances described in Barnes. State v. Wroten,

, 

 (2d Dist.); State v. Kohler, 5th Dist. Delaware

No. 22 CAA 10 0068, 

; State v. Grier, 6th Dist. Lucas No.

L-21-1263, 

; State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111448,

. See also State v. Wallace, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-23-04, 2023-

Ohio-3014, ¶ 30-33.

       {¶9} In reaching this conclusion, our sister districts have noted that the Ohio

Supreme Court did not reject or overrule the nine-factor analysis but simply

concluded that these “factors do not apply here.” Johnson at ¶ 43, quoting 

. Finding the reasoning of these other decisions to be persuasive, we

join our sister districts in continuing to apply the nine-factor analysis to cases that

do not present a situation that is factually similar to Barnes. 

; Kohler

at ¶ 15; Grier at ¶ 26; Johnson at ¶ 44-45. Since Edwards has not alleged that he

became aware of new evidence that would have affected his decision to enter a plea,

we will use the nine-factor analysis to evaluate the trial court’s decision.



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           {¶10} Whether withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution: In its brief, the

State concedes that it did not argue the prosecution would be prejudiced by the

withdrawal of the guilty plea and suggests that this factor should weigh in favor of

the defendant. However, the trial court concluded that this factor “adds weight to

the denial of Defendant’s motion.” (Doc. 70).

           {¶11} The representation afforded to the defendant by counsel: During the

course of this case, Edwards was represented by attorneys from three different firms.

In its judgment entry, the trial court conducted an extensive summary of Edwards’s

representation, concluding that these attorneys were experienced in criminal law

and were “highly competent.” (Doc. 70).

           {¶12} The extent of the hearing held pursuant to Crim.R. 11: On August 12,

2022, the trial court engaged Edwards in a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy. When

asked to enter his plea, Edwards hesitated, indicating that he did not feel that he

could proceed. The trial court then gave Edwards time to confer with defense

counsel. After returning to the courtroom, the trial judge explained the substance

of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy again. Edwards then indicated that he wanted to proceed

and enter a plea of guilty. In its decision, the trial judge concluded that Edwards

was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing.1




1
    A visiting judge who did not preside over the Crim.R. 11 colloquy decided the motion to withdraw.

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       {¶13} The extent of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea: In this

case, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw, giving the State and

the Defense an opportunity to present evidence. The Defense chose not to present

any testimony. Rather, the parties opted to submit a recording of the Crim.R. 11

colloquy. The trial court reviewed this recording in the process of reaching a

decision on this motion.

       {¶14} Whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration of the motion:

The trial court’s judgment entry indicates that it considered the arguments of the

parties and viewed the exhibit submitted at the hearing before reaching a decision.

The judgment entry examines the applicable factors and fully explains the trial

court’s reasons for denying Edwards’s motion.

       {¶15} Whether the timing of the motion was reasonable: Edwards made his

motion to withdraw on the date of his sentencing hearing. According to its brief,

the State does not believe that, under the facts of this case, the timing of this motion

was unreasonable. The trial court does not appear to have relied upon this factor in

reaching its decision on this motion.

       {¶16} The stated reasons for the motion: The defendant did not give any

reasons for his motion to withdraw at the hearing other than that he “felt rushed to

make the decision * * *.” (Tr. 4). However, in this case, the trial court gave

Edwards time to confer with defense counsel during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. After

being allowed time to review the plea agreement with his attorney, the trial court

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explained a second time the consequences of pleading guilty. Edwards then chose

proceed.

       {¶17} Whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges and

potential sentences:    At the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court thoroughly

explained the nature of the charges against Edwards and the potential penalties

before giving him time to confer with counsel. After this consultation, the trial court

reviewed most of these details a second time. Edwards affirmed that he understood

the nature of the charges against him and each of the potential penalties he could

face. He also stated that he had no questions about the content of the Crim.R. 11

colloquy.

       {¶18} Whether the accused was perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense

to the charges: At the hearing on the motion to withdraw, defense counsel asserted

that Edwards maintained his innocence of the charges. In response, the State

pointed out that he had admitted “to the PSI writer * * * that he did in fact have

sexual conduct with the victim while she was under the age of 13.” (Tr. 6). The

State then argued that his claim of innocence at the hearing contradicted his own

admissions. At this hearing, Edwards did not identify any evidence or raise any

arguments that would suggest that he has a complete defense to the charges against

him.

       {¶19} In this case, Edwards did not provide the trial court with a reasonable

or legitimate basis for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in this case. Without

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more, “a ‘change of heart’ is not sufficient justification to withdraw a plea.” State

v. Martre, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-18-61, 

. See State v. Burress,

4th Dist. Lawrence No. 21CA19, 

, ¶ 7 (“A mere change of heart is

not a legitimate and reasonable basis for the withdrawal of a plea.”). Having

examined the evidence in the record under the applicable nine-factor analysis, we

cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Edwards’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea in this case. Accordingly, his sole assignment of

error is overruled.

                                    Conclusion

       {¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls




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