Martha Stringer v. County of Bucks

                                       PRECEDENTIAL

        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                  _____________

                      No. 23-1373
                     _____________

       MARTHA STRINGER; PAUL STRINGER

                            v.

 COUNTY OF BUCKS; MR. ANDREW KOVACH; KYLE
 WYLIE; JENIFER FORMAN; CRYSTAL BIEMULLER;
   CHRISTINE CUTEO; JACQUELINE TORRES; C.O.
PAGONE; C.O. HINES; C.O. STYERS; JOHN DOES 1-20;
     C.O. MURDOCH; LANGSTON MASON; C.O.G.
 WILLIAMS; SERGEANT MANDER; C.O. NESTER; C.O.
DUPREY; C.O. GEIBERT; C.O.A. CRUZ; C.O. SHERROD;
C.O. HUGHES; C.O. MILES; C.O. HEILMAN; SERGEANT
 GILL; LT. MORRIS; C.O. MIME; C.O. MCINTYRE; C.O.
       DEVLIN; C.O. SOUTH; SERGEANT LYNN;
                 C.O. CANTERMAN

 Mr. Andrew Kovach, Kyle Wyle, Jenifer Forman, Crystal
Biemuller, Christine Cuteo, Jacquline Torres, C.O. Pagone,
 C.O. Hines; C.O. Styers, C.O. Murdoch, Langston Mason,
  C.O. G. Williams; Sergeant Mander, C.O. Nester; C.O.
  Duprey; C.O. Geibert, C.O.A. Cruz, C.O. Sherrod, C.O.
  Hughes, C.O. Miles, C.O. Heilman; Sergeant Gill, LT.
Morris, C.O. Mine, C.O. McIntyre, C.O. Devlin, C.O. South,
             Sergeant Lynn, C.O. Canterman,
                                  Appellants
                    _______________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                (D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01525)
      District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller
                   _______________

                 Argued January 30, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges.

                  (Filed: June 18, 2025)

Kerri E. Chewning [ARGUED]
Jeffrey M. Scott
Archer & Greiner
Three Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, Suite 3500
Philadelphia, PA 19103

      Counsel for Appellants

Charles L. Becker [ARGUED]
David K. Inscho
Ruxandra M. Laidacker
Kline & Specter, PC
1525 Locust Street
19th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102

      Counsel for Appellee




                               2
                       _______________

                  OPINION OF THE COURT
                      _______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

       When hauled into federal court, state actors
undoubtedly want qualified immunity at the earliest possible
stage. But how soon is too soon? We consider in this
interlocutory appeal whether to deny a motion to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds where the complaint is sufficiently
detailed to state a claim for a constitutional violation but not
specific enough to assess whether the right was clearly
established at the time it was allegedly violated.

       In spring 2020, Plaintiffs Martha and Paul Stringer
received news that any parent would dread: Their daughter,
Kimberly, who had long struggled with severe mental illness,
had been detained after an altercation with a neighbor and was
being mistreated by the staff of the Bucks County Correctional
Facility (BCCF), where she was being held. After Kimberly
was finally transferred to a mental hospital and then released,
the Stringers sued the County of Bucks and various BCCF
corrections officers on Kimberly’s behalf, 1 alleging that the
officers’ actions—which included pepper spraying Kimberly
and subjecting her to a restraint chair—violated her Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The District
Court concluded the Stringers sufficiently pleaded a violation
of Kimberly’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and denied
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that a more

1
    Martha and Paul have power of attorney for Kimberly.




                               3
developed factual record was needed to ascertain whether the
Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

       We agree. While the Stringers’ complaint states a claim
for a violation of a constitutional right, namely, Kimberly’s
right to be free from the use of excessive force, it is not
sufficiently detailed to enable the Court to define that right
with more specificity and then assess whether that right was
clearly established, as required for qualified immunity.
Because the District Court correctly determined that
Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity is not clear
from the face of the complaint, we will affirm and remand for
limited discovery as needed for a fact-specific qualified
immunity analysis.

I.     Factual and Procedural Background

       A.     Kimberly’s Detention at BCCF

        Kimberly Stringer has long struggled with mental
illness, including bipolar disorder. In the spring of 2020, her
mental health deteriorated further, and her “worsening
paranoia” led her to hit and threaten a neighbor. App. 78. Falls
Township police officers arrested her and held her at BCCF to
await trial.

       At BCCF, Kimberly suffered greatly. According to the
amended complaint (Complaint), even though Kimberly’s
mental illness rendered her unable to comply with prison
directives, Defendants “punished” her on multiple occasions
for her noncompliance by pepper spraying her, handcuffing
her, and placing her in a restraint chair. The Complaint asserts
that Defendants used a combination of these tactics not once,
but many times, including, at a minimum, on May 6, 10, 11,




                               4
20, and 29. On May 10, Defendants allegedly put Kimberly in
the restraint chair twice in the same day: once at 10:10 AM and
again at 12:25 PM. At no time, according to the Complaint,
did Kimberly pose a threat to the guards or other inmates, nor
could she have, as she allegedly deteriorated into a catatonic
state over the course of her detention. Even as her condition
became so severe that she was moved to a cell in the Women’s
Special Housing Unit for Mental Health Inmates, Defendants
allegedly continued to pepper spray and restrain her as
punishment for noncompliance with their directives. 2

      At some point, according to the Complaint, other
inmates became so alarmed by Kimberly’s treatment that they
2
  The Complaint alleges that Sergeants Morris, Lynn, Mason,
Kovach, Wylie, and Mander, the supervisors at the jail who
authorized the use of force against Kimberly, knew that
Kimberly was unable to comply with directives from the
guards because of her mental illness—though it is unclear
when they became aware of these facts. It does not specifically
allege knowledge on the part of the other Defendants. That,
too, will require factual development on remand because,
while excessive force claims and qualified immunity defense
are evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard,
see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 

, 396–97 (2015);
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 

 (2017), “deciding whether
a use of force was objectively reasonable demands ‘careful
attention to the facts and circumstances’ relating to the
incident, as then known to the officer,” Barnes v. Felix, 

 (2025) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 

 (1989)); see Kingsley, 

 (evaluating
alleged excessive force “from the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the
time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).




                               5
managed to contact the Stringers to alert them to their
daughter’s critical condition. Kimberly’s mother, Martha,
promptly emailed the Bucks County Commissioner to ask if
her daughter had faced pepper spray, but she was assured that
was not the case. Two days later, however, a news article was
published about Kimberly’s treatment, allegedly based on
firsthand accounts of inmates who had witnessed her ordeal.
Two days after that public disclosure, Kimberly was
transferred to Norristown State Mental Hospital. By that point,
however, she allegedly had suffered pain, disfigurement, and
possible brain damage and was “cat[at]onic,” “unable to
verbally communicate[,] and nearly entirely unresponsive.”
App. 84.

       B.     District Court Proceedings

        In April 2022, Kimberly’s parents sued Bucks County
and various BCCF corrections officers in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of Kimberly’s Eighth
Amendment rights under 

. 3 Although
Plaintiffs diligently sought access to documents and videotapes
concerning Kimberly’s time at BCCF—including the
recordings of at least two “planned” uses of force that
supposedly were recorded—Defendants allegedly refused to
produce any video evidence. Plaintiffs’ initial complaint
identified certain officers by name but also included 20 John
Doe officers. In August 2022, after receiving a limited number

3
  As the District Court explained, because Kimberly was a
pretrial detainee, not a post-conviction prisoner, the Fourteenth
Amendment (as opposed to the Eighth Amendment) governed
her rights while detained. Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged
this point in Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.




                               6
of use-of-force records, the Stringers amended their Complaint
to identify the John Does. Defendants moved to dismiss on
various grounds, including failure to state a claim and qualified
immunity—an affirmative defense that shields officials from
civil liability to the extent that their conduct did not violate
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable
official would have known.

       In February 2023, the District Court granted
Defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part. 4 As relevant
to qualified immunity, the only subject of this interlocutory
appeal, the District Court concluded that the Stringers had
stated a claim for a violation of Kimberly’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from excessive force that amounts
to punishment. The Court then denied without prejudice the
remaining Defendants’ request for qualified immunity as

4
  The Court determined that, because the Stringers’ amended
claims related back to their initial complaint, it would not
dismiss the newly named defendants for the Stringers’ failure
to file within the relevant statute of limitations. In addition, the
Court declined to dismiss the excessive force and supervisory
liability claims against all individual Defendants other than
Defendant Mander, against whom the Stringers’ supervisory
liability claim was dismissed. The Court dismissed the
municipal liability claim against Bucks County because the
Stringers did not plead facts showing either that the County had
a “custom or policy” of authorizing the use of excessive force
on mentally ill prisoners or that the County failed to adequately
train or supervise its employees. Stringer v. County of Bucks,
No. 22-1525, 

, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2023)
(quoting McTernan v. City of York, 

 (3d Cir.
2009)).




                                 7
“premature” because it could not, without further factual
development, “presently determine whether it would have been
clear to any of the correctional officers that their conduct was
unlawful when interacting with Stringer.” Stringer v. County
of Bucks, No. 22-1525, 

, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 22, 2023). The Court noted that Defendants could re-raise
qualified immunity once limited discovery uncovered the facts
necessary to meaningfully assess whether they acted
reasonably in light of clearly established law. Defendants
timely appealed. 5

II.    Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

       The District Court had jurisdiction under 

 and 1343. Because qualified immunity serves as an
“immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,”
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 

 (1985), a district court’s
decision to allow discovery operates as a denial for purposes
of an interlocutory appeal, see Weimar v. County of Fayette,

 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, we have appellate

5
  In the same order denying in part Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the District Court authorized the Stringers to amend
their municipal liability claim against Bucks County and their
supervisory liability claim against Defendant Mander. After
Defendants appealed, the Stringers took advantage of that
opportunity, filing a second amended complaint. Because the
amendments did not alter the allegations against the individual
Defendants asserting qualified immunity, this appeal will
“resolve [the] disputed question” of whether they are entitled
to qualified immunity on the face of the now-operative
complaint. Roberts v. Lau, 

, 623 n.1 (3d Cir. 2024)
(alteration in original) (quoting Saint-Jean v. Palisades
Interstate Park Comm’n, 

 (3d Cir. 2022)).




                               8
jurisdiction here under the collateral order doctrine based on
the District Court’s postponement of the qualified immunity
analysis. See George v. Rehiel, 

 (3d Cir.
2013).

        We review the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds de novo, 

 and we may affirm on any basis
supported by the record, TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 

 (3d Cir. 2019). In conducting our review, we “accept all
plaintiff[s’] allegations as true and draw all inferences in [their]
favor,” George, 

 n.4, and we will not dismiss a
complaint “merely because it appears unlikely that the
plaintiff[s] can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on
the merits,” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 

(3d Cir. 2008).

III.   Discussion

        Defendants contest the District Court’s denial of
qualified immunity on several different grounds. Below we
first set out the framework for analyzing qualified immunity at
the pleading stage before turning to Defendants arguments,
specifically that (1) the lack of factual details in the Complaint
entitled them to immunity, (2) the District Court erred in
denying their request for immunity as “premature” without
fully analyzing the clearly established prong, and (3) the
District Court should have made specific qualified immunity
determinations for each individual Defendant, even at the
pleading stage.




                                 9
       A.     The Analytical Framework for Qualified
              Immunity on the Pleadings

        The doctrine of qualified immunity “balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson
v. Callahan, 

 (2009). Whether qualified
immunity can be invoked to shield an official from personal
liability turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the
official’s action, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

(1982), “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly
established’ at the time it was taken,” Anderson v. Creighton,

 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 

).

        An official sued under § 1983 for an alleged
constitutional violation is entitled to qualified immunity unless
he (1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was clearly
established when he acted. George, 738 F.3d at 571–72. For
a right to be “clearly established,” the contours of that right
“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson,

. Existing case law, in other words, must give
the official “fair warning” that his conduct is unconstitutional.
Hope v. Pelzer, 

 (2002). Typically,
analogous precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court or
a consensus of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals is
required. Clark v. Coupe, 

 (3d Cir. 2022);
Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 

 (3d Cir. 2021). Yet
broad principles of law suffice to give fair warning when an
official commits a patently “obvious” constitutional violation.
Hope, 

; Mack v. Yost, 

 (3d Cir.




                               10
2023) (quoting Schneyder v. Smith, 

 (3d Cir.
2011)); see, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 

 (2020).

        As for timing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed the importance of resolving qualified immunity “at the
earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson, 

(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 

 (1991) (per
curiam)). But even though the defense may be raised either in
a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) or in a motion for summary judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56, Rule 12(b)(6) is often “a
mismatch for immunity and almost always a bad ground for
dismissal.” Fogle v. Sokol, 

, 162 n.14 (3d Cir.
2020) (quoting Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 

, 775
(7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).

       To be sure, the first prong of the qualified immunity
analysis—whether the facts alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right—fits like a glove at the motion-to-dismiss
stage because it overlaps with a district court’s inquiry under
Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). See Kedra v. Schroeter, 

 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, a well-pleaded § 1983
complaint necessarily alleges a constitutional violation for
purposes of qualified immunity, while a complaint that fails to
plausibly plead the violation of a right does not.

       As we have repeatedly recognized, however, the second
prong of a qualified immunity analysis—whether the right
allegedly violated was “clearly established”—presents unique
difficulties at the pleading stage. See Curley v. Klem, 

 (3d Cir. 2002); Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 

 (3d Cir. 1996). That is because “the right allegedly
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity




                              11
before a court can determine if it was clearly established,”
Wilson v. Layne, 

 (1999), and defining the
right with specificity is a “fact-intensive inquiry,” Grant, 

, that “must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case,” Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 

, 300
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 

, 201
(2001)). But “qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6)
motion only when the immunity is established on the face of
the complaint,” id. at 291 (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 

 (3d Cir. 2001)), and complaints typically lack the
case-specific details needed to conduct the clearly established
analysis. Thus, it is often the case that, without more than the
complaint to go on, a court “cannot fairly tell whether a right
is obvious or squarely governed and thus clearly established by
precedent, making qualified immunity inappropriate” on a
motion to dismiss. Myers v. City of Centerville, 

 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see, e.g., Sause v. Bauer, 

, 959–60 (2018) (per curiam) (reversing the grant of
qualified immunity on a 12(b)(6) motion because factual issues
precluded resolution of the question).

        That is unsurprising given the parties’ respective burden
at the 12(b)(6) stage. Courts do not “apply a heightened
pleading standard in cases in which a defendant pleads
qualified immunity,” so a plaintiff “has no pleading burden to
anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense.”
Thomas, 463 F.3d at 289, 294. Instead, the “burden of pleading
a qualified immunity defense,” like any other affirmative
defense, “rests with the defendant.” Id. at 293. But because
plaintiffs are “no[t] obligat[ed] to plead a violation of clearly
established law in order to avoid dismissal on qualified
immunity grounds,” id., even well-pleaded complaints may not
include sufficient facts to allow a court to identify the right




                               12
with the requisite specificity, see, e.g., Russell v. Richardson,

 (3d Cir. 2018). So the fact-bound nature of
the clearly established inquiry combined with the dearth of
facts at the pleading stage makes it “difficult for a defendant to
claim qualified immunity on the pleadings before discovery
and before the parties (much less the courts)” uncover the
precise contours of the official’s conduct and the context in
which it occurred. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City
Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 

 (6th Cir. 2005)
(Sutton, J., concurring); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How
Qualified Immunity Fails, 

, 38, 53–54 (2017)
(analyzing qualified immunity cases from five districts over a
two-year period and concluding that motions to dismiss on
qualified immunity grounds are granted less than 10% of the
time).

       In such cases, the district court must deny the motion to
dismiss and seek to resolve qualified immunity at summary
judgment. That is because, when a court cannot determine on
the face of the complaint whether a “reasonable official would
have understood” that what he did violated the asserted
constitutional right, Mullenix v. Luna, 

 (2015)
(per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 

(2012)), the plaintiff “will be entitled to some discovery,”
Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301. But “[u]ntil the Rule 12(b)(6) motion
is resolved, all discovery [related to the claims subject to the
qualified immunity defense] must be stayed.” 6 Id. at 302. So
6
  This limitation on discovery does not forbid a district court
from exercising its discretion to allow discovery to proceed on
claims not subject to a qualified immunity defense while the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is pending, even if the information
sought overlaps with claims subject to a qualified immunity




                               13
before ordering any discovery, a 12(b)(6) motion on qualified
immunity grounds must be denied. 7 Of course, a district court


defense. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig.,

, 365 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litig., 

 (3d Cir. 1982).
7
  To be sure, before ruling on the motion to dismiss, a district
court has discretion to order the plaintiff to reply to the
qualified immunity defense under Rule 7(a)(7) or grant a
defendant’s motion for a more definite statement under Rule
12(e). See Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 

, 301 (3d Cir.
2006). But the more-definite-statement route is appropriate
only in the “rare case,” Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n,
Inc., 

 (3d Cir. 1967), such as in Thomas,
where (1) the “pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous” that the
defendant cannot respond with his qualified immunity defense
without prejudice to himself and (2) the requested information
is both peculiarly within the plaintiff’s knowledge and tailored
to framing the defendant’s response, 463 F.3d at 301 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)); see also 5C Charles C. Wright & Arthur
H. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1376 (“[T]he
class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion
under Rule 12(e) is quite small” because Rule 12(e)’s purpose
“is to permit litigants to procure information needed to frame a
responsive pleading, not as a substitute for discovery.”). Post-
Iqbal, such cases are even rarer because overly vague or
ambiguous complaints will not survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See
Russell v. Richardson, 

 (3d Cir. 2018)
(explaining that Rule 12(e) is not appropriate when the
complaint “is not devoid of factual allegations”); Chapman v.
Yellow Cab Coop., 

 (7th Cir. 2017). So, as
district courts have repeatedly concluded, when the complaint




                              14
may “limit the timing, sequence, frequency, and extent of that
discovery under Rule 26,” id. at 301, and “should give priority
to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified
immunity defense,” Crawford-El v. Britton, 

(1998).

        In short, “the fact-intensive nature of qualified
immunity makes it often a bad fit for Rule 12(b)(6).” Siefert v.
Hamilton County, 

 (6th Cir. 2020). And
“because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends on
the facts of the case, a complaint is generally not dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds,” Reed v.
Palmer, 

 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up), but
rather at summary judgment, 8 see Fogle, 957 F.3d at 162 n.14.


is well-pleaded, Rule 12(e) has limited utility, see, e.g., Dudley
v. Smick, 

, 528–29 (W.D. Pa. 2023);
Garanin v. City of Scranton, No. 3:19-CV-1275, 

, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2019), though they have
“broad discretion to utilize these procedures in a manner that
is useful and equitable to the parties,” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301;
Fogle v. Sokol, 

, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We
defer to the District Court to determine the best path.”).
8
  Our sister circuits have come to the same conclusion. See,
e.g., Riddick v. Barber, 

, 650 n.5 (4th Cir. 2024)
(“Qualified immunity defenses are usually not successful at
this early stage in the proceedings, where plaintiffs must
present only a claim that is plausible on its face. Instead,
qualified immunity typically is best addressed at the summary
judgment stage after the facts have been developed through
discovery.” (cleaned up)); Thompson v. Ragland, 

 (10th Cir. 2022) (“Because they turn on a fact-




                               15
       B.     Whether the District Court Erred in Denying
              Qualified Immunity

       The District Court correctly determined the Complaint
plausibly pleaded a violation of Kimberly’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to be free from objectively unreasonable
excessive force that amounts to punishment. See Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 

, 397–98 (2015). So under our
analytical framework for analyzing qualified immunity at the
12(b)(6) stage, Defendants are entitled to dismissal only if they
can show, based on the pleadings alone, that this right was
neither clearly established nor obvious. 9 Leveto, 258 F.3d at

bound inquiry, ‘qualified immunity defenses are typically
resolved at the summary judgment stage’ rather than on a
motion to dismiss.” (quoting Thomas v. Kaven, 

 (10th Cir. 2014))); Reed v. Palmer, 

(7th Cir. 2018); Keates v. Koile, 

 (9th Cir.
2018); Wesley v. Campbell, 

 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“[I]t is generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity.”); Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 

 (1st
Cir. 2010) (“It is not always possible to determine before any
discovery has occurred whether a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity.”); McKenna v. Wright, 

(2d Cir. 2004) (concluding “that a qualified immunity defense
. . . faces a formidable hurdle when advanced on [a 12(b)(6)]
motion”).
9
  Defendants argue they also win on “the first prong” because
the Complaint did not plead “facts which demonstrate that each
. . . Defendant violated Ms. Stringer’s clearly established
constitutional rights.” Opening Br. 25, 28 (emphasis added).
But that conflates the two prongs of qualified immunity. Prong




                               16
161 (“Qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion
only when the immunity is established on the face of the
complaint.” (cleaned up)). Defendants concur with the District
Court that the Complaint is not sufficiently specific to make
this fact-bound determination. Yet they offer three other
arguments for why they should prevail. None passes muster.

        First, Defendants contend that “the lack of requisite
factual detail” precluding a meaningful analysis of the clearly
established prong “requires a finding of qualified immunity.”
Opening Br. 17, 24 (emphasis added). In their view, “if the
District Court could not discern whether it would have been
clear to [them] that using a restraint chair and [pepper] spray
on a[] . . . mentally ill pretrial detainee violated a clearly
established constitutional right, then qualified immunity must
be found and the motion to dismiss granted.” Id. at 16. But
this argument flips our precedent on its head.

        Because “the burden of pleading qualified immunity
rests with the defendant, not the plaintiff,” Thomas, 463 F.3d
at 293, an “absence of detailed factual allegations supporting a
plaintiff’s claim for relief under § 1983 does not . . . establish
defendants’ immunity,” id. at 289. Instead, as “qualified
immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the
immunity is established on the face of the complaint,” id. at
291, a defendant cannot carry his burden where, as here, a
complaint makes out a violation of a constitutional right but is


one is satisfied whenever a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a
general constitutional violation under Rule 8(a)(2): There is no
daylight between the first prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry and a 12(b)(6) analysis. See Thomas, 463 F.3d at 295;
Kedra v. Schroeter, 

 (3d Cir. 2017).




                               17
not specific enough to assess whether the right at issue was
clearly established when the event occurred, see id. at 293.

        Defendants’ second argument is simply the flip side of
the same coin. They challenge the District Court’s conclusion
that the clearly established inquiry was premature and that the
Court was “obligated” to conduct a “[f]ull,” detailed qualified
immunity analysis before denying their motion to dismiss.
Opening Br. 17, 19. That argument, however, conflates the
standard for dismissal at the pleading stage with that at
summary judgment.

       We ourselves have repeatedly stated that resolution of a
qualified immunity defense is “premature when there are
unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity
analysis.” Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 

 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 

 (3d Cir. 2005)); Phillips, 

 n.7; Curley, 

; see also Kovats v. Rutgers, 

, 1313–
14 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a qualified immunity
determination was “premature” when the “legal issues [were]
inextricably intertwined with the factual issues” and “there has
been no discovery on th[ose] factual issues”). And discovery
related to the claims against which qualified immunity is
asserted is not permitted “[u]ntil the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
resolved.” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 302. So when the clearly
established inquiry “is not possible” at the pleading stage
without a more developed factual record, a district court must
reject qualified immunity as “premature,” deny the motion to




                               18
dismiss, and proceed with at least limited discovery. Schrob v.
Catterson, 

 (3d Cir. 1991). 10

        That is precisely what occurred when the District Court
concluded Defendants’ request for qualified immunity was
“premature” because it could not, without further factual
development, “determine whether it would have been clear to
any of the [Defendants] that their conduct was unlawful when
interacting with Stringer.” Stringer, 

, at *5
n.7. Even Defendants concede that a proper analysis of the
second prong was “impossible” because the Complaint lacks
vital “facts” and “details” needed to understand the specifics of
what happened in BCCF, Opening Br. 21–22, including
whether the use of force or restraint chair was punitive or done
for the security of the prison or Kimberly’s safety, how long
she was confined to the restraint chair or pepper sprayed, and
whether she was a danger to herself.

       Such factual questions must be answered before we—
or the District Court—can define the right with appropriate
specificity and reach “the crucial question” at the core of the
qualified immunity analysis: “whether the [Defendants] acted
reasonably in the particular circumstances that [they] faced.”
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 

 (2014) (emphasis
added). And specificity is “especially important” in excessive-
force cases, Mullenix, 

, because the
“reasonab[leness] of force often hinges on the details of an

10
   See also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 

(4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Fundamentally, a court is entitled
to have before it a proper record, sufficiently developed
through discovery proceedings, to accurately assess any claim,
including one of immunity.”); Giragosian, 

.




                               19
individual case,” Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 

 (3d Cir. 2021). Here, for example, when Kimberly was
not responding to the directives of the guards, was she actively
resisting or merely non-compliant? See Goodwin v. City of
Painesville, 

 (6th Cir. 2015). Did she “pose
a threat to [her]self or others” each time she was placed in the
restraint chair? Young v. Martin, 

 (3d Cir.
2015). If she did, for how long was she handcuffed and
restrained, and did she remain in this state even after she no
longer posed a threat? Why was she pepper-sprayed and for
how long? What prior knowledge of her condition did each
Defendant have when they took the alleged actions? Put
simply, Defendants’ immunity defense cannot be resolved
without some discovery, so the District Court properly denied
the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and indicated it would
consider qualified immunity at summary judgment. 11

       Defendants next argue that the District Court erred by
failing to conduct a qualified immunity analysis for each
individual Defendant based on his specific conduct. At the
pleading stage, however, the Stringers only needed to state a
claim as to each individual Defendant for a constitutional
violation, and the complaint alleges that all Defendants either
authorized or engaged in conduct that amounted to excessive
force—including pepper spraying Kimberly, handcuffing her,
and placing her in a restraint chair for an indeterminate amount
of time. At this stage, we must accept these allegations as true,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Kedra,

. And while discovery may allow the District

11
   Defendants acknowledged at oral argument that a more
definite statement would be unhelpful in this case, and, upon
remand, that limited discovery would be the best path forward.




                               20
Court to differentiate between the Defendants claiming
immunity, see Grant, 98 F.3d at 122–23; Rouse v. Plantier, 

 (3d Cir. 1999), the Court was within its
discretion to postpone that decision until that discovery was
obtained. 12

       In sum, because “resolution of the qualified immunity
of [Defendants] is not possible” until “the record is . . .
expanded,” the District Court “correctly determined that
dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion in this case was premature and
that the case would be better decided on summary judgment.”
Schrob, 

. We “express no opinion” on the
objective reasonableness of Defendants’ actions because the
District Court “is in a better position to resolve these issues on
a motion for summary judgment after supplementation of the
record.” 

 Instead, “[b]ecause the record before us is
insufficient for determination of [Defendants’] claim of
qualified immunity, . . . we will remand to the district court for
further development of the record” with respect to that defense.
Brown v. United States, 

 (3d Cir. 1988).

IV.    Conclusion

       For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
order denying the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity
grounds without prejudice and remand with instructions for the
District Court to conduct limited discovery tailored to
uncovering those facts needed to rule on Appellants’ immunity
defense.
12
   Although two video recordings of Defendants’ encounters
with Kimberly allegedly exist, the Defendants allegedly have
refused to turn over those recordings and other recordings
requested by Kimberly’s parents.




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