Miller v. Miller

¶ 1. Mother appeals from a family court order denying her request to recognize a Canadian child-custody judgment and to relieve her of an earlier contempt adjudication. We hold that the trial court erred in declining to recognize the foreign judgment, and that the contempt order has since become moot. Accordingly, we reverse.

¶ 2. Like many multi-jurisdictional custody disputes, this appeal arrives with a long and tangled factual and procedural history. The parties lived together in Vermont for a number of years before their child was born in March 1994. They were married in 1996 but separated one year later and were divorced in March 1999 pursuant to a final judgment of the Bennington Family Court. By agreement of the parties, the court awarded mother sole legal and physical rights and responsibilities for the child and granted father liberal visitation. By the time of the divorce, mother had moved with the child to Massachusetts. The record discloses that in May 2000 a Massachusetts family court issued a temporary ex parte abuse-prevention order at mother’s request, prohibiting father from having any contact with the child. In June 2000, following a hearing at which father appeared, the court *468issued a final abuse-prevention order again prohibiting father from having any contact with the child. The order was scheduled to expire in one year.1

¶ 3. Father subsequently moved to reinstate visitation in Massachusetts. Following a hearing, the Massachusetts family court issued an order granting father supervised visits with the child and providing for a further review in six months conditioned on father’s successful completion of six supervised visits. Based on father’s behavior during the first visit, however, the visitation supervisor cancelled the second visit and wrote a letter to the court, in July 2000, requesting that future visits occur in a different setting with a “high[er] degree of security (on-duty police officer, weapon check).” The letter cited concerns about father’s “contained rage” and “emotional stability” and characterized him as a “high risk” client. Apparently, no further visits occurred thereafter. Nevertheless, in August 2000, the Massachusetts family court issued an order at the parties’ request providing that “all further proceedings concerning the care, custody and visitation of the minor child” would be “conducted in Massachusetts and not in Vermont.” At the same time, the Bennington Family Court granted the parties’ joint motion to recognize Massachusetts’s jurisdiction over the matter.

¶4. In early January 2001, mother and child began a series of moves which she claims were necessitated by father’s harassment and threats. Mother states that she moved initially into a battered women’s shelter in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and thereafter fled to Florida when father discovered her location in Massachusetts. She further claims that she left Florida out of a concern that father had discovered her there, and ultimately moved to a shelter for battered women in the Province of Quebec, Canada, in May or June 2001. Father contends that he was unaware of mother’s whereabouts during this period.

¶ 5. In June 2002, in response to father’s motion, the Massachusetts family court issued an order providing that, in light of mother’s “unknown” location and father’s continued residence in Vermont, the latter represented the most appropriate venue to exercise jurisdiction. Father then filed successive motions in the Bennington Family Court to enforce the visitation provisions of *469the original Vermont divorce decree, to obtain temporary custody, and to hold mother in contempt. Mother was served by publication but did not appear at a scheduled hearing in August 2002, which resulted in a brief, emergency order transferring custody to father.

¶ 6. In September 2002, the court issued a written decision. The court acknowledged that a review of the child’s best interests was difficult because of his absence from the state for the last three years and the lack of information about his present physical and emotional health. Nevertheless, the court expressed concern as to whether the child was receiving adequate medical attention for a seizure disorder that had come to the court’s attention during an earlier abuse-prevention hearing. The court also noted that mother had been found to suffer from depression in the final divorce judgment, that her petition for relief from abuse in Vermont had been denied, and that she “may be of unstable personality . . . [and] in the throes of some mental illness . . . which would make her an unfit guardian for the child.” Accordingly, pending “a full [ejvidentiary [hjearing to consider the child’s best interest” the court ordered that custody be transferred to father “until further [h]earing of the [c]ourt.” The court also found mother to be in contempt for her “willful failure to provide [father] with his right to parent child contact” as provided by the court’s earlier orders.

¶ 7. After the hearing before the Bennington Family Court on August 21, 2002, but before the court issued its decision in September, mother filed a motion to terminate father’s right to visitation and for child support in the family court of the Province of Quebec, Canada, where she had taken up residence after fleeing from Florida. An expert psychological evaluation of mother and the child was submitted to the Canadian court in October 2002. The psychologist’s report states that it was based on interviews with mother and the child as well as a review of a number of documents, including the Bennington Family Court decision of September 2002, notes from the child’s former teacher in Massachusetts and current teacher in Quebec, and reports filed with the Massachusetts family court by the visitation supervisor. The psychologist’s report recounts in detail mother’s allegations of father’s physical and psychological abuse, harassment, and stalking, some of which allegedly occurred in the child’s presence. The expert described mother as “sad but always in control of her emotions,” coherent and well organized, and without any signs of *470psychosis, mood disorders, or other personality disorders. She was, in the expert’s opinion, “in good mental health,” appeared to function well, and despite the recent instability in her life “had been able to take good care of’ the minor. As to the child, then eight years old, the expert noted that he was “successful” in school and “well integrated into his class group,” was obviously “bright,” expressed himself well, and established an easy relationship with the expert. Although mother reported that the child had an epileptic condition which required him to take a daily medication, he remained physically vigorous. As for the child’s views toward father, the expert concluded from the child’s remarks that he had witnessed father make numerous threats and denigrating comments against mother and himself, and as a result had developed a strongly negative perception of father, stating in categorical terms that he did not wish to resume parent-child contact. The expert concluded that an abrupt resumption of visitation with father would have a traumatic and destabilizing impact on the child.

¶ 8. Father was served with mother’s Canadian petition by mail, and subsequently moved to dismiss the petition and transfer jurisdiction to Vermont. In May 2003, the Canadian court entered an order granting temporary custody to mother. The following month, it issued a nine-page decision denying father’s motion to dismiss. The court explained that under Canadian law it had the discretion to decline jurisdiction if it determined that the courts of another jurisdiction were better positioned to resolve the dispute, and that any decision must “be taken in [the child’s] interest and with respect to his rights.” These interests should include, according to the court, “the moral needs, intellectual, affective and physical needs of the child, his age, his character, his family circumstances and the other aspects of the situation.” Based upon its review of several exhibits, including the expert psychological evaluation and the materials on which it relied, the court found that father’s “attitude and comportment” toward mother and the child and the risks of reunification with father militated against a transfer of jurisdiction.

¶ 9. In July 2004, father filed a motion with the Canadian family court to have his own expert psychologist evaluate mother and the child, and thereafter to grant custody to father. For reasons unclear from the record, however, father subsequently withdrew the motion. In February 2005, the Canadian court issued a final *471judgment awarding custody of the eleven-year-old child to mother and reserving the issue of visitation with father. Father appealed the ruling, which the Canadian appellate court affirmed in October 2005.

¶ 10. In January 2006, mother returned to Vermont and was arrested by federal marshals, based on federal charges of international parental kidnapping.2 *Mother was transferred to state custody on the outstanding contempt adjudication, and a show-cause hearing was held in which mother was given the opportunity to purge herself of the contempt by disclosing the child’s whereabouts; she refused, and consequently remained incarcerated. In February 2006, mother moved to dismiss the contempt proceeding on the ground that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the August and September 2002 orders transferring custody to father and holding her in contempt for interfering with father’s visitation rights.3 The court denied the motion, concluding that Vermont had jurisdiction under 15 V.S.A. § 1032(a)(2), which provides that the court may exercise jurisdiction if it is in the best interests of the child, the child and at least one contestant have a “significant connection with this state,” and “there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child’s present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships.”4 *472Mother appealed from the denial, but the appeal was dismissed in May 2006, for failure to comply with a scheduling order.

¶ 11. In June 2006, mother filed a motion seeking relief from the judgment of contempt and recognition of the Canadian custody order in furtherance of the interests of justice and the best interests of the child, pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).5 The trial court denied the motion, observing that mother had failed to appeal either the 2002 judgment of contempt or the 2006 denial of her motion to dismiss, and that Rule 60(b) was not a substitute for timely appeal. The court also declined to recognize the Canadian family court judgment, ruling that it could not determine from the Canadian orders — which were in French — whether Canada had properly exercised jurisdiction. Mother moved to reconsider, pointing out that, in fact, she had previously submitted English translations. The court denied this motion as well, finding that it remained unable to determine whether the Canadian court had properly exercised jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

I.

¶ 12. Although the parties focus largely on whether Canada or Vermont had jurisdiction, as explained more below the critical question — in our view — turns on which was ultimately the “more appropriate forum” to resolve this protracted dispute under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.6 We begin by noting the overall relevance of UCCJA principles despite the complicating *473presence of a foreign jurisdiction. The UCCJA expressly provides that its “general policies . . . extend to the international area,” 15 V.S.A. § 1051, and courts and commentators have consistently interpreted this provision to confer comity, or recognition, to child custody proceedings and determinations of foreign nations that meet minimal standards of due process and promote the UCCJA’s fundamental goals.7 See, e.g., McFaull v. McFaull, 560 So. 2d 1013, 1014 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “the general policies of the UCCJA . . . extend to the international area and recognition and enforcement of custody decrees are extended to other countries if there has been reasonable notice and the opportunity to be heard”); Garg v. Garg, 881 A.2d 1180, 1204 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (observing that “numerous other states have concluded that the UCCJA applies to international custody disputes” and collecting cases); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 685 A.2d 1319, 1325 (N.J. 1996) (“The majority of state courts that have considered the issue have held, either explicitly or implicitly, that the term ‘state’ may include a foreign nation.”); see generally D. Blair, International Application of the UCCJEA: Scrutinizing the Escape Clause, 38 Fam. L.Q. 547, 557 (2004) (observing that, with few exceptions, “courts have applied the UCCJA in a straightforward manner in international custody disputes.”); Note, American and International Responses to International Child Abductions, 16 N.Y.U. J. *474Int’l L. & Pol. 415, 428 (1984) (“[T]he [National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law] made the UCCJA’s basic policies applicable to international cases.”).

¶ 13. An understanding of the UCCJA’s international reach was implicit in In re Cifarelli, 158 Vt. 249, 254, 611 A.2d 394, 397 (1992), where we upheld a trial court ruling that Bermuda had properly exercised jurisdiction over certain custody and visitation issues concerning a minor notwithstanding the fact that a Vermont court had entered the initial order. The child in question had lived in Vermont for only a few months but had been a resident of Bermuda for over a year at the time of the superior court order dismissing the action in favor of Bermuda; information about the child’s physical and psychological health and development were more readily available in Bermuda, where that country’s social services agency had investigated her circumstances; and the child’s primary care provider and physicians resided in Bermuda. Thus, we concluded that, “when the superior court dismissed the action, Vermont was an inconvenient forum according to the provisions of 15 V.S.A. § 1036,” and Bermuda “was the most appropriate forum” to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 254-55, 611 A.2d at 397-98.

¶ 14. Other courts have also recognized that it may be appropriate in certain circumstances to decline jurisdiction in favor of a foreign judgment where the UCCJA factors demonstrate that it would be in the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Plas v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 490, 499 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that France represented the more convenient forum to resolve custody dispute); Ivaldi, 685 A.2d at 1327 (noting that “[t]he interests of the child are critical in determining which jurisdiction provides a more convenient forum” and remanding for the court to decide whether to decline jurisdiction in favor of Moroccan divorce judgment); Middleton v. Middleton, 314 S.E.2d 362, 368 (Va. 1984) (ruling that Virginia would “treat England as the equivalent of a statutory 'home state’ under the forum non conveniens provisions of the Act” and declining jurisdiction where child’s contacts with England were stronger); In re Ieronimakis, 831 P.2d 172, 179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that Greece was the more appropriate forum to adjudicate child custody where it was the child’s residence, contained the most significant family connections, and held the most substantial evidence concerning the child’s welfare).

*475¶ 15. As noted, the parties here have focused more on whether Canada had jurisdiction than whether it should have exercised it. That concern is understandable in light of the trial court ruling, which summarily dismissed the Canadian decision to retain jurisdiction on the ground that its failure to make findings relative to the criteria for the exercise of jurisdiction set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 1032 made it impossible to “presently determine whether the Canadian court properly exercised jurisdiction substantially in accordance with the UCCJA.” Upon careful review, however, we find that the trial court ruling does not withstand scrutiny.

¶ 16. Canada has not, of course, enacted the UCCJA, and its findings do not explicitly address the jurisdictional criteria of § 1032 as such. There was no real dispute before the Canadian court, however, that mother and the child had been living in Quebec for more than one year when she filed her custody petition in the Canadian family court in September 2002. Although the specific address that mother initially provided proved to be inaccurate, the Canadian court relied on evidence in the expert evaluation indicating that mother had settled in Quebec almost sixteen months before she filed the petition. Furthermore, father admitted in his Canadian pleadings that mother and the child had resided in Quebec for at least a year before she filed her petition, observing in one motion that it was not “until August 2002, that [father] became aware that [mother] and his child had moved to the jurisdiction of the District of St.-Francois, Province of Quebec.” Moreover, it is apparent that the Canadian court considered its assumption of jurisdiction to be in the interests of the child based on his Quebec residence, the significant evidence presented to the court concerning his physical and emotional health, and the perceived risks of returning the child to father in Vermont. The Canadian decision thus evinces at least two viable grounds for its exercise of jurisdiction under the UCCJA: as the child’s home state, under § 1032(a)(1), and as the state where at least one contestant and the child have a significant connection, where substantial evidence concerning the child’s welfare may be found, and where the assumption of jurisdiction would serve the child’s interests, under § 1032(a)(2)-(4).

¶ 17. Mother’s assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, it is similarly evident that the Bennington Family Court could reasonably assert jurisdiction on at least one ground as well, inasmuch as Massachusetts had expressly declined to exercise jurisdiction in *476favor of Vermont, and father and his family continued to reside in Vermont. See id. § 1032(a)(4) (Vermont has jurisdiction if “another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction”).

¶ 18. The question of whether jurisdiction exists, however, is separate from the question of whether it should be exercised. As to that issue, the record here shows that while Vermont may have issued the initial divorce decree and custody order in March 1999, the child had already left Vermont to live with mother in Massachusetts, had been out of Vermont for three years when father filed his petition for modification in August 2002, and indeed is acknowledged by all parties to have lived outside of Vermont for the last nine years. See Rocissono v. Spykes, 170 Vt. 309, 318, 749 A.2d 592, 599 (2000) (listing factors commonly considered by courts in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction, including “the location of the children at the time of the proceeding” and the “length of time that the children have or had been in or out of the forum state at the time the proceeding commenced”); see also Sampson v. Johnson, 846 A.2d 278, 289 (D.C. 2004) (directing trial court on remand to determine appropriate forum based on “the situation as it exists following the remand”).

¶ 19. It is equally evident from the record that substantial evidence relating to the child’s welfare and development was “more readily available” in Canada than Vermont when father filed his modification motion. 15 V.S.A. § 1036(c)(3). The Bennington Family Court’s September 2002 ruling acknowledged as much, noting the difficulty of obtaining evidence concerning the child’s best interests as he had not been before a Vermont court or apparently in the state since he was five years old. Further, we note that the court’s expressed concerns about mother’s state of mind and ability to care for the child’s neurological condition were purely speculative. The Canadian judgment, in contrast, rested on a relatively recent, comprehensive evaluation of the emotional and physical health of mother and the child; the child’s adjustment at school, intellectual development, and perceptions of father; and the likely emotional impact on the child of an abrupt reunification with father. Nor can we ignore the Canadian court’s obvious concern about the risks to mother and the child if compelled to litigate in father’s home state. We need not credit all of mother’s allegations *477of abuse to accept her belief, and the Canadian court’s implicit conclusion, that Canada provided a more secure forum. See, e.g., Stoneman v. Drollinger, 2003 MT 25, ¶ 34, 64 P.3d 997 (declining jurisdiction in Montana based, in part, on history of domestic violence and the mother’s sense “that she feels safer in Washington where . . . [the father] does not know her address or daily pattern of activities”).8 Therefore, despite father’s continued residence in Vermont, the conclusion is inescapable that Canada had a closer connection with the child and more substantial evidence concerning his health and welfare when father filed his motion, and that evidence and connection with Canada have undoubtedly only increased over time.

¶ 20. Balanced against these factors is the inescapable fact of mother’s patent and longstanding interference with father’s opportunity to establish parent-child contact. One of the fundamental goals of the UCCJA is the prevention of “forum-shopping” by one parent seeking an advantage over the other, Rocissono, 170 Vt. at 318, 749 A.2d at 598, and one of the specific statutory factors we must consider in determining an appropriate forum is whether the exercise of jurisdiction would “contravene any of the purposes” of the UCCJA. 15 V.S.A. § 1036(c)(5).9 There is no *478evidence here that mother was consciously forum-shopping in moving to Canada rather than, as she claimed, seeking to evade an allegedly abusive former spouse, but the ultimate effect in depriving father of his legal rights was the same. Nevertheless, in matters as serious as determining a child’s future, our paramount concern must remain focused on the welfare of the child. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl B., 867 P.2d 1074, 1079 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (“The prime consideration in determining if a court is an inconvenient forum is the best interests of the child.”). Accordingly, courts have recognized that, in deciding whether or not to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJA, the important goal of discouraging parental misconduct in child custody matters may — in rare instances — be outweighed by considerations relating to the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1203 (La. 1986) (“If the best interests of all children are to be served . . . [t]he imperative to discourage abduction and other violations of custody orders may, in extraordinary circumstances, be subordinated to the paramount concern in all custody matters for the welfare of the child.”); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 682 (Mich. 1993) (“Even in child snatching cases, courts have placed consideration of the child’s best interests ahead of punishment of the wrongdoer.”); State ex rel. Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (observing that the “clean hands” doctrine “is a discretionary ground for denying jurisdiction and does not supersede the best interests of the child”); Nehra v. Uhlar, 402 A.2d 264, 267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (recognizing that the children’s “welfare should not be sacrificed on the altar of judicial punishment of a parent for her wrongdoing in removing the children from a foreign jurisdiction, or in violating the order of a foreign court”).

¶ 21. For the reasons previously discussed, we conclude that this is one of those rare cases where the best interests of the child must take precedence over the policy goal of deterring parental wrongdoing. As noted, at the time of the original petition the child had been absent from Vermont for three years, and the family court consequently had no real evidentiary basis on which to evaluate the child’s welfare or determine his best interests for purposes of a custodial placement. The Canadian court, in contrast, was home to both the mother and the child and had access to current information concerning the child’s schooling, physical and emotional well-being, and attitude towards his parents. While *479we are reluctant to give even an appearance of rewarding parental misconduct, we cannot ignore the impact that distance and the passage of time have exerted in this matter. We conclude, therefore, that Canada was the more appropriate forum to resolve this matter, and that the Bennington Family Court should have declined jurisdiction in favor of the foreign forum.10

¶ 22. Several procedural objections to this conclusion are, of course, immediately apparent. First, the Bennington Family Court was not apprised of the Canadian proceeding when it issued its decision in September 2002, and thus can hardly be faulted for failing to defer to a proceeding of which it was unaware. Mother’s petition for relief from judgment, however, provided an opportunity to rectify this omission in the interests of the child, and we conclude that such relief was appropriate for the reasons stated. See Riehle v. Tudhope, 171 Vt. 626, 627, 765 A.2d 885, 887 (2000) (mem.) (recognizing that Rule 60(b)(6) “is intended to accomplish justice in extraordinary situations that warrant the reopening of final judgments after a substantial period of time”). We recognize as well that mother failed to appeal either the 2002 modification ruling (she was served by publication but claimed to be unaware of the ruling) or the subsequent 2006 order denying her motion to dismiss. As we have explained, however, and as other courts have also recognized, the important interest in finality of judgments must occasionally — in rare cases — yield to the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Livingston v. Livingston, 572 P.2d 79, 86 (Alaska 1977) (holding that the “paramount criterion of the best interest of the child” in custody matters justified invocation of Rule 60(b) to reopen final divorce judgment in light of subsequent disclosures); In re Drummond, 945 P.2d 457, 462 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that “[w]here the best interests of the child demand it, the exceptional circumstances” provision of Rule 60(b) should be used to reopen adoption decree); In re Matyaszek, 824 N.E.2d 132, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (noting that Ohio courts have “recognized that the child’s best interests are paramount in determining whether relief from judgment is appropriate”); State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 363 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Wis. 1985) (holding *480that final custody and support judgment may be reconsidered on motion for relief from judgment where failure to do so would have “significant future ramifications for . . . the child”). We conclude that this is such a case.

¶ 23. Finally, we note that, although apprised of the Bennington Family Court order, the Canadian court apparently made no effort to contact the Vermont family court to coordinate their efforts, as required by the UCCJA. See 15 V.S.A. § 1036(d) (requiring state courts to communicate with one another to “exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court”). Although the Canadian court was obviously not bound by this provision, comity would certainly have called for a higher level of international cooperation than was evidenced here. The UCCJA is not predicated upon reciprocation, however, and judicial proprieties must not be preserved at the expense of the interests of the child. Cifarelli, 158 Vt. at 253, 257, 611 A.2d at 397, 399 (observing that the UCCJA “is not a reciprocal law” and holding that “[a] failure to comply strictly with the communication provision does not require reversal”). Accordingly, we discern no procedural impediment to recognition of the Canadian judgment.

¶ 24. Nothing in the dissent undermines these fundamental conclusions. Nevertheless, several of the dissent’s claims merit a response.

¶25. As a threshold matter, we simply cannot let pass the dissent’s unnecessary characterization of the parties. While willing to tarnish mother’s character based on speculative findings lacking evidentiary support, the dissent virtually ignores documented evidence of father’s physical and psychological violence. The dissent makes much of the family court’s denial of mother’s motion for relief from abuse, overlooking the Massachusetts order granting such relief, as well as the visitation supervisor’s letter to the Massachusetts court expressing such concern about father’s “contained rage” and “emotional stability” that she requested a more secure setting and warned that release of the letter to father would “increase the likelihood of out of control behavior” toward mother, the child, and the supervisor herself. Nor is there sufficient acknowledgment by the dissent of the Canadian psychologist’s report setting forth in substantial detail mother’s *481allegations concerning father’s physical and emotional violence, as well as the child’s report concerning father’s threats.

¶ 26. We do not raise this issue to excuse mother’s misconduct or to indict father’s. Our role is not to make a case for either party, but to state the facts plainly and without embellishment. An argument for upholding the trial court’s refusal to recognize the Canadian judgment can certainly be made; it does not require manipulation of the record to do so.

¶ 27. The dissent’s tendency to overstate the case does not end with the record evidence. It asserts that the Court “bypasses” several legal standards “to reach its result.” Post, ¶ '34. This claim is also baseless. As a procedural matter, the dissent argues that, having failed to appeal either the 2002 order or the 2006 denial of her jurisdictional complaint, mother “was foreclosed” from seeking relief under Rule 60(b). Post, ¶ 41. We have, indeed, repeatedly observed that Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal, explaining that the important interest in finality of judgments demands that the rule be applied “guardedly,” Levinsky v. State, 146 Vt. 316, 318, 503 A.2d 534, 536 (1985) (per curiam denial of motion for reargument), and only in “extraordinary” circumstances. Riehle, 171 Vt. at 627, 765 A.2d at 887. Our holding that the instant case represents one of those rare instances justifying relief does not represent an abandonment of the rule but rather an application of it under “the historical authority of the courts of equity to reform judgments in special circumstances.” Levinsky, 146 Vt. at 318, 503 A.2d at 536 (quotation omitted); see also Kellner v. Kellner, 2004 VT 1, ¶ 12, 176 Vt. 571, 844 A.2d 743 (mem.) (“Finality and repose sometimes must yield to the interests of justice . . . .”); Koch v. Billings Sch. Dist. No. 2, 833 P.2d 181, 188 (Mont. 1992) (noting the general principle that while it is ordinarily not permissible to rely on Rule 60(b) “to remedy a failure to take an appeal,” this is not “an inflexible rule and in unusual cases a party who has not taken an appeal may obtain relief on motion”) (quotations omitted).

¶28. The dissent also asserts that, having argued for recognition of the Canadian judgment on the ground that Canada rather than Vermont had jurisdiction, mother waived any claim that Canada was the more convenient forum. Just as there are cases where a failure to appeal may not be fatal to relief from judgment, there are instances where a failure to object or raise a *482specific issue does not preclude its consideration on appeal. See Cardiff v. Ellinwood, 2007 VT 88, ¶ 12, 182 Vt. 602, 938 A.2d 1226 (mem.) (Court may consider issue not raised below “in the interests of judicial economy”); Ledbetter v. Brown City San Bank, 368 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (while failure to raise an issue below normally precludes review on appeal, “this rule is not inflexible and will not be applied where the issue is one of law concerning which the necessary facts have been presented”) (quotations omitted). This is plainly such a case. First, as our earlier discussion makes clear, the critical factors underlying a forum analysis are largely the same as those applicable to the issue of jurisdiction, to wit, the child’s home state, significant connections with the forum, and the location of substantial evidence concerning the child’s welfare, care, interests, and personal relationships. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 1032(a), 1036(a). Contrary to the implication of the dissent, therefore, the parties here were afforded ample opportunity to address the critical issues underlying our analysis. Furthermore, as earlier noted, this case has dragged on for too many years, and a remand to address the record evidence under a slightly different legal theory would represent a useless expenditure of time and resources and needlessly subject the child to continued instability.

¶ 29. On more substantive matters, the dissent also claims that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, “[t]he only extraordinary circumstance appearing in this case is mother’s criminal contumacy.” Post, ¶ 35. Here again the dissent has opted for rhetoric over a dispassionate review of the record. As the record makes clear, the child has lived and attended school in Canada for years, has thrived at school and in his community, and would suffer if that stability were threatened. Moreover, evidence and witnesses relating to the child’s schooling, home life, and personal relationships are all in Canada. As earlier noted, we are not the first court to recognize that, in weighing the important public interest in finality of judgments against the best interests of a child, the latter must sometimes predominate. Nor, in these highly unique circumstances, will granting Rule 60(b) relief in order to recognize the Canadian judgment unduly expand the rule’s scope or undermine its beneficial purposes. The case for relief is compelling and sound.

¶ 30. Finally, the dissent claims that the Canadian court’s exercise of jurisdiction was not based on the standards set forth *483in the UCCJA. It is true, as the dissent observes, that the Canadian court did not expressly address such UCCJA considerations as the child’s home state, whether another state had a closer connection with the child and his family, or the location of substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, present and future welfare, and personal relationships. Much of this information was in the record before it, however, and all of these factors undoubtedly informed the Canadian court’s explicit conclusion that the retention of jurisdiction was in the best interests of the child, a conclusion with which we fully concur. Thus, the Canadian court’s failure to follow the precise forms of Vermont law does not undermine its substantive conclusion that Canada was the more appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction.

II.

¶ 31. Our conclusion that the family court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the custody issue does not necessarily extend to the contempt motion. See Thompson v. Thompson, 171 Vt. 549, 550, 762 A.2d 1236, 1238 (2000) (mem.) (holding that a contempt proceeding is not a custody adjudication under the UCCJA and that the family court acted properly in considering a contempt motion despite its determination that New York offered a more convenient forum); Matthews v. Riley, 162 Vt. 401, 414, 649 A.2d 231, 240-41 (1994) (noting that the UCCJA does not affect the court’s inherent power to enforce existing custody orders). In this regard, however, we may take judicial notice of the fact that, while the instant appeal was pending, the family court vacated the contempt adjudication in response to mother’s disclosure of the whereabouts of the child.11 Civil contempt is essentially a coercive measure designed to compel compliance with a court order, and as such the contemnor always retains the power to “purge” or terminate the sanction through compliance. Sheehan v. Ryea, 171 Vt. 511, 512, 757 A.2d 467, 468 (2000) (mem.). Accordingly, it is well settled that a contemnor who chooses this option renders the contempt order moot and unappealable, for the court is then left with no means to grant effectual relief. See, e.g., Cent. Emergency Med. Servs., Inc. v. *484State, 966 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Ark. 1998) (holding that when appellant, adjudicated in contempt for failure to deliver certain documents, “purged its contempt, it rendered the propriety of the contempt order moot”); In re Browning, 573 P.2d 1095, 1095-96 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (dismissing appeal of contempt adjudication when mother delivered custody of child in compliance with court order); Vinson v. Vinson, 191 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that, when wife delivered property to husband in compliance with divorce judgment, she had “complied with the contempt judgment, thus rendering the case moot and unappealable”); see also In re Young’s Tuttle Street ROW, 2007 VT 118, ¶ 4, 182 Vt. 631, 939 A.2d 521 (mem.) (“[W]hen a tribunal has already granted the relief requested, the appellate case is moot, because the reviewing court can no longer grant effective relief.” (Quotation omitted.)). Accordingly, we conclude that the contempt claim has been rendered moot, and need not be addressed on appeal.

The portion of the family court order denying mother’s request for recognition of the Canadian judgment is reversed. The portion of the order denying mother’s request for relief from the judgment of contempt is reversed on the ground that the contempt order has been vacated and the issue is moot.