Hagan v. Rogers

OPINION OF THE COURT

The central question before this Court is whether it is clear and manifest that Congress, through the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995, intended to remove prisoners from the definition of “Persons” permitted to join claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. We answer this question in the negative.

Appellants are fourteen state inmates of the Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center in Avenel, New Jersey (“ADTC”). The prisoners jointly filed a single complaint, on behalf of themselves and a purported class, alleging that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. The prisoners requested in forma pauper-is (“IFP”) status and the appointment of counsel. Before the Defendants had been served, the District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed thirteen of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding that prisoners were barred from permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 (“Rule 20”) The Court also denied class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”). Appellants challenge both decisions on appeal.

This appeal presents several issues. First, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying joinder, and if so, whether IFP prisoners are barred from Rule 20 joinder as a matter of law. We are also *150asked to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s denial of class certification, and if so, whether the denial was proper.

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying joinder, and that IFP prisoners are not categorically barred from joining as plaintiffs under Rule 20. Furthermore, filing fees should be assessed against any plaintiff permitted to join under Rule 20 as though each prisoner was proceeding individually. Finally, we elect to exercise jurisdiction over the class certification question, and conclude that the District Court’s explanation for denying certification was inadequate. We will accordingly remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

Appellants filed a single pro se complaint on October 20, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, against officials associated with the ADTC, a state facility for the detention and treatment of convicted sex offenders. The prisoners allege that the Defendants violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to address the threat of a serious and undiagnosed contagious skin disease, possibly scabies, spreading through the facility. Appellants also moved to certify a class of all persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The prisoners requested IFP status and applied for the appointment of counsel.

Before Defendants had been served, the District Court issued an order sua sponte on January 25, 2007, dismissing without prejudice all Plaintiffs, except Lewis Hagan, upon concluding that permissive joinder was unavailable to IFP prisoner litigants. The Court suggested that Rule 20 joinder may be preempted by certain provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”). Pub.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (Apr. 26, 1996). The Court was also persuaded by the reasoning of other district courts that had determined that general circumstances of incarceration render joint prisoner litigation impractical. The Court did not discuss whether the Plaintiffs satisfied the basic requirements of joinder under the Rule, nor did it identify any circumstances of incarceration that rendered Plaintiffs’ joinder impractical. The Court ordered a new case to be opened for each dismissed Plaintiff, and gave each prisoner 30 days to file an amended complaint in order to proceed individually. The Court deferred consideration of the requests for IFP status and for the appointment of counsel pending the filing of the amended complaints.

In the same sua sponte order, the District Court also denied Appellants’ motion to proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). The Court identified concerns regarding the typicality of the named Plaintiffs’ claims and the prisoners’ disparate factual circumstances, particularly with regard to medical needs and injury. The Court also reasoned that a pro se prisoner litigant could not represent a class of fellow inmates.

None of the Plaintiffs filed amended complaints within the requisite 30 days, but all joined in appealing to this Court for review of both the joinder and class certification rulings. On February 1, 2007, Appellants also filed a motion to stay all action relating to the District Court’s January 25 order, and asserted their belief that the Court’s applications of Rules 20 and 23 were incorrect. On May 4, 2007, after the original 30-day period for amendment had expired, the District Court granted a stay and stated in its order that Appellants would have 30 days to file *151amended complaints after we completed our review of their appeal.

We assigned counsel as amicus curiae on behalf of Appellants and asked counsel to address the following questions: (1) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying joinder; (2) if so, whether prisoners are barred from Rule 20 joinder as a matter of law; (3) if prisoners are not barred from permissive joinder, how court fees should be assessed among the joint plaintiffs; and (4) whether the District Court improperly denied class certification. Although Defendants have not yet been served, we invited the Attorney General of New Jersey to similarly respond to these questions through an amicus brief, and she has done so. We address each of the questions presented below.

II. Rule 20 Joinder

A. Jurisdiction

Appellants seek review of the District Court’s order denying joinder and dismissing all claimants except Hagan without prejudice, and with leave to amend. The only arguable basis for this Court to review the decision is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which authorizes appellate jurisdiction over final orders of the district courts. Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 667 (3d Cir.1991). “A final order is one that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ ” Id. at 668 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)).

While an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is normally not final within the meaning of § 1291, “a dismissal with leave to amend will be treated as a final order if the plaintiff has elected to stand upon the original complaint.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted). Appellants argue that the order was final because the prisoners chose to stand on their initial complaint, rather than filing amended complaints to proceed individually. Respondents counter that the prisoners did not stand on their complaint because they requested and received a stay of the District Court’s order pending the resolution of this appeal.

We cannot discern from our prior cases a clear rule for determining when a party has elected to stand on his or her complaint. In Frederico, we determined that a plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint where at no time during the proceedings did she seek to correct the purported pleading deficiencies, but instead repeatedly asserted that her complaint was sufficient as filed. Id. at 192. In Batoff v. State Farm Insurance Co., 977 F.2d 848 (3d Cir.1992), we determined that we had jurisdiction when a plaintiff did not amend his dismissed complaint within the 30 days allotted by the district court. Id. at 851 n. 5. We were also satisfied that certain plaintiffs in Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024 (3d Cir.1991), elected to stand on their dismissed claims after they renounced, by letter briefs filed with this Court, any intention to reinstitute proceedings against the defendants at issue. Id. at 1031.

There is no question that none of the prisoners amended their complaints within the 30 days ordered by the District Court. All of the Plaintiffs joined the instant appeal, and there is no evidence that any ever wavered from their argument that they should be permitted to join under Rule 20. These circumstances indicate that the Appellants stand on their initial complaint, as had the plaintiffs in Frederico and Batojf. A potentially distinguishing aspect of this case is that the Appellants *152sought, and the District Court granted, a stay of its January 25 order that apparently would preserve the rights of Appellants to proceed individually if they lost on the Rule 20 issue here. Although none of the Appellants filed amended complaints within 30 days of the order, they all joined in requesting a stay of that order on February 1, 2007.

Yet the District Court did not grant the stay until May 4, 2007, long after the 30 days afforded to the Plaintiffs had expired. From the expiration of the dismissal order granting leave to amend until the grant of the stay, the Plaintiffs were in the same position as the plaintiff in Batoff. If they were not intent on staking their claims on the fate of this appeal, they would have been expected to file amended complaints as the deadline neared, in the absence of a ruling on the requested stay. After the 30 days expired, the subsequent issuance of the stay—which included a further right to amend-—was a fortuitous development outside of their control. We are persuaded that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated their intent to stand on their original complaint.

Moreover, by requesting the stay, Appellants were squarely stating their opposition to District Court’s interpretation of Rule 20, and their desire to proceed jointly. The Court’s invitation to the prisoners to amend and proceed individually directly contradicted their position on appeal. This situation is different from a typical dismissal with leave to amend where the amendment could cure a particular pleading flaw or failure. This is also different from a typical joinder situation in which a court might grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint in order to add plaintiffs. See Michelson v. Citicorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.1998). Here, the District Court effectively ruled the joint complaint legally inadequate, and subsequent individual pleading by Appellants would have effectively conceded the joinder issue. This should be viewed as the type of situation where jurisdiction exists under § 1291 because there is nothing a plaintiff can do to cure the defect in a dismissed complaint. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.1995). The District Court’s ruling foreclosed further joint action, and Plaintiffs could do nothing to cure this purported defect.

For these reasons, we conclude that we have jurisdiction under § 1291.

B. Rule 20 and IFP Prisoner Litigants

Appellants argue that the District Court erred in concluding that prisoners were categorically barred from joining as plaintiffs under Rule 20. Amicus for Respondents contends that the District Court interpreted Rule 20 correctly, in light of certain provisions of the PLRA, and in consideration of the unique circumstances of incarceration. We conclude that nothing in the PLRA demonstrates that Congress intended to alter the plain language of Rule 20, and that conditions of incarceration should not be considered in disregarding the unambiguous language of the Rule. Accordingly, prisoner litigants may not be categorically precluded from joining as plaintiffs under Rule 20.

A district court’s order severing parties for failure to satisfy the joinder requirements of Rule 20 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir.1997). A district court abuses its discretion when “its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court’s order denying joinder was not *153based on any findings regarding the particular plaintiffs in the case or the parameters of Rule 20 itself. Instead, the Court concluded that the prisoners were barred from joinder in light of certain statutory provisions and general circumstances of incarceration. Thus, the operative question is whether the District Court based its order on an erroneous conclusion of law.

The language of Rule 20 that is pertinent to this matter is plain and unambiguous:

Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:

(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(1). For courts applying Rule 20 and related rules, “the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 388 U.S. 715, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Rule 20 permits “the joinder of a person who has some interest in an action ..., even when that interest is not so strong as to require his joinder” under Rule 19. Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293, 299 (3d Cir.1980). Nothing in the plain language of the Rule indicates that prisoners are excluded as “persons” permitted to join as plaintiffs.

The District Court did not apply Rule 20 by determining whether Appellants’ claims arise from “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrenees,” or whether there was “any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(1).1 Instead, the Court relied on arguments raised by other courts suggesting that prisoners are categorically excluded from Rule 20. These arguments fall into two general categories: (1) With the enactment of the PLRA, Rule 20 has effectively been modified to exclude prisoner litigants; and (2) characteristics of prison populations render prison litigants ill-suited for Rule 20 joinder. We address these arguments in turn.

1. Rule 20 and the PLRA

The two provisions of the PLRA that have troubled other courts in the context of joinder of claims are codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1915(g). Section 1915(b) provides that “if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” § 1915(b)(1). Payment of the full fee may be spread over a number of monthly payments. § 1915(b)(2). Respondents argue that collecting full fees from multiple joint litigants to comply with § 1915(b)(1) would conflict with § 1915(b)(3), which provides, “In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action or an appeal of a civil action or criminal judgment.” § 1915(b)(3).

Section 1915(g) limits the availability of IFP status to prisoners through a “three strike” rule, which provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior *154occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

§ 1915(g). A district court is obligated to dismiss a case sua sponte upon finding it, inter alia, frivolous or malicious, or that it fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2):

The District Court did not expressly decide that there was a conflict between § 1915(b) and Rule 20, but referred to tensions between the provisions identified by other courts. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1915(b)(1) preempted Rule 20 as to IFP prison litigants in Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir.2001). The court reasoned that, by plainly requiring each IFP prisoner to pay the full filing fee, § 1915(b)(1) repealed Rule 20 joinder as to IFP prisoner litigants. Id. at 1198. The court was persuaded by Congress’s desire to deter frivolous suits, and the recognition by other courts that excessive prisoner litigation presented a problem. Id.

However, decisions from the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are at odds with Hubbard. In a sua sponte administrative order addressing the effects of the PLRA, the Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit ordered that filing fees are to be divided among prisoner litigants choosing to join in suits, thus indicating that prisoners were not barred from doing so. In re Prison Litigation Reform Act., 105 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (6th Cir.1997). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit engaged in a more thorough analysis when it reversed a district court’s interpretation of Rule 20 in Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir.2004). The court considered the same two concerns that District Court considered here—namely, that joinder of claims in the context of prisoner litigation presents unique challenges, and that joinder could undermine § 1915 if prisoners were permitted to split fees or avoid strikes. Id. at 854. However, the court stated:

It does not follow that § 1915 has superseded Rule 20. The PLRA does not mention Rule 20 or joint litigation. Repeal by implication occurs only when the newer rule is logically incompatible with the older one. And there is no irreconcilable conflict between Rule 20 and the PLRA: Joint litigation does not relieve prisoners of any duties under the more recent statute.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

The court concluded that, while the PLRA did not preempt joinder, § 1915(b)(1) did affect the collection of fees for IFP prisoner litigants such that each prisoner must pay the full individual fee. Id. at 855-56. The court also determined that, reading the PLRA and Rule 20 together, § 1915(g) would require joint litigants to be held' liable for strikes against their co-plaintiffs claims. The court articulated no concern that § 1915(g) conflicts with Rule 20 joinder. Rather, “[w]hen claims are related enough to be handled together, they are related enough for purposes of § 1915(g).” Id. at 855.

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Boriboune is compelling. The PLRA did not alter the text of Rule 20, or make any reference to the Rule. Lacking such an express reference, the only way to conclude that the PLRA altered Rule 20 would be to determine that the later statute repealed the Rule by implication as to prisoner litigants. This requires more than mere tension in applying the later law’s provisions to the earlier. “[R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not *155be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.” National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 2532, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict, or where the latter act covers the whole subject area of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273, 123 S.Ct. 1429, 155 L.Ed.2d 407 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Since the PLRA does not even address permissive joinder, much less ¿over the whole subject area, we cannot conclude that the later statute repealed Rule 20 unless the two provisions are in irreconcilable conflict. In interpreting the later statute, “[w]e will not infer a statutory repeal unless ... such a construction is absolutely necessary in order that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all.” National Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S.Ct. at 2532 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

The plain language of § 1915(b)(1) can be read in complete harmony with Rule 20 by requiring each joined prisoner to pay the full individual fee. As the Seventh Circuit reasoned, taking “§ 1915(b)(1) at face value,” the requirement for each prisoner to pay a full fee is simply one price that a prisoner must pay for IFP status under the PLRA. Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 856.2

Such an interpretation can also be read in harmony with § 1915(b)(3), which provides that “[i]n no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of fees permitted by statute for the commencement” of a civil action or appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3). Section 1915(b)(3) must be read in the context of § 1915(b) as a whole. Section 1915(b)(1) provides that a court must ultimately collect a full filing fee from a prisoner, and, where possible, must collect an initial portion of the fee up front. Section 1915(b)(2) establishes procedures by which a prisoner shall make monthly payments against the balance of the fee. Read in sequence, common sense indicates that § 1915(b)(3) merely ensures that an IFP prisoner’s fees, when paid by installment, will not exceed the standard individual filing fee paid in full. Nothing in § 1915(b) mentions joinder or indicates that Congress intended § 1915(b)(3) to serve as a bar to the collection of multiple individual fees from individual plaintiffs in a joint litigation.3 Reading the PLRA as requiring each joined IFP litigant to pay a full individual filing fee by installment, and no more, harmonizes the PLRA with Rule *15620, and internally harmonizes the various provisions of § 1915(b).

We are merely called upon in this case to determine how two laws should operate together. The two laws at issue accomplish independent and complementary purposes, which can and should coexist. As the Seventh Circuit noted, “[j]oint litigation does not relieve prisoners of any duties under the more recent statute.” Boriboune, 391 F.3d at 854. The application of repeal by implication would undermine congressional goals. Moreover, it would expand repeal by implication into an everyday principle, since Congress routinely enacts legislation with provisions that do not neatly coexist with existing statutes. Sections 1915(b)(1) and (3) hardly convey a “clear and manifest” intent by Congress to repeal Rule 20, and constructing the PLRA so as to nullify Rule 20 is not “absolutely necessary.”

We think that the Seventh Circuit was correct when it observed that the “three strikes” provision of § 1915(g) is not necessarily in conflict with Rule 20. If a plaintiff desires to join with other prisoners, he could face the prospect of being responsible for the strikes of others. We disagree with the District Court in the instant action that the issue would necessarily be resolved the other way—that is, that a joint litigant will necessarily avoid a strike under § 1915(g) because a prisoner would not be charged for the dismissal of his or her claim as long as the entire case was not dismissed. The question of precisely how strikes should be assessed in a joint prisoner litigation was not before the District Court and is not before us. However, when combined with a full filing fee requirement, § 1915(g) may actually dissuade joint litigation since a court could hold that, reading the PLRA and Rule 20 together, a plaintiff is accountable for the dismissal of a co-plaintiffs claims.

Thus, we conclude that the PLRA did not repeal Rule 20 joinder as to IFP prisoner litigants. Nothing in the PLRA speaks with sufficient clarity or creates an irreconcilable conflict, and the statute cannot be deemed to exclude IFP prisoner litigants from Rule 20 joinder as a matter of law.

2. Rule 20 and Conditions of Incarceration

In addition to the purported conflicts between Rule 20 and the PLRA, the District Court also relied on general conditions faced by inmate populations to conclude that joinder was unavailable. The Court noted several difficulties in multiple-prisoner litigations that were identified by other district courts in Wasko v. Allen County Jail, 2006 WL 978956 (N.D.Ind. April 12, 2006) and Swenson v. MacDonald, 2006 WL 240233 (D.Mont. Jan.30, 2006). The difficulties identified by those courts were (1) “the need for each plaintiff to sign the pleadings, and the consequent possibilities that documents may be changes as they are circulated”; (2) “prisoners may seek to compel prison authorities to permit them to gather to discuss the joint litigation”; (3) “jail populations are notably transitory, making joint litigation difficult”; and (4) the possibility that coercion may affect the relations between the inmates. (App.12.) The District Court concluded that these considerations made “joint litigation exceptionally difficult.” (Id.) The Court did not address any considerations specific to the Plaintiffs in this action.4

*157Essentially, the District Court relied on arguments that prisoners should not be considered “persons” permitted to join under Rule 20. We do not agree. “The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like any other statute, should be given their plain meaning.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 F.3d 135, 142 n. 7 (3d Cir.2001). The Court’s “inquiry is complete if we find the text of the Rule to be clear and unambiguous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 20’s use of the term “persons” is clear and unambiguous. Nothing in the Rule itself raises any hint that prisoners should not be included within the broad definition of persons capable of joining their claim pursuant to the Rule. Thus, the District Court’s reliance on these extrinsic considerations rather than the plain language of Rule 20 was error.5

The District Court based its decision to deny joinder on an erroneous interpretation of Rule 20, and we therefore conclude that the Court abused its discretion in denying joinder to Appellants.6 Aside from correcting this error of law, however, our decision does not limit the District Court’s broad authority with regard to joinder under Rule 20, which is, after all, discretionary. In exercising its discretion, the District Court must provide a reasoned analysis that comports with the requirements of the Rule, and that is based on the specific fact pattern presented by the plaintiffs and claims before the court. It is insufficient for a court to rely on general assumptions regarding the circumstances of incarceration.

III. Class Certification

Appellants also argue that the District Court erred in denying their motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). In their complaint, Appellants claimed that inmates of the ADTC were either subject to actual skin infections, or were subject to the threat of future injury due to deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials in failing to contain the contagion. The District Court denied class certification for failure of the named Plaintiffs to meet certain requirements of Rule 23(a).

This Court has the discretion to exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal denying class certification. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(f); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir.2001). We have identified nonexclusive principles to guide our discretion, counseling us to exercise jurisdiction when denial of certification would effec*158tively terminate a litigation, create excessive pressure to settle, or reach a novel or unsettled question of law. Id. at 164. In light of the fact that this matter will be remanded for resolution of the joinder issue, we find it appropriate to exercise our jurisdiction over the class certification issue also.

We review a district court’s denial of class certification for abuse of discretion. In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir.2001). A district court abuses its discretion when “its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Danvers Motor Co., Inc., 543 F.3d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rule 23(a) provides that members of a class may only sue on behalf of a class if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder is impractical; (2) there are common questions of law or fact; (3) the claims of the representative parties are typical of the class; and (4) “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Although the District Court’s precise grounds for denying certification are not entirely clear, it appears that the Court determined that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of 23(a).

The Court stated that “the claims of the representative party may not be typical of the claims of the class” because the purported class would include inmates that suffered life-threatening injuries, and inmates that suffered no physical injuries. (App.13) The Court also reasoned that the treatment received by different members of the class could vary. “In light of the disparate factual circumstances of class members, especially the difference in regard to medical needs and injury,” the Court determined that a class action was undesirable. (Id.) Furthermore, the Court stated that a prisoner proceeding pro se could not adequately represent a class of inmates.

The District Court’s reasoning is problematic. In Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.1988), this Court ruled that a district court erred in failing to certify a class of prisoners that alleged that they were all constitutionally injured by the conditions at their facility. The Court reasoned that, with regard to typicality and commonality,

Rule 23 does not require that the representative plaintiff have endured precisely the same injuries that have been sustained by the class members, only that the harm complained of be common to the class, and that the named plaintiff demonstrate a personal interest or “threat of injury ... [that] is ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ”

Id. at 177 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)).

On the limited basis of the District Court’s brief opinion, we fail to see how the Plaintiffs in this case failed to satisfy the requirements of Hassine. Appellants alleged that all prisoners at the facility, including the named plaintiffs, were subject to the threat of an injury. The complaint squarely alleges that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by being “deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease,” and that the amendment “also protects against future harms to inmates.” (App.27.) The District Court failed to articulate why, at this early stage, this alleged threat of injury is insufficiently typical or common to allow Appellants’ action to proceed as a class.

Moreover, we do not question the District Court’s conclusion that pro se liti*159gants are generally not appropriate as class representatives. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t is plain error to permit [an] imprisoned litigant who is unassisted by counsel to represent his fellow inmates in a class action.”) However, the District Court had expressly deferred consideration of the Plaintiffs’ motion for appointment of counsel, finding that such a decision would be premature since the Defendants had not yet been served. We likewise find it premature for the District Court to conclude that Plaintiffs’ representation of the class would be inadequate before the Court decided whether to appoint counsel. For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying class certification.

IV. Conclusion

The District Court’s order denying joinder to the Appellants was based on an erroneous conclusion of law and will be REVERSED. The District Court also abused its discretion in concluding that Appellants could not proceed as a class, and the order denying class certification will be VACATED. We will REMAND the matter for further consideration consistent with this Opinion.