Wayne Prater v. Pennsylvania Department of Cor

                                      PRECEDENTIAL

        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     ______

            Nos. 19-1732, 20-2254, 20-2897
                       ______

                  WAYNE PRATER,
                     Appellant in 19-1732

                          v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PA D.O.C.; BARRY
  SMITH, Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale; KENNETH
 HOLLIBAUGH, Deputy Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale;
 DAVID CLOSE, Deputy Superintendent at SCI Houtzdale;
   REBECCA REIFER, Superintendent Assistant at SCI
Houtzdale; MICHELLE IVICIC, Corrections Classifications
    & Program Manager (CCPM); JANET PEARSON,
   Corrections Health Care Administrator (CHCA); DR.
 MUHAMMAD NAJI, Medical Director at SCI Houtzdale;
JOSEPH H. DUPONT, Chief Hearing Examiner; JOSEPH J.
  SILVA, Director Health Bureau Care Services; ADREN
SMITH, Director Health Care Services; FREDDY NUNEZ,
 Hearing Examiner; DORINA VARNER, Chief Grievance
     Officer; KERI MOORE, Grievance Officer; JOEL
 BARROWS, Major at SCI Houtzdale; K. SHEA, Security
 Captain at SCI Houtzdale; T. KNOWLES, Captain at SCI
Houtzdale; CO 1 MOONEY, Lieutenant (Lt.) SCI Houtzdale;
   C.O. KELLY, Lieutenant (Lt.) at SCI Houtzdale; CHIEF
 JAMES, Lieutenant (Lt.) SCI Houtzdale; PEGGY BARNS,
  Physician Assistant (P/A) at SCI Houtzdale; ELIZABETH
               JURY, Nurse at SCI Houtzdale;
RICHARD or RICH, Male Nurse at SCI Houtzdale; DAREN
    GINTER, Unit Manager at SCI Houtzdale; WILLIAM
   NORVELL, Maintenance Supervisor at SCI Houtzdale;
   POBORSKI, Sergeant (Sgt.) at SCI Houtzdale; LARUE,
Sergeant (Sgt.) at SCI Houtzdale; G. Cogan, Counselor at SCI
   Houtzdale; DUFORE, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI
    Houtzdale; FLORA, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI
                         Houtzdale;
MR. MAINES, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale;
     LONG, Correctional Officer (C/O) at SCI Houtzdale
                           ______

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                 (D.C. No. 3-19-cv-00019)
       Magistrate Judge: Honorable Keith A. Pesto
                         ______

                   AARON VAUGHN,
                      Appellant in No. 20-2254

                             v.

CORRECTION OFFICER IMOHOFF, (Pod Officer of F-B
Pod from 11/10/16 - 3/15/17); SERGEANT TIKEY, (Sgt. of
 F-B Pod 6 to 2am shift); CORRECTION OFFICER GILL;
 CORRECTION OFFICER CARTER, (Pod Officer of F-B




                             2
  Pod from 11/10/16 - 3/15/17); LIEUTENANT SCHAMP,
    (RHU Lt. 2-10pm shift); CORRECTION OFFICER
     STECKLY, (Pod Officer of F-B Pod 2-10pm shift);
CORRECTION OFFICER TUSCANO, (Pod Officer of F-B
Pod 2-10pm shift); JOHN DOE, (Co-worker with CO Gill on
 11/10/16); CORRECTION OFFICER W. PEREZ-RAMOS
                          ______

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                (D.C. No. 2-17-cv-00546)
      Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan
                        ______

             ISAAC RAY VAUGHAN, JR.,
                    Appellant in No. 20-2897

                           v.

 ALBION SCI; C.O. BOYD, Guard; C.O. WOODS; C.O.
CAMRON; C.O. MCINTOSH; C.O. W. CHRISTOPHER;
       C.O. ARNOLD; MR. LANCE, Unit Man.;
 MS. NORTIN, Counselor; MS. HERMAN; MS. SNOW,
                     Psych;
MS. RICHARDS, Psych; SUPERINTENDENT MICHAEL
                    CLARK;
          C.O. MAKENEY; C.O. SEVERO
                     ______

     On Appeal from the United States District Court




                           3
        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                 (D.C. No. 1-18-cv-00116)
     Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo
                         ______

              Argued on April 20, 2023
   Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER and FISHER, Circuit
                      Judges.

                  (Filed: August 2, 2023)

Wayne Prater
#KV-1019
Houtzdale SCI
P.O Box 1000
209 Institution Drive
Houtzdale, PA 16698
      Pro Se, Case No. 19-1732

Aaron Vaughn
#KW-3603
Huntingdon SCI
1100 Pike Street
Huntingdon, PA 16654
      Pro Se, Case No. 20-2254

Isaac Ray Vaughan, Jr.
#JF-0037
Albion SCI
10745 Route 18
Albion, PA 16475
       Pro Se, Case No. 20-2897




                            4
Michelle Henry, Attorney General
Sean A. Kirkpatrick ARGUED
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
       Counsel for Amicus Curiae Case No. 19-1732

James S. Ballenger
Samuel Gerstemeier ARGUED
Tristan Locke ARGUED
University of Virginia School of Law
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
       Counsel for Amicus Curiae Appellant Case Nos. 19-
1732, 20-2254 and 20-2897

Michelle Henry, Attorney General
Howard G. Hopkirk
Michael J. Scarinci
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Daniel B. Mullen ARGUED
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
1251 Waterfront Place
Mezzanine Level
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
       Counsel for Appellees Case Nos. 20-2254 and 20-2897

                         ______

               OPINION OF THE COURT




                            5
                             ______


FISHER, Circuit Judge.
        Wayne Prater, Isaac Vaughan, Jr., and Aaron Vaughn
each challenge an order entered by a magistrate judge in their

 cases. A magistrate judge involuntarily
dismissed Prater’s case without prejudice for failure to
prosecute, while the magistrate judges in Isaac’s and Aaron’s
cases entered summary judgment for all defendants.1
        Primarily at issue on appeal is whether the magistrate
judges acted within the scope of their statutorily granted
jurisdiction under 

. Section 636 is both
innovative and limited. It was intended to lighten the load
carried by district court judges by granting some preliminary
and final decision-making authority to magistrate judges.
However, to protect the purpose of Article III and citizens’
right to an independent, life-tenured decisionmaker, § 636
places precise limits on a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction absent
parties’ consent. For example, a magistrate judge can oversee
pretrial discovery even without the consent of the parties, but
he cannot grant summary judgment or involuntarily dismiss a
case. However, those limits dissolve if the parties voluntarily
consent to a magistrate judge’s final judgment jurisdiction
under § 636(c)(1).
        Thus, the magistrate judges’ jurisdiction to enter final
orders in each of these three cases turns on the parties’ consent.
We will dismiss Prater’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
all parties did not consent and, therefore, the magistrate judge

       1
        Isaac and Aaron have almost identical last names, so
we use their first names to avoid confusion.




                                6
lacked the power to involuntarily dismiss the case. When a
magistrate judge lacks jurisdiction, so do we. By contrast, the
magistrate judges were empowered to enter summary
judgment in Isaac’s and Aaron’s cases because all parties either
expressly or impliedly consented. Therefore, we have
jurisdiction and will affirm summary judgment based on the
plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.




       This consolidated case concerns three appeals from
orders entered by magistrate judges in the Western District of
Pennsylvania.

                        a. Wayne Prater
        Wayne Prater, a prisoner at State Correctional
Institution Houtzdale, tore his Achilles tendon in an accident
in July 2016. In February 2019, he filed a complaint against the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and thirty-one
prison officials. Along with his complaint, Prater filed a motion
to proceed in forma pauperis and a consent to jurisdiction
form, choosing to proceed before a magistrate judge under
§ 636(c)(1) for any and all further proceedings in lieu of
proceeding before a district court judge. Prater alleged prison
officials showed “deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need” and “intentional[ly] inflict[ed]” “unnecessary and
wanton pain” by delaying his Achilles surgery for months,
threatening his life by administering allergenic medication,
denying him adequate pain medication, and exposing him to




                               7
conditions that risked re-injury. JA Prater 27.2 Prater sought
compensatory and punitive relief for these alleged ongoing
violations of his First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. In addition, Prater sought relief related to
a misconduct violation he received for improperly contacting
his children.
        The Western District assigned the case to a magistrate
judge. The magistrate judge denied Prater’s IFP motion under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which does not
permit inmates to proceed IFP if they have three strikes—i.e.,
three actions or appeals dismissed because they are “frivolous,
malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” 

(g). According to the magistrate
judge, Prater’s previous lawsuits amounted to four strikes. And
the magistrate judge concluded that Prater did not qualify for
the three-strikes exception for prisoners who are “under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 

 Therefore,
Prater could proceed with his claims only “upon payment of
the full filing fee.” JA Prater 5. The magistrate judge also stated
that Prater’s complaint impermissibly joined “unrelated claims
and defendants” that did “not share common questions of law
or fact” or “arise out of the same series of occurrences,” so he
ordered any subsequent complaint to comply with federal
joinder rules. JA Prater 5; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
Prater did not file an amended complaint or pay the full filing
fee, so on February 28, 2019, the magistrate judge dismissed
Prater’s case “without prejudice for failure to prosecute (failure
to pay the filing fee).” JA Prater 6. Prater appealed.



       2
        Separate appendices were filed in each appeal. We cite
them as “JA [name] [page].”




                                8
                      b. Isaac Vaughan, Jr.
       Isaac Vaughan, Jr., a prisoner at SCI Albion, filed a
complaint against the institution in April 2018, alleging that he
was assaulted on two separate occasions by prison officials.
Isaac followed up with an amended complaint, naming SCI
Albion and fourteen individuals. He alleged officials subjected
him to excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment
right when he was pepper-sprayed, beaten, shackled, placed on
suicide watch, restrained, drugged, and shocked while guards
ripped off his clothes. In support of his complaint, Isaac stated
that he had properly exhausted administrative remedies
because he “talk[ed] to everyone [he] could” about the
incidents and filed a formal grievance. JA Isaac 67. In his
formal grievance, Isaac offered several reasons why it “took so
long” for him to file one. JA Isaac 237. Even so, his grievance
was rejected as untimely. He did not seek further
administrative review.
       Along with his complaint, Isaac filed an IFP motion and
a “consent to jurisdiction” by a magistrate judge under
§ 636(c)(1) in lieu of proceeding before a district court judge.
JA Isaac 42. The magistrate judge granted Isaac’s IFP motion,
permitting him to formally lodge his complaint in May 2018.
Throughout the litigation, the Office of Attorney General—
acting through several deputy AGs who successively staffed
the case—appeared on behalf of all defendants and waived
service of process. The initial deputy AG on the case also filed
a form consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction under
§ 636(c)(1) on behalf of SCI Albion—the only named
defendant at the time. The defendants eventually deposed
Isaac. During his deposition, Isaac admitted that the only
defendants who used force against him during either of the
incidents were Correctional Officers Christopher and Maskrey.




                               9
       All defendants moved for summary judgment. They
argued SCI Albion was immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, and, among other things, Isaac’s claims against
the fourteen officials were not properly exhausted under 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the PLRA. The magistrate judge agreed
and entered summary judgment in favor of SCI Albion under
the Eleventh Amendment; in favor of the superintendent for
lack of personal involvement in the alleged violation; and in
favor of all other defendants based on failure to exhaust. Isaac
appealed.

                        c. Aaron Vaughn
        Aaron Vaughn, a prisoner at SCI Dallas, filed a
complaint against SCI Greene, over thirty officers, and several
groups of John/Jane Doe defendants in April 2017. He alleged
a variety of violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He filed several amended
complaints. But over time, various claims and defendants fell
out of the case. The main claim at issue on appeal is Aaron’s
excessive force claim that CO Gill and a John Doe co-worker
(later identified as CO Johnston) beat him while transporting
him from one housing unit to another. In support of his
complaint, Aaron stated that he properly exhausted
administrative remedies. Aaron filed a formal grievance about
the incident. DOC initiated an investigation pursuant to policy
and then denied the grievance. Aaron unsuccessfully appealed
once but did not seek final administrative review. Aaron also
detailed the alleged abuse in a “Request to Staff Member”
form. JA Aaron 484.
        Along with his complaint, Aaron filed an IFP motion.
After his IFP motion was granted, Aaron filed a “consent to
jurisdiction” by a magistrate judge under § 636(c)(1) in lieu of
proceeding before a district court judge. JA Aaron 135.




                                10
Throughout the litigation, the Office of Attorney General—
acting through several deputy AGs who successively staffed
the case—appeared on behalf of all defendants and waived
service of process. The initial deputy AG on the case filed a
form consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction under
§ 636(c)(1) on behalf of SCI Greene and Robert Gilmore—the
only defendants Aaron ordered to be served at the time.
        The defendants deposed Aaron and moved for summary
judgment. The magistrate judge entered summary judgment for
CO Gill and CO Johnston, concluding that Aaron failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by not taking a final
administrative appeal. The magistrate judge noted that DOC
maintains two policies for reporting abuse: ADM 001 and
ADM 804. However, she reasoned that only the latter—which
sets forth the formal grievance procedures, including the final
administrative appeal—satisfies the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirements. The magistrate judge also noted that Aaron
failed to substitute and serve CO Johnston as the John Doe co-
worker from his complaint. Nevertheless, she entered summary
judgment in CO Johnston’s favor because Aaron’s excessive
force claim against CO Johnston was “identical” to Aaron’s
claim against CO Gill and “ar[o]se from the same set of
fact[s].” JA Aaron 44. Aaron appealed.


       On appeal, Prater, Isaac, and Aaron argue that the
magistrate judges lacked jurisdiction to enter final judgment
orders in their respective cases. Given the similar jurisdictional
issues posed by each of their cases, we consolidated the three
appeals and appointed amicus curiae on behalf of the three




                               11
prisoners.3 Meanwhile, the Commonwealth participated in all
of the cases but in different capacities. It provided its views by
way of special appearance in Prater’s case—essentially similar
to the role of amicus curiae—and represented the defendants
in Isaac’s and Aaron’s cases.

       The magistrate judges’ jurisdiction and our jurisdiction
are the central issues on appeal. The district courts had
jurisdiction under 

 and 1343. If the
magistrate judges had jurisdiction, it would have been pursuant
to 

. Our jurisdiction is “contingent upon” the
magistrate judges’ jurisdiction and would flow from
§§ 636(c)(3) and 1291. Burton v. Schamp, 

, 205
n.9 (3d Cir. 2022). We review de novo whether a magistrate
judge had jurisdiction to issue a final order. 

 And we review
our own jurisdiction de novo. Dewey v. Volkswagen A.G., 

 (3d Cir. 2012). We conclude that the magistrate
judge in Prater’s case lacked jurisdiction to involuntarily
dismiss his case, but the magistrate judges in Isaac’s and
Aaron’s cases properly exercised final judgment authority.


       In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrate Act,

 et seq., which abolished the office of United
States commissioner and established the office of magistrate.

 Stat. 1107. It “conferred upon

       3
        The Court is grateful to the Appellate Litigation Clinic
at the University of Virginia School of Law for its able
representation of the plaintiffs, and in particular thanks J. Scott
Ballenger, Samuel Gerstemeier, and Tristan Locke for their
well-presented and helpful briefs and oral arguments.




                                12
magistrates all the powers that commissioners had enjoyed” to
settle “minor federal legal disputes,” plus additional duties as
assigned by district courts. Gomez v. United States, 

, 865–66 (1989). “The Act grew out of Congress’ desire to
give district judges additional assistance in dealing with a
caseload that was increasing far more rapidly than the number
of judgeships.” Thomas v. Arn, 

 (1985)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Congress
intended magistrate judges “to play an integral and important
role in the federal judicial system.” See Peretz v. United States,

 (1991) (calling magistrate judges “nothing
less than indispensable” given district courts’ “bloated
dockets” (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Williams, 

 (3d Cir. 1989))).4
        Under the Act, district court judges may “delegate
certain matters to magistrate judges.” Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n v. City of Long Branch, 

 (3d Cir.
2017). However, because magistrate judges derive their power
from Article I of the Constitution (establishing the legislative
branch), not Article III (establishing the judicial branch), the
Act “limit[s] the circumstances” in which a magistrate judge
exercises final adjudicatory authority. See Burton, 25 F.4th at
206; see generally U.S. Const. art. II, § 2 (permitting Congress
to “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers” in “the
Courts of Law”); 

(a) (providing for
appointment of magistrate judges by district court). The scope



       4
         In 1990, Congress revised the statute and renamed
“magistrates” as “magistrate judges.” See Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 

, 

.




                               13
of a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction depends on two factors: the
consent of the parties and the nature of the matter.
        The Act permits a district court judge to “designate a
magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter,”
without the parties’ consent, save eight exceptions, including
“a motion . . . for summary judgment, . . . and to involuntarily
dismiss an action.” 

(b)(1)(A). The Federal
Rules implementing the Act call pretrial matters that may be
referred to a magistrate judge without parties’ consent
“nondispositive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). If a party disagrees
with the magistrate judge’s decision on such matters, the party
may timely object, after which the district court “must . . .
modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly
erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id.; see also 

(b)(1)(A).
        In matters a magistrate judge does not have the power
to “determine” without the parties’ consent—pretrial motions
excepted under § 636(b)(1)(A), “applications for posttrial
relief” in criminal cases, and “prisoner petitions challenging
conditions of confinement”—a judge may “designate a
magistrate judge to conduct hearings . . . and to submit to a
judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations” for disposition. 

(b)(1)(B).
The Federal Rules call these matters “dispositive.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). A party may file timely objections to the magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations. The district court “shall”
review de novo any timely objections and “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”5 28 U.S.C.

       5
         A party’s failure to timely object to a magistrate
judge’s recommendation may cause the party to lose the right




                              14
§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Whether or not
objections are filed, the district court “must take some action
for a report and recommendation to become a final order”;
thus, the district court retains final adjudicatory authority.
EEOC, 

.
       In addition, the Act provides that “[u]pon the consent of
the parties,” a magistrate judge “may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry
of judgment in the case.” 

(c)(1); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 73.
       So absent party consent, a magistrate judge’s
jurisdiction extends only to nondispositive pretrial matters.
Outside those nondispositive pretrial matters, the magistrate
judge makes findings of fact and provides the district court
with non-final recommendations. But when there is party
consent, the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction is coextensive with
the district court’s jurisdiction, extending to any or all
proceedings, including entry of final judgment.


       With that background in mind, we first address Prater’s
challenge to a magistrate judge’s authority to deny IFP




to de novo review by the district court; instead, a district court
need only provide “reasoned consideration” to the legal issues
raised by the recommendation. EEOC, 866 F.3d at 99–100
(citation omitted). However, a failure to timely object does not
forfeit the right to appellate review once the district court has
entered a final decision on the recommendation. Henderson v.
Carlson, 

, 878–79 (3d Cir. 1987).




                               15
motions.6 Though the Commonwealth purports to concede the
issue, the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction is a predicate of our
own, and subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or
forfeited for failure of the parties to object to it. See Burton, 25
F.4th at 207.
        Based on the statute, Federal Rules, and caselaw, we
conclude that magistrate judges maintain jurisdiction to decide
IFP motions. Starting with the plain text, § 636(b)(1)(A) carves
out only eight matters from a magistrate judge’s pretrial
jurisdiction. But the fact that IFP motions do not appear in this
list of exceptions is not conclusive because most courts agree
the list is illustrative, not exhaustive, of matters beyond the
scope of a magistrate judge’s pretrial jurisdiction. E.g., Baylor
v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing First and Sixth Circuit cases); see also
Gomez, 

 (reasoning “jury selection,” which is
not a listed exception under § 636(b)(1)(A), “is more akin to
those precisely defined, ‘dispositive’ matters”).
        Even so, other textual clues suggest IFP motions are
nondispositive pretrial matters. Take § 636(b)(1)(B), which
expressly permits magistrate judges to recommend the
disposition of (rather than determine) “applications for
posttrial relief” and “prisoner petitions challenging conditions
of confinement.” Congress clearly prohibited magistrate
judges from determining only the merits of such petitions. By
contrast, § 636(b)(1)(B) does not prevent magistrate judges


       6
         The magistrate judge’s denial of Prater’s IFP motion
included a mandate that Prater’s subsequent complaints
comply with federal joinder rules. We do not understand the
parties to be challenging the magistrate judge’s power to order
compliance with federal joinder rules.




                                16
from ruling on the IFP motions that often accompany such
petitions. Notably, the power to allow plaintiffs to proceed IFP
dates back to at least 1892—well before the passage of the
Federal Magistrates Act in 1968 and amendments thereto in the
1970s. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 

 (3d
Cir. 2001); see also Gomez, 490 U.S. at 865–71 (tracing
statutory history of magistrate judge authority). So Congress
passed § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) against the longstanding
backdrop of district courts deciding pretrial IFP motions in
tandem with substantive prisoner petitions. Yet, the statute
limits a magistrate judge only from deciding the latter.
        The Federal Rules implementing § 636(b) bolster our
conclusion. As noted, the Rules use a different organizing
principle than the statute. Instead of listing specific exceptions
to magistrate judge jurisdiction, the Rules carve out all
“dispositive” matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). And while the
Rules’ language is surely broader than the statute’s text, we
must construe the term “dispositive . . . in harmony with the
classifications limned in [§] 636(b)(1).” Phinney v. Wentworth
Douglas Hosp., 

 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing principle
of in pari materia). Thus, the “enumeration” of specific
exceptions in § 636(b)(1)(A) “informs the classification of
other motions as dispositive or nondispositive.” Id. at 6.
        IFP motions are “not of the same genre” as the
exceptions to a magistrate judge’s pretrial jurisdiction
enumerated in the Act, which are generally outcome
determinative. See id. Most of the enumerated exceptions—
motions for judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
dismissal, for example—can formally decide the case. See 

(b)(1)(A). Two of the enumerated exceptions do
not follow this general rule but, nevertheless, fall outside of
magistrate judges’ § 636(b)(1)(A) authority. First, motions for
injunctive relief are not outcome determinative for entire




                               17
claims, but they are “dispositive” in that they conclusively
resolve parties’ rights and obligations for the period of the
injunction. Second, motions to suppress evidence in criminal
cases raise unique concerns because they may well determine
the outcome of criminal matters. While the denial of an IFP
motion may functionally end a case when a plaintiff also lacks
the ability to pay, the denial is not outcome determinative in
the same way as a disposition would be related to the
illustrative list of dispositive motions in § 636(b)(1)(A). After
a denial of an IFP motion, a plaintiff can proceed with his case,
unimpeded as to the merits, after first paying the filing fee.
        Though the parties cite other Circuits that have
concluded otherwise, we do not find those cases persuasive.
Taking each case in turn, Donaldson v. Ducote concerned the
right to proceed IFP on appeal. 

 (5th Cir.
2004). Obviously, a decision regarding that right does not
pertain to pretrial authority. Meanwhile, Tripati v. Rison held
a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction over IFP motions derived only
from a referral and parties’ consent under § 636(c) but did not
substantively discuss § 636(b) or distinguish IFP motions from
other matters a magistrate judge has the pretrial authority to
decide. 

, 548–49 (9th Cir. 1988). That leaves
Woods v. Dahlberg, 

 (6th Cir. 1990), and the
decisions relying upon it without much comment: Lister v.
Department of Treasury, 

 (10th Cir. 2005),
and Hunter v. Roventini, 

 (4th Cir.
2015). These cases primarily reason that magistrate judges may
not deny IFP motions because doing so “is the functional
equivalent of an involuntary dismissal”—one of the express
statutory carveouts in § 636(b)(1)(A). Woods, 

.
        It is not clear that simply denying an IFP motion without
prejudice is the “functional equivalent” of an involuntary
dismissal under § 636(b)(1)(A). Rather, a court is merely




                               18
determining how a petitioner’s case proceeds—with or without
prepayment of a filing fee. See Abdul-Akbar, 

.
And we have endorsed a broad view of magistrate judges’
pretrial power to determine how cases proceed. See, e.g., Siers
v. Morrash, 

 (3d Cir. 1983) (denial of
appointment of counsel); United Steelworkers of Am. v. N.J.
Zinc Co., 

, 1006–08 (3d Cir. 1987) (grant of
motion to strike jury demand); Turner v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 

, 341 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990) (denial of motion
to reopen discovery period); see also Sell v. United States, 

 (2003) (involving involuntary medication order
by magistrate judge pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(A)). Just as with
other pretrial matters within § 636(b)(1)(A)’s scope, denying
an IFP motion simply sets parameters under which a plaintiff
may proceed. That contrasts with orders that end the case,
which magistrate judges may not decide. See, e.g., Burton, 25
F.4th at 203 (dismissal of complaint with prejudice at
screening stage); Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 

,
438 (3d Cir. 2005) (equitable allocation of responsibility for
pollution in a CERCLA case, which was “one of the ultimate
issues to be tried”).
        The Commonwealth warns that finding magistrate
judge jurisdiction over IFP motions would force an inmate to
simultaneously file objections in district court and appeal to
our Court given that denials of IFP motions are immediately
appealable under Roberts v. United States District Court, 

 (1950). But the Commonwealth overlooks the
distinction between § 636(b) finality and § 1291 finality. The
fact that a litigant may appeal directly to our Court when a
district court denies his IFP motion does not mean the litigant
can appeal directly to our Court when a magistrate judge
denies his IFP motion. See Siers, 

 & n.8. While
it is true that a magistrate judge’s decision is “final” in the




                              19
sense that it is “dispositive as to the discrete matter referred to
him or her,” § 636(b)(1)(A) outlines a specific procedure for
review of that final decision that begins with the district court,
not our Court. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Dominick D’Andrea, Inc.,

, 250 (3d Cir.), as amended (Sept. 8, 1998).
        We can be sure that a magistrate judge’s decision under
§ 636(b) is not directly appealable to our Court under § 1291
because “when Congress has intended that certain decisions of
a magistrate be directly appealable to a circuit court, it has
expressly said so.” Siers, 

. For example,
§ 636(c)—which, upon the parties’ consent, grants a
magistrate judge authority to decide any and all matters—
provides for appeal of a magistrate judge’s decision “in the
same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district
court.” In other words, it permits an appeal “in the same
manner as an appeal” pursuant to § 1291. Thus, § 636(c)
finality equals § 1291 finality. No similar language appears in
§ 636(b) related to a magistrate judge’s decision on
nondispositive pretrial matters. Quite the opposite. Congress
has made clear that “review of a magistrate’s decision on a
nondispositive pretrial matter”—such as an IFP motion—
“must, initially, be had in the district court.” Siers, 

. Unless an inmate follows § 636(b)’s specific review
procedure, which starts with the district court, a magistrate
judge’s denial of an IFP motion is not “considered a ‘final’
decision of the district court for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”
or Roberts. Id. at 115.
        Putting it all together, because an IFP motion is a
nondispositive pretrial matter, a magistrate judge’s denial does
not become final and appealable to our Court within the
meaning of § 1291 until after being objected to by the
dissatisfied party and reviewed by the district court. See id. at
116. Once the district court rules on the motion, the denial




                                20
becomes final under § 1291. See, e.g., Sinwell v. Shapp, 

 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Deutsch v. United States,

 (3d Cir. 1995) (regardless of whether
dismissal is with or without prejudice, “an in forma pauperis
plaintiff must be afforded appellate review of a determination
that he is required to pay all or a portion of the court costs and
filing fees to file a claim”). Not until that point does an inmate
have a final, appealable order eligible for our review. Should
an inmate fail to obtain review of the denial of an IFP motion
in the district court first, as contemplated by the procedures in
the statute, he forfeits the right to challenge the IFP ruling in
our Court. See United States v. Polishan, 

, 239–
40 (3d Cir. 2003).
        Treating IFP motions as nondispositive honors the
statutory grant of power to magistrate judges to resolve “any
pretrial matter,” protects an inmate’s right of review by a
district court judge, and mitigates premature appeals of non-
final decisions. Applying those principles here, the magistrate
judge’s power to deny Prater’s IFP motion derived from his
pretrial authority pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(A) and was not
contingent on the parties’ consent. And according to the
statute, the appropriate avenue for review of the magistrate
judge’s denial is first before the district court, not our Court.
Thus, we have no authority to review the magistrate judge’s
denial of Prater’s IFP motion until after Prater seeks review in
the district court.


       Prater, Isaac, and Aaron also challenge the magistrate
judges’ jurisdiction to enter final judgments in their respective
cases. A magistrate judge dismissed Prater’s case for “failure
to prosecute (failure to pay the filing fee).” JA Prater 6. And
the magistrate judges in Isaac’s and Aaron’s cases entered




                               21
summary judgment orders in favor of all defendants. A
magistrate judge may “hear and determine any pretrial matter .
. . except a motion for,” among other things, “summary
judgment . . . and to involuntarily dismiss an action.” 

(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Because the statute carves
out of magistrate judge jurisdiction the final judgment orders
at issue here, the magistrate judges could not rely on their
pretrial authority to enter the orders. But “[u]pon the consent
of the parties,” a magistrate judge “may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry
of judgment in the case.” 

 § 636(c)(1). Thus, the magistrate
judges’ jurisdiction to enter final orders in each of these
appeals turns on whether they acted “upon the consent of the
parties.”
        Under § 636(c)(1), consent is required from named
plaintiffs and from defendants who are “directly affected by an
order or a judgment issued by that magistrate judge,” including
yet-to-be-served parties but excluding parties the plaintiff
failed to timely serve. Burton, 25 F.4th at 209 & n.43. Consent
can be express or implied. See Roell v. Withrow, 

 (2003).
        The parties agree, as do we, that not all named
defendants in Prater’s case provided express or implied
consent. Specifically, there is no evidence that the
Commonwealth ever consented to magistrate judge
jurisdiction. In fact, the Commonwealth concedes it was not
even aware of Prater’s suit prior to dismissal. Absent consent,
“the magistrate judge, as an Article I judge, simply d[id] not
have jurisdiction to decide the matter” and dismiss Prater’s
case for failure to prosecute. See Burton, 25 F.4th at 206. His
authority was restricted by the limits of § 636(b) and permitted
him only to submit a recommended disposition to the district
court.




                               22
        The same is not true in Isaac’s and Aaron’s cases. The
parties agree that plaintiffs Isaac and Aaron expressly
consented, as did the initially named and served defendants in
each suit. However, they dispute whether later-added
defendants, who did not file consent forms, consented.7
        Though later-added defendants did not expressly
consent, we can infer consent based on their “conduct during
litigation.” Roell, 

. In Roell, the plaintiff alleged
that prison officials disregarded his medical needs in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 

 Once the plaintiff consented to
a magistrate judge’s jurisdiction, the district court referred the
case, with the caveat that the referral “would be vacated if any
of the defendants did not consent.” 

. The clerk
subsequently sent the referral order to the defendants and
requested that they state through their answer or a separate
pleading whether they consented. 

 Only one of the three
defendants consented; the others, represented by different
counsel, did not. 

 Yet the parties “proceeded in front of the
Magistrate Judge, all the way to a jury verdict and judgment.”

 The Supreme Court held that implied consent suffices for
final judgment jurisdiction under § 636(c)(1) and will be found
where “the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for
consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared
to try the case before the Magistrate Judge.” Id. at 590. By their
actions, the two defendants “suppl[ied] the consent necessary
for the Magistrate Judge’s ‘civil jurisdiction.’” Id. at 591
(quoting 

(c)(2)).



       7
         CO Johnston need not have consented either because
he was not named, Dewey, 

, or because Aaron
failed to timely serve him, Burton, 25 F.4th at 209 n.43.




                                23
        All defendants in Isaac’s and Aaron’s cases cleared
Roell’s implied consent bar. Counsel common to all defendants
in each case filed a consent form on behalf of some or all of the
initially named defendants. In doing so, counsel was “made
aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it.” Id. at
590. And by signing the form, counsel “voluntarily consent[ed]
to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct any and all
further proceedings in the case” pursuant to “the provisions of
[§] 636(c)(1),” and forewent the “option” of having the case
“assigned to a United States District Judge.” JA Isaac 56; JA
Aaron 151. And because in both cases, later-named or later-
served defendants were represented by the same counsel—
OAG—we can infer their voluntary consent to magistrate
judge jurisdiction.
        Amicus argues consent was not effective because later-
added defendants—as opposed to their counsel—did not
consent. The Commonwealth responds that the decision to
proceed before a magistrate judge belongs exclusively to
counsel and cites Gonzalez v. United States, 

(2008), for support. We agree with Amicus that the
Commonwealth overreads Gonzalez, which merely permitted
counsel to choose whether to proceed before a magistrate judge
during voir dire under a different subsection of the Act, not
§ 636(c)(1).8 See Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 249–53. Consenting to
a full trial before a magistrate judge is categorically different.

       8
         The Supreme Court held that counsel’s consent—as
opposed to a defendant’s—was sufficient to empower a
magistrate judge to supervise voir dire pursuant to § 636(b)(3).
See Gonzalez, 

. That subsection states, “A
magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States.” 

(b)(3).




                               24
In any event, we need not wade into the constitutional thicket
of what rights may or may not be waived by counsel alone.
Compare 

 at 248–52 (suggesting some “fundamental” rights
may be waived only by the client), with 

 at 255–58 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (reasoning “all waivable rights (except, of
course, the right to counsel) can be waived by counsel”). There
is no indication that any defendant would not have consented.
        This case fits comfortably within Roell’s rule, which
permits us to infer a defendant’s consent from counsel’s
conduct, so long as consent is knowing and voluntary. See 538
U.S. at 589–90; see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,

, 685 (2015) (“a litigant’s consent—whether
express or implied—must still be knowing and voluntary”).
There is no indication that defense counsel in either Isaac’s or
Aaron’s case acted contrary to the wishes of their clients. Nor
does Amicus show that, despite voluntarily appearing through
counsel before the magistrate judges, one or all defendants
involuntarily or unknowingly waived their right to litigate
before an Article III judge. Absent such a showing, a
straightforward application of Roell preserves a litigant’s
“personal right” to insist on a trial before an Article III judge.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 

 (1986).
        In cases like this, Roell’s rule makes practical sense. In
his amended complaint, Isaac sued the prison and fourteen
individual officials. Aaron sued the prison and over thirty
individual officials, some named, some unnamed, and some
improperly named. As the pro se cases proceeded through the
pleading and discovery phases, numerous officials were added,
dropped, re-added, re-dropped, and renamed. Amicus’s
proposed rule—that to comply with Roell the
Commonwealth’s attorney needed to round up the new, added,
renamed, or re-added defendants and obtain their consent with




                               25
each new iteration of the suit—is hardly a workable solution in
cases where numerous member-defendants of an institutional
group are being sued.
        We are also unpersuaded by Amicus’s attempts to
narrow Roell to avoid its import. First, Amicus draws
unwarranted distinctions between consent based on
defendants’ knowledge and consent based on counsel’s
knowledge. Roell explicitly permits either. 

(“litigant or counsel was made aware” (emphasis added)).
        Second, Amicus claims Roell’s rule applies only when
“the litigants [have] repeated verbal notice, throughout lengthy
proceedings, that the magistrate judge [is] operating on the
understanding that they consented.” Amicus Br. 24. But Roell
is not so fact bound. Though the Court supposed implied
consent would be “the exception, not the rule,” it nevertheless
reasoned that so long as a party is “notified of the availability
of a district judge, . . . a litigant’s general appearance before
the magistrate judge will usually indicate the necessary
consent.” Roell, 

 n.7. It may be true that a
general appearance, on its own, is not particularly illuminating
and equally suggests parties intend to proceed under
§ 636(b)(1) or (c)(1). However, once a litigant or counsel
makes the informed choice to forgo a district judge, we may
glean new meaning from a subsequent general appearance. The
fact that a magistrate judge exercises recommendation (rather
than final judgment) authority prior to the filing of a consent
form is irrelevant.
        Third, Amicus is wrong that Burton narrowed Roell’s
reach. In Burton, we declined to find implied consent for three
defendants who shared common counsel. 25 F.4th at 204, 210.
From that, Amicus concludes that filing a consent form for one
defendant cannot “automatically transfer[]” consent to
“subsequent defendants represented by the same counsel.”




                               26
Amicus Br. 27. But Amicus ducks a key distinction. Unlike
here, none of the Burton defendants filed a consent form prior
to final disposition. 25 F.4th at 210–11 & n.59. Absent a form,
or any other evidence, we could not infer that defense counsel
knew of the need for consent and the right to refuse it. See id.
at 210. Even more, the practical implications of Amicus’s
reading of Burton would create strange results: the
happenstance of staffing decisions at a law firm or government
office related to particularly complex cases could nullify
consent. Contrary to Amicus’s argument, by finding implied
consent here, we are not transforming § 636(c)(1) into an opt-
out regime. We are simply applying Roell, which set the bar
for opting in.
        Finally, we reject Amicus’s claim that procedural
defects nullified the later-added defendants’ implied consent.
Amicus emphasizes that the later-added defendants were not
advised, in keeping with § 636(c)(2)’s requirements, that
consent may be refused without consequences. But the statute
only imposes that requirement when, after the parties have
been notified by the clerk of court about the availability of a
magistrate judge, the court advises them again of the
magistrate judge’s availability. See 

(c)(2)
(“[t]hereafter”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b) (“Reminding the
Parties”). And in any event, Roell held there was implied
consent where “§ 636(c)(2) was honored in the breach.” 

. The touchstone of implied consent is not
“adherence to the letter of § 636(c)(2),” but rather the
voluntariness of the parties’ consent based on their knowledge
and conduct during litigation. See id. at 587.
        Therefore, we conclude all required parties in Isaac’s
and Aaron’s cases either expressly or impliedly consented to
magistrate judge jurisdiction, permitting the magistrate judges
to enter summary judgment orders. When counsel filed consent




                              27
forms early in each case related to initially named defendants,
counsel became aware of the need for consent and the right to
refuse it, and still voluntarily continued to appear on behalf of
all defendants before the magistrate judges.

        Because the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to
involuntarily dismiss Prater’s case, we must determine what
that means for our jurisdiction on appeal.
        It is settled law that “[i]f the requirements of [§]
636(c)(1) are not satisfied, the ‘magistrate judge [is deprived]
of jurisdiction over the case’” and may not enter final orders;
concomitantly, “we are statutorily deprived of appellate
jurisdiction over the magistrate judge’s orders.” Burton, 25
F.4th at 205 (citation omitted). Despite Burton’s clear
language, Amicus contends that we have statutory appellate
jurisdiction to vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective
magistrate judge orders pursuant to § 636(c)(3), which permits
“any case referred under paragraph [c](1)” to be “appeal[ed]
directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals.”
Because § 636(c)(3) does not require a valid referral, the
argument goes, an appellate court maintains jurisdiction to
vacate and remand even improperly referred cases that lack
consent.
        We disagree. Consent, not referral, allows the
magistrate judge “to direct the entry of a judgment of the
district court.” 

(c)(3). And this “entry of
judgment” is what permits us to review a magistrate judge’s
decision “in the same manner as an appeal from any other
judgment of a district court.” 

 As Gonzalez put it,
“jurisdiction turns on consent,” 

, whereas the
referral merely sends or directs the case to a magistrate judge
for decision, see Refer, Webster’s Third New International




                               28
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1971) (“to
send or direct for . . . decision”); cf. Roell, 538 U.S. at 586–87
(procedurally defective referral does not nullify jurisdiction
where there is voluntary consent). Our hands are tied, then,
because our “final order jurisdiction” over a magistrate judge’s
decision arises under § 636(c)(3) only “to the extent it is final
under 

.” See Dewey, 

 (citation
omitted); compare with Ellison v. Am. Bd. of Orthopaedic
Surgery, 

, 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2021) (vacating and
remanding after exercising § 1291 jurisdiction). Without
§ 636(c) consent jurisdiction, we are back where we started
many paragraphs ago: either the magistrate judge’s order must
be reviewed by the district court or incorporated into a
subsequent final order (for § 636(b)(1)(A) orders) or adopted
by the district court (for § 636(b)(1)(B) orders) before we have
the power to act on it in any way.
        We need not choose between adopting Amicus’s novel
theory of quasi-subject-matter jurisdiction to review
jurisdictional issues under § 636(c) on the one hand, or facing
a “jurisdictional blackhole” on the other. Amicus Br. 37. Upon
entry of a jurisdictionally defective magistrate judge order,
parties simply have nonbinding, non-final judgments in hand.
As the Commonwealth points out, a litigant’s personal rights
are protected even when a magistrate judge enters an improper
dismissal because the litigant retains the right to an Article III
forum: review by the district court. See United States v.
Raddatz, 

 (1980). While other remedies, such
as a writ of mandamus or vacatur of the referral under
§ 636(c)(4) may be discretionary, district court review of a
magistrate judge’s recommendation is not. See id.; see also
EEOC, 

. Nor does the passage of time threaten
to foreclose Prater’s right to district court review. The timing
of Prater’s objections may affect the rigor of review he receives




                               29
from the district court, but it does not shut the district court’s
doors. See EEOC, 866 F.3d at 99–100.
       Statutory appellate jurisdiction aside, both parties argue
that we may vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective
magistrate judge orders pursuant to our supervisory authority.
We will not shoehorn into our supervisory authority a power to
vacate and remand absent jurisdiction. We have consistently
described our supervisory authority as empowering the Court
to “mandate procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint
of sound judicial practice.” United States v. Wecht, 

 (3rd Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks
omitted); see also Arn, 

. This process-related
oversight power is an insufficient stand-in for statutory
appellate jurisdiction. Further, invoking our supervisory
authority to vacate and remand jurisdictionally defective
magistrate judge orders would be invalid because we would be
contravening the clear text of a statute, see United States v.
Payner, 

 (1980), which grants us jurisdiction
only over a judgment entered upon the consent of the parties.
       Admittedly, there is not perfect consistency in our
disposition of cases when we lack jurisdiction to review an
order entered by a magistrate judge. See, e.g., Burton, 25 F.4th
at 212 (vacating and remanding); Siers, 

(dismissing). Despite our inconsistent history and the parties’
consensus that vacatur and remand is proper, we will dismiss
Prater’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Dismissal is more
appropriate because when jurisdiction “ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 

 (1868); see also, e.g., Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 

 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction
an appeal from a magistrate judge’s discovery order that had
not been reviewed by the district court); Geaney v. Carlson,




                               30


 (7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction because “magistrate’s dismissal is a nonappealable
order”); McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 

(6th Cir. 2006) (same). But see Allen v. Meyer, 

 (9th Cir. 2014) (vacating and remanding jurisdictionally
defective magistrate judge order dismissing inmate’s § 1983
case).
       The somewhat antiquated cases the parties cite in
support of a roving “supervisory appellate power,” Walling v.
James V. Reuter, Inc., 

 (1944), to justify
vacatur do not change our conclusion. Walling and its progeny
have been narrowly interpreted to permit a court to “make such
disposition of the whole case as justice may require” when
“mootness prevents us from reviewing [a judgment] that has
prospective effects.” See Camreta v. Greene, 

,
714 n.11 (2011) (citation omitted). No mootness issue exists
here. And a court’s power to issue a “corrective order” even
when “the merits cannot be reviewed,” see Gully v. Interstate
Nat. Gas Co., 

 (1934), has similarly been
narrowly construed, see, e.g., Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Okla.
Packing Co., 

 (1934) (vacating and
remanding because the correct appeals procedure was not
“more definitely settled” and dismissal would cause appellants
to “los[e] their opportunity” for merits review); United States
v. Corrick, 

 (1936) (vacating and
remanding “merely for the purpose of correcting” an
erroneously entered injunctive order against the Secretary of
Agriculture and others that prevented them from prosecuting
corporations who violated rate schedules); Bailey v. Patterson,

 (1962) (vacating and remanding order from
improperly convened three-judge district court). In fact, the
cases cited by the parties adhere to the “general rule” of
dismissing an appeal in the absence of jurisdiction so long as




                              31
our dismissal does not give the deficient order “full effect . . .
in violation of [a] legal or constitutional right.” Stickney v. Wilt,

 (1874); see United States v. Huckabee, 

 (1872) (calling dismissal “the correct practice”
where “a court has no jurisdiction”). Here, dismissal simply
means Prater must seek review of the magistrate judge’s non-
final, non-binding order in the district court, where his claim
will be finally adjudicated by an Article III official.

        While we will dismiss Prater’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, we have the power to review Isaac’s and Aaron’s
appeals under 

(c)(3). We will affirm the
magistrate judges’ summary judgment orders in both cases for
failure to exhaust.
        Under the PLRA, prisoners who seek to challenge their
conditions of confinement must exhaust all available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We determine
“whether a prisoner has ‘properly’ exhausted a claim” by
“evaluating the prisoner’s compliance with the prison’s
administrative regulations governing inmate grievances.”
Spruill v. Gillis, 

 (3d Cir. 2004). At issue here
are two procedures. The first, ADM 804, sets out the default
procedure for the inmate grievance process. The second, ADM
001, relates to reporting and investigating inmate abuse by
staff. Amicus concedes Isaac and Aaron did not exhaust their
remedies under ADM 804. Nevertheless, it argues Isaac and
Aaron exhausted their claims because they reported to prison
staff the details of their abuse allegations in accordance with
ADM 001. For Amicus to be right, ADM 804 and ADM 001
must provide alternative paths for exhaustion. They do not.
        ADM 804 creates the three-step Inmate Grievance
System. First, an inmate must submit a grievance to the Facility




                                 32
Grievance Coordinator. The grievance must include the
relevant facts, individuals involved, claims alleged, and relief
sought. A different official—the Grievance Officer—reviews
the grievance and submits an initial response. The inmate may
appeal the initial response to the Facility Manager, who
reviews it and issues a decision. The inmate may file a final
appeal to the Secretary of Corrections’ Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals.
        ADM 804 clearly states when it does not apply—for
example, when an inmate alleges sexual abuse, or his claim
concerns an “incident[] of an urgent or emergency nature” or
misconduct charges. ADM 804 § 1(A)(2), (7). When one of
those exceptions applies, a plaintiff is excused from satisfying
ADM 804’s exhaustion requirement. See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 

, 307 (3d Cir. 2020). But Isaac and Aaron
do not argue that they satisfy an existing exception; rather, they
ask that we read into the text of DOC policy a new exception—
exhaustion under ADM 001. Just as we refrain from rewriting
statutes, we will not amend DOC policy from the bench and
add a new avenue for administrative exhaustion. See 

(applying principles of statutory interpretation to DOC policy).
        While ADM 804 creates a formal procedure to resolve
problems or other issues of concern arising during
confinement, ADM 001 aims to ensure that staff do not subject
an inmate to corporal or unusual punishment, or personal abuse
or injury. ADM 001 speaks to all who may be privy to inmate
abuse—inmates, employees, and all persons and entities who
maintain contact with inmates. The policy permits an inmate
who is the victim of abuse to report it verbally or in writing to
a staff member, complain directly to DOC’s Central Office, or
file a formal grievance pursuant to ADM 804. The fact that
ADM 001 does not require a formal grievance to trigger an
investigation shows the policy mitigates and provides relief for




                               33
alleged abuse even when it does not violate legal rights. By
contrast, ADM 804 requires an inmate to specify in his
grievance any alleged violation of department regulations or
other law as well as specify the compensation or legal relief the
inmate desires. ADM 001 contains no similar requirements, all
of which would be necessary to afford an inmate meaningful
relief in court.
        The interrelatedness of the policies does not suggest the
two are interchangeable. ADM 804’s cross reference to ADM
001 reveals that the two policies work in tandem, not in place
of one another. When an inmate brings an abuse grievance, the
normal ADM 804 review does not proceed until an
investigation occurs in accordance with ADM 001. The
Grievance Officer does not provide an initial response to an
abuse-related grievance until he receives and reviews the
documentation from the ADM 001 investigation. But that does
not change the fact that ADM 804 is the sole procedure for
obtaining an adjudicatory decision subject to appeal. A
different conclusion would nullify the grievance review
process outlined by ADM 804. While ADM 001 produces
investigative reports that may help the ADM 804 process
along, among other purposes, it does not replace ADM 804.
        We conclude that ADM 804 is the exclusive means of
exhaustion. And, having failed to follow the full administrative
review process under ADM 804, Isaac and Aaron necessarily
failed to properly exhaust their claims under the PLRA.

       Finally, we address Amicus’s argument that we should
exercise our supervisory authority to review the Western
District of Pennsylvania consent procedures and rectify their
supposed deficiencies.




                               34
        While “courts of appeals are authorized to ‘mandate
procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound
judicial practice,’” Wecht, 

 (citation omitted),
“our supervisory power should not be invoked lightly,” Sowell
v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 

 (3d Cir. 1991).
The consent procedures for the Western District ensure
voluntary consent by litigants, adhere to § 636(c) procedures,
and leave room for district courts to experiment with
magistrate judge involvement in cases. Local Rule 10 codifies
the procedure for obtaining party consent soon after a pro se
prisoner initiates a civil suit. See W.D. Pa. Local Civ. R. 10(E).
And Local Rule 72 makes clear that absent consent, a
magistrate judge has the power only to decide nondispositive
motions and recommend a decision on dispositive motions. See
W.D. Pa. Local Civ. R. 72(C)–(E).
        Amicus attacks the Local Rules from several angles, but
its arguments are not persuasive. First, even though all prisoner
civil cases and non-death-penalty habeas cases are
automatically assigned to a magistrate judge, the Local Rules
specify that the magistrate judge’s decision-making authority
is constrained by the jurisdictional limits of § 636. See W.D.
Pa. Local Civ. R. 72(G). Thus, in keeping with § 636(b)(1) and
the Federal Rules, the Local Rules permissibly designate
magistrate judges to exercise limited decision-making
authority absent consent. Second, the Local Rules do not run
afoul of § 636(c)’s requirement that a litigant be advised of the
right to refuse magistrate judge jurisdiction and the lack of
adverse consequences upon refusal. Section 636(c) requires
this advisement only when courts are reminding litigants about
the availability of magistrate judge jurisdiction, not first
informing them. 

(c)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 73(b). Plus, the advisement is meant to mitigate coercive
consent after a litigant has already declined magistrate judge




                               35
jurisdiction. Amicus does not identify coercion after first
refusal here or generally in the Western District. Finally, unlike
the ambiguous and jurisdiction-presuming consent forms in
Anderson v. Woodcreek Venture Ltd., 

 (9th
Cir. 2003), cited by Amicus for support, the Western District’s
forms (i) require consent prior to final judgment, (ii) identify
statutory authority, and (iii) provide an explicit option to select
a district court judge. W.D. Pa. Local Civ. R. 10, 72.
        In short, the Western District’s Local Rules provide
adequate safeguards. Jurisdictions may vary how they
implement § 636 and Federal Rules 72 and 73, and we are
satisfied that the Western District’s procedures ensure knowing
and voluntary consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction.

       For these reasons, we will dismiss Prater’s appeal
challenging the magistrate judge’s involuntary dismissal of his
case because we lack jurisdiction. And we will affirm the
magistrate judges’ summary judgment orders in Isaac’s and
Aaron’s cases for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.




                                36