Blunt v. Lower Merion School District

OPINION OF THE COURT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.INTRODUCTION......................................................255

II.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.................................257

III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................264

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW..............................................265

V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.....................................266

VI. SUMMARY OF THE LAW..............................................267

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.........................267

B. Redress and the Statute of Limitations under the IDEA.................269

C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ................................271

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ...................................................273

E. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Relevant Regulations of the Department of Education..................•........................274

F. Americans with Disabilities Act.......................................275

G. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence...........................................275

H. Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Defenses .............276

1. Claim Preclusion................................................276

2. Application of Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) in Class Actions.....277

I. Standing ..........................................................278

VII. ANALYSIS............................................................280

A. The Effect of the Gaskin Settlement on the Claims Against the PDE.....281

B. Whether CBP Has Standing in this suit ...............................282

C. The Blunts and the 90-day Statute of Limitations under the IDEA, as Revised by the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004 ............................................................291

D. Whether Appellants Established a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination ...................................................293

1. Rejection of Certain Evidence by the District Court and Alleged Impermissible Reliance on Other Evidence Without a Daubert Hearing......................................................294

a. The MAP Presentation.......................................295

b. Daniel Reschley’s Report.....................................295

*2552. Whether the District Court Properly Viewed the Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Plaintiffs as Non-Movants and Whether Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination................................................296

3. Statistical Evidence .............................................299

VIII. CONCLUSION ................. .....................................301

I. INTRODUCTION

In what may be an oversimplification, we introduce our opinion on this appeal by setting forth that the central controversy is a dispute over whether African American students in the Lower Merion School District (“LMSD”) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully brought this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and state law, claiming that African American students in the LMSD suffered from such discrimination.1 They now appeal from portions of the District Court’s orders on federal issues entered at various times during the course of the litigation. We, however, are not concerned with the substance of the state law claims on this appeal as the District Court did not exercise jurisdiction over those claims.

This case encompasses a myriad of legal issues, including standing to bring suit, application of a statute of limitations, res judicata (claim preclusion), application of disability laws, appropriateness of education provided to students, anti-discrimination laws, and sections of the Code of Federal Regulations implementing the applicable laws. The case on appeal also includes a cross-appeal by the LMSD, but we will dismiss the cross-appeal without deciding it on the merits as it is moot. The District Court found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to survive LMSD’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination charges and the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ other claims for other reasons. Thus, the Court did not find that there had been any violations of federal law.

Plaintiffs, now appellants, appeal from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 *256Memorandum and Judgment Order granting a final summary judgment to defendant LMSD and against all the plaintiffs in the case remaining at the time that the Court granted summary judgment, the Court already having dismissed several of the parties and claims from the case by previous orders.2 Appellants also appeal from rulings in two intermediate orders that became final at the time of the entry of the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, namely: the dismissal of all claims of plaintiffs, now appellants, Amber Blunt, a now former student at LMSD, and Crystal and Michael Blunt, her parents, in the District Court’s memorandum and order of February 15, 2008, the “February 15, 2008 Order”; the dismissal of all plaintiffs’ claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”) in the District Court’s order and memorandum of August 19, 2009, the “August 19, 2009 Order”; and the dismissal of plaintiff Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc. (“CBP”) as a party in the District Court’s August 19, 2009 Order for lack of standing. Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 1.

Plaintiffs, with the exception of the CBP and the mainline branch of the NAACP (the “NAACP”), are present and past African American students of the Lower Mer-ion Township public schools, who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” under the IDEA and/or those students’ parents. The plaintiffs repeatedly used the term “disabled” to describe the student plaintiffs throughout the pleadings, a term consistent with the IDEA, a statute under which they were making claims, as the IDEA safeguards the rights of disabled students. Nevertheless, at this stage in the litigation some appellants argue that the LMSD incorrectly identified them as learning disabled,3 thereby causing them injury.4 Appellants claim that their placement in remedial classes had a negative impact on their opportunity for educational advancement, but by the time of the proceedings on the motion for summary judgment they were seeking relief in the District Court only pursuant to Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through 42 U.S.C. *257§ 1983. Appellants’ case is largely based on their contention that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias.5

Ultimately, the summary judgment question turns on whether there is enough record evidence to establish that LMSD intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs, whether through its own actions or by failing to correct a third party’s intentional discrimination. Looking at the whole record, which includes statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent. There is no evidence showing that the District intended to discriminate against plaintiffs, nor that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students as a form of intentional discrimination. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This suit has had many plaintiffs and defendants, though some have come and gone, and includes many related issues and claims.6 We now are dealing with what is left of this litigation by entertaining the present appeals which have been consolidated with the cross-appeal in this Court under No. 11-4200.7

The plaintiffs filed the original complaint on July 30, 2007. At that time the plaintiffs were current or former students in the LMSD, four parents, and the two or*258ganizations that we have identified.8 The original defendants were the LMSD and two of its officials in their official capacity.9 No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. I.10

The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on September 26, 2007, adding three plaintiffs (two current or former students in the LMSD and one parent) 11 and several defendants, including the Lower Merion School Board, its President, Vice President, and various members of the Board (together, the “School Board”), the Pennsylvania Department of Education (the “PDE”), and two of its officials. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 10. Inasmuch as the LMSD and the School Board have the same interest in this case and are represented by the same attorneys, we sometimes refer to them together as the LMSD. The plaintiffs named the PDE as a defendant because they believed that it failed to meet the supervisory, monitoring and compliance procedural obligations that federal law imposed on it. The FAC concerned, inter alia, as appellants indicate in one of their briefs, “a decision of the Pennsylvania Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel (the ‘Appeals Panel’) pursuant to the IDEA.” Appellants’ No. 11-4201 br. at 8-9;12 see also J.A. vol. 2, at 91-151. As stated above, the original complaint alleged that the defendants violated the IDEA, 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (regarding the monitoring requirements imposed on states receiving federal funds for education of students with disabilities), the ADA, § 504 of the RA, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, all premised on the theory that plaintiffs had learning disabilities for which LMSD had not made adequate provisions. The FAC invoked the same legal theories/statutes as the original complaint. J.A. vol. 2, at 91-151.

On October 8, 2007, LMSD and the School Board filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed *259to exhaust their administrative remedies, the CBP and NAACP did not have standing, and the FAC failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. They also contended that the IDEA action was untimely. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 11.

On November 19, 2007, the PDE filed a motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.13 No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 21-22; J.A. vol. 2, at 284. PDE argued that the Blunt plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the IDEA’S statute of limitations and that the other individual student plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA. Id. The PDE further argued that its sovereign immunity barred the state law claims asserted against it, and that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against it. Id.

On February 15, 2008, the District Court entered an order dismissing various plaintiffs and claims from the FAC. The Court methodically eliminated each federal law claim that the Blunt plaintiffs made against each defendant. In particularly significant holdings that we address at length below, the Court held that a 90-day statute of limitations in the IDEA barred the Blunts’ claims under the IDEA, RA, and ADA and that a separate two-year statute of limitations barred their other claims. Consequently, the order dismissed the Blunts’ federal claims in their entirety, although their state law claims remained. See No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 9; see also J.A. vol. I, at 42.42-42.45. The Court also determined that the individual plaintiffs, other than the Blunts, had not sought an administrative remedy for their IDEA claims, and therefore it dismissed the IDEA claims of the remaining individual plaintiffs against the LMSD defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.16. However, the Court found that the individual plaintiffs did not need to exhaust administrative remedies with •respect to their claims against the PDE because Pennsylvania regulations provide for administrative resolution of disputes between students, their parents, and their representatives and school districts, but do not provide for administrative resolution of similar disputes with the Commonwealth. Id. at 42.17.

The District Court also dismissed plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims (other than the Blunts’ claims) against the LMSD and the School Board for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, reasoning that the claims were based on the same allegations as plaintiffs’ IDEA claims and that, if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, it would have been available through the IDEA administrative dispute process. Id. at 42.18-42. 19. The Court noted that “[t]he parties agree[d]” regarding the exhaustion requirement for those claims. Id. The Court found, however, that the IDEA exhaustion requirement did not bar plaintiffs’ claims under Title VI because, unlike the IDEA, Title VI does not “focus on ‘the rights of children with disabilities.’ ” Id. at 42. 19. The Court also did not find that the plaintiffs needed to exhaust their § 1983 claims administratively.

In addition, as we indicated above, the District Court concluded that the NAACP and CBP lacked standing as plaintiffs.14 *260Id. at 42.33. The Court also found that the counts against individual defendants in their official capacity (as representatives of the other defendants, LMSD, the School Board and PDE) were duplicative, and therefore it dismissed the FAC against those individuals to “simplify!] the litigation in a way that does not cause any prejudice to plaintiffs.”15 Id. at 42.35-42.36.

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) on July 8, 2008, adding two plaintiffs, one parent and one student.16 No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 49. The SAC, in accord with the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order, removed as defendants the School Board members previously so-named in their official capacities. But the SAC continued to name the School Board in its caption though it did not make allegations against the School Board in its body. The SAC, however, included the PDE and two of its officials as defendants. The SAC continued to name the Blunts as plaintiffs, despite the circumstance that the Court had dismissed all of their federal claims in its February 15, 2008 Order.17 The SAC also added several paragraphs discussing the CBP’s alleged increase of expenditures that it attributed to “the inferior quality of LMSD’s dual system of education.” Moreover, the SAC named several persons who the CBP claimed were members of that organization in a clear attempt to demonstrate that the CBP had standing. SAC at 34-36. In addition, the SAC added six paragraphs regarding plaintiff NAACP’s expenditure of resources in addressing alleged issues with the LMSD. SAC at 37-38.18

The plaintiffs filed a third and final amended complaint (“TAC”) on August 5, 2008. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 55; J.A. vol. 9, 3847-97. The plaintiffs remained the same in the TAC as previously except that one parent was no longer a plaintiff.19 The TAC, however, no longer named two officials of the School Board as defendants, and it did not name the officials of the PDE that the plaintiffs previously had named as defendants. The TAC continued to list the School Board as a named defendant in the caption, and the PDE and LMSD remained named defendants in both the caption and the body of the TAC.20 Despite the District Court’s dis*261missal of all of the Blunts’ federal claims in the complaint in its February 15, 2008 Order, the TAC included them again in Count VI against the LMSD and the School Board pursuant to the Pennsylvania Public School Code, 22 Pa.Code § 14.102 et. seq.21 Plaintiffs sought widespread in-junctive relief and “compensatory damages each on their own behalf to offset the deprivations of an appropriate education to which they are entitled.” TAC at 3, para. 6; J.A. vol. 9, at 3849.

The LMSD and the School Board filed an answer to the TAC and a separate motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 15, 2008. The PDE filed an answer to the TAC on August 19, 2008. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 58.

On August 15, 2008, the LMSD and the School Board filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings addressed to the Blunts’ remaining state law claims, which the Blunts formally opposed on August 29, 2008. J.A. vol. 3, at 561-72, 575-89. The District Court issued a Memorandum and Order on November 18, 2008, (the “November 18, 2008 Order”), in which it noted that the motion incorrectly had been styled as a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, when it was really a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court granted the motion,22 finding that it did not have supplemental jurisdiction over the Blunts’ state law claims and that there was not a common nucleus of operative fact between her claims and those of the other students.23 J.A. vol. 3, at 597.

On December 22, 2008, the remaining plaintiffs moved for class certification. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 64. After the parties briefed the issues, the District Court held a hearing on the motion on July 21. 2009. Id., Doc. No. 122.24 By an order of August 19, 2009, (the “August 19, 2009 Order”), the Court denied plaintiffs’ mo*262tion for class certification (Appellants’ No. 11-4200 br. at 39),25 again dismissed the claims brought by the CBP and the NAACP for lack of standing, and found that a prior court-entered settlement agreement reached in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F.Supp.2d 628 (E.D.Pa.2005), barred all claims against the PD E, which it therefore dismissed from the case. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.46-42.69.

In concluding that CBP lacked standing, the District Court found that it did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, and did not suffer an injury giving it standing. Rather, “[i]ts injuries [we]re more akin to an abstract, ideological interest in the litigation as opposed to the necessary ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the controversy necessary to confer standing.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.52. In addition, the Court reasoned that CBP did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members because, according to CBP’s bylaws, it did not have any members. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.53-54; August 19, 2009 Order at 9 (“The corporation’s bylaws specifically state ‘the Corporation shall have no members.’ In light of this express statement in a formal document governing the conduct of the corporation, we find that it does not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members because it has none.”). J.A. vol. 1, at 42.54.

The District Court also dismissed the claims against the PDE because the settlement agreement that the parties had reached in Gaskin barred this action against the PD E. The Court noted that Gaskin was similar to this action, as 12 students with disabilities and 11 disability advocacy groups brought that case against the PD E, among others, pursuant to the IDEA, § 504 of the RA, and Title II of the ADA. The Gaskin plaintiffs made similar (although not identical) allegations as those in this case, alleging that the defendants failed to provide disabled students the opportunity to participate in regular education classrooms, provided insufficient supplementary aids and services, and generally failed to provide them with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). J.A. vol. 1, at 42.63, 42.67. Though the Court acknowledged that the Gaskin complaint had not alleged racial discrimination as “the basis for the improper treatment of those with learning disabilities,” the Court nonetheless held that the causes of action in Gaskin and here arose from the same “common nucleus of operative facts.” The Court therefore concluded that the release included in the Gaskin settlement agreement, which by its terms was effective for five years from September 19, 2005, to September 19, 2010, barred the claims in this case because the plaintiffs brought this action and individual plaintiffs in this action were evaluated and identified as learning disabled during this period. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.67, 42.68; Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 19:9-22. Significantly, the class of plaintiffs in the Gaskin litigation *263was very broad and included “all present and future school age students with disabilities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” 26

On April 5, 2011, the District Court denied a motion by LMSD to amend its answer to the plaintiffs’ TAC to include an additional defense based on releases that certain plaintiffs signed after the LMSD filed its answer in this case because the Court believed that the LMSD unreasonably had delayed making the motion. J.A. vol. 1, at 46-47. LMSD has filed a cross-appeal from the order but, as will be seen, this appeal is moot and thus we do not address it.

The LMSD filed a motion for summary judgment on July 15, 2011, (No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 159), and it is that motion that has led to the order at the heart of this appeal. The parties filed numerous documents in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2011, the District Court held a hearing on the motion, at which time the Court afforded all parties the opportunity to present their arguments. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 174,183.

On October 20, 2011, the District Court made three docket entries, two of which were orders and a third which is the memorandum explaining the basis for those orders (collectively, the “October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order”). No. 2:07-ev-3100, Doc. Nos. 180-82. In the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to partially exclude and/or limit the report and testimony of Daniel J. Reschly, Ph.D., a witness for the LMSD, as moot. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 181. The Court’s principal order granted summary judgment to the LMSD against all remaining plaintiffs in the action. J.A. vol. 1, at 1-39; also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 182. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to put forth any evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the LMSD intentionally segregated the students on the basis of race into inferior educational programs in violation of Title VI. J.A. vol. 1, at 30-32. The Court also held that plaintiffs had failed to establish a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as they had not established that the LMSD had engaged in purposeful discrimination and had not been deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights. J.A. vol. 1, at 33-34.

The District Court noted in particular that plaintiffs were required to “raise at least some reasonable inference that they were placed into classes and offered services by the [LMSD] due to intentional discrimination based on their race and not simply due to errors in evaluation.” The Court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to support this inference with sufficient evidence, and had not put forth more than a scintilla of evidence that the LMSD had acted with a racially discriminatory purpose in identifying them as disabled and *264placing them in special education courses (regardless of whether this identification was correct or not). They also failed to identify an official policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs’ rights. J.A. vol. 1, at 32-36;27 also available at No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 180.

On November 18, 2011, the Blunt plaintiffs and the CBP filed a notice of appeal from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order. J.A. vol. 1, at 40-42. In an attempt to preserve their right to appeal from all of the Court’s dispositive orders, their November 18, 2011 notice of appeal stated that “[w]ithout limiting their right to appeal any particular order rendered during District Court proceedings, Plaintiffs listed herein specifically appeal the following orders.” The notice of appeal then went on to challenge the February 15, 2008 Order dismissing the Blunts’ claims under the IDEA and the District Court’s orders of February 15, 2008, and August 19, 2009, as they pertained to CBP and its lack of standing. J.A. vol. 1, at 40-42; see also No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 186.

Also on November 18, 2011, plaintiffs Linda Johnson, Lydia Johnson, Dur-rell/Hall, Dudley/Whiteman, Allston, Coleman, and Muse/Griffm filed an appeal generally from the District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order. Their notice of appeal specifically cited the District Court’s order of August 19, 2009, in which the Court dismissed the claims against defendant PD E, an order of October 20, 2011, entering the summary judgment in favor of LMSD, and an order of October 20, 2011, denying as moot plaintiffs’ motion to preclude expert testimony. No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 187.

On December 1, 2011, LMSD filed a cross-appeal from the portion of the District Court’s February 15, 2008 Order which denied LMSD’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VI claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies28 and, as we have indicated, the District Court’s April 5, 2011 denial of its motion to amend its answer to the TAC. J.A. vol. 1, at 43-45; 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. Nos. 123-24.

III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ federal law claims pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A),29 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the Court had supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We, however, do not determine whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the state law claims because no party contends that the Court *265erred in not exercising jurisdiction over those claims. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well established that we employ a plenary standard in reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, applying the same standard as the district court. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir.2009)); Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 570 (3d Cir.2001); see also Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir.2013); Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir.1995) (citing Beazer E., Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir.1992)). Inasmuch as our review is plenary, “[w]e may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record,” even if the court did not rely on those grounds. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir.2000).30

In considering an order entered on a motion for summary judgment, “we view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Babbitt, 63 F.3d at 236. As we also have explained, “[a] factual dispute is material if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiffs claim, and is genuine if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir.2002) (in turn quoting Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 298 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir.2002))).

However, where a non-moving party fails sufficiently to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, there is not a genuine dispute with respect to a material fact and thus the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir.2007). Further, mere allegations are insufficient, and “[o]nly evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable factfin-der to find all of the elements of [the] prima facie case merits consideration beyond the Rule 56 stage.” Id. (quoting and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

We review a district court’s determinations concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See Martin v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir.2001) (“Where a party makes known the substance of the evidence it desires to introduce, we review the District Court’s decision to exclude the evidence for an abuse of discretion.”) (citing Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 334 (3d Cir.2000)). There is an abuse of discretion if the district court’s decision “ ‘rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.’ ” Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Merritt Logan, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., Inc, 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir.1990)) (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir.2000)). “An abuse of discretion can also occur ‘when no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.’ We will not interfere with the district court’s exercise of discretion ‘unless there is a definite and firm eonvic*266tion that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’ ” Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146 (internal citations omitted).31

It is also well established that we review de novo a district court’s determination of a party’s standing to bring suit, as a court makes a determination of whether a party has standing on a legal basis, at least where, as here, the determination does not depend on the court’s resolution of a factual dispute. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 218 (3d Cir.2013); Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir.2009).32

Judgments of a court applying the IDEA’S statute of limitations but not resolving disputes of fact are subject to plenary review as conclusions of law, but “whether [plaintiffs] proved an exception to the [IDEA] statute of limitations, and whether the [School] District fulfilled its FA PE obligations ... are subject to clear error review as questions of fact. Such [fjactual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct, and if [we] do[ ] not adhere to those findings, we must explain why.” D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir.2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing and quoting P.P. ex. rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir.2009); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir.2003)).

When a district court reviews an administrative law judge’s decision, a court of appeals exercises plenary review over the court’s legal conclusions, and reviews its findings of fact with a “modified de novo” standard of review (giving the administrative factual findings “due weight” and considering them to be prima facie correct) for clear error. Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 266. However, we do not make such an analysis here, as the issue before us with respect to the Blunts, the only appellants who exhausted their administrative remedies, is whether the District Court correctly dismissed their case on the grounds that they brought it beyond the period allowed by the statute of limitations. The resolution of that issue would not be aided by administrative expertise.

V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Though the District Court made many rulings, the appellants have appealed only from some of them. Accordingly, we are able to summarize the issues on this appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court correctly dismiss the action against the PDE on the basis of res judicata (claim preclusion)?

2. Did the District Court correctly conclude that CBP did not have standing as a plaintiff in this action?

3. Does the IDEA’S 90-day statute of limitations, in which a party adversely affected by an administrative determination of an IDEA claim may bring a state or *267federal suit, enacted on December 3, 2004, and effective July 1, 2005, apply to bar the Blunts’ federal action, given that they first began the administrative judicial process on April 8, 2005, when the IDEA’S statute of limitations for bringing a claim in state or federal court after receiving an adverse administrative determination was two years, and they received their final adverse administrative disposition on August 31, 2005, almost two months after the new 90-day statute of limitations came into effect, and almost nine months after Congress enacted it?33

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in how it treated certain evidence that plaintiffs offered by not giving it greater weight and not considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs when the Court considered and granted the motion for summary judgment made by the LMSD and, on the other hand, in how it treated certain evidence that LMSD offered for consideration on that motion?

5. Did plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VI and § 1983 such that summary judgment was inappropriate?34

VI. SUMMARY OF THE LAW

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Congress enacted the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., with the goal of “improving educational results for children with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1). The congressional findings and purposes section of the IDEA is quite broad and sets forth in great detail Congress’ intention in adopting the IDEA.

Each public school district in a state that accepts federal funds under IDEA35 has a continuing obligation, called the “child find” requirement, to identify and evaluate all students reasonably believed to have a disability, and each state receiving funds must establish procedures to effectuate this requirement. Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M. R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir.2012). As we pointed out in Ridley, Pennsylvania has set forth child find procedures in 22 Pa.Code §§ 14.121 through 14.125. Id.

States receiving federal funding for assistance in the education of children with disabilities under the IDEA are responsible for providing a FA PE to any students who are identified as learning disabled until they reach 21 years of age. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d); see also 34 C.F.R. *268§§ 300.1-300.2;36 Jonathan H. v. Souder-ton Area Sch. Dist., 562 F.3d 527, 528 (3d Cir.2009); Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 272. As we explained in Ridley:

A FAPE consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to benefit from the instruction. Although a state is not required to maximize the potential of every handicapped child, it must supply an education that provides significant learning and meaningful benefit to the child. [T]he provision of merely more than a trivial educational benefit is insufficient.

680 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 1999); L.E. v. Ramsey Bd. of Educ., 435 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir.2006)).

In providing a FA PE to a disabled student, school districts must work with the student’s parents to create an individualized education plan (“IEP”), containing certain elements that the Code of Federal Regulations specifies must be made available to each disabled student. We have explained the balance between reasonable goals for the IEP and a parent’s fondest hopes for the parent’s child as follows:

Under the IDEA, school districts must work with parents to design an IEP, which is a program of individualized instruction for each special education student. ‘Each IEP must include an assessment of the child’s current educational performance, must articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the nature of the special services that the school will provide.’ Although the IEP must provide the student with a ‘basic floor of opportunity,’ it does not have to provide ‘the optimal level of services,’ or incorporate every program requested by the child’s parents .... [T]he IDEA guarantees to a disabled child ‘an education that is appropriate, not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents’.... ‘[A]t a minimum, the IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s intellectual potential,’ and ‘individual abilities.’

Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (internal citations omitted).

Congress amended the IDEA through the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004 to require that an IEP include “a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child.” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 276 (emphasis in original) (quoting and citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(IV))- Because neither the text of the IDEA nor the regulations promulgated under it provided guidance regarding the peer-review research provision, we looked to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations for guidance, and determined (1) that although schools should strive to base a student’s IEP on peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the student’s IEP team *269must be allowed to be flexible in devising an appropriate program for any particular student in light of the available research; and (2) courts must accord significant deference to the choices made by school officials as to what constitutes an appropriate program for each student.37 Ridley, 680 F.3d at 277 (citing 71 Fed.Reg. at 46,665 (2006); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556-57 (3d Cir.2010); Ridgwood, 172 F.3d at 247).

B. Redress and the Statute of Limitations under the IDEA

“If parents believe that an IEP fails to provide their child with a FAPE, they may request an administrative ‘impartial due process hearing,’ ” as may a school district if it wants to change an existing IEP or seeks an evaluation without the parents’ consent. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 269-70 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53, 126 S.Ct. at 532).

The burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing under the IDEA lies with the party seeking relief. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62, 126 S.Ct. at 537. Similarly, the party judicially challenging an administrative decision bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the finding for each claim challenged. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 270.

On December 3, 2004, Congress revised the IDEA with the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004, which included a two-year statute of limitations governing the time during which an aggrieved party may file a request for an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA. P.L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(c). The two-year period runs from the date that the parent knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for the complaint. The same two-year statute of limitations for bringing administrative claims also applies to other legal claims premised on the IDEA, such as claims under § 504 of the RA, or claims “invoking Child Find and FAPE duties.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (quoting P.P. ex. rel. Michael P., 585 F.3d at 734). In the same legislation, Congress shortened the statute of limitations to 90 days for a party dissatisfied with the result of the administrative proceedings to bring a federal or state judicial action to challenge that result. Though Congress mandated that these new statutes of limitations were to be retroactive, it delayed their effective dates until July 1, 2005.

In 2010, we determined that the seven-month “grace period” between the enactment of the two-year statute of limitations and its effective date provided litigants *270with reasonable notice and opportunity to bring claims, so that it was not unfair to impose the new statute of limitations and thus the period that the limitations period allowed was not impermissibly short. Steven I. v. Cent. BucksSch. Dist., 618 F.Bd 411, 415-16 (3d Cir.2010).38 We further explained that “all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by them, [and] a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Id. at 416 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we noted that the Supreme Court

has upheld retroactive adjustments to a limitations period only when the legislature has provided a grace period during which the potential plaintiff could reasonably be expected to learn of the change in the law and then initiate his action. In the context of a retrospective statute of limitations, a reasonable grace period provides an adequate guarantee of fairness. Having suffered the triggering event of an injury, a potential plaintiff is likely to possess a heightened alertness to the possibly changing requirements of the law bearing on his claim.

Id. at 417 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 549, 102 S.Ct. 781, 802, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

An IDEA claimant’s right to redress does not end with the administrative review process, for any aggrieved party who received an adverse administrative determination regarding his or her complaints with respect to IDEA compliance may bring an action in a “[s]tate court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy,” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), within 90 days of the final administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B).39 Prior to the amendment of the IDEA shortening the limitations period, the time for bringing suit in a state or federal court after receiving an adverse administrative determination had been two years. The amendment adopting the 90-day statute of limitations passed by Congress on December 3, 2004, became effective July 1, 2005, seven months after its enactment. This 90-day statute of limitations period begins running on “the date of the decision of the [administrative] hearing officer.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B); see also Jonathan H., 562 F.3d at 530 (“Section 1415(i)(2)(B) limits a party’s right to ‘bring an action’ to within 90 days after the final administrative decision.”).

As with ADA claims, a party seeking redress under the IDEA must exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action seeking redress in a state or federal court. See Komninos by Komninos v. Up*271per Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984)); see also I.M. ex rel. C.C. v. Northampton Pub. Schs., 869 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Mass.2012) (“Plaintiffs’ conceded failure to exhaust their administrative remedies with regard to the ADA-grounded claim and/or appeal such a decision within 90 days is fatal to its present viability.”).

We have explained that the policy of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is strong but it has some very limited exceptions, namely:

• where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate (see Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327, 108 S.Ct. 592, 606, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988));

• where the issue presented is a purely legal question;

• where the administrative agency cannot grant relief (for example, due to lack of authority); and

• an emergency situation, such as where exhaustion of administrative remedies would cause ‘severe or irreparable harm’ to the litigant.

Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778-79.40

Nonetheless, we have cautioned that “[t]he advantages of awaiting completions of the administrative hearings are particularly weighty in Disabilities Education Act cases. That process offers an opportunity for state and local agencies to exercise discretion and expertise in fields in which they have substantial experience.... [Therefore], courts should be wary of foregoing the benefits to be derived from a thorough development of the issues in the administrative proceeding.” Id. at 779-80. We have explained that “the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme” and “includes a judicial remedy for violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of [a] child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.’ ” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir.2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)).41

C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI further provides, in relevant part, that *272the guidelines and criteria established by Title VI “dealing with conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States ... whatever the origin or cause of such segregation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(a).

The application of Title VI to recipients of federal assistance through the Department of Education, as explained in the Code of Federal Regulations is especially germane to this case:

(a) General. No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, col- or, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program to which this part applies.

(b) Specific discriminatory actions prohibited.

(1) A recipient under any program to which this part applies may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, on ground of race, col- or, or national origin:

(i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided under the program;

(ii) Provide any service, financial aid, or other benefit to an individual which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to others under the program;

(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any matter related to his receipt of any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program;

(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial aid, or other benefit under the program;

(v)Treat an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies any admission, enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership or other requirement or condition which individuals must meet in order to be provided any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided under the program;

34 C.F.R. § 100.3(a), (b)(l)(i)-(b)(l)(v).

Private individuals who bring suits under Title VI may not recover compensatory relief unless they show that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597, 607, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3230, 3235, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983); see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 282-83, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1517-18, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (reaffirming that private individuals cannot recover compensatory damages under Title VI except in cases of intentional discrimination). Recently, we held that plaintiffs bringing claims under the ADA and RA may establish intentional discrimination with a showing of deliberate indifference. S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir.2013). Given the parallels between Title VI and the statutes at issue in S.H., our rationale for adopting deliberate indifference as a form of intentional discrimination in S.H. applies with equal force in the Title VI context. We explained that the deliberate indifference standard was “better suited to the remedial goals of the RA and the ADA,” id. at 264, which is also true for Title VI given that the remedies available for violations of Title VI are coextensive with those available under the ADA and the RA, Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 2100, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002).

*273Other courts of appeals to have considered the issue agree that deliberate indifference may, in certain circumstances, establish intentional discrimination for the purposes of a Title VI claim. See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 664-65 (2d Cir.2012) (explaining that deliberate indifference to teacher or peer harassment of individual may create liability if a plaintiff establishes “(1) substantial control, (2) severe and discriminatory harassment, (3) actual knowledge, and (4) deliberate indifference”); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-38 of Garvin Cnty., Ok., 334 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir.2003) (holding that “deliberate indifference to known instances of student-on-student racial harassment is a viable theory in a Title VI intentional discrimination suit”); Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir.1998) (finding that school district may violate Title VI if there is a racially hostile environment, the district had notice of the problem, and it failed to respond adequately). The Supreme Court, addressing claims under Title IX, explained that in order to establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the school district had knowledge of the alleged misconduct and the power to correct it but nonetheless failed to do so. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 645-49, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1672-74; S.H., 729 F.3d at 265. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient; “only actual knowledge is a predicate to liability.” Zeno, 702 F.3d at 666.

D. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...

To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant’s discriminatory action was purposeful:

To bring a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a denial of equal protection, plaintiffs must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. They must demonstrate that they ‘received] different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated.’

Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.1990) (internal citations omitted). We further explained in Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 293 (3d Cir.2009):

Our analysis yields the following conclusion: in order to establish municipal liability for selective enforcement of a facially viewpoint- and content-neutral regulation, a plaintiff whose evidence consists solely of the incidents of enforcement themselves must establish a pattern of enforcement activity evincing a governmental policy or custom of intentional discrimination on the basis of viewpoint or content.

We also have explained that “[a]n essential element of a claim of selective treatment under the Equal Protection Clause is that the comparable parties were ‘similarly situated.’ Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike ‘in all relevant aspects.’ ” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir.2008) (citing Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 125 (3d Cir.2005)).

*274E. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Relevant Regulations of the Department of Education

Section 504 of the RA, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., states, in relevant part:'

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....

29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Thus, § 504 of the RA requires school districts receiving federal funding to provide a FAPE to each qualified handicapped person within the recipient’s jurisdiction. See Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 274; see also Ridley, 680 F.3d at 280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by A.W., 486 F.3d 791); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a)-(b).42 We have explained that this means “a school district must reasonably accommodate the needs of the handicapped child so as to ensure meaningful participation in educational activities and meaningful access to educational benefits.... However, § 504 does not mandate ‘substantial’ changes to the school’s programs, and courts ‘should be mindful of the need to strike a balance between the rights of the student and [his or her] parents and the legitimate financial and administrative concerns of the [s]chool [district.’ ” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 280-81 (internal citation omitted); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 247; Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). On the other hand, mere administrative or fiscal convenience does not constitute a sufficient justification for providing separate or different services to a handicapped child. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 281 (citing Helen L. v. Di Dario, 46 F.3d 325, 338 (3d Cir.1995)).

To establish that there has been a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the student was disabled; 43 (2)(s)he was “otherwise qualified” to participate in school activities; (3) the school district received federal financial assistance; and (4) the student was excluded from participation in or denied the ben*275efits of the educational program receiving the funds, or was subject to discrimination under the program. See id. at 280.

F. Americans with Disabilities Act

In a provision similar to the safeguards we have outlined above, Title II of the ADA provides, in relevant part:

Subject to the provisions of this sub-chapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12132.

The Code of Federal Regulations has effectuated the ADA by mandating that there be equal opportunity in benefits and services for disabled individuals. It provides, in relevant part,

(b) (1) A public entity, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, on the basis of disability—

(ii) Afford a qualified individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others;

(iii) Provide a qualified individual with a disability with an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others;

(vii) Otherwise limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or service.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(h), (iii), (vii).

We have explained that “the substantive standards for determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are the same.” Ridley, 680 F.3d at 282-83 (citing McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir.1995)).

G. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination Through Circumstantial Evidence

Inasmuch as we have recognized that individuals who violate the law based on discriminatory motives sometimes do not leave a trail of direct evidence, but instead “cover their tracks” by providing alternate explanations for their actions, we have found that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie factual foundation of discrimination by drawing reasonable inferences from certain objective facts that are generally not in dispute. See Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162-63 (3d Cir.2001).44

*276In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, a Title VII employment discrimination case mentioned several times during oral argument in this case,45 the Supreme Court rejected defendants’ arguments that statistics never can establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Rather, the Court held that statistics, when bolstered by other evidence, may, depending on the circumstances, establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 431 U.S. 324, 338-40, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856-57, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). However, the Court cautioned that the “usefulness [of statistics] depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1856-57.

Importantly, the Supreme Court has explained that neither the “courts or defendants [are] obliged to assume that plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is reliable,” and has cited, for example, the weaknesses inherent in small or incomplete data sets and/or inadequate statistical techniques. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. at 1857 n. 20 (“Considerations such as small sample size may, of course, detract from the value of such evidence.”).

The Supreme Court also has rejected the use of particular standard deviations or “any alternative mathematical standard” in establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and has stressed that the significance or substantiality of numerical disparities must be judged on a case-by-case basis. “[S]uch a case-by-case approach properly reflects our recognition that statistics ‘come in infinite variety and ... their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.’ ” Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. at 2789 n. 3 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the Court has noted that its “formulations, which have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation.” Id. at 995, 108 S.Ct. at 2789.

H. Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Defenses

1. Claim Preclusion

We have explained that

[c]laim preclusion, formerly referred to as res judicata, gives dispositive effect to a prior judgment if a particular issue, although not litigated, could have been raised in the earlier proceeding. Claim preclusion requires: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privities [sic]; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.

Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.—Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.1984)).

*277In analyzing whether these three elements have been met, we “[do] not apply this conceptual test mechanically, but focus on the central purpose of the doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit. In so doing, we avoid piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (in turn quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984).

We further have explained that “[w]e take a ‘broad view’ of what constitutes the same cause of action” and that “res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261 (emphasis in original) (citing Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194) (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983-84). In analyzing essential similarity, we consider several factors: “(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same ...; (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same ...; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same. It is not dispositive that a plaintiff asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions.” Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir.1982)); see also Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir.2009) (“This analysis does not depend on the specific legal theory invoked, but rather [on] the essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.) (internal quotation marks omitted).”

Thus, res judicata bars a claim litigated between the same parties or their privies in earlier litigation where the claim arises from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in the earlier litigation. “Moreover, ‘res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in the previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d at 171). Further, “[t]he fact that several new and discrete discriminatory events are alleged does not compel a different result. A claim extinguished by res judicata ‘includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.’ ” Id. at 174 (emphasis in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982)).

2. Application of Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) in Class Actions

We have explained that “[i]t is now settled that a judgment pursuant to a class settlement can bar later claims based on the allegations underlying the claims in the settled class action. This is true even though the precluded claim was not presented, and could not have been presented, in the class action itself.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir.2001). While “it may seem anomalous at first glance ... that courts without jurisdiction to hear certain claims have the power to release those claims as part of a judgment ... we have endorsed the rule because it serves the important policy interest of judicial economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action.” Id. at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grimes v. Vitalink Comm’ns Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1563 (3d Cir.1994)).

*278It is highly significant that adding parties to the class in a subsequent class action does not necessarily preclude parties from satisfying the second prong of the res judicata test, that the parties are the same or privies of the parties in the first action. See, e.g., Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 261 (“The fact that there are additional parties in Sheridan II does not affect our conclusion.”) (citing Gregory v. Chehi 843 F.2d 111, 119 (3d Cir.1988) (“The essence of the cause of action asserted against the defendants in the state proceeding is not altered by the addition of more parties.”)).

I. Standing

Article III, § 1 of the Constitution confers judicial power on the federal courts, but limits their jurisdiction to cases and controversies “which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (“[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is well established that plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they have standing in the action that they have brought. See Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir.2003)).

The Supreme Court has explained that “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”: (1) the invasion of a concrete and particularized legally protected interest and resulting injury in fact that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, meaning that the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. at 2136, 2147 (1992) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 n. 16, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368-69 n. 16, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 218.

An injury is “concrete” if it is real, or distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and is sufficiently particularized if “ ‘it affeet[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’ ” New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President of the United States, 653 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir.2011) (citing City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)) (citing and quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 n. 1). A harm is “actual or imminent” rather than “conjectural or hypothetical” where it is presently or actually occurring, or is sufficiently imminent. The determination of what is imminent is somewhat elastic, but it is fair to say that plaintiffs relying on claims of imminent harm must demonstrate that they face a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury from the conduct of which they complain. Id. (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)).

In the context of a motion to dismiss, we have held that the “[i]njury-in-faet element is not Mount Everest. The contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not precisely defined, are very generous, requiring only that claimant allege [ ] some specific, identifiable trifle of injury.” Dan-vers Motor Co., 432 F.3d at 294 (quoting Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir.1982)).

The Supreme Court explained the difference in the burden placed on the plaintiff *279to satisfy the standing requirement at the motion to dismiss stage as compared to the motion for summary judgment stage, as follows:

At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’ In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be ‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’ Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2137 (internal citations omitted).

The Court further has noted that:

‘Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the question of standing.’ One of these is the requirement that the plaintiff ‘establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statut[e] [or constitutional guarantee] whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.’ The ‘zone-of-interests’ formulation first appeared in cases brought under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, but we have subsequently made clear that the same test similarly governs claims under the Constitution in general. Indeed, we have indicated that it is more strictly applied when a plaintiff is proceeding under a ‘constitutional ... provision’ ...

Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 468-69, 112 S.Ct. 789, 807-08, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

An organization or association may have standing to bring a claim where (1) the organization itself has suffered injury to the rights and/or immunities it enjoys; or (2) where it is asserting claims on behalf of its members and those individual members have standing to bring those claims themselves. See Common Cause of Pa., 558 F.3d at 261. Where an organization asserts its standing to sue on its own behalf, “a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved.’ ” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 739, 92 S.Ct. at 1368; see also Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 2007).

Where an organization is asserting that it has standing on behalf of its members, it is claiming that it has “representational standing.” There are three requirements for this type of standing:

(1) the organization’s members must have standing to sue on their own; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires individual participation by its members.

Pennsylvania Prison Soc., 508 F.3d at 163 n. 10 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Com'n 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977)); see also Public Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d Cir.1997).

Regarding the first prong, we have explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has re*280peatedly held that generalized grievances shared by the public at large do not provide individual plaintiffs with standing,” and further that “the right to have the government act in accordance with the law [is] insufficient, by itself, to support standing.” Id. at 120. Rather, the plaintiff organization must “make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009).

We also have rejected the “formalistic argument” that an organization necessarily lacks standing “because [its] charter prohibits [it] from having members,” but rather in some cases have relied upon “indicia of membership” in analyzing an organization’s standing. See Public Interest Research Grp., 123 F.3d at 119 (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 334, 97 S.Ct. at 2436-37).46 But we also have held that a plaintiff by making expenditures to advance litigation does not suffer sufficient damage to support standing. Fair Hous. Council of Suburban Phila. v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir.1998).47

Finally, “ ‘the jurisdictional issue of standing can be raised at any time,’ ” by either a party or by the court. See Center For Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Viltrakis, 108 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir.1997)) (citing Summers, 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142); see also Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 134 n. 4 (3d Cir.2001) (“Although Appellees do not address standing, we are required to raise issues of standing sua sponte if such issues exist.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is hardly surprising that we have this obligation inasmuch as “federal appellate courts have a bedrock obligation to examine both their own subject matter jurisdiction and that of the district courts [, and] ... standing is ‘perhaps the most important’ of jurisdictional doctrines.” Public Interest Research Grp., 123 F.3d at 117 (citing FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349, 355 (3d Cir.1987)).

VII. ANALYSIS

Now that we have set forth the procedural history, facts, and applicable law in this case we directly address the issues raised in this appeal. We first will discuss whether the District Court correctly determined that the Gaskin settlement and final adjudication barred the claims against the PD E. Then we will discuss whether CBP has standing as a litigant in this case. Our third focus will be on the issue of whether the IDEA’S 90-day statute of limitations bars the Blunt plaintiffs’ claims. Finally, we will discuss whether any of the plaintiffs still in the action when the LMSD moved for summary judgment established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VI and/or presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the LMSD *281violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 so that the District Court erroneously entered its October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order granting summary judgment in favor of the LMSD.48 As part of this last issue, we will review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s determinations in using the evidence submitted on the motion for summary judgment.

A. The Effect of the Gaskin Settlement on the Claims Against the PDE

We conclude that the District Court correctly held that the Gaskin settlement barred the plaintiffs’ claims against the PDE. Although the Gaskin plaintiffs were basing their claims against the PDE on its alleged supervisory failure and did not assert that it engaged in racial discrimination, the Gaskin class consisted of “all school-age students with disabilities in Pennsylvania who have been denied a free appropriate education in regular classrooms with individualized supportive services, individualized instruction, and accommodations they need to succeed in the regular education classroom.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.64. The allegations against PDE in this case are strikingly similar to those made against it in Gaskin. As the District Court summarized:

As in Gaskin, the plaintiffs here claim that the PDE violated the IDEA by failing to identify children with disabilities and provide needed special education and related services and by failing to provide the plaintiffs and members of the putative class a free, appropriate public education. As in Gaskin, plaintiffs here bring a claim against the PDE under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

J.A. vol. 1, at 42.67.

We conclude that the claims plaintiffs asserted against the PDE in this case overlap with the claims made in Gaskin. Though plaintiffs here advance theories of racial motivation not raised in Gaskin, the claims here arise from a “common nucleus of operative facts” when compared to the claims in Gaskin: namely LMSD’s failure to provide a FAPE to students by mishandling identification and/or testing of students for learning disabilities which resulted in incorrect placements. Thus, the release entered into in Gaskin bars the claims here against the PDE because the Gaskin release covered claims arising between 2005 and 2010 and included all present and future students with disabilities within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Indeed, appellants acknowledge that most, though not all, of the plaintiff students in this case were evaluated individually and their IEPs formulated before the Gaskin settlement. Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 19:9-22.

As explained above, we apply res judica-ta and claim preclusion as a consequence of settlement agreements because by doing so we encourage settlements and “serve[ ] the important policy interest of judicial economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that ‘prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action.’ ” Prudential, 261 F.3d at 366. We see no reason to depart from that policy in this case.

In considering the res judicata issue we recognize that, although the Gaskin release was broad,49 there is no suggestion in *282the record that the attorneys who represented the parties in Gaskin did not negotiate the settlement at arms’ length. Moreover, the district court in Gaskin reviewed and accepted the settlement; and the settlement led the parties to forego additional litigation in which they could have advanced their positions with the hope of obtaining what they perceived would be a more favorable outcome than the settlement agreement provided them. We agree with the PDE that the claims against it in this case, like those in Gaskin, deal with its alleged failure to monitor special education programs carried out by school districts in Pennsylvania, including the procedures regarding testing of students for special education services and other aspects of the provision of special education services to students entitled to them, and that the settlement covered the period from 2005-2010. Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 26:12-25.

We recognize that appellants argue that the District Court here erred in its interpretation of the parties’ intent in entering into the Gaskin settlement agreement. Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 21-23. There can be no doubt that, as other courts have held, “[t]he best evidence of ... intent is, of course, the settlement agreement itself.” Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir.2004) (emphasis added); see also Davis v. Huskipower Outdoor Equip. Corp., 936 F.2d 193, 196 (5th Cir.1991) (“[A] settlement agreement is an enforceable contract to which a court must give legal effect according to the parties’ intent as expressed in the document.”); Miller v. Ginsberg, 874 A.2d 93, 99 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005);50 Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir.1989) (where parties express their intent in language in settlement agreement and were represented by skilled attorneys, court should not look beyond that language to understand agreement). Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., 640 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.2011), a settlement agreement may release all claims arising out of the transaction with which the release was concerned even if they are not yet known; and broad releases are valid at least when negotiated between sophisticated parties. Overall, we are satisfied from the terms of the Gaskin settlement that it included the claims made against the PDE here, and thus the settlement barred them.51

B. Whether CBP Has Standing in this Suit52

The District Court dismissed CBP as a plaintiff on its own behalf in its February *28315, 2008 Order because the Court concluded that CBP had failed to “allege any injury whatsoever” to itself beyond advancing evidence that at best insufficiently could support an inference that “the defendants’ conduct may have caused [CBP] ... to ‘suffer a setback to the organization^] abstract social interests.’ ” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.33. The Court also determined in its February 15, 2008 Order that CBP had not met the three-part test that Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission indicated needed to be met for an organization to sue on behalf of its members. The CBP failed in this respect because it did not “providfe] the court with the identity of any member or alleged in the Amended Complaint that any of [its] members has suffered an injury[, and that w]ithout that information, the court ha[d] no basis to conclude that the organization[] ha[s] standing to bring claims on behalf of [its] members.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.33-42.34. Though CBP’s lack of standing may make no difference with respect to its claims against the PDE inasmuch as the Gaskin settlement may have foreclosed those claims, its claim to have standing raises an issue that must be addressed, for it continues to assert claims against the LMSD.53

CBP has not demonstrated that it suffered an injury to itself conferring standing, and, even if its claim is true that it has members notwithstanding its bylaws, CBP does not have standing to sue on their behalf. CBP has a stated purpose to promote “equity and excellence in the response of school districts to the needs of diverse student populations; to address issues related to education for populations identified as minority and/or African American; and to identify, monitor, and inform parents about educational issues impacting disadvantaged students, their families and the community at large.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.50.

In its complaint, CBP identified itself as having been “operating as an organization *284in the LMSD for about 13 years,” and as “a non-profit Pennsylvania corporation whose purpose is, inter al ia, to promote equity and excellence in the response of school districts to the needs of diverse student populations; to address issues related to education for populations identified as minority and/or African American; and to identify, monitor, and inform parents about educational issues impacting disadvantaged students, their families and the community at large.” No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 1, pp. 23-24; J.A. vol. 2, at 509. CBP claimed to bring the action “on its behalf and on behalf of its members.” Id. at 25. CBP identified its members generally as follows: “[t]he members of the organization are residents of the Lower Merion School District and current and former parents or students of the District.” Id. at 510. The District Court noted that, notwithstanding these allegations, CBP supplied documents that stated that it had no members. See August 19, 2009 Order at 5, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 123 (“The organization’s bylaws specifically state ‘[t]he Corporation shall have no members.’ ”). Nevertheless, CBP’s prohibition in its bylaws against having members does not necessarily mean that it could not have standing as a plaintiff on behalf of its members. If such a determination were predicated solely on the basis of the bylaws, it would advance the strictly formalistic approach that we have rejected in other cases. See Public Interest Research Grp., 123 F.3d at 119. Nonetheless, the bylaws do provide context to the overall analysis, particularly in considering whether CBP has attempted to create standing for itself by changing its structure and membership and by its expenditure of resources in response to the District Court’s observations concerning its standing.

In the TAC, the last revised complaint in this case, CBP did not change its statement of purpose quoted above. It, however, did identify 11 of its members by name, five of whom are individually named plaintiffs in this case, and it also identified itself as “supporting]” several more class members and individually named plaintiffs in this case at school-related meetings and court proceedings. TAC, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 55, pp. 25-26. CBP also went to great pains to explain the rise in its expenditures “over the five years” in relation to this case because, as discussed above, the expenditure of funds by an organization on behalf of a cause, though not determinative, is one factor that may be considered in resolving a standing issue. The CBP’s alleged expenditures on behalf of the interests embodied in this case included:

• Use of its resources to ‘host educational consultants and experts’ with the purpose of providing information to the Plaintiffs, class members, community and LMSD;

• A ‘sharp’ rise in expenditures over the last five years due to its efforts to ‘protect its members from the adverse impact’ of ‘the inferior quality of LMSD’s dual system of education’;

• Expenditure of resources as a result of its attending meetings related to IEPs, Section 504 and ‘disciplinary meetings, court hearings and parent-teacher conferences with and/or on behalf of various plaintiffs, CBP members and class members;

• Its efforts in facilitating a ‘Conciliation Agreement between LMSD and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission in which the District promised, inter al ia, to eradicate the disproportionate suspension of African American students as compared to White students’;

*285• Production of a 45-minute video ‘highlighting the issue of racial inequality1;

• Making the public aware of ‘racial graffiti and symbols’ which “were promulgated at both LMSD high school and middle school buildings’;54

• Publication of a community newsletter and ‘News Notes ... to disseminate the compilations of data on’ alleged racial disparities in application of disciplinary measures, segregation by race and ‘under achievement of African American students in the [Lower Mer-ion] District’;

• The ‘organization’ of educational, career, standardized test, financial aid, and college preparatory seminars.

TAC at 25-26; J.A. vol. 9, at 3871-72.

Even if all of these expenditures were legitimate, CBP has not established organizational standing. An organization may establish a “concrete and demonstrable injury” sufficient to confer standing if a defendant’s actions “perceptibly impair” the organization’s ability to provide services. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1124, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982).55 In Havens, the Supreme Court determined that a nonprofit organization formed to promote equal housing through counseling and referral services had standing to bring an action charging that operators of rental housing units had “steered” potential tenants to certain properties based on race. HOME alleged that its mission had been frustrated because it had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendants’ racial steering. The Supreme Court held that these allegations, if proven, would constitute an injury in fact, and thus HOME had standing to sue on its own behalf because the defendants’ practices had impaired its ability to provide services. Id. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124. However, organizations may not satisfy the injury in fact requirement by making expenditures solely for the purpose of litigation, Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 75, nor by simply choosing to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at all. La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). “It must instead show that it would have suffered some other injury if it had not diverted resources to counteracting the problem.” Id.

CBP has failed to show how LMSD’s actions have “perceptibly impaired” its mission.56 CBP’s very purpose relates to actions directly involving LMSD, and its expenditures were devoted to protecting students’ interests in their interactions with LMSD. In Havens, HOME’S purpose was to promote equality in the Richmond area overall and its interests thus went far beyond monitoring the specific actions at issue in the Havens case. By contrast, the CBP is targeted only at LMSD, so its very purpose was to expend resources to educate the public regarding the LMSD’s be*286havior. J.A. vol. 2, at 510 (defining CBP’s membership as residents of LMSD and LMSD parents and students). Because it is targeted at LMSD, all of CBP’s resources would necessarily have been spent on LMSD-related projects. CBP has failed to show why this particular litigation has frustrated its mission, or caused a “concrete and demonstrable” injury to its activities. It appears that the alleged additional expenditures were consistent with CBP’s typical activities, and it is thus unclear the effect, if any, that this litigation had on their expenditures. See Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 77-78 (refusing to confer standing at summary judgment where plaintiff failed to present evidence that it altered its operations or diverted resources based on litigation); Havens, 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S.Ct. at 1124 (explaining that mere “abstract social interests” do not confer standing (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739, 92 S.Ct. at 1368)). CBP simply has not established that the LMSD’s actions have frustrated its efforts to fulfill its mission. Thus, it has not established standing to sue on its own behalf.57

CBP also has not established that it has standing to sue on behalf of its members, if it has any. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission is a useful starting point in the consideration of this issue because the Supreme Court discussed indicia of membership as a means of establishing that an organization has members. 432 U.S. at 344, 97 S.Ct. at 2442.

In Hunt, the Supreme Court determined that a commission created by the State of Washington to represent and promote the advertising interests of that State’s apple growers, whose collective efforts constituted “a multimillion dollar enterprise which plays a significant role in Washington’s economy,” had standing to challenge a North Carolina statute prohibiting the display of apple grading codes on boxes of apples shipped to North Carolina. Id. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 2438. The Washington State apple grading system had been in place for over 60 years, and the stamp reflecting the apple grading was a selling point for Washington State apples because of the good reputation of that State’s apple growing regulations. But due to the structure of the industry, it would have been difficult to pack some apples in unstamped boxes and ensure that they were sent to North Carolina, while ensuring that stamped boxes were separated and not shipped to North Carolina. Id. at 337, 97 S.Ct. at 2438-39. The Supreme Court found that in the circumstances of that case58 the Washington State Apple Adver*287tising Commission had standing to bring the action challenging the North Carolina statute. Id. at 344-45, 97 S.Ct. at 2442. The Court explained that “while the apple growers and dealers are not ‘members’ of the Commission in the traditional trade association sense,” because their membership was not voluntary, but rather was required by statute, “they possessed] all of the indicia of membership in an organization.” Id. at 344, 97 S.Ct. at 2442.

In making this determination, the Court noted that only Washington State apple growers and dealers could elect the members of the Commission, and that the growers and dealers alone financed its activities, including litigation costs, through mandatory assessments levied on them. Id. at 344-45, 97 S.Ct. at 2442. The Court found that “[i]n a very real sense, therefore, the Commission represents the State’s growers and dealers and provides the means by which they express their collective views and protect their collective interests.” Id. at 345, 97 S.Ct. at 2442. The Court reasoned that the statutorily-mandated participation of apple growers and dealers through assessments did not bar the Commission from having standing, analogizing that

[mjembership in a union, or its equivalent, is often required. Likewise, membership in a bar association, which may also be an agency of the State, is often a prerequisite to the practice of law. Yet in neither instance would it be reasonable to suggest that such an organization lacked standing to assert the claims of its constituents.

Id., 97 S.Ct. at 2442.

Further, the Court noted that the Commission had a strong direct interest in the litigation, because its existence depended on the economic health of the Washington State apple-growing industry. Moreover, assessments based on the volume of apples grown and packaged provided the Commission’s funding and the North Carolina regulation was expected to have a great economic impact on the Washington State apple industry. Id., 97 S.Ct. at 2442.

Though appellants rely heavily on Hunt, Judge Greenberg believes that it clearly is distinguishable. CBP is not funded through mandatory assessments of African American students or their parents residing in the LMSD. Further, CBP’s funding is not tied directly to a clear economic interest which will be affected by the outcome of this litigation. The analogy of a traditional trade organization discussed in Hunt is simply not relevant to the CBP’s position in this case. Moreover, in an entirely different setting, the Court based its decision in Hunt on the circumstances of that case, including an analysis of how the Commission functioned as an organization.59

Although appellants amended their complaint after the District Court’s dismissal *288•of the CBP to name several alleged individual CBP members as plaintiffs, CBP’s organizational documents state that it does not have members. Moreover, even though appellants also added statements to the complaint asserting that the CBP was making expenditures related to this suit after the District Court noted the lack of economic impact of the litigation on CBP, this amendment does not supply the basis for standing. It is clear that a nonprofit entity cannot create standing in a lawsuit in which it has no direct economic interest by having its representatives attend meetings regarding the issue that the entity intends to raise in the suit, or by making expenditures to “educate” the public on what it regards as the factual or legal basis for its agenda. As the court said in Center for Law and Education v. United States Department of Education, 315 F.Supp.2d 15, 24-25 (D.D.C.2004):

Without concrete and demonstrable injury to the groups’ activities, however, evidence of a drain on the organizations’ resources does not amount to an injury-in-fact for standing purposes.... [A]n organization’s expenses in the pursuit of its agenda are self-effectuating and [claiming them as injury-in-fact] would allow any advocacy group to manufacture standing by choosing to expend resources to advocate against policy decisions made by the federal government.

Otherwise, the implication would be that any individual or organization wishing to be involved in a lawsuit could create a corporation for the purpose of conferring standing, or could adopt bylaws so that the corporation expressed an interest in the subject matter of the case, and then spend its way into having standing.

Fair Housing discussed the artificial creation of standing, and cited and quoted with approval a case that noted that “[a]n organization cannot, of course, manufacture the injury necessary to maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit. Were the rule otherwise, any litigant could create injury in fact by bringing a case, and Article III would present no real limitation.” Fair Hous., 141 F.3d at 79 (quoting Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C.Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Spann for the proposition that litigation-related costs are not injuries for the purposes of assessing an organization’s standing to bring suit on its own behalf); AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F.Supp.2d 287, 294 (N.D.Tex.2009) (“The Fifth Circuit has held that an organization cannot ‘bootstrap standing’ by claiming a drain on its resources as a result of costs incurred for the particular lawsuit in which it asserts standing.”). In City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F.Supp.2d 882, 897 (E.D.Pa.2000), the district court made the following convincing statement with respect to artificial standing:

It is also disturbing that the organizational plaintiffs argue that they may sue for the costs of educational sessions and other programs which they ran to counteract gun violence. By this logic, any social action organization may confer standing upon itself by voluntarily spending money on the social problem of its choice. Analogously, the environmentalist group in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)] would have standing to protest the endangerment of wildlife in Sri Lanka simply by running programs to preserve foreign fauna. This would be a novel and vast expansion of associational liability for which plaintiffs have advanced no precedential support. It also contradicts the prudential concern behind the standing doctrine that courts not become vehicles for the *289advancement of ideological and academic agendas.

In addition to not overcoming the foregoing problems with respect to its standing, CBP does not satisfy the third requirement for an organization to have standing to sue on behalf of its members, namely that neither the claim the organization is asserting nor “the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441. Even if the District Court’s analysis regarding CBP’s lack of members and its attenuated claims of injury did not demonstrate that CBP did not have standing, after considering this third criterion it is clear that the District Court reached the correct result. It is an accepted principle that “[b]ecause claims for monetary relief usually require individual participation, courts have held associations cannot generally raise these claims on behalf of their members.” Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 284 (3d Cir.2002).60

Here, individual student plaintiffs are seeking monetary reimbursement for remedial courses that they either already have taken or wish to take, and that they contend were necessary because of LMSD’s failure to provide them with a FAPE or LMSD’s incorrect analysis that they were learning disabled. Although a determination of whether this case should be certified as a class action is no longer an issue in this case, the District Court’s explanation of the highly individualized nature of these claims is instructive on this last point. It should be readily apparent to anyone reviewing this case that, in view of the complex and varying facts asserted for the individual students and the myriad legal theories presented in the District Court, the Court was correct in finding that it would have been inappropriate to certify this case as a class action. For many of the same reasons, the facts of this case make organizational representation of the individual plaintiffs insufficient without their personal participation in this litigation. After all, the particular aspects of each student’s educational needs, indeed the very individualized character of the application of IEP and FAPE to an individual student’s needs, necessarily means that addressing the diverse factual assertions in this case would require individual participation from each student litigant involved.

Significantly, the third prong of the Hunt test is prudential, not constitutional. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-56, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 1535-36, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996). As the Supreme Court explained, this inquiry is designed to ensure that sufficient reasons exist to jus*290tify departing from the “background presumption ... that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties,” and thus focuses on “matters of administrative convenience and efficiency.” Id. at 556, 116 S.Ct. at 1536. CBP’s claim to standing is grounded on the claims of its members—individual students—who are also plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Unlike other cases conferring standing on organizations, the plaintiffs in this case are not absent. See, e.g., id. (organization suing on behalf of its members); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441 (same); Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 280 (same).61 The remedies sought here—compensatory and injunctive—will benefit individual plaintiffs that are already parties to the suit. Permitting the CBP to litigate this case on behalf of its members, when those members are already parties to the lawsuit in their own right, does not fulfill the Supreme Court’s guidance to focus on “administrative convenience and efficiency” in determining prudential standing. United Food, 517 U.S. at 557, 116 S.Ct. at 1536.

As the District Court explained:

the amount of compensatory education necessary for each named plaintiff and class member would require a highly individualized inquiry into that student’s unique needs, whether those needs were met, the extent to which the School District failed to provide that student with a free, appropriate public education and the proper amount of compensatory education necessary to redress any deficiencies. The individualized analysis of each student’s educational history and needs precludes a finding that a class would be efficiently managed by this court.

August 19, 2009 Order at 17, No. 2:07-cv-3100, Doc. No. 123.

The District Court’s findings regarding the individualized nature of the factual basis for each plaintiffs claim go directly to the third prong for organizational standing, which requires that, for an organization to assert standing on behalf of its members, their individual participation in the lawsuit must be unnecessary. It is very clear that the highly individualized components of the plaintiffs’ claims, the complex history of each plaintiffs IEP and evaluations, and the changes in understanding of his or her disability status, led the Court to conclude correctly that the students’ individual participation in this lawsuit was required. Thus, the Court believed that CBP is not an appropriate representational litigant for individual students and/or their parents.62

*291C. The Blunts and the 90-day Statute of Limitations under the IDEA, as Revised by the Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004

Appellants now argue, contrary to their original contentions in the District Court in their complaint even as amended, that five or six63 of the individual student plaintiffs do not have a learning disability and the LMSD incorrectly identified them and placed them in special education classes. Nonetheless, we discuss the IDEA statute of limitations, as revised in 2004, because it appears that the Blunts still seek a recovery under the IDEA based on the contention that Amber was identified as disabled but without challenging the accuracy of the identification with respect to that contention. Accordingly, it is not clear that Amber in this litigation has joined in all respects with the other students now identifying themselves as having been incorrectly identified as disabled.

In its February 15, 2008 Order, the District Court found that the Blunts’ ADA, RA, Title VI, and § 1983 claims were barred on a different basis than their IDEA claims. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.21-42.29.64 In reaching its conclusion, the Court applied Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to the Blunts’ ADA, RA, Title VI, and § 1983 claims because the applicable federal statutes did not include governing statutes of limitations with respect to these claims. See Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 598-99 (3d Cir.1998). The Court concluded that the claims were time-barred because Amber Blunt had graduated from high school on June 9, 2005, and the original complaint in this case was filed in the District Court on July 30, 2007, more than two years after Amber suffered her alleged injuries. J.A. vol. 1, at 42.28. The Blunts do not challenge this disposition. But the Blunts do challenge the Court’s holding that the IDEA 90-day statute of limitations barred their IDEA claims.

In reviewing this determination, we note the following timeline: the LMSD denied the Blunts’ request for “transitional services” on April 8, 2005, the Blunts requested a due process hearing under the IDEA on April 11, 2005, a two-day hearing followed, and the Hearing Officer issued his decision on July 25, 2005. Id. at 42.23. Both the Blunts and the LMSD filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s decision with an Appeals Panel which issued its ruling on August 31, 2005. Id. Therefore, for purposes of calculating the time allowed by the statute of limitations for the Blunts to file their action under the IDEA, their cause of action accrued on August 31, 2005.

The Blunts argue that the 90-day statute of limitations for an IDEA claimant adversely affected by an administrative decision to bring suit in state or federal court does not apply to their case, even though this statute of limitations became effective on July 1, 2005, and the decision in their *292administrative case became final on August 31, 2005. They argue that we should reach this result because they filed their request for a due process hearing on April 8, 2005, before the change in the limitations period. Therefore, the Blunts believe that an earlier version of the IDEA under which their IDEA claims would have been timely should apply in their case. In their view, to apply the 90-day statute of limitations effective on July 1, 2005, to their case “would be an impermissible retroactive application of IDEA amendments.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42. 20. They assert that their case is unique because there has been no other case applying the statute of limitations in a situation in which the administrative due process hearing request was made before the 2004 IDEA amendments became effective, but the final administrative decision was rendered after the amendments had become effective. Thus, they contend that the 90-day statute of limitations should not bar their IDEA claims.

We, however, agree with the District Court, which “[was] not persuaded” by their contention because “[t]he date that the hearing was requested is irrelevant.” J.A. vol. 1, at 42.23. Rather, we look at the statute of limitations in effect on the date of the final administrative decision, August 31, 2005. Indeed, it might be asked why we even would consider applying any other limitations period as the Blunts could not have brought their IDEA action before August 31, 2005. Consequently, when the Blunts’ federal cause of action arose, the 90-day statute of limitations was in effect, and when they brought their case in the District Court on July 30, 3007, it was untimely. Inasmuch as the law setting forth the limitations period changed on December 3, 2004, and became effective on July 1, 2005, the change as applied to them was hardly abrupt and it left the Blunts with nine months, from December 3, 2004, until August 31, 2005, to become familiar with the revisions, and an additional 90 days after August 31, 2005, in which to file their action.

The LMSD cites Steven I. for the proposition that the two-year statute of limitations governing due process hearings is retroactive to the extent that it applies to proceedings pending when it became effective. It further contends that the seven months between the enactment of this new statute of limitations and its effective date gave potential claimants sufficient notice so that its retroactive application did not violate due process. The Blunts contend, however, that Steven I. is not applicable because that case dealt with the two-year statute of limitations for bringing an administrative claim under the IDEA, rather than the specific statute of limitations at issue, i.e., 90-day statute of limitations for bringing a state or federal suit after receipt of an adverse administrative determination. But the Blunts cannot convincingly explain why an analysis regarding the 90-day statute of limitations, embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) and applicable to the filing of a judicial challenge in a state or federal court to an administrative decision, should be different from an analysis of the validity of the changing of the time period in which to bring an administrative claim under the IDEA, embodied in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). In considering this matter we point out that the amendment of the IDEA on December 3, 2004, which took effect on July 1, 2005, dealt with both limitations periods.

We find that the reasoning we employed in Steven I. is applicable here. In that case we relied on the analysis in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. at 532, 102 S.Ct. at 793. In Texaco v. Short, the Court spoke to the issue of fairness, which balances the need for a grace period when shortening a limitations period, with the need for in*293jured parties to be vigilant in protecting their rights:

The Court has upheld retroactive adjustments to a limitations period only when the legislature has provided a grace period during which the potential plaintiff could reasonably be expected to learn of the change in the law and then initiate his action. In the context of a retrospective statute of limitations, a reasonable grace period provides an adequate guarantee of fairness. Having suffered the triggering event of an injury, a potential plaintiff is likely to possess a heightened alertness to the possibly changing requirements of the law bearing on his claim. Because redress necessarily depends on recourse to the State’s judicial system, the State is free to condition its intervention on rules of procedure, and further, to impose on the potential plaintiff the obligation to monitor changes in those rules. Plaintiffs, and their attorneys, are so aware.

Id. at 549,102 S.Ct at 802.

We therefore concluded in Steven I. that the plaintiffs in that case had been afforded ample time to make themselves aware of the new two-year statute of limitations measured from the date of injury for seeking administrative review under the IDEA. We similarly conclude that the Blunt plaintiffs had ample opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 90-day statute of limitations with respect to judicial actions. In fact, we even question whether the application of the 90-day statute of limitations in this case should be regarded as retroactive inasmuch as the Blunts did not receive an administrative decision until after the new statute of limitations was in effect, and their federal court cause of action did not accrue under the IDEA until the final administrative decision in their case. We reiterate that the Blunts cannot adequately explain why the reasoning in Steven I. should not be applied in a consideration of the effectiveness of the 90-day statute of limitations that was enacted at the same time as the two-year statute of limitations for bringing an administrative action addressed in Steven I. The fact is that the Blunts simply have not made a convincing argument for applying the two statutes of limitations in the same amendment to the IDEA in completely different ways.

D. Whether Appellants Established a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination

We deal now with appellants’ challenge to the summary judgment rendered against them on their § 1983 and Title VI claims, which allege that the LMSD intentionally discriminated against them because of their race.65 Appellants explain that “[t]his case ultimately rests upon a simple question: What quantum of evidence must a plaintiff produce to support an inference of intentional racial discrimination in order to overcome a summary judgment motion?” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 br. at 21. In addressing the discrimination claims, the LMSD responds that, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, they “presented no evidence to establish: (1) that the classes they took were ‘lower level’ and/or ‘below grade-level’ (2) LMSD maintained any specific discriminatory cus*294tom, practice or policy; or (3) “that similarly situated Caucasian students were treated differently. Indeed, the record is replete with evidence that class placement ... is driven by the decisions of students and parents.” LMSD’s br. at 36. Thus, the LMSD argues that “[t]here is ... no dispute that Plaintiffs have no direct evidence of discrimination.” Id. at 37.

Appellants argue that “if there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable inference in the [appellants’] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment.” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 5-6 (quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Appellants then conclude that “[LMSD] (and the District Court) were required to accept [all] the testimony of record and any legitimate inference Appellants draw from it, regardless of whether they agreed with those inferences or not,” and that the LMSD therefore should not have been granted summary judgment. Id. at 5-6 (appellants’ emphasis removed). As stated above, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment a district court must view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Genuine and material factual disputes— meaning those that bear on an essential element of the plaintiffs claim-where the trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-mov-ant.

LMSD was entitled to summary judgment because there is no evidence to suggest either that LMSD itself acted with a discriminatory intent, or that it knew of— but failed to correct—a third party’s intentional discrimination. See S.H., 729 F.3d at 264. Although appellants present some evidence that African American students were overrepresented in a statistical sense in special education classes, given the record we see no way to avoid a finding that each individual student’s educational needs were assessed and satisfied through a thorough and individualized process. There is not sufficient evidence to show that the educators and administrators responsible for placing students intended to discriminate against them because of their race. Moreover, in order to show that LMSD acted with deliberate indifference, appellants must show that it had knowledge of rights violations, but there is no evidence in the record to suggest that it did or that any third party under its control engaged in intentional discrimination. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47, 119 S.Ct. 1661 (finding deliberate indifference may be met where school knows of intentional harassment but fails to act.) Appellants argue that the District Court improperly assessed witnesses’ credibility, and discounted its statistical evidence. We discuss these arguments below, but ultimately agree with the District Court that the record is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding LMSD’s intent.

1. Rejection of Certain Evidence by the District Court and Alleged Impermissible Reliance on Other Evidence Without a Daubert Hearing.

As stated above, we review a district court’s decisions on admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard where a party made known to the district court the substance of the evidence it desires to introduce. Thus, in considering a district court’s application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we will reverse only where “ ‘there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.’ ” Oddi 234 F.3d at 146. Here, we *295conclude that the District Court did not make a clear error of judgment, or, indeed, any error at all in its consideration of the proffered evidence, and that, at trial, the excluded evidence could not have been made admissible. We therefore will uphold all of its rulings regarding the disputed evidence.66

a. The MAP Presentation

Appellants contend that the District Court improperly discounted a powerpoint presentation discussing a “Minority Achievement Program” (MAP). J.A. vol. 5, at 1836-39. The presentation included a bulleted list of characteristics of African American students and how to teach them effectively. We assume the contention that this presentation, if used by LMSD, would provide evidence of discriminatory intent, or deliberate indifference to a third party’s discriminatory intent. Yet we do not see any record evidence from which we could conclude that the LMSD ever used or implemented this presentation. The presentation does not contain any indication of who authored it or how it is connected to the LMSD.67 Instead, appellants rely on the testimony of Dr. Barbara Moore-Williams, an education consultant retained by LMSD to help it develop “cultural proficiency among staff.” J.A. vol. 4, at 1411. Appellants attempt to use her testimony for two purposes: to show that LMSD used and implemented the MAP presentation and to show intent.

In Dr. Moore-Williams’ deposition, appellants’ counsel questioned her about whether she had heard LMSD teachers or other personnel refer to specific bullet points from the MAP presentation. Id. at 1414. Dr. Moore-Williams responded that she had heard teachers or other personnel refer to some of the bullet points. Id. Crucially, however, Dr. Moore-Williams did not testify about the MAP presentation itself— she explains that she had heard LMSD personnel discuss in general the concepts raised in the presentation, but that does not establish who prepared the presentation, or whether LMSD ever used it or for what purpose. Indeed, even when Moore-Williams indicated that she had heard of certain bullet points, she noted that they were not related to African American students. See id. at 1414 (explaining, with respect to “active” classes, that she had not “heard about it in reference to African-American students”). At most, her testimony is relevant to the extent that she heard from LMSD personnel that they used different teaching strategies for particular students. But although purposeful use of such strategies may show racial bias and would be repugnant, it is not, as the dissent suggests, sufficient to show that LMSD created, used, or implemented the MAP presentation. Finally, the MAP presentation does not show that appellants suffered intentional discrimination; it does not discuss placement in lower-level classes and, as discussed, there is no evidence that these concepts were applied to LMSD’s individualized special education placement decisions.

b. Daniel Reschly’s Report

Appellants argue that “[t]he District Court erred when it failed to conduct a *296Daubert hearing but still relied on the District’s expert Daniel Reschly’s definitions and principles to undercut Appellants’ statistical evidence of discrimination by the District.” Appellants further contend that “the portions of Reschly’s report relied upon by the District Court form part of the basis for the two paragraphs that are specifically referred to in appellants’ form of order,” and thus the District Court erred in not holding a Daubert hearing on a motion in limine directed at the Reschly report. Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 34-38. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Appellants contend that “Reschly’s opinions should have no place in this appeal, as they should have had no place in the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment without a Daubert hearing. This provides yet another basis to reverse and remand the District Court’s ruling.” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 38. However, appellants do not specify the “definitions” and “principles” that the District Court adopted from Reschly’s report.

It may be that appellants’ specific objection with regard to Reschly’s report lies with one paragraph of the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order which refers to Reschly’s report, consisting of phrases commonly used by those studying the implementation of disability education and services under the IDEA. The paragraph reads:

Disproportionality is defined as ‘significantly greater or lower participation in special education by one or more groups compared to the participation rates for other groups.’ The preferred methods of analyzing disproportionality are risk and relative risk or risk ratio. Risk is calculated by dividing the number of students with disabilities in a particular group by the total number of students in that group.

No. 2:07-cv-3100 Doc. No. 180 at 13; J.A. vol. 1, at 16.

We find this use of Reschly’s wording to define disproportionality to be immaterial to the outcome of this litigation. The District Court did not draw inferences in favor of either side from this definition, which, we observe, seems very straightforward. Further, the concepts of risk and relative risk/risk ratio are commonly used statistical terms, and the Court described these definitions in the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order to give the reader a basic understanding of the statistical data that the plaintiffs presented which the District Court’s opinion goes on to discuss. We find no other “adoption” of Reschly’s views or principles, notwithstanding appellants’ objection to the use of his report. As stated above, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion to exclude Reschly’s expert report as moot, as the Court was able to make a determination regarding whether plaintiffs had presented a pri-ma facie case in its summary judgment analysis without the use of the report.

2. Whether the District Court Properly Viewed the Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Plaintiffs as Non-movants and Whether Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination.

Appellants argue that, when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to them as non-movants in the District Court, they established a prima facie case under Title VI and § 1983 applying the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, appellants contend that the Court erred in granting summary judgment against them on their claims predicated on these bases, as it refused “to view evidence in the light most favorable to [them].” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 28. We point out, howev*297er, that a court’s obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to a non-movant does not require the court to take into account evidence that will not be admissible at the trial. Thus, in considering appellants’ argument with respect to the adequacy of the evidence, we take into account our holdings with respect to the evidence in which we uphold the District Court’s disposition of the issues.

In its October 20, 2011 grant of summary judgment, the District Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to “put forth any evidence that supports their contention that they were ‘segregated’ intentionally into inferior education programs in violation of Title VI,” and that “plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding their § 1983 cause of action” based on the Equal Protection Clause. J.A. vol. 1, at 31-35. The Court, in considering the summary judgment motion, noted that the plaintiffs were required to “raise at least some reasonable inference that they were placed into classes and offered services by the School District due to intentional discrimination based on their race and not simply due to errors in evaluation.” The Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to offer evidence sufficient to support an inference that the LMSD had intentionally discriminated against African Americans. Moreover, plaintiffs had not put forth more than a scintilla of evidence that the LMSD acted with a racially discriminatory purpose in identifying them as disabled and placing them in special education courses regardless of whether this identification was correct. Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not identify an official policy or custom that suggested that the LMSD was deliberately indifferent to their rights. J.A. vol. 1, at 32-36.

We emphasize that, as we explained above, a nonmoving party—here, appellants—opposing a motion for summary judgment has the burden to produce evidence supporting its case with respect to material facts of the case on which it has the burden of proof. Appellants contend that they met this burden because they did offer more than a scintilla of evidence in support of their case and that a reasonable fact finder could have found that the evidence of discrimination they offered was sufficient to support a finding in their favor. We, of course, recognize that in some race discrimination situations actors do not leave a “smoking gun” evidencing their intent, and in such cases plaintiffs can prove their cases only with circumstantial evidence. In this case, however, the piecemeal anecdotes to which appellants point were insufficient to survive LMSD’s summary judgment motion.

The appellants attempt to meet this standard by pointing to an email by a member of the LMSD School Board, which they believe supported their prima facie case of discrimination when read in a light most favorable to them and considered as a part of the case as a whole. In discussing school redistricting to increase minority representation in certain schools, one member of the School Board apparently wrote an email expressing his concern that “moving any of the low income and African American students to Harriton [High School] when they can walk to [Lower Merion High School] simply creates an additional stressor that doesn’t need to be there.” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 26.

Appellants believe that “[f]rom that comment, a reasonable jury could conclude that [LMSD] fostered an institutional culture (expressed by at least one Board member) that tolerated racial insensitivity and viewed African Americans [sic] students as creating unnecessary ‘stress.’” Appellants’ No. 11-4200 reply br. at 27. *298But we do not need to decide how a reasonable jury could construe this email because even though it was available when depositions were taken and a witness other than its author referred to it on a deposition, it was not properly submitted to the District Court as it was not introduced into evidence and its author was not deposed. Consequently, appellants cannot rely on the email to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).68 Thus, the email did not contribute to the admissible evidence appellants needed to have survived summary judgment.

Appellants also argue that the District Court wrongly discounted the deposition testimony of Dr. Moore-Williams, an independent consultant that the LMSD had engaged prior to this litigation to address minority issues in the LMSD, as being based on her personal beliefs and on hearsay. In considering this testimony, the Court found that her opinions were not based on anything that she had observed firsthand, but rather concerned attitudes about race in the country and the education system in general. Appellants seem to conflate the issue of admissibility of evidence with the requirement of taking evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant when considering a summary judgment motion. Thus, during oral argument, appellants’ counsel argued that the District Court should have found that there was evidence that LMSD committed an intentional wrong against African American students in its schools, not only because it did not consider the MAP presentation, but because it also wrongly discounted Moore-Williams’ testimony as hearsay. Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 51-52. While the MAP issue seems to concern admissibility, it is clear from the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order that the Court did consider Moore-Williams’ deposition testimony, and appellants referred to this testimony in their oral arguments on October 4, 2011, in the District Court on the summary judgment motion.69 No. 2:07-cv-3100 Doc. No. 180 at 25.

The District Court’s October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order found that references to Moore-Williams’ testimony by the plaintiffs during the October 4, 2011 oral argument was “selective and misleading,” and that she had “admitted] that her statements about the School District [we]re not based on anything she observed firsthand but rather on her own personal belief and the hearsay statements of others. Accordingly, her statements cannot create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the School District’s intent to discriminate.” Id. In this regard, we do not see how the deficiencies in her testimony could have been cured so that the evidence could have become admissible at trial. Clearly, we cannot say that the Dis*299trict Court erred in its treatment of her evidence.70

Indeed, putting aside inadmissible evidence, the allegations in all of the complaints and briefs are inconsistent in their logic. For example, appellants seem to be complaining both that LMSD’s placement of individual students in special education courses has taken them away from “regular” courses, while at the same time alleging that they did not receive adequate special education and support.71 It is unclear what actions LMSD could have taken that plaintiffs would deem appropriate. In order to participate in full schedules of both special education and regular education classes, students would need a longer school day than students taking only regular education classes. Further, if individual students require extra help in particular subjects, obviously it is counterin-tuitive to protest that, for example, they are not receiving foreign language instruction during the time that they are participating in remedial courses.

We also point out that at various points in the SAC the plaintiffs express dissatisfaction with grades that are too low, and at other points complain of grades that are too high. Plaintiffs seem to believe that the divergence in grades demonstrates that they were placed in courses that either were too easy or too difficult, depending on which plaintiff they are discussing.72 But student placement is not an exact science, and different children have different needs. We repeatedly have explained that the teachers and parents, school districts, and administrative review boards are closest to the issues at hand, and therefore they are the best persons or entities to address individual concerns and complaints. Of course, this recognition underlies the need for the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA.

3. Statistical Evidence

In Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 371 (3d Cir.2011), we cited several Supreme Court cases to support our conclusion that gross statistical disparities may serve to establish a plaintiff’s prima facie case in a Title VII case if the statistical evidence is of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the policy or practice in question caused the discrimination. In considering the statistical evidence in this case, we note first that for monetary damages to be awarded under Title VI, the discrimination must be intentional. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 191, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (“[DJamages are available under Title VI for intentional violations thereof.” (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S. 582, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 77 L.Ed.2d 866 (1983))). However, even if this were not the case and we simply applied the analysis we articulated in the Meditz Title VTI case, the statistics do not indicate gross disparities of the kind and degree sufficient to give rise to an inference that the non-uniform individualized *300analyses of students in the LMSD, utilized to determine appropriate classroom placement, reflected a pattern or practice of discrimination.

The District Court in its October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order discussed in detail the statistical data that the plaintiffs put forward. No. 2:07-ev-3100, Doc. No. 180 at 13-18. As the Court pointed out, “[disproportionality is not per se evidence of discrimination” and, as plaintiffs’ own experts have acknowledged, disproportionality can be either biased or unbiased. Id. at 14. Noting that “[t]here is no specific numerical criteria for dispro-portionality set forth in the IDEA or federal regulations,” the Court explained that the PDE has established guidelines whereby it considers a disproportionality of 3.0, i.e., three to one, to be an indication of overrepresentation of that race, while the United States Department of Education’s guidelines indicate that a 1.5 dispropor-tionality ratio is an overrepresentation of that race. Id. at 14-15.

The District Court summarized the data presented by plaintiffs (collected by the PDE) for the LMSD for the years 2005-2010 as follows:

Total student body at LMSD Students Participating in special education courses

Year % of total number of Total students Number who were of African students American % of total number of students who were Caucasian %of Total total Number of student students body that that participated in participated in special special education education % of special education students who were African American % of special education students who were Caucasian

'05-'06 6,945 7.7% 84.4% 1,255 18.1% 12.7% 82.6%

'06-'07 6,981 7.9% 83.2% 1,187 17.0% 14.5% 80.2%

'07-'08 6,914 8.1% 83.1% 1,158 16.7% 14.0% 80.8%

'08-'09 6,788 8.0% 81.6% 1,101 16.2% 13.7% 80.5%

'09—'10 7,072 81.1 1,094 15.5% 14.3% 80.0%

Id. at 16-17. Though these numbers undoubtedly show that it was more likely that an African American student than a Caucasian student would be placed in a special education course, the numbers are not so disproportionate that they suggest the presence of discrimination in student placement absent additional evidence that could justify drawing this inference.

In considering the statistics, it is critical to recognize that there was no evidence presented in the District Court that the LMSD applied different evaluation procedures for determining placement of African American students than for Caucasian students. After all, if the same evaluation procedures are used for all students regardless of their race there simply is no discrimination. Moreover, the opinion of the plaintiffs’ expert, a psychologist, that five or six of the students in question incorrectly had been identified as learning disabled was not rendered until these proceedings were pending in the District Court and was insufficient to support a prima facie case for the plaintiffs, particularly inasmuch as she predicated her opinion on her personal evaluation of the students.

*301In fact, we doubt that anyone could explain better than LMSD’s counsel did at oral argument why the divergence of views on student placement should not be a basis to support plaintiffs’ claims:

[LMSD] has procedures in place that are followed for all students. And the fact a psychologist could disagree with [LMSD’s] psychologist and say ‘No, I don’t think this person met these criteria’ doesn’t prove or produce any evidence to suggest that that was as a result of these students’ races. The psychologist did not [attempt] ... to ascertain ... that identification process ... to see if there was perhaps some other indicia that could be pointed to as to why that occurred. Instead, it was simply, T don’t believe these students were [properly] identified.’ From that, the plaintiffs had made the leap that therefore it must be because of their race.

Tr. Oral Arg. June 11, 2013, at 37-38.

In reaching our result, in addition to considering the statistics we have cited and plaintiffs’ expert’s claim that students were misidentified, we have considered plaintiffs’ allegation that a small number of special education classes at LMSD were comprised of 100% African American students. But the problem with that evidence is that it was not offered in a context from which a meaningful correlation between race and class placement could be demonstrated because plaintiffs did not accompany it with testing data, grading, and other factors that might provide some meaning to the evidence that they offered. Under the IDEA structure, school districts that accept federal funds such as the LMSD must treat every student as an individual, and thus must evaluate, test, and monitor the student individually, as well as provide an IEP for the student on an individual basis. If by following this mandate a school district should make a special education placement for a particular student, the school district should not decline to make the placement merely because the application of the mandate leads to students of a particular group being statistically overrepresented in special education grouping. We certainly are not going to require or even suggest that school districts use a quota system in assigning students to special education classes so that the percentages of students in such classes be proportionate to overall school ratios when measured on a racial basis. A school district has the function of educating its students, and should be concerned with that critical matter rather than with producing particular statistics.

Appellants’ evidence of discrimination consists of statistical evidence that African American students were overrepresented in special education classes, testimony indicating that certain LMSD educators had discussed different learning styles and an email from a School Board member expressing concern about putting extra stress on black students. However, the record also reflects that each individual student’s educational needs were assessed and satisfied through a thorough and individualized IEP process, and contains no evidence that the educators and administrators responsible for placing students intended to discriminate against them because of their race. Taking the record as a whole and drawing all inferences in appellants’ favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact that LMSD itself—or a third party under its control—engaged in intentional discrimination.

VIII. CONCLUSION

First, we hold that the District Court correctly held that the action against the PDE was barred by principles of res judi-cata (claim preclusion) as a result of the *302settlement of the class action in Gaskin v. Pennsylvania, 389 F.Supp.2d 628. We reach that conclusion because the Gaskin class included all school-age students with disabilities in Pennsylvania who were denied a FAPE, and the claims pleaded against the PDE in this case were brought on behalf of students within the Gaskin class. Thus, the claims asserted against the PDE in this case overlap with the claims that had been brought against it in Gaskin.

Next, in reviewing the District Court’s conclusions regarding the IDEA’S statute of limitations for a party adversely affected by an administrative determination of an IDEA claim to bring a state or federal suit, we hold that the Court correctly concluded that the 90-day statute of limitations barred the Blunts’ IDEA claims. In reaching this result, we hold that it did not matter that the Blunts’ administrative judicial process began on April 8, 2005, a date on which the IDEA’S statute of limitations for bringing a claim in state or federal court after receiving an adverse administrative determination was two years, because the Blunts’ final administrative disposition was on August 31, 2005, almost two months after the 90-day statute of limitations came into effect, and almost nine months after Congress enacted it. Contrary to the Blunts’ contention, the amended statute of limitations was not unfairly retroactively applied, for they had nine months notice regarding the amendment of the statute of limitations before their IDEA action was barred; thus they had ample time to bring their case. In fact, inasmuch as their cause of action did not arise until after the amendment of the statute of limitations, it is fair to say that the amendment simply was not applied retroactively in their case. Further, as noted above, the Blunts had the responsibility to be vigilant about changes in legislation, including statutes of limitation. Our reasoning in Steven I. regarding the shortened IDEA statute of limitations for bringing an administrative claim plainly applies here with respect to the judicial claim.

Judge Greenberg concludes that CBP did not have standing to sue on its own behalf or on behalf of its members, but Judges Ambro and McKee conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing CBP for lack of standing because CBP had organizational standing under Havens. Although a majority of the Court thus does not accept the District Court’s ruling that CBP did not have standing, this conclusion does not change our outcome in light of a different majority’s independent conclusion that the Court properly entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs, as CBP has not explained why it could have prevailed where the individual plaintiffs did not.

We also hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in how it dealt with disputed evidence. The Court was correct in determining that the MAP presentation was not authenticated, and it did not abuse its discretion in discounting Moore-Williams’ testimony or in not giving it more weight than it did. Further, the Court did not err in its use of Reschly’s report.

Finally, plaintiffs did not establish a pri-ma facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VI or § 1983; thus, the entry of summary judgment against them on their claims under those laws was appropriate. Evidence that the District Court found to be inadmissible need not have been considered in a light most favorable to the non-movant plaintiffs because the evidence could not have become admissible at trial. Further, the evidence before the Court did not support a circumstantial prima facie case of racial discrimination in violation of *303Title VI or § 1983. In particular, the statistical evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case even when considered with other evidence.

The IDEA’S goal is to ensure that educators and parents have necessary tools to improve educational results of disabled students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(3) (stating as one purpose of the IDEA, “to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary tools to improve educational results for children with disabilities by supporting system improvement activities”). As we have noted in the past, it is not necessarily the case that when students do not achieve equal results from their education there is a constitutional violation. Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of State of Del., 90 F.3d 752, 766 (3d Cir.1996); see also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2293, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (It is a “settled rule that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”).

In summary, we will affirm the District Court’s orders of October 20, 2011, February 15, 2008, and August 19, 2009, on appeal at Nos. 11-4200 and 11—4201, and will dismiss LMSD’s cross-appeal at No. 11—4315.73