Heather Lynn Hannay v. Department of Transportation

In these cases, we are called upon to interpret a provision of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., commonly referred to as the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. The statute provides, in relevant part, that “[g]overnmental agencies shall be *51 liable for bodily injury . . . resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner .. . ,” 1 Specifically, we must address whether the phrase “liable for bodily injury” allows for recovery of economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages. The Court of Appeals in Hannay v Dep’t of Transp concluded that economic damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, 2 while the Court of Appeals in Hunter v Sisco concluded that noneconomic damages are not compensable under this exception. 3

We conclude that the phrase “liable for bodily injury” contained in the motor vehicle exception means legally responsible for damages flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body. More simply, “bodily injury” is merely the category of harm for which governmental immunity from tort liability is waived under MCL 691.1405 and for which damages that naturally flow are compensable. Moreover, the restrictions on damages recoverable in third-party tort actions involving motor vehicle accidents set forth in MCL 500.3135 of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., apply to cases permitted by the waiver of governmental immunity provided for in the motor vehicle exception. We therefore hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met.

*52 Because we conclude that work-loss damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, we must also address a second issue presented in Hannay: whether the facts as found were sufficient to satisfy the statutory language defining work-loss damages with respect to plaintiffs claim of work loss as a dental hygienist. Plaintiff, a 22-year-old employed in a dental office, aspired to be a dental hygienist. 4 Plaintiff had previously applied for admission to a dental hygienist program at Lansing Community College (LCC), but she was not admitted to the program. Plaintiff intended to enhance her application and reapply to the program, but she had not been accepted at the time of her injury. Her employer and his wife, a hygienist in his office, testified that plaintiff would have gained admission to the program and that they would have employed plaintiff as a hygienist after she completed her education and obtained her license. Notwithstanding this testimony, we conclude that it is simply too tenuous a proposition to conclude that the work-loss damages in dispute were a legal and natural consequence of the tortious conduct. Instead, these damages are contingent and speculative, rendering plaintiffs claim for work-loss damages barred under Michigan law to the extent that her claim is based on potential wages as a dental hygienist.

In Hannay we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, but we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support her claim for work-loss damages as a dental hygienist. In Hunter we reverse the Court of *53 Appeals’ holding with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. We remand both cases to the respective trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. HANNAY-

This matter arises from a February 13, 2007 motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle driven by plaintiff Heather Hannay and a salt truck owned by defendant Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) and driven by MDOT’s employee, Brian Silcox. Silcox failed to stop at a stop sign, and the salt truck collided with plaintiffs vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that Silcox 5 and MDOT, as Silcox’s employer and the owner of the salt truck, were hable for damages caused by Silcox’s negligence. Plaintiff alleged injuries to her shoulders, neck, spine, back, head, chest, arms, knees, and other internal and external injuries to her body. Plaintiff claimed all economic damages compensable under the no-fault act, but specifically alleged allowable expenses and work loss in excess of the statutoiy limitations. 6 MDOT raised governmental immunity as an affirmative defense.

Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that MDOT was liable for work-loss damages exceeding the *54 statutory limitations under the no-fault act and that plaintiff was entitled to work-loss damages as a dental hygienist earning $28 per hour. 7 In reaching its conclusion, the court found that it was “more likely than not” that plaintiff would “have been admitted into the Dental Hygienist program at LCC,” that it was “more likely than not [that she would] have successfully completed the program,” and that plaintiff had proven part-time, but not full-time, employment of three days a week.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not err by awarding plaintiff economic damages and that the trial court’s factual findings supported the calculation of plaintiffs work-loss award. 8 Regarding the trial court’s conclusion that work-loss damages were recoverable against a governmental entity in light of the motor vehicle exception, the Court of Appeals held that “the bodily injury that must be incurred to maintain an action against a governmental entity and the items of damages recoverable from those injuries are separate and distinct from one another.” 9 Thus, the panel concluded that “work-loss benefits .. . that exceed the statutory personal protection insurance benefit maximum pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3) are awardable against governmental *55 entities . . . .” 10 The panel characterized work-loss damages as “items of damages that arise from the bodily injuries suffered by plaintiff,” and explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would conflate the actual bodily-injury requirement for maintaining a motor vehicle cause of action against a governmental entity with the types of damages recoverable as a result of the bodily injury.” 11

B. HUNTER

This matter arises from a July 20, 2009 motor vehicle accident involving plaintiff Harold Hunter, Jr., and a dump truck owned by defendant City of Flint Transportation Department (Flint) and driven by Flint’s employee, defendant David Sisco. 12 Flint’s vehicle sideswiped plaintiffs vehicle.

Plaintiff sued Flint as the employer of Sisco and owner of the dump truck and independently for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that the injuries he suffered amounted to a serious impairment of a bodily function, a permanent and serious disfigurement, and a serious neurological defect (closed-head injury). According to plaintiff, he suffered injuries to his spine as a result of the accident. Plaintiff alleged noneconomic damages, namely, pain and suffering, as well as shock and emotional damages. 13 Flint raised governmental immunity as an affirmative defense.

*56 Flint filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), asserting that plaintiff could not succeed in a claim against Flint because the damages he sought were not compensable under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and that plaintiff failed to establish that he suffered a threshold injuxy under the no-fault act. Flint’s position was that because plaintiffs no-fault provider was liable for economic damages under the no-fault act, and because the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity does not allow for recovery of noneconomic damages, the claim against Flint should be dismissed. The trial court denied Flint’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that “bodily injury” encompasses noneconomic damages associated with bodily injury and finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of a bodily function that was caused by the accident.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion for summary disposition in part, holding that noneconomic damages “are precluded under MCL 691.1405 because a governmental agency may only be liable for ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage,’ ” and noneconomic damages “do not constitute physical injury to the body and do not fall within the motor vehicle exception.” 14 Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration *57 in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Hannay, but the panel denied the motion.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The meaning of the phrase “liable for bodily injury” is an issue of statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo. 15 The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.” 16 In doing so, “[c]ourts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.” 17 This Court has explained:

When construing a statute, we consider the statute’s plain language, and we enforce clear and unambiguous language as written. While terms must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning, words and phrases as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.[ 18 ]

“[W]ords and phrases used in an act should be read in context with the entire act and assigned such meanings as to harmonize with the act as a whole,” and “a word or phrase should be given meaning by its context or setting.” 19

While this Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings, such as those used to calculate a damages award, *58 for clear error, 20 we review de novo the applicability of those facts to the law. 21

Moreover, when a party files suit against a governmental agency, it is the burden of that party to plead “his or her claim in avoidance of governmental immunity.” 22 A party can bring a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), as was the case in Hunter, on the ground that the claim is barred by governmental immunity. 23 Plaintiff Hunter also filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10), which is appropriate when, “[ejxcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” 24 This Court reviews de novo decisions regarding motions for summary disposition. 25

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY ACT

Sovereign immunity and governmental immunity, while related concepts, are not synonymous. 26 “Sovereign immunity refers to the immunity of the state from suit and from liability, while governmental immunity refers to the similar immunities enjoyed by the state’s political subdivisions.” 27 As we recently explained in *59 In re Bradley Estate, the GTLA replaced and was preceded by Michigan jurisprudence, dating back to 1837, “recognizing] the preexisting common-law concept of sovereign immunity, which immunizes the ‘sovereign’ state from all suits to which the state has not consented, including suits for tortious acts by the state.” 28 MCL 691.1407(1) codifies this common-law sovereign immunity concept and “limits a governmental agency’s exposure to tort liability.” 29

However, the GTLA not only provides immunity for the state and its agencies, like defendant MDOT in Hannay, but also provides immunity for the state’s political subdivisions, such as defendant Flint in Hunter. 30 We explained in Robinson v Lansing that “[i]n Michigan, governmental immunity was originally a common-law doctrine that protected all levels of government.” 31 However, this Court, in 1961, “abolished common-law governmental immunity with respect to municipalities.” 32 The Legislature reacted by enacting the GTLA in 1964, “restoring immunity for municipalities and preserving this protection for the state and its agencies.” 33 The GTLA provides six exceptions to gov *60 ernmental immunity, one of which is the motor vehicle exception—the subject of these cases. 34

B. THE MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION

The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, provides:

Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948.

This provision has remained unchanged from its original phrasing when enacted as part of the GTLA in 1964. 35 The heart of our inquiry is the interpretation of the phrase “liable for bodily injury,” which contains two key components: (1) “liable for” and (2) “bodily injury.”

1. “LIABLE FOR”

Our recent decision in Bradley Estate sheds light on the proper interpretation of the phrase “liable for,” though the motor vehicle exception was not at issue in *61 that case. Instead, we interpreted the phrase “tort liability ” found in the GTLA’s broad grant of immunity, MCL 691.1407(1), 36 which grants immunity to governmental entities from “tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” Specifically, we were called on to decide whether a particular cause of action sought to impose “tort liability” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(1), thus, triggering governmental immunity pursuant to that provision. 37 We concluded that “ ‘tort’ as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.” 38 Looking at the phrase as a whole, we explained:

Our analysis, however, requires more. MCL 691.1407(1) refers not merely to a “tort,” nor to a “tort claim,” nor to a “tort action,” but to “tort liabilityThe term “tort,” therefore, describes the type of liability from which a governmental agency is immune. As commonly understood, the word “liability,” refers to liableness, i.e., “the state or quality of being liable.” To be “liable” means to be “legally responsible[.]” Construing the term “liability” along with the term “tort,” it becomes apparent that the Legislature intended “tort liability” to encompass legal responsibility arising from a tort. We therefore hold that “tort liability” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) means all legal responsibility arising from a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.[ 39 ]

Because this Court concluded that “liable” means “legally responsible,” our interpretation of “tort liability” in MCL 691.1407(1) informs how to interpret the *62 phrase “liable for” in the motor vehicle exception. We see no reason why this Court’s prior analysis of the word “liability,” which stems from the word “liable,” should not likewise apply in this case, particularly given that the phrases “tort liability” and “liable for” are contained within the same statute—the GTLA. 40 Thus, the phrase “liable for bodily injury” means legally responsible for bodily injury.

2. “BODILY INJURY”

We interpreted the phrase “bodily injury” in Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, specifically within the context of the motor vehicle exception. 41 The central issue in Wesche was “whether the motor vehicle exception . .. authorizes a claim for loss of consortium against a governmental agency.” 42 In analyzing the language of the motor vehicle exception, we stated: “This language is clear: it imposes liability for ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ resulting from a governmental employee’s negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle.” 43 Because the GTLA does not define “bodily injury,” this Court resorted to dictionary definitions, stating:

The word “bodily” means “of or pertaining to the body” or “corporeal or material, as contrasted with spiritual or mental.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000). The word “injury” refers to “harm or damage done or sustained, [especially] bodily harm.” Id. Thus, “bodily injury” simply means a physical or corporeal injury to the *63 body. It is beyond dispute that a loss of consortium is not a physical injury to a body. A claim for loss of consortium is simply one for loss of society and companionship.. .. Thus, because loss of consortium is a nonphysical injury, it does not fall within the categories of damage for which the motor-vehicle exception waives immunity![ 44 ]

We see no reason to deviate from our prior analysis. Thus, because we have interpreted “bodily injury” to mean “a physical or corporeal injury to the body,” “liable for bodily injury” means legally responsible for a physical or corporeal injury to the body.

3. “LIABLE FOR BODILY INJURY”

Our final consideration in looking at the phrase “liable for bodily injury” as a whole is to determine the scope of the liability to which the government is exposed under the motor vehicle exception. Essential to this inquiry is the fundamental difference between an injury and the damages that arise from that injury. This Court’s decision in Henry is instructive for determining the scope of liability in that it delineates this distinction. 45 There, we set forth the traditional elements of a negligence action—“(1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages” 46 —but explained that “it has always been implicit in this analysis that in order to prevail, a plaintiff must also demonstrate an actual injury to person or property.” 47 We then made clear that “such *64 injury constitutes the essence of a plaintiffs claim,” 48 and that “injury” and “damages” are distinct from one another, explaining:

While the courts of this state may not have always clearly articulated this injury requirement, nor finely delineated the distinction between an “injury” and the “damages” flowing therefrom, the injury requirement has always been present in our negligence analysis. It has simply always been the case in our jurisprudence that plaintiffs alleging negligence claims have also shown that their claims arise from present physical injuries. We are not aware of any Michigan cases in which a plaintiff has recovered on a negligence theory without demonstrating some present physical injury. Thus, in all known cases in Michigan in which a plaintiff has satisfied the “damages” element of a negligence claim, he has also satisfied the “injury” requirement.[ 49 ]

Thus, “damages” and “injury” are not one and the same—damages flow from the injury.

In light of this Court’s prior interpretation of “tort liability” in Bradley Estate, this Court’s interpretation of “bodily injury” in Wesche, and this Court’s delineation of the difference between “injury” and “damages” in Henry, “liable for bodily injury” in the present case means legally responsible for damages flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body. Stated differently, “bodily injury” is simply the category of harm (i.e., the type of injury) for which the government waives immunity under MCL 691.1405 and, thus, for which damages that naturally flow are compensable. Therefore, the legal responsibility that arises from “bodily injury” is responsibility for tort damages that flow from that injury. This conclusion is supported by *65 the fact that the GTLA generally grants immunity from “tort liability,” 50 and to the extent that this immunity is waived, the resulting liability, logically, is liability for tort damages.

It is a longstanding principle in this state’s jurisprudence that tort damages generally include damages for all the legal and natural consequences of the injury (i.e., the damages that naturally flow from the injury), which may include damages for loss of the ability to work and earn money, as well as pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress damages. For example, in Sherwood v Chicago & WM R Co, 51 this Court approved of a jury instruction that stated:

In estimating the compensatory damages in cases of this character, all the consequences of the injury, future as well as past, are to be taken into consideration, including the bodily pain, which is shown by the proofs to be reasonably certain to have naturally resulted from the injury. The injured party, when entitled to recover, should be awarded compensation for all the injuries, past and prospective. These are intended to include and embrace indemnity for actual nursing and medical expenses; also for loss of power, or loss of capability to perform ordinary labor, or capacity to earn money, and reasonable satisfaction of physical powers. The elements of damages which the jury are entitled to take into account consist of all effects of the injury complained of, consisting of personal inconvenience, the sickness which the plaintiff endured, the loss of time, all bodily and mental suffering, impairment of capacity to earn money, the pecuniary expenses, the disfigurement or permanent annoyance which is liable to be caused by the deformity resulting from the injury; and, in considering what would be a just sum in compensation for the sufferings or injury, the jury are not only at liberty to consider the *66 bodily pain, but the mental suffering, anxiety, suspense, and fright may be treated as elements of the injury for which damages, by way of compensation, should be allowed. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, damages for both a loss of the ability to work and earn money as well as pain, suffering, and emotional distress have long been understood as consequences of an injury for which damages are compensable. 52 Additionally, in Beath v Rapid R Co, this Court concluded that “[t]he plaintiff was not confined in her recovery to damages sustained by reason of physical pain and anguish suffered, but had the right to recover for the mental pain and anxiety she was compelled to undergo by reason of the injuries sustained,” because “the shame and mortification which the plaintiff had suffered by being obliged to use crutches” “was one of the elements of damages which might naturally flow from the injury.” 53

Moreover, recent caselaw of this Court reiterates this longstanding principle. For example, in Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 54 we noted the general rule regarding recovery of damages in a tort action recognized in Sutter v Biggs 55 that “the tort-feasor is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful act, whether foreseeable or not, provided the damages are *67 the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act, and are such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated.” 56 This body of caselaw collectively demonstrates the longstanding principle that tort damages generally include the damages that naturally flow from the injury, which may include both economic damages, such as damages incurred due to the loss of the ability to work and earn money, as well as noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress damages. 57

As indicated by the Hannay Court of Appeals panel, concluding that “bodily injury” does not include dam *68 ages naturally flowing from that injury would conflate the requirement of a bodily injury (i.e., the injury requirement recognized in Henry) with the items of damages that are recoverable as a result of that injury (i.e., the damages that naturally flow from the bodily injury). Thus, the statutory language of MCL 691.1405 does not support a conclusion that the Legislature intended to restrict liability to certain items of damages resulting from a bodily injury. Instead, the language only indicates that the Legislature intended to restrict the categories of injury for which the tort damages that naturally flow are compensable. We therefore hold that the phrase “liable for bodily injury” within the motor vehicle exception means that a plaintiff who suffers a bodily injury may recover for items of tort damages that naturally flow from that physical or corporeal injury to the body, which may include both economic and non-economic damages. As discussed later in this opinion, however, the scope of these damages is limited by the no-fault act. 58

4. “BODILY INJURY” IS A TERM OF ART IN MICHIGAN JURISPRUDENCE

Our analysis interpreting the phrase “liable for bodily injury” gains further support from our state’s history of governmental-immunity legislation, which indicates that “bodily injury” is a term of art used by the Legislature in the context of governmental immunity to refer to a category of injury for which damages that naturally flow are compensable, as long as those damages are properly pleaded. As a legal term of art, “bodily injury” is a technical phrase that has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law” and, *69 therefore, “shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” 59

This phrase appeared in the context of governmental immunity in 1861 in the first version of the highway exception. Public Act 197 of 1861 provided

[t]hat any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways in this State, by reason of neglect to keep in repair any bridge or culvert, by any township or corporation whose duty it is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair, such township or corporation shall be liable to, and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before any court of competent jurisdiction.[ 60 ]

The 1885 61 and 1887 versions of the highway exception added sidewalks to the list of structures for which there was a duty to keep in repair. 62 Therefore, as far back as 1861, the phrase “bodily injury” was used by the Legislature to connote a category of injury for which damages—specifically, “just damages”—were compensable.

Our decisions implicating these early versions of the highway exception urge a consistent interpretation in this case. For example, regarding damages because of *70 an inability to work, this Court’s decision in Moore v Kalamazoo is instructive. 63 In that case, the plaintiff was injured due to a defective sidewalk, and the trial court instructed that the jury “should take into account her past earnings. . . during the time that she has already been injured, and the time that you find, from the evidence, that she will remain incapable of earning anything in the future . . . .” 64 This Court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to warrant admission of the proofs of damages and the instruction given. 65 This case made clear that the damages that were recoverable as a result of a bodily injury included damages resulting from an inability to work that flow from the injury, if properly alleged. 66

*71 In another example, this Court’s 1894 decision in Roberts v Detroit demonstrated that pain and suffering damages, like damages resulting from an inability to work, were recoverable for a bodily injury in the context of the highway exception. 67 The plaintiff sought loss-of-consortium damages from the city of Detroit that resulted from injuries his wife incurred due to falling on a defective sidewalk. The issue was whether the highway exception applied to provide the plaintiff a cause of action in light of the fact that it was the plaintiffs wife who was physically injured, rather than the plaintiff himself. 68 This Court stated, “[s]o far as [the highway exception] is concerned, it limits the liability to cases of bodily injury,” and concluded that:

The plaintiffs case does not fall within [the highway-exception] (1) because he has no right to recover for the bodily injury—i.e., pain and suffering, etc—of another; (2) because the statute in terms limits the recovery to the person so injured or disabled/[ 69 ]

It is clear from Roberts that had the plaintiff, rather than his wife, suffered a bodily injury, damages naturally flowing from that injury would have been recoverable under the highway exception, including damages for “pain and suffering.” Further, this case demonstrates that while damages that naturally flowed from *72 the injury were compensable, the person seeking such damages must have had a bodily injury.

More generally, this Court’s decision in Hall v City of Cadillac demonstrated that damages that were the natural consequence of a bodily injury were recoverable. 70 Hall involved a city’s failure to keep a sidewalk in reasonable repair, which resulted in bodily injury to the plaintiff, and this Court reviewed the instructions to the jury. 71 This Court concluded in relevant part that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “damages for the injury suffered and its natural consequences were recoverable, up to the time of trial, together with such prospective damages of like character as were reasonably probable .. . .” 72 Thus, damages that were a natural consequence of the bodily injury were recoverable.

In light of the foregoing, by the time the phrase “bodily injury” appeared in the 1964 version of the motor vehicle exception, 73 that phrase long had a settled meaning in Michigan law. “Bodily injury” was understood to be a category of injury for which damages that were the natural consequence flowed, including both damages resulting from an inability to work, as well as pain and suffering, so long as those damages were properly pleaded.

5. THE HUNTER COURT’S RELIANCE ON WESCHE IS MISPLACED

The Court of Appeals in Hunter relied in part on Wesche’s definition of “bodily injury” in concluding that *73 because noneconomic damages do not constitute a physical injury, such damages are not compensable under the motor vehicle exception. 74 The panel first looked to Wesche and agreed with this Court’s conclusion that the term “liable for bodily injury” does not create a threshold requirement, explaining, “[h]ad the Legislature intended to simply create a threshold that, once established, would permit noneconomic or emotional damages, it would have done so explicitly .. . .” 75 The panel determined that the Wesche definition of “bodily injury” was correct, and based on that definition, concluded that damages for pain and suffering as well as shock and emotional-distress damages do not constitute a “bodily injury” that is compensable under the motor vehicle exception. 76

We agree with the Hunter panel only to the extent that it concluded that Wesche correctly defined “bodily injury.” We concluded in Wesche that the motor vehicle exception does not waive governmental immunity for loss-of-consortium claims, reasoning that “a loss of consortium is not a physical injury to a body,” and while “a loss-of-consortium claim is derivative of the underlying bodily injury, it is nonetheless regarded as a separate cause of action and not merely an item of damages.” 77 We concluded that the motor vehicle exception “does not state or suggest that governmental agencies are liable for any damages once a plaintiff makes a threshold showing of bodily injury or property damage.” 78 Unlike provisions of the no-fault act that create a statutory threshold, such as MCL 500.3135(1), *74 MCL 691.1405 “contains no such language.” 79 Instead, “[i]t merely provides that governmental agencies ‘shall be liable for bodily injuiy and property damage’ and says nothing to suggest that a separate cause of action, such as one for loss of consortium, may be asserted once a threshold of ‘bodily injury’ has been met.” 80 For these reasons, this Court held “that a loss of consortium is not a ‘bodily injuiy’ ” and therefore, governmental entities are entitled to governmental immunity for loss-of-consortium claims. 81

We disagree with the Hunter panel’s construction of Wesche because it conflates injury with damages. We stated in Wesche that “[t]he waiver of immunity is limited to two categories of damage: bodily injury and property damage.” 82 Notably, the word “damage” in the singular has a very different meaning than the plural word “damages.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “damage” as “[l]oss or injury to person or property < actionable damage resulting from negligence>,” and “damages” as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injuiy <the plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages from the defendant >.” 83 The Court of Appeals in Hunter ostensibly read the word “damage” in our opinion in Wesche to mean “damages,” which was an error. 84 Moreover, our decision in Wesche focused on the fact that a loss of consortium does not constitute an “item of damages” because it is not a claim for bodily injury. 85 *75 Thus, it can be inferred from our decision that items of damages naturally flowing from a bodily injury are compensable. Our conclusion in Wesche that a bodily injury is not a threshold requirement that, once met, permits recovery of all potential damages and that, instead, a plaintiff seeking damages for a bodily injury must have actually suffered a bodily injury, is consistent with this Court’s decision in Roberts: 86 The Roberts decision made clear that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for a bodily injury when the requested damages resulted from the bodily injury of another. 87 We therefore reaffirm that “bodily injury” in the motor vehicle exception is not a threshold requirement that opens all doors of potential liability for tort damages; rather, it is a category of injury for which items of tort damages that naturally flow are available, as confined by the limitations of the no-fault act. 88

6. DAMAGES COMPENSABLE UNDER THE MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION

Our analysis, however, does not end with our interpretation of the phrase “liable for bodily injury” within the motor vehicle exception. While governmental entities are legally responsible for damages naturally flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body under the language of the motor vehicle exception, this liability is limited by the no-fault act, which generally abrogates “tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle,” unless the damages come within an enumerated exception. 89 As we explained in Hardy v Oakland Co, *76 “the restrictions set forth in the no-fault act control the broad statement of liability found in the immunity statute.” 90 Thus, to the extent that the no-fault act narrows the damages available in a third-party tort action through its general abolition of tort liability and provision of certain enumerated exceptions, those restrictions likewise apply when the tortfeasor is a governmental entity.

Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss ... in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three types of no-fault benefits. 91 Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements under MCL 500.3135 have been met. 92 In this respect, we affirm the Hannay panel’s conclusion that work-loss *77 benefits that exceed the statutory maximum are available against a governmental entity, 93 and we reverse the Hunter panel’s conclusion that noneconomic damages “do not fall within the motor vehicle exception.” 94

*78 C. HANNAY: WORK-LOSS DAMAGES AWARDED

Because we have concluded that damages for work loss are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, we must now address whether the facts as found were sufficient to satisfy the statutory language defining work-loss damages with respect to plaintiffs claim of work loss as a dental hygienist. Damages in tort actions that are “[r] emote, contingent, or speculative” are not compensable because they are not in conformity with the general rule that a “tortfeasor is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful act,” as long as “the damages are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act, and are such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated.” 95 This Court has elaborated on this point, stating:

[T]o render a wrongdoer liable in damages in a tort action where the connection is not immediate between the injurious act and the consequences, such nearness in the order of events and closeness in the relation of cause and effect must subsist, so that the influence of the injurious act would predominate over that of other causes, and concur to produce the consequences or be traceable to those causes.[ 96 ]

*79 This Court does not, however, “preclude recovery [of damages] for lack of precise proof” or “require a mathematical precision in situations of injury where, from the very nature of the circumstances, precision is unattainable,” particularly in circumstances in which the defendant’s actions created the uncertainty. 97 The plaintiff bears the burden to prove the damages sought by a preponderance of the evidence. 98

In addition to these overarching rules for recovery of damages in tort, we recognize that there is a distinction drawn between work loss and loss of earning capacity in the context of claims made under the no-fault act. This Court has made clear that while work-loss damages are compensable under the no-fault act, loss-of-earning-capacity damages are not. 99 This distinction is derived from the statutory language of the no-fault act, specifically MCL 500.3107. 100

MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss as defined in sections 3107 and 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those sections.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 500.3107 defines “work loss” in the context of no-fault benefits, providing, in relevant part:

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:

*80 (b) Work loss consisting of loss of income from work an injured person would have performed during the first 3 years after the date of the accident if he or she had not been injured... ,[ 101 ]

Importantly, the statutory language requires that work-loss damages consist of lost income from “work an injured person would have performed.” We explained in MacDonald v State Farm that “work-loss benefits compensate the injured person for income he would have received but for the accident.” 102 Thus, work-loss damages are only available if the accident was the “but for” cause—i.e., cause-in-fact—of the work loss. Indeed, this Court made clear in Ouellette v Kenealy that such economic damages “are recoverable in tort only ... for ‘actual’ work loss,” i.e., “actual loss of income from work an injured person would have performed if he had not been injured,” “when the loss of income exceeds the daily, monthly, and three-year limitations.” 103

This Court has expressly recognized that in contrast to work-loss damages, loss of earning capacity damages are those arising from work that an injured person “could” have performed but for the injury. 104 Thus, damages for work loss consist of wages that a person *81 “would” have earned but for the accident, 105 whereas loss-of-earning-capacity damages are wages a person “could” have earned but for the accident. 106 In other words, work-loss damages compensate a plaintiff for the specific wages that he or she would have earned in light of the specific facts of the case, while loss-of-earning-capacity damages compensate a plaintiff for his or her loss of unrealized potential for earning income, i.e., for possible wages a plaintiff could have earned if he or she pursued potential opportunities, education, etc.

Yet, “[w]ork-loss benefits are not necessarily restricted to a claimant’s wage at the time of the accident.” 107 That “a claimant is working a lower paying part-time job at the time of the accident” does not preclude the plaintiff “from proving that he would have taken a higher paying full-time job had he not been injured in a car accident.” 108 Ultimately, however, “claimants are left to their proofs.” 109 In the context of assessing work-loss benefits under the no-fault act, this Court has made clear that work loss should not overcompensate a claimant by, for instance, “basting] his work loss, without any proof of actual loss, on the highest paying job he ever had”; instead, it is “intended to compensate claimants approximately dollar for dollar for the amount of wages lost because of the injury or disability.” 110

*82 Because work-loss damages are intended to replace the income a person would have received but for the accident, prior wages generally are the most relevant and reliable evidence for determining what a plaintiff actually would have earned had the accident not occurred. 111 Only in certain circumstances may a plaintiff recover work-loss damages for wages he or she could not have earned before the accident, i.e., wages that are not based on the plaintiffs wage history. While the statute by its terms does not limit a plaintiffs work-loss award to the plaintiffs wages at the time of the accident, 112 courts must be cautious in considering wages that the plaintiff could not have earned before the accident in calculating a work-loss award because of the risk that a calculation based on such wages will be contingent and speculative and, therefore, barred under Michigan law.

*83 Michigan caselaw provides some examples of circumstances under which it was appropriate to consider wages the plaintiff could not have earned before the subject accident in determining what wages a plaintiff would have earned but for the accident. In Gobler v Auto-Owners Ins Co, this Court interpreted a phrase contained in the survivor’s benefits provision of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3108, the language of which is analogous to MCL 500.3107, providing:

[A] survivor’s loss . . . consists of a loss, after the date on which the deceased died, of contributions of tangible things of economic value, not including services, that dependents of the deceased at the time of the deceased’s death would have received for support during their dependency from the deceased if the deceased had not suffered the accidental bodily injury causing death and expenses .. . .[ 113 ]

The decedent in that case died on the day that he completed his final requirements for a forestry degree from Michigan State University, had applied for forestry positions, was awarded a degree posthumously, and received what amounted to a job offer six months after he died. 114 The evidence presented also indicated that the decedent would have accepted the position. Thus, the evidence established that the decedent would have earned wages as an employee of the forestry service; but for his death, there was virtually nothing standing between the decedent and his earning the income at issue. 115 This Court concluded that it was not convinced that the trial court had made a mistake in finding that the deceased “would have been employed by the forestry service had he survived the accident.” 116

*84 In Swartout v State Farm Mut, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss a plaintiffs claim for work-loss benefits. 117 At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was to graduate from nursing school in two months, but because of her injuries, she was unable to complete what would have been her final semester. 118 She was able to graduate the following year and obtain employment, but sought work-loss benefits because of the delay in her employment caused by the accident. 119 The plaintiff submitted the following evidence: (1) an affidavit from her school stating that but for her being forced to withdraw due to the accident, she would have graduated on time and (2) an affidavit from a hospital stating that plaintiff would have been employed there no later than July 27, 1981, if she had received her degree on time, and identifying the rate of pay she would have received. 120 The majority explained:

[The] plaintiff... has alleged facts which, if believed, would establish the source of her employment, the exact date of employment and the exact wages that would have been received between July of 1981 and June of 1982. In other words, plaintiff has stated a claim for wages that would, rather than could, have been earned but for her injuries. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs claim should have survived defendant’s motion for summary disposition. [ 1 21 ]

The Court of Appeals majority concluded that “whether plaintiff would have received income but for her injuries should be left to the trier of fact,” as was the case in *85 Gobler. 122 Thus, when the evidence presented demonstrates that the wages at issue were inevitable but for the accident, a damages award based on such wages will not be barred as a matter of law on grounds of being contingent and speculative.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Gobler and Swartout, however, plaintiff Hannay was not on the brink of graduating from her professional degree program—indeed, she had not yet been accepted into the dental hygienist program. Moreover, plaintiff Hannay’s application for admission was rejected twice, once on its merits. Conversely, in Gobler and Swartout, the plaintiffs had satisfied nearly every condition to employment. Plaintiffs situation is more akin to that of the plaintiff in Gerardi, a Court of Appeals case in which the plaintiff sought work-loss benefits because of a one-year delay in her nursing school studies caused by injuries she incurred in an automobile accident. 123 The plaintiff still had one year of nursing school remaining at the time of her injury. 124 The Court concluded that “[a] fair reading of the complaint reveals that the plaintiff is in fact alleging a loss of wages she could have earned in the future as a registered nurse, but for the delay in her studies,” i.e., loss-of-earning-capacity damages, reasoning, in part, that “plaintiff would not have been able to work as a registered nurse prior to her accident.” 125

Plaintiff Hannay ostensibly pleaded her claim for damages as a claim for work-loss damages as a dental hygienist, and the trial court purported to award such damages. This was error. The evidence presented did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that *86 but for the accident, plaintiff Hannay ultimately would have earned wages as a dental hygienist.

In his deposition testimony, Mark Johnston (the dentist plaintiff worked for as a dental assistant) indicated that plaintiff was “destined to work in a dental office” and was “well on her way to getting into the [dental hygienist] program . . . .” Similarly, in her deposition testimony, Mary Johnston (a longtime dental hygienist who worked with plaintiff, who had been an instructor at the school where plaintiff applied, and who administered licensing exams for dentists and dental hygienists) testified that she thought plaintiff “absolutely. . . would have been admitted into the program.” The Johnstons both indicated that they would have hired plaintiff as a hygienist in their office.

Clearly, the Johnstons were convinced that plaintiff Hannay would be successful in achieving her long-held dream of becoming a dental hygienist. The operative question here is not whether these witnesses were credible 126 —the operative question is what exactly did the evidence presented demonstrate? Did the evidence demonstrate that plaintiff Hannay would have earned wages as a dental hygienist but for her bodily injuries, or did it demonstrate merely that had she continued to apply herself and pursue the opportunity to become educated and licensed in that field she could have earned such wages, i.e., that she possessed a yet-unrealized potential for earning such wages?

We recognize that there is some degree of uncertainty inherent in work-loss awards generally, 127 but even *87 assuming that the opportunity presented by the Johnstons did in fact constitute an offer of employment, the sheer number of conditions that were required to be satisfied before plaintiff could be employed by Dr. Johnston—namely, that plaintiff Hannay would have been accepted into the dental hygienist program, would have successfully completed the program, and would have passed the licensing exam—places this case outside the inherent uncertainty involved in work-loss claims.

We conclude that these unsatisfied conditions render the award of work-loss damages under the no-fault act contingent and speculative in this case and, therefore, barred under Michigan law to the extent that these damages were based on plaintiffs potential employment as a dental hygienist. In short, “it is too tenuous a proposition to say that the element of damages in dispute,” namely, work-loss damages for loss of income as a dental hygienist, “is a legal and natural consequence of defendant’s wrongful act.” 128 The Johnstons’ honestly held belief that plaintiff would have succeeded was simply not sufficient to prove that plaintiff would have satisfied the conditions necessary to earn wages as a dental hygienist, including the primary condition of being admitted into the dental hygienist program, a condition which neither they nor plaintiff had final control over. Accordingly, the facts as found by the trial *88 court were not sufficient to satisfy the statutory language defining work-loss damages with respect to plaintiffs claim of work loss as a dental hygienist, namely that plaintiff would have earned income as a dental hygienist but for the accident.

For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision to affirm plaintiff Hannay’s work-loss damages award, and remand to the trial court for recalculation of the work-loss award consistent with this opinion.

IV CONCLUSION

In light of our holding that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for both economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements under MCL 500.3135 have been met, we affirm the Han-nay panel’s conclusion that work-loss benefits that exceed the statutory maximum are available against a governmental entity, and we reverse the Hunter panel’s conclusion that noneconomic damages do not fall within the category of damages compensable under the motor vehicle exception and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. With regard to the second issue in Hannay, we reverse the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that affirms the work-loss damages award and remand to the trial court for recalculation of the work-loss award consistent with this opinion.