Yajure Hurtado

Cite as 

 (BIA 2025)                                Interim Decision #4125




    Matter of Jonathan Javier YAJURE HURTADO, Respondent
                            Decided September 5, 2025
                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

  Based on the plain language of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 

(b)(2)(A) (2018), Immigration Judges lack authority to hear bond
requests or to grant bond to aliens who are present in the United States without admission.
FOR THE RESPONDENT: Gabriel Harrison, Esquire, Bellingham, Washington
FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY:                           Cassidy A. Cloninger,
Associate Legal Advisor
BEFORE: Board Panel: HUNSUCKER and MONTANTE, Appellate Immigration
Judges; MCCLOSKEY, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge.
HUNSUCKER, Appellate Immigration Judge:


    The respondent, a native and citizen of Venezuela, appeals from the
Immigration Judge’s April 18, 2025, order denying his request for a
redetermination of his custody status. 1 The Immigration Judge determined
that he lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s bond request because the
respondent was subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 

(b)(2) (2018)
and, in the alternative, that the respondent is a flight risk. 2 This case presents
an issue that the Board has not previously addressed in a precedential
decision—the Immigration Judge’s authority to hold a bond hearing for an
alien present in the United States who has not been admitted after inspection.

       I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
   The respondent crossed the border into the United States without
inspection in November 2022 near El Paso, Texas. United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services granted him temporary protected status in 2024,

1
   Throughout the remainder of this decision, we will use the term “bond hearing” to
reference any hearing in which the Immigration Judge considers any aspect of an alien’s
detention or conditions of release.
2
   On April 30, 2025, the Immigration Judge issued a written memorandum in support of
the bond order.
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but that status expired on April 2, 2025. The respondent was apprehended
by immigration officials, and on April 8, 2025, the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) issued a notice to appear charging the respondent as
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 

(a)(6)(A)(i) (2018), for being “[a]n alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any
time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.”

    The respondent requested a bond hearing before the Immigration Judge.
At the hearing, the Immigration Judge determined he had no jurisdiction to
set bond under the facts of the respondent’s case. Alternatively, the
Immigration Judge stated he would have denied bond because the respondent
is a flight risk. The respondent timely appealed to the Board.

   On July 18, 2025, the Board issued a request for supplemental briefing,
asking the parties to specifically address whether the Immigration Judge has
the authority to conduct a bond hearing for an alien who is present in the
United States without admission. Both parties filed supplemental briefs.

     II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
    We review de novo whether an Immigration Judge has the authority to
consider the bond request of an alien who entered the United States without
admission and who has been present in the United States for at least 2 years.
See 

(d)(3)(i) (2025). The authority of an Immigration
Judge to adjudicate any matter, including a request for a bond, is limited to
the authority that is delegated to the Immigration Judge by the INA and the
Attorney General through regulation. 3 See 

(b) (2025); see
also Matter of A-W-, 

 (BIA 2009); Matter of D-J-, 

 (A.G. 2003).


3
    The authority of an Immigration Judge to consider a bond request is impacted by legal
authorities which generally define that authority in the negative. For example, the
Immigration Judge is without authority to conduct a custody redetermination hearing for
aliens in exclusion proceedings. See 

(h)(2)(i)(A) (2025). An
Immigration Judge is also without authority to conduct a custody redetermination hearing
for an arriving alien, including an alien paroled after arrival pursuant to section 212(d)(5)
of the INA, 

(d)(5). See 

(h)(2)(i)(B); see also Matter of
Oseiwusu, 

 (BIA 1998). Various other sections of the INA and the
regulations further prohibit the Immigration Judge from considering custody
redetermination under certain circumstances. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A),

(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A); INA § 236(c), 

(c) (West
2025); 

(b)(1), 1003.19(h)(1)(i)(A)–(E) (2025).
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                         A. Detention Under Section 235

   The inspection, detention, and removal of aliens who have not been
admitted is governed by section 235 of the INA, 

. There,
Congress defined an applicant for admission as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States
(whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is
brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or
United States waters).” INA § 235(a)(1), 

(a)(1).

    Under section 235, Congress created three different categories of
applicants for admission. The first two categories are covered by
section 235(b)(1)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(1)(A). They include:
(1) arriving aliens inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or 212(a)(7),

(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and (2) aliens not admitted or paroled into
the United States who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C) or
212(a)(7), 

(a)(6)(C), (a)(7), and “who ha[ve] not
affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that [they]
ha[ve] been physically present in the United States continuously for the
2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of
inadmissibility.”        INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II), 

(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II); see also 

(b)(1) (2025). The INA
explicitly requires that aliens who fall into either of these two categories are
subject to mandatory detention for the duration of their immigration
proceedings.       See INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV), 

(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii)(IV); see also 

(b)(2)(iii). Thus, an
Immigration Judge lacks authority to hear a bond request filed by an
applicant for admission in either of these two categories. See Matter of M-S-,

, 515–19 (A.G. 2019).

    The third category of applicants for admission subject to the inspection,
detention, and removal procedures set forth in section 235 of the INA,

, are those aliens who are seeking admission and who an
immigration officer has determined are “not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 

(b)(2)(A).
This category is a “catchall provision that applies to all applicants for
admission not covered by [section 235(b)(1)].” Jennings v. Rodriguez,

 (2018). Like with the first two categories of applicants
for admission, the INA explicitly requires that this third “catchall” category
of applicants for admission be mandatorily detained for the duration of their



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immigration proceedings. 4       See INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 

(b)(2)(A); see also Jennings, 

 (interpreting the “plain
meaning” of sections 235(b)(1) and (2) to mean that applicants for admission
be mandatorily detained for the duration of their immigration proceedings);

(b)(1)(ii).

                           B. Detention Under Section 236

    Section 236 of the INA, 

 (West 2025), provides
additional direction for the apprehension and detention of aliens “pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” INA
§ 236(a), 

(a). Section 236 “generally governs the process
of arresting and detaining” aliens who are deportable under section 237(a),

(a) (2018), including “aliens who were inadmissible at the
time of entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since
admission.” Jennings, 

 (citing INA § 237(a)(1), (2), 

(a)(1), (2)).

    The detention provisions of section 236, distinguish between two groups
of aliens. The first group consists of aliens arrested on a warrant issued by
DHS, who, subject to certain restrictions, may be detained or released on
bond or conditional parole. INA § 236(a), 

(a). The
regulatory provision at 

(d) (2025) authorizes Immigration
Judges to “exercise the authority in section 236 of the [INA] . . . to detain the
alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the amount of bond, if any,
under which the respondent may be released, as provided in § 1003.19 of this
chapter.” The second group of aliens identified in section 236 are certain
defined categories of “criminal aliens” subject to mandatory detention under
section 236(c) of the INA, 

(c). An Immigration Judge is
without authority to consider a bond request filed by an alien falling into this
category.

    Section 236 does not purport to overrule the mandatory detention
requirements for arriving aliens and applicants for admission explicitly set
forth in section 235(b)(1) and (2) of the INA, 

(b)(1), (2).
Thus, while an inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been

4
   While these aliens might be subject to parole by the Attorney General or DHS, that is
not an issue that the Immigration Judge has authority to consider. See INA § 212(d)(5)(A),

(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. 212.5(a) (2025) (designating who may exercise
authority to grant parole); see also Jennings, 

 (noting that the Attorney
General may grant aliens detained under sections 235(b)(1) and (b)(2) temporary parole
into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”
(quoting INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 

(d)(5)(A)).
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present in the United States for over 2 years is not subject to the expedited
removal process, the alien nevertheless “shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 240.” INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 

(b)(2)(A).

              III. APPLICATION OF THE RESPONDENT
    The issue presented on appeal is one of statutory construction: Does the
INA require that all applicants for admission, even those like the respondent
who have entered without admission or inspection and have been residing in
the United States for years without lawful status, be subject to mandatory
detention for the duration of their immigration proceedings, and thus the
Immigration Judge lacks authority over a bond request filed by an alien in
this category? In addressing this issue, the Board must begin with the “plain
language” of the INA. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 

 (2009)
(“As with any question of statutory interpretation, [the] analysis begins with
the plain language of the statute.”).

    “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 

 (1997); see also Beecham v. United States,

 (1994) (“The plain meaning that we seek to discern is the
plain meaning of the whole statute, not of isolated sentences.”). The Board
does not “view the language of statutory provisions in isolation but
instead . . . read[s] the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme.’” Matter of C-T-L-, 

(BIA 2010) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 

 (2000)); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 

 (2000)
(“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that
definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”).

    Under the plain reading of the INA, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s
determination that he did not have authority over the bond request because
aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants
for admission as defined under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their removal
proceedings. See Jennings, 

 (holding that the INA
“unequivocally mandates that aliens falling within the scope [of section
235(b)(1) and (2)] ‘shall’ be detained,” and that “[u]nlike the word ‘may,’
which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement”
(quoting Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 

 (2016))).

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    The respondent concedes that he is an “applicant for admission” under
section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 

(a)(1), by virtue of his entry
without inspection. The respondent also contends, however, that because he
has been residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years (since
his November 2022 entry without inspection), he cannot be considered as
“seeking admission” as the phrase is used in section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA,

(b)(2)(A).

    The respondent’s argument is not supported by the plain language of the
INA, and actually creates a legal conundrum. If he is not admitted to the
United States (as he admits) but he is not “seeking admission” (as he
contends), then what is his legal status? The respondent provides no legal
authority for the proposition that after some undefined period of time residing
in the interior of the United States without lawful status, the INA provides
that an applicant for admission is no longer “seeking admission,” and has
somehow converted to a status that renders him or her eligible for a bond
hearing under section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a). See Matter
of Lemus, 

, 743 & n.6 (BIA 2012) (noting that “many people
who are not actually requesting permission to enter the United States in the
ordinary sense [including aliens present in the United States who have not
been admitted] are nevertheless deemed to be ‘seeking admission’ under the
immigration laws”). The respondent’s argument also leaves unanswered
which applicants for admission would be covered by section 235(b)(2)(A) of
the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), if, as he argues, applicants for admission
who have been living for years in the United States without admission and
without lawful status are somehow exempt from section 235(b)(2)(A) and
instead fall under section 236.

    The respondent also contends that the Immigration Judge’s interpretation
of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), as applying to
aliens who are present in the United States without inspection renders
superfluous sections 236(c)(1)(A), (D), and (E), 

(c)(1)(A),
(D), (E), which bar certain categories of inadmissible aliens from requesting
bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a). According to
the respondent, Congress would not have enacted the provisions of sections
236(c) and also amended the provision as it did with the recent passage of
the Laken Riley Act, 

, 

, 3 (2025), if those
aliens were already subject to mandatory custody under section 235(b)(2)(A)
of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A). 5 The respondent’s argument is

5
   The Laken Riley Act amended section 236(c) of the INA, 

(c), to
require that the Attorney General take into custody certain criminal aliens who are deemed
inadmissible, including for being “present in the United States without being admitted or
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unavailing, however, because nothing in the statutory text of section 236(c),
including the text of the amendments made by the Laken Riley Act, purports
to alter or undermine the provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA,

(b)(2)(A), requiring that aliens who fall within the definition
of the statute “shall be detained for a proceeding under section 240.”

    The respondent’s interpretation would, in fact, render section
235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), superfluous.
Interpreting the provisions of section 236(c) as rendering null and void the
provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) (or even the provisions of section
235(b)(1) of the INA, 

(b)(1)), would be in contravention of
the “cardinal principle of statutory construction,” which is that courts are to
‘“give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,’ rather than
to emasculate an entire section.” United States v. Menasche, 

,
538–39 (1955) (citations omitted).

    Further, the fact that section 236(c) of the INA, 

(c),
mandates detention of a subset of the category of aliens that are also subject
to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), is not a basis on which to determine that section
235(b)(2)(A) is null and void. See Barton v. Barr, 

 (2020)
(holding that because “redundancies are common in statutory
drafting—sometimes in a congressional effort to be doubly sure, sometimes
because of congressional inadvertence or lack of foresight, or sometimes
simply       because        of     the      shortcomings        of        human
communication,”—“[r]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license
to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text”).

    The respondent also argues that the relevant legislative history of the INA
supports an interpretation of the INA that authorizes bond and bond hearings
under section 236(a) for aliens present in the United States without
admission. On the contrary, the legislative history supports the interpretation
the Board is taking here. The statutory definition of an “applicant for
admission” at section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 

(a)(1), was added
to the INA in 1996, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), 

Div. C, § 302(a), 

-546, 3009-579. Before the passage of
IIRIRA, the INA provided for inspection of aliens only when they were
arriving at a port of entry. See former INA § 235(a), 

(a)
(1994) (discussing “aliens arriving at ports of the United States”); see also

paroled,” under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, 

(a)(6)(A)(i), and who
have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes, including theft.
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former INA § 235(b), 

(b) (discussing the detention of aliens
by “the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival”). Aliens who
were “seeking admission” at a port of entry under former section 235 of the
INA, 

, or who had been paroled into the United States and
were determined to be excludable were placed in exclusion proceedings and
subject to mandatory detention, with potential release solely by means of a
grant of parole under section § 212(d)(5), 

(d)(5) (1994). See
also former INA §§ 212(a), 235(a)–(b), 236, 

(a), 1225(a)–
(b), 1226 (1994); see also 

(a)–(c) (1995).

    At the same time, aliens who were “in the United States” and within
certain classes of deportable aliens, including those “who entered the United
States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by
the Attorney General” were deemed deportable under former section 241(a)
of the INA, 

(a) (1994), and placed in deportation
proceedings. Those aliens were entitled to request release on bond. See
former INA § 242(a)(1), 

(a)(1) (1994); see also 

(c)(1) (1995). Thus, the placement of an alien in exclusion or
deportation proceedings before the 1996 passage of IIRIRA depended on
whether the alien had made an “entry” within the meaning of the INA. See
former INA § 101(a)(13), 

(a)(13) (1994) (defining “entry”
as “any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place
or from an outlying possession”).

    In 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which, among other things,
substituted the term “admission” for “entry,” and replaced deportation and
exclusion proceedings with removal proceedings. See Martinez v. Att’y Gen.
of U.S., 

, 413 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Prior to the 1996 amendment,
the INA assessed status on the basis of ‘entry’ as opposed to ‘admission.’”).
Congress acted, in part, to remedy the “unintended and undesirable
consequence” of having created a statutory scheme where aliens who entered
without inspection “could take advantage of the greater procedural and
substantive rights afforded in deportation proceedings,” including the right
to request release on bond, while aliens who had “actually presented
themselves to authorities for inspection were restrained by ‘more summary
exclusion proceedings,’” and were subject to mandatory custody. 

(quoting Hing Sum v. Holder, 

 (9th Cir. 2010).

    The legislative history of IIRIRA explains that in replacing the definition
of “entry” with a definition for “admission” and “admitted,” Congress:
     intended to replace certain aspects of the current “entry doctrine,” under which illegal
     aliens who have entered the United States without inspection gain equities and

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     privileges in immigration proceedings that are not available to aliens who present
     themselves for inspection at a port of entry. Hence, the pivotal factor in determining
     an alien’s status will be whether or not the alien has been lawfully admitted.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 225 (1996). The House Judiciary Committee
Report for what would become IIRIRA further explains:
     Currently, aliens who have entered without inspection are deportable under section
     241(a)(1)(B). Under the new “admission” doctrine, such aliens will not be
     considered to have been admitted, and thus, must be subject to a ground of
     inadmissibility, rather than a ground of deportation, based on their presence without
     admission. (Deportation grounds will be reserved for aliens who have been admitted
     to the United States.).

.

    Thus, after the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA, aliens who enter the United
States without inspection or admission are “applicants for admission” under
section 235(a)(1) of the INA, 

(a)(1), and subject to the
inspection, detention, and removal procedures of section 235(b) of the INA,

(b). The legislative history confirms that, under a plain
language reading of section 235(b)(1) and (2) of the INA, 

(b)(1), (2), Immigration Judges do not have authority to hold a bond
hearing for arriving aliens and applicants for admission. See Chapman v.
Hous. Welfare Rts. Org., 

 (1979) (noting that the Supreme
Court’s “task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes
Congress sought to serve.”); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 

 (1990) (“The starting point for interpretation of
a statute ‘is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 

 (1980))).

    The respondent contends that the statement in the House Judiciary
Committee Report that “[s]ection 236(a) restates the current provisions in
section 242(a)(1) regarding the authority of the Attorney General to arrest,
detain, and release on bond an alien who is not lawfully in the United States”
demonstrates that Congress intended to retain the same discretionary
detention scheme for aliens unlawfully in the United States that was in place
prior to the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA. H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 229.
The respondent’s argument is unavailing, however, because nothing in the
portion of the report cited by the respondent suggests that it was intended to
undermine or alter the earlier statements, in the same report, that aliens
present in the United States without inspection will be considered “seeking
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admission.” See 

. The House Judiciary Committee Report makes
clear that Congress intended to eliminate the prior statutory scheme that
provided aliens who entered the United States without inspection more
procedural and substantive rights than those who presented themselves to
authorities for inspection. See id.; see also Martinez, 

 n.5.
Interpreting the provisions of the INA in the manner the respondent argues
would essentially repeal the statutory fix that Congress made with the 1996
passage of IIRIRA.

    As the legislative history reflects, the Immigration Judge’s interpretation
of the respondent as an applicant for admission under section 235(b)(2)(A)
of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), and therefore subject to mandatory
detention and ineligible for a bond hearing is supported by the plain language
of the INA. See Jennings, 

 (“Read most naturally, [sections
235(b)(1)] and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission
until certain proceedings have concluded. Section [235(b)(1)] aliens are
detained for ‘further consideration of the application for asylum,’ and
[section 235(b)(2)] aliens are in turn detained for ‘[removal] proceeding[s].’”
(last two alterations in original)). Thus, we affirm the Immigration Judge’s
interpretation, and hold, under a plain language reading of section
235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), Immigration Judges lack
authority to hear bond requests or to grant bond to aliens, like the respondent,
who are present in the United States without admission.

   Citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 

 (2024), the
respondent also contends in his supplemental brief that DHS’ “longstanding
practice” of treating aliens who are present in the United States without
inspection as detained under section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a),
and therefore eligible for a bond, supports his argument that he is likewise
detained under section 236(a). See Loper Bright, 

 (‘“[T]he
longstanding “practice of the government”’—like any other interpretive
aid—‘can inform [a court’s] determination of “what the law is.”’” (citation
omitted)). 6 Somewhat similarly, the respondent contends that Congress did

6
    We acknowledge that for years Immigration Judges have conducted bond hearings for
aliens who entered the United States without inspection. However, we do not recall either
DHS or its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously raising the
current issue that is before us. In fact, the supplemental information for the 1997 Interim
Rule titled “Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of
Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures,” 

,
10323 (Mar. 6, 1997), reflects that the Immigration and Naturalization Service took the
position at that time that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present
without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered
without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination.”
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not intend the provisions of section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), to apply to aliens who are arrested after having lived in the
United States for more than 2 years, as reflected in DHS’ practice of treating
those aliens as detained under section 236 of the INA, 

.

    The respondent’s argument is unavailing, however, because the Supreme
Court in Loper Bright made that statement specifically with respect to
judicial interpretation of a “doubtful and ambiguous law.” 

 at 385–86. As
explained above, the statutory text of the INA is not “doubtful and
ambiguous” but is instead clear and explicit in requiring mandatory detention
of all aliens who are applicants for admission, without regard to how many
years the alien has been residing in the United States without lawful status.
See INA § 235(b)(1), (2), 

(b)(1), (2). The Supreme Court in
Loper Bright did not hold that the long-standing practice of the government
can somehow change, or even eviscerate, explicit statutory text that is
contrary to that practice. See 603 U.S. at 385–86; see also Niz-Chavez v.
Garland, 

, 171 (2021) (stating that “no amount of policy-talk
can overcome a plain statutory command”).

    Likewise, the respondent’s citation to Matter of Akhmedov, 

 (BIA 2025), does not support his arguments. The Board’s
statement in that decision that the respondent’s custody determination was
governed by section 236(a) of the INA, 

(a), even though
the respondent was present in the United States without inspection, Matter
of Akhmedov, 29 I&N Dec. at 166, does not somehow eviscerate or nullify
section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), or vest the
Immigration Judge with authority over the respondent’s bond request.
Whether the respondent was subject to mandatory detention under section
235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), and whether the
Immigration Judge had authority to hear the bond request, were not issues
presented to the Board in that case.

    The respondent also argues that because DHS issued an arrest warrant in
conjunction with the Notice to Appear and a Notice of Custody
Determination, DHS has detained the respondent pursuant to section 236(a)
of the INA, 

(a), and the Immigration Judge therefore has
statutory and regulatory authority to consider his request for a bond. The
respondent cites Matter of Q. Li, 

 (BIA 2025), in support of
his argument. Matter of Q. Li, 

, held:
     [A]n applicant for admission who is arrested and detained without a warrant while
     arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and subsequently
     placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

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     § 1225(b), and is ineligible for any subsequent release on bond under section 236(a)
     of the INA, 

(a).

Matter of Q. Li, 

, further stated that “[s]ubject to certain
exceptions contained in section 236(c) of the INA, 

(c), aliens
detained under section 236(a) may be eligible for discretionary release on
bond pursuant to section 236(a)(2) of the INA, 

(a)(2).”

    Our conclusion in Matter of Q. Li that aliens detained without a warrant
while arriving in the United States are mandatorily detained under section
235(b) of the INA, 

, is consistent with our holding in the
present case. While the respondent reads Matter of Q. Li as suggesting that
aliens present in the United States who are detained with a warrant of arrest
are detained under section 236(a), that issue was beyond the scope of our
decision in that case. Our acknowledgement that “aliens detained under
section 236(a) may be eligible for discretionary release on bond” does not
mean that all aliens detained while in the United States with a warrant of
arrest are detained under section 236(a) and entitled to a bond hearing before
the Immigration Judge, regardless of whether they are applicants for
admission under section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A).

   In short, the mere issuance of an arrest warrant does not endow an
Immigration Judge with authority to set bond for an alien who falls under
section 235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A). See Matter of
A-W-, 25 I&N Dec. at 46 (discussing the limits on Immigration Judge
authority); Matter of D-J-, 

 (same); 

(b); see also 

(b)(1)(ii). If it did, it would render
meaningless the many prohibitions cited above on the authority of an
Immigration Judge to set bond.

    Ultimately, this issue of statutory interpretation is complicated by a
patchwork of statutes implemented at different times and intended to address
different issues. The INA is a complex set of legal provisions created at
different times and modified over a series of years. Where these provisions
impact one another, they cannot be read in a vacuum. See Matter of C-T-L-,
25 I&N Dec. at 345 (BIA 2010) (explaining that the Board does not “view
the language of statutory provisions in isolation but instead [is] charged with
reading the words ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the
overall statutory scheme’” (citation omitted)). Additionally, the fact that a
statute specifically prohibits an Immigration Judge from doing a particular
act cannot be read as authorizing the Immigration Judge to perform acts that
are not otherwise specifically prohibited.

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    ‘“[A]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted . . . ’
is deemed ‘an applicant for admission.’” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 

 (2020) (quoting INA § 235(a)(1), 

(a)(1)); see also
Matter of Lemus, 25 I&N Dec. at 743 (“Congress has defined the concept of
an ‘applicant for admission’ in an unconventional sense, to include not just
those who are expressly seeking permission to enter, but also those who are
present in this country without having formally requested or received such
permission . . . .”). Applicants for admission remains such unless an
immigration officer determines that they are “clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted.” INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 

(b)(2)(A).
Failing to clearly and beyond a doubt demonstrate that they are entitled to
admission, such aliens “shall be detained for a proceeding under section
240.” Id.; see also Jennings, 

.

    Aliens, like the respondent, who surreptitiously cross into the United
States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully
inspected and admitted by an immigration officer. Remaining in the United
States for a lengthy period of time following entry without inspection, by
itself, does not constitute an “admission.” See INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 

(a)(13)(A) (2018) (defining “admission”). Likewise, being arrested
pursuant to a warrant and placed into removal proceedings does not
constitute an admission. Therefore, just as Immigration Judges have no
authority to redetermine the custody of arriving aliens who present
themselves at a port of entry, they likewise have no authority to redetermine
the custody conditions of an alien who crossed the border unlawfully without
inspection, even if that alien has avoided apprehension for more than 2 years.

    Holding otherwise would require reading the INA to conclude that
Congress intended that aliens unlawfully entering the United States without
inspection, particularly those who successfully evaded apprehension for
more than 2 years, be rewarded with the opportunity for a bond hearing
before an Immigration Judge, whereas aliens who present themselves to
officers at a port of entry are ineligible for a bond hearing. This is an
incongruous result which is not supported by the plain language or any
reasonable interpretation of the INA. 7


7
    Violations of the INA and the regulations often have consequences for aliens seeking
relief and protection from removal. See, e.g., Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 

, 31314 (May 16, 2023) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003 and 1208) (establishing
a “rebuttable presumption of asylum ineligibility” for certain aliens who did not “avail
themselves of a lawful, safe, and orderly pathway to the United States” or “seek asylum or
other protection in a country through which they travel[ed]”). For example, aliens who
have not been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States” are ineligible for
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                               IV.     CONCLUSION
   The Immigration Judge properly held that he lacked authority to hear the
respondent’s request for a bond as the respondent is an applicant for
admission and is subject to mandatory detention under section 235(b)(2)(A)
of the INA, 

(b)(2)(A), and the regulation at 

(b)(1)(ii). 8 Accordingly, the following order will be entered.

    ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.




adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA, 

(a) (2018). See also
Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 

 (2021). Likewise, an applicant for asylum will,
absent extraordinary or changed circumstances, be ineligible for relief if he or she did not
file the application within 1 year of his or her last arrival in the United States. See INA
§ 208(a)(2)(B), (D), 

(a)(2)(B), (D).
8
   As we are dismissing the respondent’s appeal on the grounds that the Immigration Judge
lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent’s motion for a bond, we need not address the
Immigration Judge’s alternative holding denying bond because the respondent did not meet
his burden of proving that he is not a flight risk, or the respondent’s appellate arguments
contesting that alternative holding. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 

 (1976) (per
curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues
the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
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