Kendall v. Russell
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION OF THE COURT
(July 13, 2009)
Leon A. Kendall, a judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, filed this suit against members of the Virgin Islands Commission on Judicial Disabilities (the âCommissionâ), alleging that Virgin Islands Act No. 3876 (the âCommission Actâ or the âActâ), which empowers the Commission to remove judges of the Superior Court, violates the separation of powers principle inherent in the Revised Organic Act of 1954 (the âROAâ). 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq. The Commission asked the District Court to abstain from hearing the case, but the Court declined and entered judgment for Judge Kendall, declaring that the Commission Act does indeed violate the ROA and enjoining the Commission members from initiating or continuing removal proceedings against Judge Kendall. Now, four members of the Commission, Ronald A. Russell, Bruce Marshack, Robert Molloy, and Luis Morales, appeal the District Courtâs judgment.
I. Background
A. Establishment of the Commission
On September 9, 1976, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands passed the Commission Act, which instituted significant changes involving the judicial system of the Virgin Islands. One of those changes was the creation of the Commission. V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 4, §§ 651-59. The Act grants the Commission the âpower to retire or remove a magistrate or judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islandsâ and lists as grounds for removal conviction of a felony, willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties, a mental or physical disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties, or any other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or brings the judicial office into disrepute. Id. §§ 651, 656.
The Act further specifies that the Commission is to be composed of two members appointed by the Governor of the Virgin Islands, two members appointed by the President of the Virgin Islands Legislature, and one member appointed by the Board of Governors of the Virgin Islands Bar Association. Id. § 652. Members of the judiciary are not eligible to serve on the Commission. Id.
The Commission may investigate a judgeâs health or conduct on its own initiative or following a complaint. Id. § 657(b)(1). Before the Commission can issue an order affecting a judgeâs tenure, it must hold a hearing. Id. A judge who is subject to a Commission hearing must be given notice of the hearing and of the nature of the matters under inquiry. Id. § 657(b)(2). The judge is entitled to attend the hearing, be represented by counsel, present evidence on his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. Following a hearing, the Commission makes determinations regarding the conduct or health of the judge concerned. Id. § 657(b)(3). The concurrence of at least four members is required for the Commission to make a determination for removal or retirement. Id.
According to the terms of the Act, if the Commission makes a determination for removal or retirement, it must file an order in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Id. §§ 656(a), (b), 657(b)(3). The Act provides that the judge who is the subject of the order may then petition
B. Judge Kendall and the Commission
In 2003, Leon A. Kendall was appointed to serve as a judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands. In June 2007, Judge Kendall received a letter informing him that the Commission had received and planned to investigate two complaints against him. The Commission served Judge Kendall with two documents on November 16, 2007, each styled as an âOrder and Notice of Hearing,â and each bearing a distinct case number and hearing date.
Judge Kendall considered the pending hearings to be âcontinuing looming threatsâ to his judicial independence.
The next day, October 5, Judge Kendall filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The District Court consolidated the hearing on the motion with a trial on the merits and heard testimony and arguments on December 13, 2007. On January 16, 2008, the Court issued a judgment in favor of Judge Kendall, holding that the provisions of the Act empowering the Commission to remove Superior Court judges violate the ROA, and enjoining Commission members from initiating or continuing removal proceedings against Judge Kendall.
Next, the Court turned to the merits of those claims. It began by establishing that, for a local legislature to have the power to remove a judge, the legislature must be expressly granted that power by some legal authority, usually a state constitution. Noting that the ROA serves as the Constitution of the Virgin Islands, the Court reviewed the relevant portions of the ROA and concluded that it does not grant the Legislature power to remove judges. Without having such power itself, the Legislature could not delegate it to the Commission. Hence, the Court
Four members of the Commission (âAppellantsâ) filed a timely notice of appeal. They assert that the District Court erred in refusing to abstain from ruling while there were proceedings before the Commission. On a related point, they argue that the District Court erred in construing the Act as not providing for judicial review of Commission orders. Finally, they contend that the District Court erred in holding that the provisions of the Act granting the Commission power to remove Superior Court judges are invalid and unenforceable under the ROA.
II. Discussion
We first consider abstention and then turn to the validity of the contested provisions of the Act.
A. Abstention
âA federal district court has discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering with an ongoing state proceeding.â Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971)). As noted earlier, the Younger doctrine allows a district court to abstain, but that discretion can properly be exercised only when (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2008). It is beyond dispute that the second element of that tripartite test is present in this case. Judicial accountability and the regulation of the judiciary are obviously important state interests, and the government of the Virgin Islands is rightly concerned with the
1. Commission Proceedings Are Not Judicial
In determining whether state proceedings are judicial in nature, we have identified some âtraditional indicia of a judicial action.â Coruzzi v. New Jersey, 705 F.2d 688, 690 (3d Cir. 1983). For example, proceedings may be judicial in nature if they are initiated by a complaint, adjudicative in nature, governed by court rules or rules of procedure, or employ legal burdens of proof. See id. In addition, and of particular significance in this case, the Supreme Court has indicated that the availability of judicial review is an important element of judicial proceedings. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assân, 457 U.S. 423, 433, 437, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982) (citing the availability of review by the New Jersey Supreme Court as a significant factor in determining that local attorney disciplinary proceedings were judicial in nature); see also Ohio Civil Rights Commân v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986) (characterizing the holding in Middlesex as being âthat federal courts should refrain from enjoining lawyer disciplinary proceedings initiated by state ethics committees if the proceedings are within the appellate jurisdiction of the appropriate State Supreme Courtâ (emphasis added)).
The Act sets forth several prescriptions for the Commission that make its work akin to judicial proceedings. The Commission may not enter an order affecting a judgeâs tenure without holding a hearing. V.I. CODE Ann. tit. 4, § 657(b)(1). A judge under investigation must be given notice of any hearing into his conduct and the nature of the matters under inquiry. Id. § 657(b)(2). In addition, the judge has the right to attend hearings, be represented by counsel, present evidence on his own behalf, and confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him. Id.
The Act also purports to provide for judicial review by requiring that Commission orders affecting judicial tenure be submitted to the District Court for review and by stipulating that any â[djetermination by the district court shall be final and conclusive.â Id. § 659. That provision of the Act, however, presents a conspicuous problem. âFederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by
Appellants contend that there is a foundation in federal law for the jurisdiction they claim exists, or at least existed when the Act was passed. They base their argument on section 1613a(a) of the ROA, which provides that, prior to the authorized establishment of a local appellate court, âthe District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have such appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law to the extent now or hereafter prescribed by local law.â 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a).
Appellants next argue that, even if the District Court does not have jurisdiction to review Commission orders, judicial review is nevertheless available before the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. Appellants contend that when the Virgin Islands Supreme Court was created in 2004, the Commission Act was âimplicitly or impliedlyâ amended to provide for Supreme Court review of Commission orders. (Appellantsâ Opening Br. at 16.) In support of their argument, Appellants cite section 1613a(d) of the ROA, which states, â[ujpon the establishment of the appellate court provided for in section 1611(a) of this title[,] all appeals from the decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands established by local law not previously taken must be taken to that appellate court.â 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d). According to Appellants, that provision of the ROA shifts responsibility for the review of local court decisions and Commission orders from the District Court to the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.
Appellants bolster their argument by directing us to the process that the Legislature recently established for the removal of Justices of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court.
Pursuant to title 4 V.I.C. chapter 36, a justice of the Supreme Court shall be involuntarily retired from office when the Commission on Judicial Disabilities determines that the justice suffers from a mental or physical disability, including habitual intemperance, which prevents, or seriously interferes with, the proper performance of his judicial duties, and the Commission files in the Supreme Court an order of involuntary retirement and the order is affirmed on appeal or the time within which an appeal may be taken from the order has expired.
The argument is not without persuasive force, since it may well be that the Legislature intended Commission orders regarding Superior Court judges to be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. But the fact remains that there is simply no legislation saying that. The Commission Act itself unambiguously charges the District Court with that task. For us to read the language otherwise or to conclude that the Commission Act has been âimplicitly or impliedlyâ amended would be to legislate from the bench, a task we have neither the authority nor the inclination to undertake.
2. Lack of Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims
One consequence of the lack of opportunity for judicial review of Commission decisions is that there is not a meaningful chance for a judge under investigation to raise federal claims. Such an opportunity is a necessity under the third prong of the Younger test for abstention. Even if the Commission permitted a judge to advance federal claims â and it is not clear it would â that would not be adequate because, again, without judicial review, the local administrative process alone is not a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims. Cf. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 433; Ohio Civil Rights Commân, 477 U.S. at 627 (recognizing that Younger abstention may be appropriate when there are ongoing state administrative proceedings, âso long as in the course of those proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his constitutional claimâ).
We have previously noted that âthe third part of the [Younger] test âis satisfied in the context of a state administrative proceeding when the federal claimant can assert his constitutional claims during state-court judicial review of the administrative determination.â â Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting OâNeill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 792 (3d Cir. 1994)). An implication of that holding, which we embrace now, is that the absence of judicial review of federal claims means the third part of the Younger test has not been satisfied.
B. Validity of the Act
Having concluded that the District Court rightly refused to abstain, we now turn to the Courtâs decision that the Commission Act violates the separation of powers principle inherent in the ROA.
The Constitution grants Congress the authority to âmake all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.â U.S. CONST, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Pursuant to that authority, Congress passed the ROA, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541 et seq., which, as we have noted, serves as the Constitution of the Virgin Islands. See Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032, 28 V.I. 345 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The ROA divides the power to govern the territory between a legislative branch, 48 U.S.C. § 1571, an executive branch, id. § 1591, and a judicial branch, id. § 1611. By organizing the government in that manner, Congress âimplicitly incorporated the principle of separation of powers into the law of the territory.â Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 465, 37 V.I. 464 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 48 S. Ct. 480, 72 L. Ed. 845 (1928), the Supreme Court dealt with an analogous situation. It reviewed the Philippine Organic Act and noted how that act embedded the separation of powers in the territorial government of the Philippines. Id. at 199-202 (1928). The Court then articulated the practical effect of the separation of powers principle:
It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the Legislature cannot exercise either*1035 executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power.
Id. at 201-02. In short, the separation of powers principle prohibits any branch of government from exercising powers that are reserved for the other branches, unless such an exercise is âexpressly provided or incidental to the powersâ that a branch necessarily has.
The question then becomes whether there is a basis in the ROA, either express or as incidental to a grant of power, for the Legislature to regulate the conduct of judges. The Appellants, of course, say there is. They note that, in the ROA, Congress authorized the Legislature of the Virgin Islands to create local courts. 48 U.S.C. § 1611(a), (b). In the same section, Congress addressed the power to promulgate rules governing those courts:
The rules governing the practice and procedure of the courts established by local law and those prescribing the qualifications and duties of the judges and officers thereof, oaths and bonds, and the times and places of holding court shall be governed by local law or the rules promulgated by those courts.
Id. § 1611(c). Appellants contend that the power to prescribe the qualifications and duties of the judges encompasses the power to remove judges from the bench.
We think, however, that their proposed construction of that provision stretches the statutory language beyond its natural and intended meaning. While the ROA does grant the Legislature the authority to prescribe the qualifications of judges, which the Legislature has done,
Moreover, we think it extremely doubtful that Congress, in developing the ROA, would ignore that the power to remove officers from a coordinate branch of government is expressly established in the United States Constitution, see, e.g., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (âThe House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole power of impeachment.â); Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (âThe Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.â); Art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (âludgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States . . . .â), and is not simply left to inference or presumption. We believe Congress would have followed that pattern or otherwise been plain about its intention, had it meant for the Virgin Islands Legislature, operating under a regime of separated powers, to have authority to remove judges.
Appellants next argue that the Legislature did not violate the principle of separation of powers in establishing the Commission because the Commission itself is part of the judicial branch. Even if inconsistent with the rest of their arguments about the exercise of legislative power, that contention at least has the merit of being in tune with the widespread understanding that the authority to discipline judges is fundamentally a
In the ROA, Congress explicitly granted the judicial power of the Virgin Islands to certain enumerated bodies: âThe judicial power of the Virgin Islands shall be vested in a court of record designated the âDistrict Court of the Virgin Islandsâ established by Congress, and in such appellate court and lower local courts as may have been or may hereafter be established by local law.â 48 U.S.C. § 1611(a). Pursuant to that grant of power, the Virgin Islands Legislature has created local courts and listed which entities exercise the judicial power of the Virgin Islands:
The judicial power of the Territory is vested in a court of general jurisdiction created by section 21 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, approved July 22,1954, as amended, designated the âDistrict Court of the Virgin Islandsâ, and in courts of local jurisdiction to be designated the âSuperior Court of the Virgin Islandsâ and the court of last resort established pursuant to section 21(b) of the Revised Organic Act, âThe Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.â Each court is a court of record.
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 2. Not surprisingly, since it is not a court, the Commission is not listed in either the ROA or the Virgin Islands Code as an entity that exercises judicial power.
The Commission Act itself also undercuts Appellantsâ argument by explicitly prohibiting those âwho are serving in any capacity in any court in the Virgin Islandsâ from being selected as members of the Commission. Id. § 652(a). In addition, as explained above, the Act currently provides no valid avenue for judicial review of Commission orders. Since the Commission is not a court and since judges can neither sit on the Commission nor review its findings or proceedings, it is quite plainly not a part of the judicial branch.
Because the Legislature purported to authorize the Commission to exercise the power to remove judges without itself having such power, we agree with the District Court that the Commission Act violates the separation of powers principles inherent in the ROA.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the District Court was correct to not abstain from hearing Judge Kendallâs claims and to hold that the provisions of the Act empowering the Commission to remove Superior Court judges violate the separation of powers principle of the ROA. In reaching that conclusion, we do not hold that Superior Court judges are beyond discipline or removal in the Virgin Islands. The territorial judiciary has inherent authority to regulate the conduct of its judges, the limits of which authority we do not now consider. Similarly, because the issue is not before us, we do not now consider whether the Commission Act would pass muster under the ROA if Commission orders
. Defendant and Commission member Robert OâConnor did not join in the appeal.
In his testimony at the Preliminary Injunction hearing ultimately held before the District Court, Judge Kendall spoke of the âcomplaintsâ against him as the threat to his judicial independence, but the context of his remarks indicates he was speaking of proceedings before the Commission generally rather than the complaints alone. (App. II at 63-67.)
As is more fully described herein, Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971) (â[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.â). Younger applies in the context of a territoryâs proceedings as well. See Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Younger abstention doctrine was triggered by local administrative proceedings in Puerto Rico).
As the ROA is a federal statute, the District Court had federal question jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While we review the District Courtâs decision on abstention for abuse of discretion, the underlying legal questions that determine whether the Court had discretion to abstain are subject to plenary review. IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Intâl Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2006). We also exercise plenary review over issues of statutory interpretation. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 508 F.3d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 2007).
The appellate court anticipated by the ROA was formed when the Virgin Islands Legislature provided for the establishment of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court. Pursuant to the Act of September 30, 2004, No. 6687, § 13(a), 2004 V.I. Sess. Law 190; 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d), that court now reviews all appeals from decisions of the courts of the Virgin Islands.
Endeavoring to justify the Legislatureâs effort to expand the jurisdiction of the District Court, the dissent says, âthe Legislature was simply acknowledging that, at the time of the Actâs adoption, the V.I. District Court functioned as the proper appellate tribunal over territorial courts, and was not granting the V.I. District Court power it did not already have.â Whether the District Court had appellate power over local administrative bodies, however, is a question that cannot be answered by mere assertion. The dissent cites nothing in support of its statement on this point, and the pertinent authority indicates that the District Court never had the power that the Legislature and the dissent claim for it. Again, by its terms, the ROA only grants the District Court âappellate jurisdiction over the courts of the Virgin Islands,â
Our dissenting colleague claims that, â[pjursuant to the Actâs language, and following the enactment of [the statute establishing the Virgin Islands Supreme Court], the Commission must file all orders of removal in the [Virgin Islands] Supreme Court, which must affirm any appealed orders before they become effective.â (Dissent at Part II.A.2.) That assertion, however, assumes the conclusion of the argument by taking it as given that the Commission Act was amended to provide for appeals from Commission orders to be filed in the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. It is precisely on that point that we disagree. The legislation establishing the territorial Supreme Court does not say or imply any such thing. It can certainly be argued that the legislation should have done so and that, since it does not, the Virgin Islands Legislature ought to take the matter up now, but recognizing what ought to be done does not imbue us with the power to do it. There is unquestionably a practical allure to the dissentâs approach, but the end does not justify the extraordinary means the dissent would employ. We have explained that, â[i]f the legislature has not directly amended a statute, it is only in the rarest case that a court should rule the statute amended. To do so is to rule that a statute does not mean what it plainly says.â Galvan v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 549 F.2d 281, 288, 13 V.I. 636 (3d Cir. 1977). Here the statute authorizing the Commission plainly says that Commission orders are to be reviewed by the District Court, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §656(a)(2)(C), and that is all it says on the matter. The statute creating the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands is likewise entirely silent about appeals from the Commission. On this record, we are not persuaded that this is one of those rarest of cases in which an amendment can be said to be implicit.
Nor have our earlier precedents taken the step urged by the dissent. Citing Walker v. Govât of the V.I., 230 F.3d 82, 43 V.I. 265 (3d Cir. 2000), our dissenting colleague declares that âwe have previously encountered the issue of implicit repeal of the V.I. District Courtâs jurisdiction as a result of the creation of the V. I. Superior Courtâ and suggests that we are revisiting that issue today because this case presents an âanalogous context.â (Dissent at n.A.2.) But neither Walker nor any other case has ever confronted the question of whether the legislation creating the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands impliedly gave that Court
Ultimately then, while the dissent indicates it is eschewing a meddling in Virgin Islands affairs, we think ours is the more restrained approach. Rather than declaring what we think the Virgin Islands Legislature must have meant, even though it did not say it, we leave it to the Government of the Virgin Islands, through its elected representatives, to decide how appeals from the Commission should be handled.
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 72, which bears the heading âSelection, appointment, qualifications and salaries of judges,â states as follows:
(a) The judges of the Superior Court shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislature. Judges so appointed shall continue in office until their successors are appointed and confirmed or until they are renominated and confirmed, but in no event shall judges remain in office more than 120 days after the expiration of their terms unless they have been renominated and confirmed.
(b) To be eligible for nomination for appointment as a judge of the Superior Court, a person must be a member in good standing of the Virgin Islands Bar and shall have been engaged in the active practice of law for not less than five years immediately prior to his*1036 nomination, of which not less than three years shall have been in the Virgin Islands and for appointment as a judge in the Family Court Division, the person must also meet the qualifications established in section 171(c).
(c) The judges of the Superior Court shall be officers of the Government of the Virgin Islands â No judgeâs compensation shall be reduced during his term of office without his consent.
Citing to Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d at 466, Appellants argue that the authority to discipline judges may be shared between the judiciary and the legislature. In Magras, we stated that the ROA âenvisions the possibility of the sharing of power over the regulation of attorneys between the Virgin Islands courts and the Virgin Islands legislature, at least to the extent of imposing a license fee.â Id. Magras does not suggest, however, that the legislature and the judiciary share overlapping powers to discipline judges. To the contrary, our holding in Magras was based in part on our determination that the attorney licensing scheme posed a minimal interference on the judiciary â s power to regulate attorneys. Id. at467. We recognized that our outcome may have been different if the challenged action was one which permitted the legislature to âdisbar a delinquent attorney or to regulate his professional practice, judgment, or activity.â Id. at465. Our holding in Magras thus does not contemplate the legislature having authority to discipline attorneys, much less its having authority to discipline judges.
We are careful to distinguish here between purely legislative functions and special checks and balances which an organic document may entrust to the legislature. So, for example, as we have previously noted, the impeachment powers that Congress wields are expressly granted by the United States Constitution and are not incidental to Congressâs legislative functions.