Brown v. Onslow Bay Marine Grp., LLC

Brown v. Onslow Bay Marine Grp., LLC, 

.


STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA                    IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
                                               SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
ONSLOW COUNTY                                         21 CVS 1794

ROBERT L. BROWN, JR.; ON POINT
OFFSHORE, LLC; and WILLIAM E.
ECHARD, in their respective capacities
as members of ONSLOW BAY MARINE
GROUP, LLC,
                                               ORDER AND OPINION ON
                   Plaintiffs,
                                           DEFENDANT ONSLOW BAY MARINE
                                              GROUP, LLC’s MOTION FOR
        v.
                                                SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ONSLOW BAY MARINE GROUP,
LLC,

                   Defendant.


   1.     THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Onslow Bay Marine

Group, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) filed by Defendant

Onslow Bay Marine Group (“OBMG” or “Defendant”) on 13 September 2022. (ECF

No. 43.) The Motion requests that summary judgment be granted in favor of OBMG

on all claims brought in two cases that were consolidated at the time the Motion was

filed. Because the cases have since been deconsolidated, this Order and Opinion

addresses the Motion only to the extent it seeks judgment as to the single claim

brought in this case (“Brown I”) and not the claims brought in a companion case

initiated in New Hanover County Superior Court bearing filing number 21 CVS 2469

(“Brown II”).

   2.     For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part.

        Poyner Spruill LLP, by Nicholas J. Ellis and Dylan Castellino, for Plaintiffs
        Murchison, Taylor & Gibson, PLLC, by Andrew K. McVey, and Bailey & Busby,
        PLLC by Stephen C. Bailey, for Defendant

   Robinson, Judge.
                                 I.    INTRODUCTION

   3.     Plaintiffs Robert L. Brown, Jr. (“Brown”), William E. Echard (“Echard”), and

On Point Offshore, LLC (“On Point”) are, or understand themselves to be, 1 minority

members of Onslow Bay Marine Group (“OBMG” or “Defendant”). On 23 April 2021,

Brown, Echard, and On Point made an inspection demand on OBMG pursuant to

N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-04. Between May and October 2021, OBMG provided some, but not

all, of the requested documents. This lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs seek a court order

compelling Defendant to produce the remaining records requested in their inspection

demand and awarding costs incurred by Plaintiffs in pursuing their claim.

                           II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

   4.     The Court does not make findings of fact when ruling on motions for

summary judgment. “[T]o provide context for its ruling, the Court may state either

those facts that it believes are not in material dispute or those facts on which a

material dispute forecloses summary adjudication.” Ehmann v. Medflow, Inc., 

, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2017).

   5.     OBMG is a manager-managed LLC engaged in the manufacture of center

console offshore and tournament edition boats. (Knight Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 44.1.)




1 Whether Plaintiff Robert L. Brown, Jr. and/or On Point Offshore, LLC are members of

OBMG is in dispute. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff William E. Echard is a member
of OBMG and has standing to bring the suit under N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-04. (Def.’s Br. Supp.
Mot. Summ. J. 7, ECF No. 45.)
   6.      John Bradley Knight, Jr., (“Knight”) is a resident of North Carolina who has

a 51% ownership interest in OBMG and is a member-manager thereof. (Knight Aff.

¶¶ 1,7.)

   7.      Echard is a member of OBMG possessing a 9.8% ownership interest.

(Knight Aff. ¶ 9.)

   8.      Brown is the majority member of On Point. On Point is listed in OBMG’s

records as owning a 24.5% interest in OBMG, and it is disputed whether such interest

constitutes membership or is merely an economic interest. (See Knight Aff. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs contend that both Brown and On Point are members of OBMG, jointly

owning the 24.5% interest in question.

   9.      Maximilian Merrill (“Merrill”) and Chris Wiles (“Wiles”), nonparties in this

action, are minority economic interest holders in OBMG holding 4.9% and 9.8%

economic interests, respectively. (Knight Aff. ¶ 8.)

   10.     On 17 April 2021, Merrill sent an email to Knight, Echard, and Wiles raising

concerns with Knight’s conduct as manager of OBMG in, among other things, “using

[OBMG] as [his] personal piggy bank.” (Pl.’s Ex. 10, 6.) In reply, on 18 April 2021,

Knight represented that he had “full documentation of EVERY dollar on a spread

sheet” purportedly reflecting cash transactions to and from OBMG (the “Knight Cash

Email”). (Pl’s Ex. 10, 2.)

   11.     Jessica Hayes (“Hayes”) was the office manager of OBMG from November

2015 until September 2020. (Hayes Aff. ¶ 2.) In this role, Hayes served as OBMG’s

bookkeeper and reported to Knight. (Hayes Aff. ¶ 4.) Hayes understood that Knight
maintained his own records of cash transactions involving the company. (Hayes Aff.

¶¶ 7–8.)

   12.     On 23 April 2021, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent the Inspection Demand to

Defendant. (Knight Aff. Ex. A [“Demand Ltr.”].) The Inspection Demand stated

“Brown and Echard ha[ve] concerns as to the current state of affairs of [OBMG]” and

“[t]he purpose of this request is to enable [Plaintiffs] to understand [OBMG’s] current

and historical financial condition[.]”   (Demand Ltr. 1.)    The Inspection Demand

requested, among other things, OBMG’s tax returns from 2017–20, full-year and

year-to-date financial statements, and material information relating to advance boat

orders, cash and barter transactions, and OBMG’s borrowings (the “Requested

Information”). (Demand Ltr. 1–3.)

   13.     The Inspection Demand requested that the documents be made available by

7 May 2021 and further stated:

         If you would, please send all Requested Information that is available
         electronically to me [via email]. If any such Requested Information is
         only available in hardcopy, please overnight complete copies to my
         attention at [our law office.]

         Should you prefer, we would be happy to establish a secure, electronic
         data room to which [OBMG] may upload any and all Requested
         Information.

         Please let me know immediately if [OMBG] has any questions regarding
         this letter.”

(Demand Ltr. 4.)
   14.    On 7 May 2021, counsel for OBMG provided 2 Plaintiffs with at least three

documents, including OBMG’s 2018, 2019, and 2020 tax returns and a current OBMG

membership list. (Knight Aff. ¶ 18., Ex. B, 1 [“July 2 Ltr.”].)

   15.    On 2 July 2021, counsel for Defendant confirmed by letter that Defendant

had earlier provided Plaintiffs with certain Requested Information: “[y]ou are already

in possession of the 2018, 2019 and 2020 tax returns and the current known

membership list.” (July 2 Ltr. 1.) The letter also set forth a list of documents

Defendant intended to provide to Plaintiffs, and objected to the production of “client

lists, trade secrets, exact expenditures for boats in the process of being built, suppliers

and contracts with current customers[,]” because such documents are “confidential

and proprietary information[.]” (July 2 Ltr. 2.)

   16.    The 2 July 2021 letter did not set forth a date, time, or location for inspection

to occur. Nor did OBMG object to sending the Requested Information electronically

or by mail.

   17.    One month later, on 11 August 2021, OBMG mailed to Plaintiffs a list of its

current ownership, its state tax returns, its 2017 federal tax return, documents

showing indebtedness to Bank of America, documents reflecting barter transactions,

and a spreadsheet reflecting amounts paid in mortgage and rent for 175 Sloop Point

Road Space, Hampstead, North Carolina.            (Knight Aff. ¶ 21, Ex. C, 3.) OBMG

supplemented its production by mail on 21 October 2021, enclosing OBMG’s balance


2 The record does not disclose the means by which OBMG turned over documents to Plaintiffs

on 7 May 2021, whether in person, by mail, or otherwise. The record also contains no evidence
that OBMG objected to Plaintiffs’ request that documents be transmitted to Plaintiffs’
counsel electronically or by mail.
sheets and profit and loss statements from 2017–20. (Knight Aff. ¶ 22, Ex. D). On

neither occasion did OBMG object to sending the documents to Plaintiffs by mail.


                           III.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY

   18.    The Court sets forth here only those portions of the procedural history

relevant to its determination of the Motion.

   19.    This Action was initiated by Plaintiffs on 21 May 2021 with the filing of the

Complaint in Onslow County Superior Court, case number 2021 CVS 1794 (“Brown

I”). (ECF No. 3.) The Complaint set forth a single claim seeking a court order

compelling OBMG to produce corporate records pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-04.

(Compl. ¶ 23.)

   20.    On 20 August 2021, this action was consolidated with Brown II for discovery,

mediation, and all other proceedings except for trial. (See Or. Joint Mot. Consolid. ¶

8.a., ECF No. 18.)

   21.    Defendant filed the Motion, supporting brief, and exhibits on 13 September

2022. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 43 [“Mot.”]; Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ.

J., ECF No. 45 [“Def.’s Br.”]; Def.’s Index in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 44

[“Def.’s Ex.”].)

   22.    Plaintiffs filed their response and exhibits on 13 October 2022 (See Pls.’

Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 57 [“Pl.’s Br.”]; Pl.’s Index Opp. Def.’s Mot.

Summ. J., ECF No. 56 [“Pl.’s Ex.”].)

   23.    Defendant filed its reply brief on 21 October 2022. (Def.’s Reply Br. Supp.

of Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 60 [“Reply Br.”].)
   24.    The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on 29 November 2022. (See

Am. Not. Hearing, ECF No. 59.)

   25.    On 1 December 2022, the Court sua sponte deconsolidated this action from

Brown II in all respects.

   26.    The Motion has been fully brief, argued, and is ripe for determination.

                              IV.    LEGAL STANDARD

   27.    Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c). “A ‘genuine issue’ is one

that can be maintained by substantial evidence.” Dobson v. Harris, 

(2000).

   28.    The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue

of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Hensley v. Nat’l Freight Transp., Inc., 

 (2008). The movant

may make the required showing by proving that “an essential element of the opposing

party’s claim does not exist, cannot be proven at trial, or would be barred by an

affirmative defense, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot

produce evidence to support an essential element of her claim.” Dobson, 

 (citations omitted).

   29.    “Once the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence
demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least

establish a prima facie case at trial.” Gaunt v. Pittaway, 

, 784−85

(2000).

   30.    The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. Dobson, 

. However, the nonmovant “may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of their pleading, but their response, by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. If [the nonmovant] does not so respond, summary judgment,

if appropriate, shall be entered against [the nonmovant].” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule

56(e).

                                   V.     ANALYSIS

   31.    Defendant seeks summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs’ inspection

demand, the sole claim for relief in the present case. The Court will address each of

Defendants’ contentions in turn.

   A.     Membership Status of Brown and On Point Offshore, LLC

   32.    As a threshold matter, OBMG argues that Brown and On Point are not

members of OBMG and therefore do not have inspection rights under N.C.G.S. § 57D-

3-04. (Def.’s Br. 7.) OBMG, however, concedes that Echard is a member and is

entitled to such inspection rights. (Def.’s Br. 7.) During oral argument on the Motion,

counsel for OBMG acknowledged that because Echard is a member entitled to

inspection rights, whether Brown or On Point are members is immaterial. The Court

agrees. By virtue of Echard’s undisputed membership in OBMG and status as a
plaintiff in this case, the Court need not decide the membership status of Brown and

On Point unless and until Echard ceases to be a plaintiff in this action.

   B.     Inspection Demand’s Compliance with N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-04(e)

   33.   OBMG next argues that Plaintiffs’ information request is void because it

does not comport with § 57D-3-04(e). Subsection (e) states that “[t]he exercise of a

member’s rights to inspect and copy the LLC’s records is to take place at the LLC’s

principal office, or other location or locations selected by the LLC, during the LLC’s

regular hours of operation unless the LLC directs otherwise.” OBMG contends that

because Plaintiffs asked that the Requested Information be sent electronically or by

mail, (Demand Ltr. 4), Plaintiffs have “disregarded” the statute and, therefore, the

Inspection Demand is void as a matter of law.

   34.   The Court disagrees.      While Defendant is correct that § 57D-3-04(e)

empowers the LLC to establish the location for inspection and copying, with the

default location being the LLC’s principal office, the record shows that from 7 May

2021 until 21 October 2021, OBMG repeatedly and without objection provided

Plaintiffs with Requested Information via mail. (See July 2 Ltr., Knight Aff. Ex. C,

Knight Aff. Ex. D.) Certainly, OBMG could have objected to the Inspection Demand

for noncompliance with § 57D-3-04(e) at the time the demand was made. Considering

OBMG’s repeated course of conduct and failure to object, however, the Court

concludes that OBMG has waived that objection.
   C.       OBMG’s Compliance with the Inspection Demand

   35.      OBMG contends that it has furnished all of the Requested Information

contemplated by § 57D-3-04 and that Plaintiffs are “unable to point to a category of

documents contemplated by the statute and say that OBMG has failed to provide

them.” (Def.’s Br. 8.) Plaintiffs admit that OBMG has produced a substantial amount

of the Requested Information, but they maintain that OBMG “has not provided all of

the documents and information pertaining to the cash Knight has taken from the

company.” (Pl.’s Br. 15.) In particular, Plaintiffs contend Defendant is withholding

a spreadsheet allegedly maintained by Knight accounting for “every dollar” of cash

transactions between Knight and OBMG (the “cash spreadsheet”). (Pl.’s Br. 15; Pl.’s

Ex. 10, 2.) Plaintiffs contend that the Knight Cash Email and the Hayes affidavit

demonstrate that Knight kept his own records of cash receipts, and Defendant

“cannot now credibly claim” the cash spreadsheet was destroyed.

   36.      Defendant has submitted sworn testimony that “OBMG has provided

Plaintiffs all documents to which they are entitled pursuant to the information rights

statute.”    (Knight Aff. ¶ 25.)    At oral argument, counsel for OBMG stated

unequivocally to the Court that no such spreadsheet exists.       Plaintiffs have not

submitted specific evidence to rebut this sworn testimony from OBMG. Instead,

Plaintiffs argue that the Knight Cash Email and Hayes affidavit establish a dispute

of material fact regarding the existence of Knight’s cash spreadsheet, and for that

reason, they believe summary judgment should be denied. According to Plaintiffs,
the case should proceed to trial for a jury to determine whether the cash spreadsheet

allegedly maintained by Mr. Knight still exists and is in OBMG’s custody.

   37.   The Court concludes that § 57D-3-04 does not create an independent cause

of action for Plaintiffs to obtain a jury determination regarding whether a document

currently exists, and if so, who possesses the document.       Companies producing

records pursuant to § 57D-3-04 are bound by Rule 11 and the contempt powers of the

Court.   Where, as here, Defendant has submitted sworn testimony that it has

provided all documents it possesses that are required by the Inspection Demand and

the statute, and where Plaintiffs have failed to rebut such sworn testimony with

admissible evidence demonstrating that additional responsive documents exist and

are in Defendant’s possession, custody, or control, no jury issue remains.

   D.    Further Documents Outside Ambit of § 57D-3-04

   38.   Plaintiffs contend, in part, that Defendant is not entitled to summary

judgment because it has refused to produce a number of categories of documents in

its possession related to the operation and financial condition of the entity.

Defendant argues that it should not be required to produce certain information

requested pursuant to § 57D-3-04(a)(5) (“information from which the status of the

business and the financial condition of the LLC may be ascertained”) because such

information is excessive in breadth and depth and not “reasonably necessary for a

reasonable investor to determine the condition of the company.” (Def.’s Br. 8–9.)

   39.   The information in dispute includes: (1) an exact accounting for advance

orders received for 37-foot Tournament Edition boats, (2) documentation of every cash
transaction in excess of $500.00 in the three years prior to the Inspection Demand,

(3) all contracts and other documents relating to sale or lease of company property

and financial arrangements, (4) all contracts with customers and suppliers, (5) a list

of all employees and independent contractors, their classification, salaries, wages,

total compensation paid, (6) a description of currently threatened litigation, legal

claims, regulatory actions, or other actions and related correspondence. (Def.’s Br.

8–9.)

   40.   With the exception of the cash spreadsheet that Knight purportedly

maintained, Plaintiffs have failed to respond to the objections Defendant raises

regarding the categories of information in paragraph 39, supra.          Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have conceded that such categories of information are not necessary to

determine the status of the business and financial condition of the Company. (See

Or. Pls.’ BCR 10.9 Dispute, ¶ 16, ECF No. 26.)

   41.   Additionally, the Court again determines, as it has previously when ruling

on discovery disputes in this action, that the documents specifically identified in

paragraph 39 are outside the scope of § 57D-3-04(a)(5).    Accordingly, Defendant is

not obligated to produce them.

                                 VI.   CONCLUSION

   42.   In sum, although the Court concludes that Defendant initially did not timely

produce all documents it was required to produce in response to Plaintiffs’ demand

for inspection, it further concludes as a matter of law that Defendant ultimately

complied with its statutory obligation. Thus, the Court concludes that there is no
disputed issue of material fact as to Defendant’s obligation to produce company

documents in response to Plaintiffs’ document demand.

   43.     For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS the Motion insofar as

it seeks judgment that Defendant OBMG has fully complied with its obligations

under N.C.G.S. § 57D-3-04.

   44.     The Court’s determination herein is without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ claim for

costs as permitted by applicable statute. Any such request, however, must be raised,

and supported by proper documentation, within sixty days of the entry of this Order.

         SO ORDERED, this the 12th day of December, 2022.




                                           /s/ Michael L. Robinson
                                          Michael L. Robinson
                                          Special Superior Court Judge
                                          for Complex Business Cases