Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
ΒΆ 1. We are asked to review a decision of the court of appeals that reversed the circuit court's decision,
ΒΆ 2. We conclude as follows: (1) Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) is the legislative codification of the concerted action theory of liability; (2) the damages in this case resulted from the consumption of beer to the point of intoxication and the subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated; and (3) although Robert Zimmerlee, David Schrimpf, and Tomakia Pratchet acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan" to procure beer, they did not so act in consuming beer to the point of intoxication and in the subsequent act of driving while intoxicated, and, therefore, David Schrimpf is not jointly and severally liable under Β§ 895.045(2) for the death of Chris Richards. Accordingly, Badger Mutual Insurance Company is relieved from making any further payment to Michelle Richards.
ΒΆ 3. An ill-conceived idea between teenagers to "get some beer" one evening culminated in tragedy the next morning when an intoxicated Robert Zimmerlee, 19, failed to stop for a stop sign and smashed into the driver's side of Christopher Richards' vehicle, killing him instantly. Chris' wife, Michelle Richards (Richards), sought to recover damages. She initially pursued a negligence claim against Zimmerlee and his insurer. The parties settled on a Pierringer
ΒΆ 4. The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Events leading to the accident unfolded the prior evening, when Schrimpf and Zimmerlee decided to "go get some beer." Schrimpf was employed at a West Allis restaurant, and he said that one of his co-workers, Pratchet, would be able to purchase the beer for them because she was of-age.
ΒΆ 5. Zimmerlee and Schrimpf drove together to Schrimpf s employer, where Pratchet was working that
ΒΆ 6. From the restaurant, Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet traveled together to a nearby grocer, where Pratchet purchased an 18-pack of beer for Zim-merlee and Schrimpf with money Zimmerlee provided. The two dropped Pratchet off at a bus stop and Zim-merlee and Schrimpf went their separate ways for several hours, with the beer remaining in Zimmerlee's car.
ΒΆ 7. Later that evening, Schrimpf and Zimmerlee reconnected, and with 18-pack in tow, arrived at Spencer's party between 12 midnight and 1:00 a.m. While Schrimpf drank "some" of the beer, Zimmerlee consumed "maybe half' of the 18 beers.
ΒΆ 8. At approximately 7:30 a.m., the duo left Spencer's party. Schrimpf sat in the passenger seat, and Zimmerlee took the wheel of his car. They proceeded only half a block before colliding with Chris Richards' vehicle.
ΒΆ 9. Two days before trial was set to commence, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. By the terms of that settlement agreement, the jury trial was waived and the parties agreed to allow the circuit judge to decide the question of whether Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan that caused damage to Chris and Michelle Richards. The circuit court answered that question in the affirmative and held the parties jointly and severally liable for Richards' damages.
ΒΆ 10. There is no dispute that Zimmerlee was negligent in the operation of his vehicle and that his
ΒΆ 11. The parties also agreed to the apportionment of causal negligence among them: Zimmerlee at 72 percent; Schrimpf at 14 percent; and Pratchet at 14 percent. The parties stipulated to Richards' damages and that Schrimpfs and Pratchet's combined causal negligence resulted in $500,000 of the total damages, or $250,000 each. Accordingly, the parties agreed that Richards was to be paid $250,000, as Schrimpfs share of the total damages, regardless of the outcome of this lawsuit. If the final court decision in this case concluded that the parties did not act in accordance with a common scheme or plan that resulted in Richards' damages, Richards would not receive the 14 percent of the damages that remained unpaid. If, however, it was concluded that the parties did act in accordance with such common scheme or plan that caused Richards' damages, then Schrimpf and Pratchet would be jointly and severally liable to Richards and, therefore, Schrimpf, and thereby Badger Mutual, would be required to pay Richards an additional $250,000 to cover the remainder of the damages.
ΒΆ 12. What the parties dispute is whether the foregoing stipulated facts give rise to joint and several liability under Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). The parties contest whether Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan that resulted in Richards' damages, as those terms are used in Β§ 895.045(2).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
ΒΆ 14. The outcome of this case hinges on the interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). The interpretation and application of a statute are questions of law that we review independently, "but benefiting from the analyses of the court of appeals and the circuit court." Morder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ΒΆ 19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.
B. The Parties' Positions
ΒΆ 15. Both parties posit that Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) is unambiguous; however, they offer differing interpretations and applications of it under the facts before us. Before turning to a discussion of the language of the statute, it is instructive to recount briefly the parties' respective arguments.
1. Richards' position
ΒΆ 16. Richards argues that the parties agree that Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan to purchase beer. She
ΒΆ 17. Furthermore, Richards argues that cannons of statutory interpretation preclude this court's consideration of the title of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2), "Concerted action," when interpreting the statute. Richards argues that, because the statute is plain on its face, it is improper for the court to consider extrinsic sources to facilitate its interpretation, and because Wisconsin law provides that titles of statutes are not part of the statute, the title to Β§ 895.045(2) is an extrinsic source. The import of Richards' argument in this regard is twofold: (1) we have not adopted the concerted action theory of liability, as embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts Β§ 876, even though it is incorporated into Wisconsin Jury Instruction 1740 that attends Β§ 895.045(2). Therefore, the so-called, but misnamed, "concerted action cases" that predate Β§ 895.045(2) provide no guidance in interpreting the statute; and (2) the enactment of Β§ 895.045(2) did not alter the law in Wisconsin that causal negligence is predicated on whether
2. Badger Mutual's position
ΒΆ 18. In response, Badger Mutual argues that, while Richards correctly asserts that the statute is unambiguous, Richards nevertheless misapprehends the statute's meaning. First, Badger Mutual contends that "Concerted action" is the title for the theory of liability described in Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2), as shown by the discussions in Wisconsin cases. Badger argues that because the concerted action theory of liability embodied in Β§ 895.045(2) is the concerted action referred to in Wisconsin case law, subsection (2) requires that all parties have equal causal negligence. Consequently, because the parties stipulated to apportionment of causal negligence among Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet, their liability to Richards falls within subsection (1), not within subsection (2) of Β§ 895.045.
ΒΆ 19. Second, Badger Mutual acknowledges that while Schrimpfs conduct was a substantial factor in causing the accident, it did not also constitute concerted action, as is required before it falls within Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). Badger Mutual contends that the Restatement (Second) of Torts Β§ 876 and the common law in regard to concerted action support its position. Badger Mutual contends that the common scheme or plan to purchase beer did not damage Chris Richards. It was the reckless driving while intoxicated that resulted in damage to Chris Richards. However, the reckless driving was not part of a common scheme or plan in which Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet participated. Accordingly, it concludes that Schrimpfs liability to Rich
C. Interpretation of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2)
1. General principles
ΒΆ 20. Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of the statute." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ΒΆ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ΒΆ 43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). We assume that the meaning of a statute is expressed in the words the legislature chose. Id., ΒΆ 44. The context in which the operative language appears is important too because a statute's meaning may be affected by the context in which the words chosen by the legislature are used. Id., ΒΆ 46. If our focus on the statute's language yields a plain, clear meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to its plain terms. Id. If the statutory language is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to consult extrinsic sources to facilitate interpretation. Id.
ΒΆ 21. However, if a statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is ambiguous. Id., ΒΆ 47. When a statute is ambiguous, we may resort to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, to assist our understanding of the statute's meaning. Id., ΒΆ 48.
2. Statutory history
ΒΆ 22. A review of statutory history is part of a plain meaning analysis. Id., ΒΆ 69. Statutory history
ΒΆ 23. The early common law rule of contributory negligence that existed prior to 1931, when the predecessor to Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(1) was enacted, required that any contributory negligence of a plaintiff was a complete bar to recovery. Brewster v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 346, 247 N.W. 449 (1933). Also at common law, joint and several liability was the rule, such that when multiple tortfeasors caused injury to a plaintiff who was not contributorily negligent, the plaintiff could recover his or her entire damages from any tortfeasor. Group Health Coop. of Eau Claire v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co., 164 Wis. 2d 632, 634-35, 476 N.W.2d 302 (Ct. App. 1991).
ΒΆ 24. In 1931, the legislature established statutory comparative negligence.
ΒΆ 26. The current version of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045 was created by 1995 Wis. Act 17. That Act amended comparative negligence in subsection (1) and created subsection (2). In subsection (1), the legislature chose to significantly change the law of joint and several liability by limiting the circumstances under which joint and several liability could be applied. Id. The relevant portion of Β§ 895.045(1) provides:
Comparative negligence. .. . The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than*556 51% is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed.
Under revised subsection (1), a contributorily negligent plaintiff is precluded from recovering more of his or her damages from a tortfeasor than the tortfeasor's causal negligence bears to the total causal negligence. Id. For those tortfeasors, the common law rule of joint and several liability is abrogated. See id. Only when a tortfeasor is at least 51 percent causally negligent will the tortfeasor be jointly and severally liable for all damages attributed to all tortfeasors in the comparisons made under subsection (1). Therefore, in many cases involving joint tortfeasors and a contributorily negligent plaintiff, there no longer is joint and several liability.
ΒΆ 27. In amending Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045 in 1995, the legislature also created subsection (2). This subsection retains the common law rule of joint and several liability in the circumstances described in the statute. Subsection (2) provides:
Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme or plan, those parties are jointly and severally liable for all damages resulting from that action, except as provided in s. 895.043(5).8
Subsection (2), which the legislature chose to title "Concerted action," retains the common law rule of joint and several liability, if "that action" is taken in accordance with a common scheme or plan resulting in
3. Ambiguity
ΒΆ 28. Richards urges us to interpret Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) such that it applies to persons engaged in a common scheme or plan to accomplish a result that in combination with other acts ultimately causes harm. Richards asserts that common law concerted action is not what the legislature meant to describe in subsection (2). Badger Mutual contends that the action that causes the harm must be undertaken to facilitate the common scheme or plan
ΒΆ 29. When confronted with an ambiguous statute, we may resort to extrinsic sources to help uncover the statute's meaning. Id., ΒΆ 48. The legislative history now available that relates to the creation of subsection (2) of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045 is sparse. However, the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of an earlier. version of the 1995 changes in Β§ 895.045 that were eventually enacted states:
This bill modifies the comparative negligence system in several ways. The bill requires that the negligence of the plaintiff be measured separately against each of the joint tort-feasors. Under this bill, a joint tort-feasor's liability is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that party.
The bill specifies that the changes in the rule of joint and several liability do not apply to parties whose concerted action results in damages ...
Drafting File for 1995 Wis. Act 17, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1995 S.B. 11, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. The LRB's analysis supports our conclusion that the 1995 changes to Β§ 895.045 were meant to significantly change the common law rule of joint and several liability that had applied to negligence actions in the past. However, the
ΒΆ 30. The title is not part of a statute according to Wis. Stat. Β§ 990.001(6); however, it may be used to assist in understanding a statute's meaning. Brennan v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 112 Wis. 2d 38, 41, 331 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1983). We note that the title to Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) is "Concerted action." Concerted action is a theory of liability that comes from the common law, as do key words the legislature chose to use in subsection (2), such as "common scheme or plan." Accordingly, we review Wisconsin's common law and the learned treatises cited therein for guidance in interpreting the title and terms of subsection (2). See, e.g., Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ΒΆΒΆ 15, 16, 19, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296 (explaining that the words used by the legislature in Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.85(3) derive in large part from the common law; and therefore, a review of the common law is helpful to statutory interpretation).
4. Wisconsin appellate decisions
ΒΆ 31. Four published appellate opinions offer potential guidance on the meaning of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). Danks v. Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 N.W.2d 846; Bruttig v. Olsen, 154 Wis. 2d 270, 453 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984); and Ogle v. Avina, 33 Wis. 2d 125, 146 N.W.2d 422 (1966).
ΒΆ 32. Danks provides only the briefest interpretation of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). There, liability for a personal injury was at issue. Danks was injured while
ΒΆ 33. Danks had several theories under which he attempted to impose liability on Stock Building Supply. One of those theories was concerted action liability, in which Danks contended that the lifting of the truss was undertaken in accordance with a common scheme or plan pursuant to Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). Id., ΒΆ 38. The court of appeals decision concluding that Stock Building Supply was not liable turned on the lack of an affirmative act of negligence by Stock Building Supply. Id., ΒΆ 22.
ΒΆ 34. However, Danks does interpret Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) as pertaining only to tortfeasors who take concerted action. Id., ΒΆ 39. Danks does not discuss the meanings of "Concerted action" or "common scheme or plan," but it does note that those who act "in concert" will come within the parameters of subsection (2):
Subsection (2) simply modifies subsection (1) of the statute to provide that all defendants who are legally responsible for causing a plaintiffs damages, and who acted in concert in so doing, are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs damages, irrespective of whether a given defendant's apportioned causal negligence is less than 51%.
Id. Danks continues to conclude that "Β§ 895.045(2) plays no role to determine whether a given defendant may be held liable." Id., ΒΆ 40 (emphasis in original).
ΒΆ 35. Collins precedes Danks and the 1995 revisions of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045. There we discussed concerted action as a theory of liability and relied on the explanation of that theory by Professor Prosser. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 184. In it we explained that:
The concerted action theory of liability rests upon the principle that "those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding."
Id. (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts Β§ 46, at 292 (4th ed. 1971)). However, we declined to apply the concerted action theory when the plaintiff, who sought damages from former manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) that caused an aggressive form of cervical cancer, could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES that was taken by her mother. Id. at 186.
ΒΆ 36. Collins explained that the concerted action theory required an agreement among the parties. Id. at 185. The allegation of Collins was that the "defendants failed to adequately test [DES] or to give sufficient
ΒΆ 37. Collins is helpful to our analysis. For example, the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan in Collins that we concluded was necessary to support the concerted action theory of liability is important to our consideration of the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan at issue in the case before us. That is, the action that harmed Collins must have been that which was undertaken to further the drug companies' agreement. Id. In addition, Collins equated "concerted action," the title of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) with "pursuance of a common plan," terms employed in the text of subsection (2). Id. at 184.
ΒΆ 38. Bruttig also tackled the topic of concerted action. There the plaintiff, Brian Bruttig who was a minor, and two friends, also minors, engaged in a game of "snowmobile tag." Brian was injured and recovery was denied because his liability was greater than that of either of the other two tortfeasors. Bruttig, 154 Wis. 2d at 273. On appeal, Brian argued that he and the two defendants were equally negligent "because the tag game created a situation of mutual stimulation where the negligence of each participant [was] entirely interrelated with that of the others and therefore each should be charged with the causal negligence of the other." Id. at 280. The court of appeals recognized the argument as the theory of concerted action liability in
ΒΆ 39. The court of appeals noted that the concerted action theory of liability has never been "explicitly adopted" in Wisconsin. Id. at 280. It also noted that Brian had not raised this theory of liability in the circuit court. Therefore, it rejected his argument to apply it on appeal. Id. at 281.
ΒΆ 40. Bruttig's discussion is helpful, as it reviews Brian's claim that the three boys "acted in concert," which terms are similar to the title of subsection (2): "Concerted action." Bruttig acknowledges that the theory that Brian is proffering is "a separate theory of liability, that of 'concerted action.'" Id. at 280. This is significant because Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) requires proof of a separate theory of liability for one who may already be a tortfeasor under subsection (1), in order to accord joint and several liability. Banks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ΒΆ 39. That is, subsection (2) requires a plaintiff to prove that the tortfeasor acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan" and also that the common scheme or plan the tortfeasor acted in accordance with resulted in damages. Id. Subsection (2) is not applicable in every case where joint tortfeasors are present.
ΒΆ 41. Our review of Wisconsin case law that touches on the concerted action theory of liability concludes with Ogle. In Ogle, we held that both negligent participants in a "drag race" were equally liable for a fatal collision resulting from their negligence, even though only one of the tortfeasors struck a third automobile causing injury. Ogle, 33 Wis. 2d at 135.
ΒΆ 42. In Ogle, two cars were racing at a high rate of speed in the same direction down a highway, when the lead car collided with the plaintiffs car. Id. at
We think when there is an understanding to reach a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is used and the cars are driven so closely together as to be practically in tandem, or to constitute a unit, that we have a situation of mutual stimulation where the negligence of each participant is so related to the negligence of the other participants that the participants should each be chargeable with the causal negligence of the other as to speed and their percentage of causal negligence should be equal.
Id. at 135. The mutual agreement to use excessive speed to reach an agreed upon destination formed the basis for the tortfeasors' concerted action. Id.
ΒΆ 43. This court went on to explain in Ogle that the usual rule of apportioning causal negligence between tortfeasors whose negligence combined or concurred in causing injury does not apply with "mutual fault" for the injury that occurred. Id. Rather, the tortfeasors in Ogle each assumed the fault of the other and causal negligence was apportioned equally between them. Id. Badger Mutual argues that the concept of equal fault for tortfeasors in concerted actions is significant to the case before us because the parties have agreed to apportioned causal negligence. Richards maintains it has no relevancy.
5. Learned treatises
ΒΆ 44. Because discussions of the concerted action theory of liability in Professor Prosser's The Law of Torts, as well as those provided by The Restatement (Second) of Torts, are so prominent in the cases that discuss the concerted action theory of liability, we
The original meaning.. . was that of vicarious liability for concerted action. All persons who acted in concert to commit a trespass, in pursuance of a common design, were held liable for the entire result. In such a case there was a common purpose, with mutual aid in carrying it out; in short, there was a joint enterprise, so that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all of the same party being present." Each was therefore liable for the entire damage done .... [SJince each was liable for all, the jury would not be permitted to apportion the damages.
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts Β§ 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984) (quoted citations omitted). This historic framework for concerted action is helpful to our understanding of the mutuality of agreement that is necessary in order to have a common scheme or plan under the concerted action theory of liability, as well as to understanding the statutory terms used to express the concerted action theory of liability.
ΒΆ 45. Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is also helpful. It provides:
Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
*566 (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
Comment on Clause (a): Parties are acting in concert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular result. The agreement need not be expressed in words and may be implied and understood to exist from the conduct itself. Whenever two or more persons commit tortious acts in concert, each becomes subject to liability for the acts of the others, as well as for his own acts. The theory of the early common law was that there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others, which made all liable for the tortious acts of any one.
Restatement (Second) of Torts Β§ 876, at 315-16 (1979). The Comment to Clause (a) is particularly helpful in its description of mutual agency and that it was mutual agency that made all the actors liable for one another's tortious acts.
ΒΆ 46. From our review of Wisconsin cases and learned treatises, wherein principles of concerted action are discussed, terms similar to those in Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) are employed and the concerted action theory of liability is explained, we conclude that Β§ 895.045(2) is the codification of the concerted action theory of liability. The statute is consistent with the concerted action theory as explained by Wisconsin courts
ΒΆ 47. Our conclusion that Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) is the codification of the concerted action theory of liability does not change Wisconsin law in regard to whether the actions of a tortfeasor were a substantial factor in causing harm sustained by another. This is so because in order to fit within the parameters of Β§ 895.045(2), a tortfeasor must already be causally negligent under substantive law. Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ΒΆ 39. One is causally negligent when his or her conduct is a substantial factor in causing injury to
6. Application of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2)
ΒΆ 48. There are two possible scenarios under the stipulated facts and the arguments made by Richards wherein she seeks to hold Schrimpf jointly and severally liable under Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) for her damages: (1) Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan to procure beer and that action resulted in her damages; or (2) Zimmerlee and Schrimpf acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan to drink to intoxication and then drive and that action resulted in her damages. Although Richards interweaves these two scenarios, we will examine them independently.
ΒΆ 49. Concerted action liability is a separate theory of liability that does not apply to all who are proved to be causally negligent. Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ΒΆ 40; see Bruttig, 154 Wis. 2d at 280; W Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Β§ 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984). Something more than causal negligence is required before the actions of a tortfeasor will come within the parameters of Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2). Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ΒΆ 40. Concerted action must be proved.
ΒΆ 51. In regard to the actions of Zimmerlee, Schrimpf, and Pratchet, it is undisputed that they agreed to purchase beer. When Schrimpf asked Pratchet to purchase beer and Zimmerlee drove her to the grocery and gave her the money that she used to purchase the beer, they acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan." Their procurement of beer was tortious. Wis. Stat. Β§Β§ 125.035(4)(b); 125.07(1). However, after that purchase, Pratchet had nothing further to do with the beer. She took a bus to an unnamed location. Zimmerlee and Schrimpf became parallel actors. Zimmerlee and Schrimpf separated, with Zimmerlee keeping the beer in his car. The scheme or plan that was common to these three defendants had been completed. Richards had suffered no damages because of actions taken to further that common plan. Something more was required. Therefore, the purchase of beer is insufficient to show concerted action, and to cause Schrimpf s conduct to fall within Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2).
ΒΆ 52. In regard to concluding that there was concerted action between Zimmerlee and Schrimpf result
ΒΆ 53.' In addition, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Zimmerlee was 72 percent causally negligent in the death of Chris Richards; Schrimpf was 14 percent causally negligent, and Pratchet was 14 percent causally negligent. The apportioned negligence here reflects Schrimpfs and Pratchet's respective several liability. However, with a concerted action theory of liability, each party assumes the causal negligence of the other so that all are equally liable. See Ogle, 33 Wis. 2d at 135. Therefore, the parties' stipulation to differing percentages of causal negligence further supports our conclusion that Richards' injury was not the result of concerted action.
III. CONCLUSION
ΒΆ 55. We conclude as follows: (1) Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045(2) is the legislative codification of the concerted action theory of liability; (2) the damages in this case resulted from the consumption of beer to the point of intoxication and the subsequent decision to drive while intoxicated; and (3) although Robert Zimmerlee, David Schrimpf, and Tomakia Pratchet acted "in accordance with a common scheme or plan" to procure beer, they did not so act in consuming beer to the point of intoxication and in the subsequent act of driving while intoxicated, and, therefore, David Schrimpf is not jointly and severally hable under Β§ 895.045(2) for the death of Chris Richards. Accordingly, Badger Mutual Insurance Company is relieved from making any further payment to Michelle Richards.
By the Court. β The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
The Honorable Patricia D. McMahon of Milwaukee County presiding.
AJI further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted.
Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963).
The parties stipulated that Richards' total damages equal $1,785,714.29.
Wis. Stat. Β§ 331.045 (1931); ch. 242, Laws of 1931.
Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045 (1971); ch. 47, Laws of 1971.
Wisconsin Stat. Β§ 895.043(5) provides: "The rule of joint and several liability does not apply to punitive damages."
The amicus brief of Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers cites Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 244 Wis. 2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833, as support for its assertion that the 1995 amendments to Wis. Stat. Β§ 895.045 did not intend to change the common law rule of joint and several liability. Reliance on Fuchsgruber for that proposition is misplaced. Fuchsgruber explained that a claim for strict products liability is not a negligence action under the common law; and therefore, because Β§ 895.045(1) involves negligence, it has no application to claims of strict products liability. Id., ΒΆΒΆ 1-3.
Badger Mutual's position is similar to that of the court of appeals, which concluded that Wis. Stat; Β§ 895.045(2) applies to persons engaged in " 'a common scheme or plan to accomplish the result that injures the plaintiff....'" Richards v. Badger
The understanding of concerted action liability as explained by Wisconsin appellate courts is consistent with the discussions by New York appellate courts. For example, Blakeslee v. Wadsworth, 37 A.D.3d 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007),
Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1740 quotes Β§ 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as well as the "Comment to Clause (a)" of that section. Moreover, the instruction quotes Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) in its description of concerted action.
Schrimpfs involvement with Zimmerlee after the parties purchased the beer resembles the involvement of the defendants in Blakeslee. There, the drivers of two vehicles alternately changed lanes on a highway, and the rear driver crashed after dipping his tires onto the right-hand shoulder of the highway. Blakeslee, 37 A.D.3d at 1022. The court held that there was insufficient proof to hold the drivers jointly and severally liable under a concerted action theory of liability because the record did not demonstrate that the drivers had an express or implied agreement to engage in a "passing contest." Id. at 1022-23.