Kenneth Ray Chatman v. the State of Texas

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00400-CR
                              __________________

                   KENNETH RAY CHATMAN, Appellant

                                        V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

                 On Appeal from the 9th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 22-03-03134-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Kenneth Ray Chatman appeals his conviction for the manufacture

or delivery of a controlled substance. His indictment included two enhancement

paragraphs. In one appellate issue, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to

prove that he is the same person who was convicted in cause number 15,290, the




                                         1
prior conviction alleged in the first enhancement paragraph of the indictment.1 We

affirm.

      In 2022, Appellant was indicted for the manufacture or delivery of a

controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more

but less than two hundred grams, a first-degree felony. See 

(d). The indictment alleged two prior convictions for

enhancement purposes. See 

(d). The first enhancement

paragraph of the indictment alleged the following:

            And the GRAND JURY further presents that said Defendant,
      Kenneth Ray Chatman, was convicted of a felony, to wit: Burglary of
      a Building on March 22, 1984 in the 221st District Court of
      Montgomery County, Texas in Cause No. 15-290-CR and said
      conviction became final prior to the commission of the aforesaid
      offense in Count I of this Indictment.

The second enhancement paragraph alleged a prior conviction for robbery in 1986.

Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of manufacture or delivery of a controlled

substance and pleaded “not true” to the two enhancement allegations. The jury found

the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed Appellant’s punishment at forty

years of imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed.




      1
        Because Appellant’s only issue on appeal challenges the evidence supporting
the jury’s finding that Appellant was the same person previously convicted in cause
number 15,290 as alleged in the first enhancement paragraph, we do not discuss
evidence related to the primary offense or to the second enhancement paragraph.
                                          2
                     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists, and the

defendant is linked to that conviction. Henry v. State, 

 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016); Flowers v. State, 

 (Tex. Crim App. 2007).

No specific document or mode of proof is required to establish these two elements.

Henry, 

; Flowers, 

. Nor is there a “best

evidence” rule in Texas that requires a prior conviction be proven with any

document, much less any specific document. Flowers, 

. Any type

of evidence, documentary or testimonial, may suffice. See 

.

      The State may establish the existence of a prior conviction by admitting

certified copies of the judgment, but certified copies of a prior conviction are

normally insufficient standing alone to link the defendant to the prior conviction,

even if the name on the judgment and sentence matched that of the defendant in trial.

See Beck v. State, 

 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Paschall v.

State, 

 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also

Henry, 

. The State has the burden of proving the link between the

prior conviction and the defendant by bringing forth some additional evidence

showing that the defendant is the same person named in the previous conviction. See

Beck, 

; see also Henry, 

.

                                         3
      Typically, this link is established by admitting certified copies of a judgment

and sentence and authenticated copies of the Texas Department of Corrections

records, including fingerprints, supported by expert testimony identifying the prints

as identical to known prints of the defendant. Paschall, 

; see

Littles v. State, 

 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc, op. on

reh’g). While this may be the preferred and most convenient way to establish a prior

conviction and link it to the defendant, the State may prove these elements in

different ways, including the defendant’s admission or stipulation or testimony by a

person who was present when the defendant was convicted of the specified crime

and can identify the defendant as the person. See Henry, 

; Flowers,

. Acceptable evidence also includes documentary proof which

contains sufficient information to establish that a prior conviction exists and the

defendant’s identity as the person convicted, such as a record that contains

photographs or a detailed physical description of a named person and the accused

was present in court for the factfinder to compare his appearance with that person

described in the record. See Henry, 

; Flowers, 

-

22; Littles, 

; see also Dorsett v. State, 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1965).

      Regardless of the type of evidentiary “puzzle pieces” the State offers to prove

the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, the factfinder

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determines if the pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the evidentiary puzzle.

Flowers, 

 (citing Human v. State, 

 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g) (equating the proof used to prove prior convictions

to a jigsaw puzzle and the pieces of evidence fitting together like puzzle pieces));

see also Henry, 

. “If these two elements can be found beyond a

reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the puzzle are necessarily

legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Flowers, 

.

      In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding to determine whether, based

on that evidence, and the reasonable inferences from it, the jury was rationally

justified in finding the allegation “true” beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v.

State, 

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (describing legal sufficiency

standard); Young v. State, 

 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining

legal sufficiency standard used to sustain conviction “appl[ies] equally to the

affirmative findings necessary to sustain the imposition of an enhanced

punishment[]”). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to

witness testimony. Temple, 

.

                                      Analysis

      On appeal, Chatman argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

finding that he is the person who was convicted in cause number 15,290, as alleged

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in the first enhancement paragraph of his indictment. Jerry Stovall, a sergeant

investigator at the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, testified at trial

that he was a fingerprint examiner and an expert in fingerprint examination. He has

testified in courts in both Travis County and Montgomery County as an expert in

fingerprint identification. During his direct examination in Chatman’s trial, Sergeant

Stovall provided the following testimony, which ties Chatman based on his

fingerprints to several exhibits the State introduced into evidence during the trial:

      Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]) Showing you State’s Exhibit 25. Do you
      recognize this?

      A. I do.

      Q. What is it?

      A. It’s a ten-card which is one of those card stocks that I mentioned
      before where I intentionally recorded fingerprints, right hand, left hand
      on that card.

      Q. And when did you make it?

      A. Yesterday at about 4:50.

      Q. Okay. In the courtroom today do you see the person whose inked
      fingerprints appear on that card?

      A. I do.

      Q. Okay. Can you point to him and identify him by what he’s wearing?

      A. Dark suit and suit and -- sorry, my glasses. Kind of a multicolored
      tie.



                                           6
Q. Okay. Just for the record, out of the three people sitting at the defense
counsel table, which one are you pointing to?

A. The gentleman in the middle.

      [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, would the record reflect the
witness has identified the defendant?

       THE COURT: [] It shall.

....

Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]) So I want to show you what’s been
premarked as State’s Exhibit 24 and 14 in particular. Do you recognize
these?

A. I do.

Q. And how do you recognize them?

A. They were provided to me previously -- previous to this date to begin
working on this print packet.

Q. And is there a fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14?

A. There is.

Q. And have you compared the defendant’s fingerprints on the inked
print with that print on State’s 14?

A. I have.

Q. And do you have an opinion as to whether or not the fingerprints
were made by the same individual?

A. It’s my opinion that they belong to the same individual.

Q. Is that individual Kenneth Chatman?

A. Yes.
                                     7
State’s Exhibit 25, the ten-print fingerprint card of Appellant’s fingerprints

personally recorded and obtained by Stovall the day before trial, was admitted into

evidence. Other relevant exhibits admitted at trial include a December 4, 1981

Judgment placing Kenneth Chatman on probation for three years for burglary of a

building in cause number 15,290 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County

and depicting a right thumb print (State’s Exhibit 14); a March 22, 1984 Order

Revoking Probation and Pronouncing Sentence for Kenneth Ray Chatman in cause

number 15,290 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County and sentencing

him to three years of imprisonment for burglary of a building (State’s Exhibit 24);

an indictment in 2009 for Kenneth Ray Chatman for two counts of possession of a

controlled substance with intent to deliver/manufacture in cause number 09-10-

10267-CR in the 284th District Court in Montgomery County that listed a prior

conviction for felony burglary of a habitation in cause number 15,290 and a prior

conviction in 05-01-00769-CR for enhancement purposes (State’s Exhibit 15); the

judgment in cause number 09-10-10267-CR convicting “Kenneth Ray Chatman”

(identified by “State ID No. TX03283368”) of the 2009 offense and noting his plea

of true to the enhancements but bearing an unclear fingerprint (State’s Exhibit 16);

and a 2005 judgment in cause number 05-01-00769-CR for “Kenneth Ray Chatman”

(identified by “SID#: TX03283368”) with a fingerprint (State’s Exhibit 19).




                                         8
      On appeal, Appellant argues Stovall later testified that he did not use State’s

Exhibit 25, the inked fingerprint card as the “known” fingerprints in the case, as the

basis of comparison to the fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14 (the judgment placing

Kenneth Chatman on probation in cause number 15,290). In support of that

argument, Appellant relies on the following testimony by Stovall:

      Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]): I want to start here on State’s 24. Can you
      tell us what the cause number is in this case?

      A. 15290.

      Q. And what is the defendant’s name on this order?

      A. Kenneth Ray Chatman.

      Q. And what is this document titled up on the top?

      A. Order Revoking Probation and Pronounce Sentence - - Pronouncing
      Sentence[.]

      Q. I’m showing you State’s Exhibit 14. Is that the same cause number
      at the top?

      A. Correct.

      Q. And for the same defendant?

      A. Yes, sir.

      Q. And what charge do we see?

      A. Burglary of a building.

      Q. And is that a felony charge?

      A. Yes, sir.
                                          9
      Q. And at the very bottom where it says right thumbprint, do we see a
      print?

      A. Yes, sir.

      Q. You mentioned earlier that you were able to compare that to the
      inked card that we put right above in State’s 25. Is this the inked print
      you compared to that print?

      A. So I compared to the offense that he was in custody for currently,
      and that print matched that print.

      In relying on this testimony on appeal, Appellant argues that the “known”

fingerprint that Stovall compared to State’s Exhibit 14 was not admitted into

evidence, the source of the “known” fingerprint was never clarified, and the record

is unclear as to what fingerprint(s) Stovall compared to the fingerprint in State’s

Exhibit 14. Appellant further argues that the signature in State’s Exhibit 14 does not

appear to be similar to any signature offered by the State into evidence and it does

not provide any evidence of Appellant’s identity, and that the other exhibits

containing judgments linking Appellant to cause number 15,290 contain minimal

identifiers and are not sufficient to identify Appellant as the one convicted in those

exhibits.

      The jury heard Stovall’s initial testimony that he personally obtained

Appellant’s fingerprints the day before trial and those prints were recorded on a card,

admitted as State’s Exhibit 25. Sergeant Stovall testified that he agreed he

“compared the defendant’s fingerprints on the inked print with that print on State’s

                                          10
14[]” (the judgment for probation for in cause number 15,290), and in Stovall’s

expert opinion the fingerprints both belonged to Appellant. This testimony was

sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the first enhancement paragraph was true.

See Paschall, 

. The jury, as the sole judge of credibility and

weight to be attached to witness testimony, could have considered all of Stovall’s

testimony, drawn reasonable inferences from his testimony, and concluded that

Stovall’s testimony did not conflict with his prior testimony that in his expert opinion

the “known” fingerprints he collected from Appellant on State’s Exhibit 25 and the

fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14 both belonged to Appellant. See Temple, 

.

      In addition to Stovall’s testimony comparing the fingerprints, other evidence

supported the jury’s finding that Appellant is the same person who is the subject of

the conviction in cause number 15,290, and Stovall agreed that the fingerprint on

State’s Exhibit 19, the judgment in cause number 05-01-00769-CR for “Kenneth

Ray Chatman[,]” matched the inked fingerprint of Appellant that Stovall had

“compared it to earlier[.]” Notably, the SID number on that judgment matched the

SID number for “Kenneth Ray Chatman” on State’s Exhibit 16, the judgment in

cause number 09-10-10267-CR and the judgment recites that “Kenneth Ray

Chatman” pleaded true to the prior convictions alleged in the enhancement

paragraphs, and the indictment in cause number 09-10-10267-CR (admitted as

                                          11
State’s Exhibit 15) stated that one of the prior convictions alleged for enhancement

purposes was the conviction in cause number 15,290. Sergeant Stovall testified that

the SID numbers are assigned by the State of Texas when someone is arrested, the

number never changes during an individual’s life, and the SID number is linked to

the individual’s fingerprints anytime they are booked for an offense.

      Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding,

we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellant is the person who is the subject of the prior

conviction in cause number 15,290. See Temple, 

; Flowers, 

. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, and we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.


                                                         LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                              Justice

Submitted on October 9, 2023
Opinion Delivered December 13, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.




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