Delano Marco Medina

                 The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                   

                      Supreme Court Case No. 21SC765
                    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
                     Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA1196

                                   Petitioner:

                            Delano Marco Medina,

                                        v.

                                  Respondent:

                      The People of the State of Colorado.

                              Judgment Affirmed
                                    en banc
                               September 11, 2023


Attorneys for Petitioner:
Schelhaas Law LLC
Krista A. Schelhaas
      Littleton, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney General
      Denver, Colorado
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART,
JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.
                                 2
CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    In North Carolina v. Alford, 

 (1970), the United States Supreme

Court upheld a defendant’s guilty plea even though the defendant maintained his

innocence while entering the plea. In so doing, the Court noted that such a

scenario (now commonly known as an Alford plea) is functionally identical to a

no-contest plea when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his interests

require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong

evidence of actual guilt.” 

.

¶2    Similarly, Delano Marco Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even

though he maintained his innocence of that charge. He did so in exchange for the

dismissal of several other criminal cases. The trial court found that Medina’s plea

was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. But because Medina agreed to waive the

establishment of a factual basis for menacing under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), the trial court

did not make a finding as to whether strong evidence of Medina’s actual guilt

existed. Medina later moved to withdraw his plea as violative of due process,

arguing that a defendant cannot waive proof of a factual basis when entering an

Alford plea. The postconviction court denied his motion, and a division of the

court of appeals affirmed.

¶3    We must now determine whether an Alford plea requires that the trial court

make a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt to pass constitutional muster. We

                                          3
conclude that there is no such requirement. Rather, we hold that a defendant may

enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis

for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), provided that the plea is voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent. We therefore affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on

slightly different grounds.

                       I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4    Medina’s wife reported that Medina had threatened her and held a knife to

her throat during an argument. The People charged Medina in Lake County with

felony menacing (committed with the use of a real or simulated weapon), a class 5

felony. At the time, Medina faced prosecution in five other Lake County cases, as

well as one Boulder County case. The court set a $10,000 cash or surety bond in

the menacing case; bond amounts were also set in the other cases.

¶5    Medina later agreed to plead guilty to felony menacing in this case. In

exchange, the People agreed to dismiss all charges in the five other Lake County

cases.1 The parties further agreed that after Medina received his Boulder County



1 The People agreed to dismiss Lake County cases 13CR53, 13CR63, 13T75,
13M130, and 13M131. While the record doesn’t reflect the charges in these cases,
we take judicial notice that they included ten felony counts (including class 4
felony identity theft, class 5 felony forgery, and four counts of class 6 felony
violation of bond conditions). See People v. Sa’ra, 

, 56 (Colo. App. 2004)
(“A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related
proceeding.”). The cases also included a habitual criminal sentence enhancer,
eleven misdemeanor counts, a misdemeanor traffic offense, and a traffic infraction.
                                         4
sentence, he would receive a consecutive one-year sentence for menacing. Medina

signed a copy of the guilty plea, which stated both: “I acknowledge that there is

factual basis for my guilty plea” and “I waive establishment of a factual basis for

the charge.”

¶6    Before the plea colloquy, Medina’s attorney (“plea counsel”) told the trial

court that Medina “steadfastly maintains that the menacing would not be a

provable case.” Plea counsel added, however, that Medina “does not have a

defense” to “other cases, in particular a bond violation.”      Accordingly, plea

counsel said that Medina was choosing to plead guilty to felony menacing, “even

though in his heart of hearts he does not believe he’s guilty of that,” so Medina

could “take advantage of the plea bargain.” And “to that extent,” plea counsel

stated, Medina “would be waiving proof of a factual basis.”

¶7    The trial court acknowledged that because Medina maintained his

innocence, he was entering an Alford plea. The court asked Medina if he had read

the plea agreement, understood everything he read, and signed it. Medina said

that he had. The court warned Medina that he would be “giving up some serious

rights” by pleading guilty, which the court then described in turn before asking if

Medina understood that he would be waiving each right. Medina said that he

understood. The trial court explained the elements of felony menacing and asked

whether Medina understood that if he went to trial, the People would need to

                                        5
prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Medina said that he understood.

The trial court asked if Medina understood that “[o]nce you plead guilty, this is a

final decision. You cannot come back at another time, change your mind, plead

not guilty and have a trial.” Again, Medina said that he understood. At that point,

the trial court asked Medina how he chose to plead, and Medina pleaded guilty.

¶8    Accordingly, the trial court found that Medina’s plea was “freely,

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given.” The court also found that Medina

had “waived the factual basis” for the menacing charge and understood that he

was waiving his rights by pleading guilty. The trial court therefore accepted

Medina’s guilty plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing. In accordance with the

plea agreement, the court then dismissed the five other Lake County cases. With

the other cases dismissed, Medina posted the $10,000 surety bond in this case and

was released from custody.

¶9    Medina failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the court issued a

warrant for his arrest. Almost a year later, Medina appeared in custody once

again, represented by a new attorney (“sentencing counsel”). The People asked

the court to enter the one-year sentence for felony menacing that Medina had

agreed to previously. Sentencing counsel, however, sought to withdraw the plea,

arguing that Medina had believed he could withdraw an Alford plea if he




                                        6
discovered new evidence and that new evidence had since come to light.2 The trial

court denied Medina’s request to withdraw his plea, stating that “there’s no

evidence before me that [Medina’s] plea was not freely, voluntarily, knowingly

and intelligently done.” And so, the court imposed the one-year sentence that

Medina had stipulated to previously, and Medina was given 165 days of

presentence confinement credit for a total sentence of 200 days of imprisonment,

plus two years of mandatory parole.

¶10   Almost three years later, Medina filed a motion for postconviction relief. As

relevant here, Medina argued that there was no factual basis for the plea,

rendering his conviction invalid under Alford. At a hearing, plea counsel testified

that Medina had “waived the factual basis” for menacing because (1) “he may

have been guilty of some of the other charges” and “wanted to take the plea

agreement,” and (2) he would be able to post bond once the other Lake County

cases were dismissed. Medina also testified and acknowledged that he “was guilty

of” the other Lake County cases, but he maintained that he was innocent of

menacing. Under cross-examination, Medina conceded that pleading guilty to

menacing “was my choice” and that “[n]obody forced me.”



2 Sentencing counsel made an offer of proof that in a jail call with Medina, the

victim stated that she had not seen Medina holding a knife during their argument.
Medina testified at the postconviction hearing, however, that the call itself took
place before he pleaded guilty.
                                        7
¶11   The postconviction court denied Medina’s motion. It found that the record

“reflect[ed] that [Medina] waived a factual basis for the purpose of availing

himself of the plea bargain in the case”; specifically, Medina did so because he

wanted to avoid prosecution in the other Lake County cases and post bond. The

court found it “[p]articularly persuasive” that Medina had pleaded guilty

knowing he would obtain the benefits of an “incredibly favorable” plea bargain,

including the dismissal of five other cases and a stipulated one-year sentence.

Moreover, the court found that the record provided sufficient grounds “to

determine that there was a strong factual basis for the offense.” Accordingly, the

court ruled that Medina’s plea was knowing and voluntary; it also ruled that

“[t]here was a factual basis for the plea sufficient to meet the Alford requirements.”

¶12   Medina appealed, arguing that under Alford, his plea was invalid because

the trial court allowed him to waive proof of a factual basis.3 People v. Medina,

, 

, 837. A division of the court of appeals first noted

that Crim. P. 11(b)(6) expressly permits a defendant to waive proof of a factual

basis when the defendant enters a plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 18, 501 P.3d at 838.

Turning to Alford, the division identified “two components to a plea when a



3 Medina also argued that the postconviction court erred by independently
assessing whether there was a factual basis for the plea and by concluding that
there was. People v. Medina, 

, 

, 837. The division
didn’t reach those arguments, 

 and they aren’t before us now.
                                          8
defendant protests his or her innocence: (1) that the defendant’s interests show he

or she should enter the plea; and (2) that there is strong evidence of actual guilt”

despite that protestation of innocence. Id. at ¶ 23, 501 P.3d at 839. The division

determined, however, that Alford didn’t resolve whether the defendant may waive

a finding that there is strong evidence of actual guilt. Id. at ¶ 24, 501 P.3d at 839.

Reviewing case law, the division determined that federal courts disagree as to

whether a strong factual basis is an independent constitutional requirement for

Alford pleas. Id. at ¶ 29, 501 P.3d at 839–40. The division found similar discord

among state courts; some hold that a strong factual basis is constitutionally

required under Alford, while others hold that a strong factual basis is required by

state procedural rules. Id. at ¶¶ 34–36, 501 P.3d at 840–41.

¶13   Faced with these competing views, the division stated that Colorado “has

treated an Alford plea like any other guilty plea” and that Crim. P. 11(b)(6)—which

does not distinguish between Alford pleas and other guilty pleas—is consistent

with that treatment. Id. at ¶ 41, 501 P.3d at 841. Accordingly, the division held

that although “the strong factual basis from Alford is required as part of

constitutional due process,” it is not an independent right from the broader

constitutional imperative that a defendant must “knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently enter[] a plea agreement.” Id. at ¶ 48, 501 P.3d at 843. And because

Crim. P. 11 allows defendants to waive the factual-basis finding, the division

                                          9
concluded that such a waiver—if validly made—doesn’t “render[] an Alford plea

involuntary as a matter of law.” Id. Applying those principles, the division

determined that the postconviction court did not err by ruling that Medina waived

a factual-basis finding and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleaded

guilty. Id. at ¶ 65, 501 P.3d at 846.

¶14   Medina petitioned for certiorari review, and we granted his petition.4

                             II. Standard of Review

¶15   “The constitutional validity of a guilty plea is a question of law that we

review de novo.” Brooks v. People, 

, 

, 312. We defer

to the trial court’s factual findings, however, if they are supported by the record.

 Likewise, in Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings, “we review the lower court’s legal

conclusions de novo but defer to the postconviction court’s factual findings if they

are supported by the record.” People v. Corson, 

, 

.

                                   III. Analysis

¶16   We begin by discussing the general requirements for a valid guilty plea. We

then turn to Alford, which upheld the validity of guilty pleas accompanied by a

protestation of innocence when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his



4 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

      Whether a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,
      

 (1970), but without strong evidence of guilt, violates due
      process.
                                         10
interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains

strong evidence of actual guilt.” 

. After surveying decisions that

have interpreted this language, we determine that a factual-basis finding is not a

constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea, but rather a procedural tool that

courts may use to evaluate whether the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent

(and therefore comports with due process). Thus, we hold that a defendant may

enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis

for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), provided that the plea is voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent. Applying these principles, we affirm, albeit on slightly

different grounds.

                                 A. Guilty Pleas

¶17   Because a guilty plea involves a defendant’s waiver of important

constitutional rights, it “is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.’” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 

 (2005) (quoting Brady v.

United States, 

 (1970)). A plea is invalid if “a defendant ‘does not

understand the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving,’ or ‘has such

an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an

intelligent admission of guilt.’” People v. Dist. Ct., 

 (Colo. 1994)

(citation omitted) (quoting Lacy v. People, 

 (Colo. 1989)).


                                          11
¶18    However, “[n]o formalistic litany is required before a court may accept a

plea of guilty.” 

 “Nor does due process generally require that the record

demonstrate an adequate factual basis for the plea.” Lacy, 

. Instead,

the record “must simply show that the defendant entered his guilty plea

voluntarily and understandingly.” 

¶19    Alongside these constitutional requirements, we have adopted rules

governing the procedures by which a defendant may plead guilty. Crim. P. 11(b).

Compliance with Crim. P. 11 “normally will satisfy constitutional due process

concerns.” Dist. Ct., 

. When a defendant pleads guilty, the court

“shall not accept” the plea “without first determining that the defendant has been

advised of all the rights set forth in Rule 5(a)(2)”; namely, the privilege against

self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to request appointed counsel, the

right to bail, the right to a jury trial, and (under certain circumstances) the right to

demand a preliminary hearing. Crim. P. 11(b); see also Crim. P. 5(a)(2). Typically,

the court must also determine “[t]hat there is a factual basis for the plea.” Crim.

P. 11(b)(6).   However, the rule provides that a defendant may “waive the

establishment of a factual basis for the particular charge to which he pleads” if the

plea is entered as the result of a plea agreement and the court confirms that the

defendant understands the basis for the agreement. 

                                          12
¶20   With these standards in mind, we turn to the type of guilty plea at issue

here: a plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence, also called an Alford plea.

                                 B. Alford Pleas

¶21   In Alford, the United States Supreme Court confronted whether the

Constitution permits a defendant to plead guilty even when the defendant

maintains factual innocence. 

. The Court answered yes. 

.

¶22   Alford was charged with first degree murder. 

. At the time, North

Carolina law provided that first degree murder must be punished with the death

penalty unless the jury recommended life imprisonment. 

 at 27 n.1. And while

Alford insisted that he was innocent, several witnesses incriminated him. 

.

So, Alford decided to plead guilty to second degree murder, which was not a

death-penalty-eligible crime. 

 at 27–28 & n.1. Before accepting his plea, the trial

court heard testimony suggesting that Alford had committed the murder. 

. Alford also testified, saying that while he maintained his innocence, he wished

to plead guilty to avoid the death penalty. 

 The court accepted Alford’s plea

and sentenced him to prison. 

.

¶23   Alford later challenged his conviction, arguing (in part) that his plea was

invalid because he maintained his innocence. See 

. The Supreme Court

stated that the standard for assessing a guilty plea’s validity “was and remains

whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the


                                          13
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” 

 The Court acknowledged

that ordinarily, a conviction on a guilty plea “is justified by the defendant’s

admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that

judgment be entered without a trial of any kind.” 

.

¶24   Nevertheless, the Court recognized that a defendant who maintains

innocence “might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and

that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty.” 

 at 33 (quoting

McCoy v. United States, 

 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). Accordingly, “[r]easons

other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead, . . . [and]

[h]e must be permitted to judge for himself in this respect.” 

 (alterations in

original) (quoting State v. Kaufman, 

 (Iowa 1879)).

¶25   The Court noted that it had already allowed lower courts to impose a prison

sentence upon a plea of nolo contendere—even though a defendant doesn’t

expressly admit guilt in such a plea.5 

 at 35–36 (citing Hudson v. United States,

 (1926)). “Implicit” in that logic, the Court determined, “is a

recognition that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence




5 A nolo contendere plea, also called a no-contest plea, “literally means ‘I do not

wish to contend.’” People v. Darlington, 

 (Colo. 2005) (quoting Nolo
Contendere, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). As the name implies, a plea of
nolo contendere permits a defendant to simply not contest guilt or innocence; still,
it is “fully equivalent” to a guilty plea for purposes of the criminal case. 

                                         14
upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with

grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” Id. at 36.

So “while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express

admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the

imposition of criminal penalty.” Id. at 37.

¶26   Returning to Alford’s case, the Court stated that it couldn’t “perceive any

material difference” between a nolo contendere plea and a plea accompanied by a

protestation of innocence “when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently

concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the

judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id. (emphasis added). In so doing, the

Court noted that some courts “properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of

innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea.” Id.

at 38 n.10 (collecting cases). But the Court reasoned that the validity of Alford’s

plea was clear when “viewed in light of the evidence against him, which

substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means

by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered.”

Id. at 37–38. Thus, the Court concluded that Alford’s choice to plead guilty while

maintaining his innocence was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 38–39.

¶27   Colorado permits defendants to make the same choice.               See People v.

Birdsong, 

 (Colo. 1998). At bottom, though, “[a]n Alford plea is

                                          15
a guilty plea.” Id.; see also United States v. Tunning, 

 (6th Cir. 1995)

(“An Alford-type guilty plea is a guilty plea in all material respects.”). So, in other

contexts, we have declined to differentiate an Alford plea from any other guilty

plea. People v. Schneider, 

 (Colo. 2001) (holding that “an Alford plea

is no different from a guilty plea” when analyzing whether a defendant may

withdraw the plea); Birdsong, 

 (holding that the trial court’s

“obligations to advise the defendant were no greater” for an Alford plea “than with

any other guilty plea”). Nor do our procedural rules differentiate an Alford plea

from any other guilty plea. See Crim. P. 11(a) (providing that a defendant may

plead guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or nolo contendere).

¶28   Left unresolved in our decisions, however, is whether an Alford plea must

be supported by a finding that there is strong evidence of actual guilt, or whether

a defendant may instead waive that finding. See Lacy, 

 & n.7 (holding

that due process generally does not require that the record demonstrate an

adequate factual basis for a plea but declining to address whether the same is true

for Alford pleas); In re Cardwell, 

, 905 n.8 (Colo. 2002) (suggesting in dicta

that “the trial judge should inquire into factual guilt” when a defendant protests

innocence). We turn to that issue now.




                                           16
                     C. Strong Evidence of Actual Guilt

¶29   Medina argues that the “strong evidence of actual guilt” discussed in Alford

is a nonwaivable, constitutional prerequisite for all Alford pleas, meaning that an

Alford plea violates due process unless it is supported by a factual-basis finding.

In response, the People argue that the requirement for courts to make a

factual-basis finding is a product of procedural rules, not the Constitution, and

that Colorado’s Crim. P. 11 allows defendants to waive that finding. Alternatively,

the People argue that even if a factual-basis finding is a constitutional requirement

for Alford pleas, defendants can waive that requirement, just as they waive

numerous constitutional rights by pleading guilty.

¶30   Other appellate courts are split on this issue. Compare Higgason v. Clark,

 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that strong evidence of guilt is not a

constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea), with Willett v. Georgia, 

 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a factual basis must support an Alford plea).

¶31   Specifically, the Seventh Circuit holds that strong evidence of actual guilt is

not constitutionally required, even in the context of an Alford plea. Higgason,

. Instead, the standard for assessing whether an Alford plea is

constitutional remains the same as with any other guilty plea: The plea must be

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 

 (quoting Alford, 

). According

to the Seventh Circuit, “[p]utting a factual basis for the plea on the record has


                                          17
become familiar as a result of statutes and rules, not as a result of constitutional

compulsion.” 

 The Higgason court recognized that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 requires

federal courts to make a factual-basis finding before accepting any guilty plea. 

But Alford “does not imply that the factual-basis requirement of Fed. R. Crim.

P. [11] and its state law counterparts comes from the Constitution.” Id. at 207.

Rather, “Alford tells us that strong evidence on the record can show that a plea is

voluntary; it does not hold that only strong evidence on the record permits a

finding of voluntariness.” Id.

¶32    The Sixth Circuit has similarly concluded that the factual-basis requirement

“is not a requirement of the Constitution, but rather a requirement created by rules

and statutes.” Tunning, 

. According to that Circuit, Alford held that

a court may accept a guilty plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence “so

long as the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consents to be

sentenced on a charge.” Roddy v. Black, 

 (6th Cir. 1975). And

“[t]his being the rule, there is no constitutional requirement that a trial judge

inquire into the factual basis of a plea.” 

 That requirement instead stems from

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the “precise terms” of which “are not constitutionally

applicable to the state courts.” 

; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3)

(“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there

is a factual basis for the plea.”).

                                         18
¶33   In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that courts are constitutionally

obligated to inquire into the factual basis of an Alford plea before accepting one.

Willett, 

. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit focused on a footnote in

Alford, which said that various courts “properly caution that pleas coupled with

claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the

plea.” 

 (quoting Alford, 

 n.10). Extrapolating from that language,

the Fifth Circuit held that “a judicial finding of some factual basis for [the]

defendant’s guilt is an essential part of the constitutionally-required finding of a

voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty” in the context of an Alford plea.

 Other federal circuits have similarly concluded that evidence of guilt must

support an Alford plea. See United States ex rel. Dunn v. Casscles, 

(2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mackins, 

 (3d Cir. 2000); United

States v. Mastrapa, 

 (4th Cir. 2007); White Hawk v. Solem, 

 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vidal, 

 (10th Cir. 2009);

United States v. Lefever, 

 (11th Cir. 2009). Even these courts,

however, disagree as to whether “strong” evidence is necessary, as opposed to less

stringent proof. Compare White Hawk, 

 (requiring a “strong factual

basis”), with United States v. Morrow, 

 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ny

Rule 11 proceeding requires that a factual basis for the plea be established and we

are unwilling to place more requirements in the context of an Alford plea.”).

                                          19
¶34   State courts are similarly split. Some have held that a factual-basis finding

is constitutionally required for Alford pleas. See, e.g., Sparrow v. State, 

,

415–16 (Idaho 1981); State v. Smith, 

, 88–89 (Haw. 1980); State v. Goulette,

 (Minn. 1977). But others treat the issue as a matter of state

procedural law, not a federal constitutional requirement. See, e.g., People v. Barker,

 (Ill. 1980) (relying on state procedural rule modeled after Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11); Robinson v. State, 

, 280–81 (Del. 1972) (same).

¶35   Among these competing views, we find the Seventh Circuit’s approach most

persuasive. Although a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt can show that an

Alford plea comports with due process, it is not a constitutional prerequisite for

every such plea. Higgason, 

. Instead, “[t]he Constitution’s standard

‘was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice.’”

 (quoting Alford, 

).

¶36   While the Supreme Court noted that evidence of Alford’s guilt “provided a

means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently

entered,” Alford, 

, the Court didn’t state that strong evidence of guilt

alone can provide those means, Higgason, 

 (“‘If A then B’ does not

imply ‘if not-A then not-B.’”). To the contrary, inquiring into factual guilt is simply

one way that courts may assess whether an Alford plea is voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent—not the only way.

                                           20
¶37   Crim. P. 11 is designed to facilitate the constitutionally required

determination that a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v.

Leonard, 

, 39–40 (Colo. 1983). But that doesn’t mean the factual-basis

finding discussed in Crim. P. 11 is itself a constitutional requirement; instead, the

finding is procedural in nature.6 See Higgason, 

; Roddy, 

 (“The requirement that a federal trial judge inquire into the factual basis of a

plea stems from [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11], rather than from the Constitution.”). Some

jurisdictions’ procedural rules, like the federal rules, require courts to make a

factual-basis finding before accepting any guilty plea. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim.

P. 11(b)(3); 

(c) (West 2023) (“The court shall also cause an

inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself . . . that there is a factual basis

for the plea.”). But our Crim. P. 11(b)(6) expressly allows defendants to waive

proof of a factual basis if their plea is entered as the result of a plea agreement.

Accordingly, under the plain language of Crim. P. 11(b)(6), defendants like

Medina may waive proof of a factual basis, even if they simultaneously profess




6 To the extent the division below concluded that a strong factual basis “is required

as part of constitutional due process,” Medina, ¶ 48, 501 P.3d at 843, we disapprove
of that portion of its opinion. While a factual-basis finding may help a trial court
determine that a defendant’s plea comports with due process, that finding is not
an integral component of due process itself. Higgason, 

.
                                           21
their innocence.7 See People v. Fuqua, 

 (Colo. 1988) (“[I]f [a criminal

procedure rule] is plain and unambiguous, we apply the rule as written.”).

¶38   This treatment comports with our previous recognition that “[a]n Alford plea

is a guilty plea.” Birdsong, 

. We have long recognized that “an

Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea” and have declined to

impose different standards when assessing either. Schneider, 

; see also

Birdsong, 

. And while we have (until today) reserved ruling on

whether a factual-basis finding must support an Alford plea, we have nonetheless

held that due process does not “generally require that the record demonstrate an

adequate factual basis” for guilty pleas. Lacy, 

. Because we have

declined to differentiate between Alford pleas and other guilty pleas generally, we

decline to do so in this context as well.

¶39   Moreover, the determination that a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case. See 

.

While a defendant’s choice to plead guilty may be influenced by the factual basis

for the charge, it may equally be influenced by other considerations. For instance,



7 In some cases, it may be better practice for trial courts to nonetheless make a

factual-basis finding before accepting an Alford plea. A thorough inquiry into the
factual basis for a plea can provide insight into whether the defendant’s decision
to plead guilty is indeed voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; it may also insulate
the conviction from later attack by providing record support that the plea
represents a voluntary and intelligent choice. Higgason, 984 F.2d at 207–08.
                                            22
by pleading guilty to menacing, Medina was able to achieve the global disposition

of several other criminal cases for which he had no defense. Cf. People v. Isaacks,

 (Colo. 2006) (discussing a defendant who was charged with

menacing but instead pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge that “was not

supported by facts” so he could take advantage of a plea bargain); People v.

Maestas, 

, 408–09 (Colo. App. 2009) (discussing a defendant who

pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree assault as part of a plea agreement,

even though it was “undisputed that there was no factual basis” for the charge).

Like Alford, Medina “now argues in effect that the State should not have allowed

him this choice.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 38–39. But that’s not what the Constitution

demands. So long as the defendant’s choice to plead guilty is voluntary, knowing,

and intelligent, the Constitution’s mandate is met. Higgason, 

(quoting Alford, 

).

¶40   Thus, we hold that a defendant may enter an Alford plea while nonetheless

waiving the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6),

provided that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

                                    D. Application

¶41   We now turn to Medina’s plea. Medina faced prosecution in several other

cases when he was charged with menacing. So, Medina had a choice to make. He

could plead guilty to menacing in exchange for the global disposition of his other


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cases (including the dismissal of numerous felony charges) and receive a

stipulated sentence of one year in the Department of Corrections. Or he could

proceed to trial in all of his cases, despite his acknowledgment that he “was guilty

of” some of those charges, and perhaps try to negotiate piecemeal plea agreements

along the way.

¶42   Medina chose the former option. He signed a plea that waived proof of a

factual basis for the menacing charge, and his counsel told the trial court that

Medina was doing so to take advantage of his plea agreement. The trial court

explained the consequences of the guilty plea to Medina, stopping several times

to ensure that Medina understood. Each time, Medina said that he did. In

Medina’s words, “it was my choice” to plead guilty, and “[n]obody forced me.”

On that record, the postconviction court ruled that Medina waived proof of a

factual basis and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleaded guilty to take

advantage of his “incredibly favorable” plea bargain.

¶43   In this appeal, Medina’s sole argument is that the trial court was

constitutionally required to find that there was strong evidence of actual guilt,

even though Medina waived proof of a factual basis. As we have discussed, there

is no such requirement. Thus, the postconviction court did not err.




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                              IV. Conclusion

¶44   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the division’s judgment, albeit on

slightly different grounds.




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