Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

                                 In The

                           Court of Appeals

                Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                          __________________

                          NO. 09-23-00040-CV
                          __________________

       SAM-CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC, Appellant

                                    V.

            MARICELA SALAZAR-LINARES, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 163rd District Court
                     Orange County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. B190455-C
__________________________________________________________________

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     When an “action” is filed arising “out of the provision of professional

services” by a licensed or registered engineer, Texas law requires the

plaintiff to file an affidavit from a third-party-licensed professional

engineer describing (1) the theory of recovery, (2) the negligence or other

action, error, or omission of the engineer in providing the professional

                                    1
service, and (3) “the factual basis for each such claim.” 1 Unless the

statute of limitations expires in ten days, the affidavit, when required,

must be filed “with the complaint[.]” 2 If the action arises out of the

provision of professional services by a licensed engineer and the plaintiff

fails to file the affidavit required by the statute, the statute provides: “A

claimant’s failure to file the affidavit in accordance with this section shall

result in dismissal of the complaint against the defendant.” 3

     The parties to this appeal disagree about whether the action the

plaintiff filed against the defendant is one that arose from the defendant’s

provision of professional services through its licensed engineer. In March

2019, Martin Salazar-Linares suffered fatal injuries while working as a

manual laborer on a construction site in Orange County, Texas. Martin’s

wife, Maricela Salazar-Linares, brought a wrongful death and survival

action on behalf of herself and her husband’s estate against several

defendants, including SAM-Construction Services, LLC (SAM), a firm

that, as is relevant here, employed a licensed engineer. SAM moved to


     1Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a), (b).
     2Id. § 150.002(a), (c).
     3Id. § 150.002(e).

                                      2
dismiss the complaint Maricela filed against it because she failed to

include an affidavit from a third-party licensed professional engineer

with the complaint. When the trial court ruled on SAM’s motion, it didn’t

dismiss Maricela’s complaint; instead, the court dismissed some but not

all of Maricela’s claims. Subsequently, SAM filed this interlocutory

appeal. 4

     On appeal, the parties disagree about whether Maricela’s “action”

arises from SAM’s “provision of professional services by a licensed or

registered professional” on the construction site where Martin was

killed. 5 Because the allegations in Maricela’s Second Amended Petition

show that her claim constitutes an action for damages arising from

SAM’s provision of professional services by SAM’s licensed engineer, we

conclude the Certificate of Merit Statute required Maricela to file an

affidavit from a licensed third-party engineer with her Second Amended

Petition. Because she didn’t do so, we hold the trial court erred in failing

to dismiss all of Maricela’s claims against SAM, as that’s the relief



     4Id. § 150.002(f).
     5See id. § 150.002(a).

                                     3
required by the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature when a claim

is based on alleged errors or omissions by the defendant in the provision

of professional services by the defendant, a licensed or professional

engineer, or the defendant engineering firm. 6

     For the reasons explained below, we reverse the trial court’s

February 2, 2023 order granting SAM’s motion in part and denying

SAM’s motion in part. We remand the cause to the trial court, and we

instruct the trial court to sign an order dismissing Maricela’s action—her

petition—against SAM. And when ordering Maricela’s petition against

SAM dismissed, the trial court may order the dismissal to be with or

without prejudice, the options given to the trial court by the Certificate

of Merit Statute. 7

                              Background

     In February 2019 through a written work authorization, the Texas

Department of Transportation (TxDoT) gave SAM the responsibility to

“perform engineering services” on the project at issue in this suit. The



     6Id. § 150.002(e).
     7Id.

                                    4
TxDot agreement with SAM on this project was subject to the terms of a

master contract, signed in 2016, and titled “Contract for Engineering

Services.” The master contract includes a general description of the

“engineering services” the State wanted SAM to provide. The master

contract describes the services “as Construction Engineering Inspection

(CEI) services to assist the State in managing its construction operations

before, during, and after the construction of improvements[.]” Under the

terms of the master contract: “All engineering services provided by the

Engineer will conform to standard engineering practices and applicable

rules and regulations of the Texas Engineering Practices Act and the

rules of the Texas Board of Professional Engineers.” 8

     In March 2019, Martin was electrocuted while working as a manual

laborer on a TxDot construction project, which involved work that various

contractors were performing on Interstate 10 (I-10). The company Martin

was working for was working on installing light poles along a sidewalk,

which ran next to the access road to I-10. On appeal, it’s undisputed that

Martin was electrocuted when a fellow employee, operating a side-boom


     8The master contract expressly defines the term Engineer as SAM.

                                    5
tractor and using the tractor, lifted a light pole into the air and caused

the pole to contact an overhead power line. When the pole was energized

by the line, electricity flowed through the tractor to the ground,

electrocuting Martin while he was leaning against the tractor and

standing on the ground.

     Third Coast Services, LLC (Third Coast) is the contractor that

TxDot hired to complete the construction work on the sidewalks beside

the access road. Third Coast contracted with two other companies, South

Texas Illumination, LLC (South Texas Illumination) and Flex Supply,

LLC (Flex Supply) to perform part of that work.

     At first, Maricela brought a wrongful death and survival action on

behalf of herself and her husband’s estate against Third Coast, South

Texas Illumination, and Flex Supply. 9 According to Maricela’s original

petition, Martin was a construction employee “of both” South Texas and

Flex Supply.




     9Third Coast, South Texas, and Flex Supply are parties to the case

in the trial court but are not parties to SAM’s interlocutory appeal.
                                     6
     In March 2021, Maricela amended her petition, adding SAM and

some other defendants, which are not relevant to this appeal, to her

suit. 10 The parties dispute whether the allegations in Maricela’s First

Amended or Second Amended Petition are the allegations relevant to

analyzing whether her claims arise out SAM’s provision of professional

services by its licensed engineer. For that reason, we will discuss the

relevant allegations in both petitions. As to Sam, the Plaintiff’s First

Amended Petition alleges:

     At all relevant times, Defendant Sam . . . was hired to inspect
     the illumination project being performed by all Defendants.
     According to its website, SAM ‘provide[s] construction
     services solutions, including contract administration,
     construction engineering and inspection, observation, quality
     assurance and quality management, and the development of
     quality manuals and specifications’—which, upon information
     and belief, it was hired to do and/or purported to do in this
     accident. SAM, according to its website, ‘supports clients and
     contractors by putting clear processes in place to keep
     communication open and maintain project schedules and
     budgets’ and ensures clients receive the foundational data
     and management support they need to successfully complete
     construction work’—which, upon information and belief, it

     10The   First Amended Petition also named SAM-Construction
Services, LLC, SAM, LLC, and Sam Construction and Investment, Inc.
as defendants. These entities answered, but Maricela nonsuited them on
November 3, 2021. When Maricela filed her Second Amended Petition,
she did not add them back to her suit.
                                  7
     was hired to do and/or purported to do in this accident.
     Moreover, SAM claims it ‘provides construction teams around
     the nation the construction engineering and inspection
     oversight they need to keep projects compliant, on time, and
     on budget….[o]ur program managers are already familiar
     with your state and local requirements…[and] work with
     contractors, consultants, trades, and vendors to keep
     communication open, maintain project controls, and set clear
     expectations for quality and performance’—which, based
     upon information and belief, it was hired to do and/or
     purported to do in this accident.

     As to SAM, the First Amended Petition alleges more than fourteen

theories of negligence. 11 As alleged in the First Amended Petition, SAM’s

agents, servants, and employees were negligent in:

      (1) “fail[ing] and neglect[ing] to properly park the side-boom
          tractor or crane, fail[ing] and neglect[ing] to have the side-boom
          tractor or crane under proper control, and fail[ing] to obtain or
          maintain the necessary licensure, permits or certifications to
          operate said side-boom tractor or crane[;]”
      (2) “[p]roviding construction services solutions, including contract
          administration, construction engineering and inspection,
          observation, quality assurance and quality management, and
          the development of quality manuals and specifications;”
      (3) “[s]upporting [South Texas Illumination, Flex Supply, and
          Third Coast], clients and contractors by putting clear
          processes in place to keep communication open and maintain
          project schedules and budgets and ensuring [they] and clients


     11To simplify the opinion, the paragraph numbers we have used in

the opinion for the allegations in the petition are not identical to the
paragraph numbers used in the plaintiff’s petition.
                                   8
    receive[d] the foundational data and management support they
    need[ed] to successfully complete construction work;”
(4) “[p]roviding construction teams around the nation the
    construction engineering and inspection oversight they need
    to keep projects compliant, on time, and on budget and
    ensuring SAM’s program managers are already f amiliar
    with contractor, municipal, state, and local requirements and
    are followed;”
(5) “[w]orking with [South Texas Illumination, Flex Supply, and
    Third Coast], to keep communication open, maintain project
    controls, and set clear expectations for quality and
    performance;”
(6) “[p]roviding    adequate training        for    its  employees,
    subcontractors and agents in the use of side-boom tractors or
    cranes;”
(7) “[p]roviding    adequate training        for    its  employees,
    subcontractors and agents in working near extremely
    dangerous high-voltage electric powerlines;”
(8) [a]dequately supervising employees, subcontractors and agents
    when working with extremely dangerous equipment;”
(9) [w]arning its employees, subcontractors and agents of the
    dangers of working near extremely dangerous equipment;”
(10) “[w]arning its employees, subcontractors and agents of the
    danger of working in and around high voltage electric
    powerlines;”
(11) “[i]instructing its employees, subcontractors and agents in
    the proper safety procedures when working near extremely
    dangerous equipment;”
(12) “[e]nsuring its employees, subcontractors and agents [were]
    properly licensed to operate side-boom tractors or cranes;”
(13) “[p]reparing and providing safety policies or procedures;”
(14) “[o]ther acts of omission and/or commission to be specified
    after an adequate time for discovery or at the time of trial;” and
(15) the gross negligence of Sam in negligently hiring, retaining,
    supervising, and inspecting “the work of South Texas
    Illumination and its employees and/or servants.”
                               9
     After it was served with Maricela’s First Amended Petition, SAM,

relying on the Certificate of Merit Statute, moved to dismiss. 12 In its

motion, Sam alleged that it was “a professional engineering firm that

provides professional engineering services.” It also alleged that the

plaintiff’s claims for damages were based on SAM’s “provision of

professional services.” Noting that Maricela didn’t file an affidavit from

a third-party licensed engineer with her First Amended Petition, SAM

argued that the Certificate of Merit Statute gave it the right to have

Maricela’s claims dismissed.

     When Maricela responded to SAM’s motion, she argued that SAM’s

liability for Martin’s death arose from SAM’s conduct “in the capacity of

construction management services—not in the practice of engineering.”

According to Maricela’s response, SAM’s liability was not based on any

“errors or omissions in providing professional engineering services.”

Instead, Maricela argued SAM’s liability arose from its “failure to provide

a safe work environment and fail[ure] to warn employees, including but



     12Id. § 150.002.

                                    10
not limited to Martin[], of the associated dangers with overhead

powerlines and the construction zone in question.”

     Following a hearing on SAM’s motion in October 2021, the trial

court signed an order that granted in part and denied in part SAM’s

motion to dismiss. The trial court’s order didn’t specify what claim or

claims were dismissed; instead, the order the trial court signed recites:

“This Court GRANTS the motion as to Plaintiff’s claims arising out of the

[SAM’s] provision of professional engineering services or the practice of

engineering[.]” The order was also vague as to the claims the trial court

allowed to remain in the case, as the order recites: “This Court DENIES

the motion as to all remaining Plaintiff’s claims that do not fall within

[SAM’s] provision of professional engineering services.”

     In November 2021, Maricela non-suited her claims against SAM. A

day later and based on the notice of nonsuit against SAM, the trial court

signed an order dismissing the plaintiff’s “case and all claims” against

SAM “without prejudice to the refiling of same.” When Third Coast saw

that the trial court had dismissed SAM from the suit, it moved to




                                   11
designate SAM as a responsible third party. 13 In its motion, Third Coast

alleged that SAM had an employee with the authority on the job site

where Martin was killed who knew or should have known that Martin’s

employer was performing the work in a manner that presented a

potential hazard. Accordingly, Third Coast alleged, SAM’s representative

could have stopped the work or redirected it before Martin’s fatality

occurred.

     Even though Maricela opposed Third Coast’s motion to designate

SAM as a responsible third party, the trial court granted Third Coast’s

motion to designate SAM as a responsible third party in April 2022.14 In

September 2022, just five months later, Maricela amended her petition

again by filing a Second Amended Petition, and she brought SAM back

into the lawsuit. In Maricela’s Second Amended Petition, she reasserted

all the allegations in her First Amended Petition. In addition, Maricela’s

Second Amended Petition includes two new paragraphs that are not in



     13See id. § 33.004 (Designation of Responsible Third Party).
     14Maricela’s pleadings opposing the      designation are not in the
Clerk’s Record, but the trial court’s order granting Third Coast’s motion
reflects that the motion was opposed.
                                    12
her First Amended Petition. The first of the new paragraphs, paragraph

18, states:

     At no point in time relevant to the instant matter did SAM
     provide ‘professional services.’ For clarity, this suit does not
     involve ‘damages arising out of the provision of professional
     services by a licensed or registered professional,’ e.g., an
     engineer, as such is defined in TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.
     CODE Chapter 150. No engineering services were ever
     provided by SAM.

The other new paragraph in the Second Amended Petition—paragraph

19—quotes testimony provided at a deposition taken by the attorney from

the plaintiff’s firm, which the attorney elicited from a corporate

representative presented by Third Coast. According to Third Coast’s

corporate representative, Josh Jakubik, the job where Martin’s fatality

occurred “was engineered[;]” however, SAM was not there that day in its

capacity as an engineer but was there inspecting safety on the scene.

     On September 21, 2022, SAM filed supplemental objections to the

motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s petition, arguing that, based on what the

trial court said in the October 2021 hearing, the trial court’s order

denying its motion should reflect that the trial court denied its motion

“in toto.” SAM also claimed in the supplemental motion that the trial

                                    13
court’s refusal to sign a clear order that dismissed the plaintiff’s action

against it was “an artificial attempt to interfere with SAM[’s] statutorily

guaranteed right to seek appellate review” from the trial court’s ruling

on SAM’s motion, a ruling that SAM “believes to be incorrect.” The

supplemental motion concludes:

           Either the claims by the Plaintiff against [SAM] arise
     out of [SAM’s] engineering services, or they do not. The
     parties deserve and are entitled to an order either granting or
     denying the motion.

     In October 2022, the trial court conducted another hearing on

SAM’s supplemental motion to dismiss. In this hearing, the trial court

orally denied SAM’s motion but following the hearing, didn’t sign a

written order. Consequently, the only “ruling” of record on SAM’s motion

to dismiss was the ruling SAM obtained on the Amended Motion to

Dismiss, that is the motion it filed in August 2021 addressing the

allegations in Maricela’s First Amended Petition. Consequently, SAM

filed a petition for mandamus seeking to require the trial court to rule on

its motion.

     In its petition, filed in November 2022, SAM argued the trial court

abused its discretion in refusing to provide the parties with a clear
                                    14
written ruling on SAM’s motion. According to SAM’s petition, SAM

claimed that by signing an order partially granting and partially denying

SAM’s motion and by subsequently refusing SAM’s request to dismiss

Maricela’s petition, the trial court had refused to rule on the merits of

SAM’s motion, depriving SAM of an adequate remedy even if it were to

later exercise its right appeal after the case was tried. 15

     In December 2022, we conditionally granted SAM’s petition for

mandamus relief. 16 We concluded that, by failing to specify what claims

were dismissed, the trial court’s October 2021 order granting SAM’s

motion failed to allow a court to determine whether the action that

remained was still one for damages arising from SAM’s provision of

professional services by its licensed engineer. 17 We suggested that the

trial court “vacate its order of October 14, 2021. 18

     After we granted SAM’s petition for mandamus relief, the parties

returned to the trial court. There, SAM filed a motion in which it


     15See In re SAM-Constr. Servs., LLC, No. 09-22-00363-CV,
2022 WL 17844022
, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 22, 2022, orig. proceeding).
    16Id. at *8.
    17Id.
    18Id.

                               15
requested the trial court to “enter an order granting [SAM’s] Amended

Motion to Dismiss, or [to] alternatively, [ ] issue a new order definitively

ruling on the merits of the Amended Motion to Dismiss[.]” On February

2, 2023, the trial court vacated its order and signed a new order. The trial

court signed a new order, and the new order—for the first time—

addressed the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition. 19 Yet

the trial court’s order doesn’t simply grant or deny SAM’s motion.

Instead, the trial court signed the proposed order that was prepared by

the plaintiff’s firm, an order granting SAM’s motion in part and denying

it in part. This time, however, the order strikes some words and one

paragraph from the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, so to that

degree the order is somewhat more specific. As amended by the trial

court’s order, the Second Amended Petition (with the strikethroughs for

reference but not for content) now states: 20



     19Tex.   R. Civ. P. 65 (Substituted Instrument Takes Place of
Original); FM P’ship. v. Bd. of Regents,
255 S.W.3d 619, 633
 (Tex. 2008)
(“[A]mended pleadings and their contents take the place of prior
pleadings.”).
      20The numbers used for the paragraphs in the opinion track the

numbers used earlier for these same paragraphs in the First Amended
                                   16
      (2) Providing construction services solutions, including
      contract administration, construction engineering and
      inspection, observation, quality assurance and quality
      management, and the development of quality manuals and
      specifications;
      (4) Providing construction teams around the nation the
      construction engineering and inspection oversight they need
      to keep projects compliant, on time, and on budget and
      ensuring SAM’s program managers are already familiar with
      contractor, municipal, state, and local requirements and are
      followed;
      (14) Other acts of omission and/or commission to be specified
      after an adequate time for discovery or at the time of trial.

Apart from these strikethroughs, SAM’s Amended Motion to Dismiss, as

supplemented by the objections that SAM filed after Maricela filed her

Second Amended Petition, was denied. The day the trial court signed the

order with the strikethroughs, SAM filed its notice of interlocutory

appeal. 21

                          Standard of Review

      At issue is whether Maricela’s petition triggered the requirements

of Chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which we




Petition, as the allegations (except for the strikethroughs, since those
words are not crossed out in the First Amended Petition) are identical.
      21See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002
(f).

                                   17
will refer to as the Certificate of Merit Statute. 22 We review a trial court’s

order denying a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion. 23 A trial court

abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or acts

without reference to any guiding rules and principles. 24 “The mere fact

that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority

in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance

does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” 25

      When the issue requires a court to interpret a statute, we conduct

that review de novo. 26 When construing the Certificate of Merit statute,

we start by applying the “plain and common meaning of the statute’s




      22Id. §§ 150.001—150.004.
      23Pipkins v. Labiche Architectural Grp., Inc.,
661 S.W.3d 842
, 848

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2022, pet. denied).
      24See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238
, 241-

42 (Tex. 1985).
      25Id. at 242.
      26See Tex. W. Oaks Hosp. LP v. Williams,
371 S.W.3d 171, 177
 (Tex.

2012) (explaining that the nature of claims the Legislature intended to
include under the umbrella of an act that requests an expert report is “a
legal question,” reviewed “de novo”).
                                   18
words.” 27 In construing the statute, our goal is to “determine and give

effect to the Legislature’s intent[.]” 28

                                  Analysis

      In SAM’s first issue, it argues the trial court erred in failing to

dismiss the plaintiff’s claims against it because Maricela never filed an

affidavit of a licensed engineer as required by Chapter 150. SAM

contends that in our review, we should look to the allegations in

Maricela’s First Amended Petition because those are the allegations

Maricela filed when SAM initially filed its motion to dismiss.

      No one disputes that if the Certificate of Merit Statute applies, the

statute requires the affidavit of a licensed third-party engineer to be

“file[d] with the complaint.”29 To be sure, in the ordinary case not

involving a dismissal of the engineering defendant from the suit, we have


      27Id. (cleaned up).
      28Id.
      29See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002
(a) (requiring the

affidavit to be filed “with the complaint”); AMEC Foster Wheeler USA
Corp. v. Goats, No. 09-18-00477-CV,
2019 WL 3949466
, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Aug. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). (“A certificate of merit must
be filed with the first-filed complaint if the claims arise out of the
provision of professional services by a licensed or registered engineer.”).

                                      19
said that we look to the plaintiff’s initial complaint against the defendant

engineer or engineering firm when determining whether the claim for

damages that the plaintiff filed is one that arises from the provision of

professional services by the licensed engineer. 30

     This case, however, has an unusual procedural history, as Maricela

nonsuited her claims against SAM eight months after she filed her First

Amended Petition. Those claims were nonsuited by written order, an

order the trial court signed in November 2021. Consequently, Maricela’s

Second Amended Petition contains Maricela’s live claims, making them

the first claims against SAM after her initial claims were voluntarily

dismissed. Moreover, the Certificate of Merit statute contemplates that

a case against an engineer or engineering firm may be dismissed without

prejudice, so we presume the legislature intended to allow plaintiffs the

opportunity to refile a suit by alleging claims narrowly to raise theories

of liability that would avoid making the plaintiff’s action one that arises




     30See Goats,
2019 WL 3949466
, at *3.

                                    20
from the engineer or engineering firm’s provision of professional

services. 31

      For example, take an engineering firm that designed an

engineering plan for a scaffold for a construction company building a

skyscraper. One of the engineering firm’s engineers drives up to the

skyscraper, hits the scaffold, causing the scaffold to collapse. Several

workers on the scaffold are seriously injured as a result. The workers

could sue the engineer and the engineer’s firm on a theory of negligence

based on the manner the engineer drove the car—in other words, avoid

filing an action that alleged an engineering claim. Or the plaintiffs could

sue the engineer and engineering firm claiming the scaffold was

defectively designed and the design contributed to the scaffold’s collapse.

In that case, those allegations would trigger the Certificate of Merit

Statute and require the plaintiffs to file an affidavit from a third-party

licensed engineer. Last, the plaintiffs could sue the engineer and the

engineering firm on both theories, that the engineer was negligent in the

manner the engineer drove the car and on a theory that the scaffold was


      31See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002
(e).

                                    21
defectively designed. In that case, the fact the petition included an action

for damages on an engineering theory would trigger the Certificate of

Merit Statute and require the plaintiffs to file an affidavit from a licensed

third-party engineer. If they did not, the petition would be required to be

dismissed.

     Given that Maricela’s case includes a dismissal of her suit, we will

focus on the allegations in her live pleadings, her Second Amended

Petition to decide whether her allegations triggered the Certificate of

Merit Statute and required her to file an affidavit with her petition of a

third-party licensed engineer.

     Except for the two new paragraphs in Maricela’s Second Amended

Petition, the allegations in her Second Amended Petition largely overlap

those she made against SAM in her First Amended Petition. One of the

two new paragraphs in the Second Amended Petition alleges that

Maricela’s claim for damages doesn’t arise out of SAM’s provision of

professional services by a licensed or registered professional. In the

second new paragraph, Maricela cited testimony from Josh Jakubik to

the effect that the job where Martin was working when he was killed was

                                     22
“engineered,” but that SAM was on the job site to inspect the safety of

the scene and wasn’t there as an engineer.

     On appeal, Maricela explains that she isn’t conceding that her

claims for damages against SAM are claims that arose from SAM’s

providing engineering services to TxDoT. Instead, she argues that as to

SAM, her claims are based on the duties SAM owed to Martin to provide

him with a safe workplace, duties Maricela argues are not duties that are

based on SAM’s status as a firm that employs a licensed engineer. In her

brief, Maricela construes the claims in her petition narrowly, asserting

her theories are limited to claims like “negligent supervision, negligent

instruction, and failure to warn about working with or near extremely

danger[ous] equipment and high voltage electric powerlines[.]”

     Even though Maricela argues her actions are not based on a theory

that her damages arise from SAM’s providing professional services to

TxDoT, paragraph seventeen of her petition—a paragraph the trial court

never struck or altered in any way—alleges:

     17. At all relevant times, Defendant Sam-Construction Services
     LLC (hereinafter, “SAM”) was hired to inspect the illumination
     project being performed by all Defendants. According to its
     website, SAM ‘ provide[s] construction services solutions,
                                   23
     including contract administration, construction engineering and
     inspection, observation, quality assurance and quality
     management, and the development of quality manuals and
     specifications’—which, upon information and belief, it was hired
     to do and/or purported to do in this accident. SAM, according to
     its website, ‘supports clients and contractors by putting clear
     processes in place to keep communication open and maintain
     project schedules and budgets’ and “ensures clients receive the
     foundational data and management support they need to
     successfully complete construction work”—which, upon
     information and belief, it was hired to do and/or purported to do
     in this accident. Moreover, SAM claims it ‘ provides
     construction teams around the nation the construction
     engineering and inspection oversight they need to keep projects
     compliant, on time, and on budget….[o]ur program managers are
     already familiar with your state and local requirements…[and]
     work with contractors, consultants, trades, and vendors to keep
     communication open, maintain project controls, and set clear
     expectations for quality and performance’—which, based on
     information and belief, it was hired to do and/or purported to do
     in this accident.

As to SAM, Maricela adopted paragraph 17 by reference in her Second

Amended Petition four times, once each time Maricela pled her actions

against SAM for vicarious liability, negligence, negligence per se, and

gross negligence. 32




     32See Tex. R. Civ. P. 58 (Allowing statements in pleadings to be

adopted by reference).
                                    24
      Normally, resolving whether the allegations in a pleading trigger

the Certificate of Merit Statute requires that a court decide two things.

First, the court must decide whether the petition alleges a claim that

involves damages against a licensed engineer or a firm that employed a

licensed engineer who practiced with the firm at a time relevant to the

dispute with the entity named as the defendant in the suit. 33 Second, the

court must determine whether, under the allegations in the plaintiff’s

petition, the plaintiff’s action seeks to recover damages that arise out of

the provision of professional services by the licensed professional. 34 Here,

the first step of that test is undisputed—no one claims SAM at the time

relevant to the dispute wasn’t a licensed engineering firm under the

definition of licensed professional as defined by the Certificate of Merit

Statute. 35

      Under the Certificate of Merit Statute, the term practice of

engineering carries the meaning “assigned by Section 1001.003,




      33Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.001(-c).
      34Id. § 150.002(a).
      35Id.

                                     25
Occupations Code.” 36 Under the Occupations Code, the term practice of

engineering:

     means the performance of or an offer or an attempt to perform
     any public or private service or creative work, the adequate
     performance of which requires engineering education,
     training, and experience in applying special knowledge or
     judgment of the mathematical, physical, or engineering
     sciences to that service or creative work. 37

The Statute then defines the practice of engineering by providing a non-

exhaustive list of examples that includes:

     (1) consultation, investigation, evaluation, analysis, planning,
     engineering for program management, providing an expert
     engineering opinion or testimony, engineering for testing or
     evaluating materials for construction or other engineering
     use, and mapping;

     (2) design, conceptual design, or conceptual design
     coordination of engineering works or systems;

     (3) development or optimization of plans and specifications for
     engineering works or systems;

     (4) planning the use or alteration of land or water or the
     design or analysis of works or systems for the use or alteration
     of land or water;

     (5) responsible charge of engineering teaching or the teaching
     of engineering;

     36Id. § 150.001(3).
     37Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1001.003(b).

                                   26
     (6) performing an engineering survey or study;

     (7) engineering for construction, alteration, or repair of real
     property;

     (8) engineering for preparation of an             operating or
     maintenance manual;

     (9) engineering for review of the construction or installation
     of engineered works to monitor compliance with drawings or
     specifications;

     (10) a service, design, analysis, or other work performed for a
     public or private entity in connection with a utility, structure,
     building, machine, equipment, process, system, work, project,
     or industrial or consumer product or equipment of a
     mechanical, electrical, electronic, chemical, hydraulic,
     pneumatic, geotechnical, or thermal nature;

     (11) providing an engineering opinion or analysis related to a
     certificate of merit under Chapter 150, Civil Practice and
     Remedies Code; or

     (12) any other professional service necessary for the planning,
     progress, or completion of an engineering service. 38

     As we see it, Maricela argues that her liability theory is narrow, not

broad. Essentially, she claims her pleadings allege that SAM’s employees

negligently exercised or failed to exercise control over Martin’s work,



     38Id. § 1001.003(c).

                                    27
which created a dangerous condition or constituted the negligent activity

that she claims caused Martin’s death. 39 But given the broad allegations

in Maricela’s Second Amended Petition, viewing her pleadings as having

pleaded only a retained right of control theory is a revisionist view of

what she pleaded, a view requiring this Court to ignore what the words

in her pleadings say.

     For instance, Maricela’s Second Amended Petition alleges SAM was

negligent in “providing construction services” and that its negligence

included “preparing and providing safety policies and procedures.” Those

services weren’t limited to services that occurred onsite. Second, Maricela

complained that SAM was negligent in “the development of quality

manuals and specifications.” That service also didn’t occur solely on the

site where Martin’s electrocution occurred. We flatly reject the appellee’s

argument that her claims were narrowly pleaded and limited to a claim

that SAM negligently exercised a retained right of control over Martin’s

work.



     39See generally Clayton W. Williams, Inc. v. Olivo,
952 S.W.2d 523, 528
 (Tex. 1997).
                                    28
     Third, even if it’s possible to allege a negligent exercise of a retained

right of control theory without triggering the Certificate of Merit Statute

when suing an engineering firm, an issue we need not decide, the

pleadings Maricela filed are far too broad to have accomplished that here.

The Occupations Code’s definition of the practice of engineering includes

“consultation,”    “planning,”     and     “engineering      for    program

management.” 40 And for engineered jobs—which the Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Petition alleges this was—the practice of engineering includes

“monitor[ing] for compliance with drawing or specifications.” 41 Last, and

as relevant to the plaintiff’s allegations, the practice of engineering

includes “engineering for preparation of an operating or maintenance

manual.” 42

     Given the broad definition the legislature gave to the practice of

engineering, a plaintiff who wishes to avoid triggering the Certificate of



     40Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1001.003(c)(1).
     41Id. § 1001.003(c)(9).
     42We have focused on these allegations for convenience and do not

intend to imply that there aren’t other allegations in the petition that
would also trigger the third-party affidavit requirement in Chapter
150.002.
                                  29
Merit Statute should plead their claims carefully to avoid pleading an

action for damages that arises from the provision by the engineer or the

engineer’s firm of professional services by the firm’s licensed engineer.

We don’t doubt that’s possible in some cases depending on the facts of

how the accident occurred. But in this case, the plaintiff had more than

one opportunity to narrow her pleadings and avoid pleading a claim

against SAM based on an engineering theory when she did not.

     We conclude the allegations in the plaintiff’s Second Amended

Petition required the claimant to file an affidavit of a licensed third-party

engineer. 43 It’s undisputed that no affidavit was filed.




     43Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(a).

                                     30
                                The Remedy

      Subsection 150.00(2)(e) provides the consequences for failing to file

the required licensed engineer’s affidavit with the petition. 44 “A

claimant’s failure to file the affidavit in accordance with this section shall

result in dismissal of the complaint against the defendant.”45 The

“complaint” is defined in the statute as “any petition or other pleading,

which, for the first time, raises a claim against a licensed or registered

professional for damages arising out of the provision of professional

services by the licensed or registered professional.” 46 As we’ve explained,

we have construed “for the first time” to mean the first time following the

dismissal of the claim based on the procedural history in this appeal.

     The remedy prescribed by the Certificate of Merit Statute doesn’t

reflect that the legislature expected trial courts to engage in battlefield

triage when deciding whether to dismiss. That is, the legislature didn’t

intend to allow trial courts to selectively dismiss some claims while




     44Id. § 150.002(e).
     45Id.
     46Id. § 150.001(1-b).

                                     31
allowing others to proceed. 47 We have reached that conclusion because

the statute applicable to healthcare liability claims, Chapter 74.351 of

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, requires that a trial court

dismiss the claim when the required report isn’t filed, but the Certificate

of Merit Statute requires that a trial court dismiss the complaint.48

Chapter 150 defines complaint as “any petition or other pleading which,

for the first time, raises a claim against a licensed or registered

professional for damages arising out of the provision of professional

services by the licensed or registered professional.” 49

     While dismissing the complaint seems harsh, particularly in cases

where the petition may include just one claim that triggers Chapter 150,

our role isn’t to add language to a statute by redefining complaint to

mean a claim. Rather, we must “take statutes as we find them,




     47Id. § 150.002(e).
     48Compare id. §     74.351(b)(2) (authorizing a court to dismiss “the
claim with respect to the physician or health care provider, with prejudice
to the refiling of the claim”), with id. § 150.002(e) (authorizing a court to
dismiss “the complaint against the defendant”).
      49Id. § 150.001(1-b).

                                      32
presuming the Legislature included words that it intended to include and

omitted words it intended to omit.” 50

     When Maricela filed a Second Amended Petition with allegations

that triggered the Certificate Merit Statute without filing the affidavit

the Statute requires, SAM had a statutory right to have the trial court

dismiss Maricela’s complaint. 51 We hold the trial court abused its

discretion by denying SAM’s motion to dismiss. 52

                                Conclusion

     When reversing a trial court’s decision, we are required to render

the judgment the trial court should have rendered.53 SAM asks this Court

to “render a judgment of dismissal on all claims against SAM[.]” Yet as

SAM recognizes, it remains in the trial court’s discretion to decide

whether the plaintiff’s claims against SAM should be dismissed with

prejudice. 54 For that reason, we reverse the trial court’s order of February



     50Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. - El Paso v. Niehay,
671 S.W.3d 929
, 951 (Tex. 2023) (cleaned up).
     51Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(e).
     52Id. §§ 150.001(1-b), 150.002(a), (e).
     53Tex. R. App. P. 43.3.
     54Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 150.002(e).

                                   33
2, 2023. We remand the case to the trial court, and we instruct the trial

court to sign an order dismissing every claim Maricela asserted in her

Second Amended Petition against SAM. The court may dismiss the

claims against SAM with or without prejudice.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.




                                                  HOLLIS HORTON
                                                     Justice

Submitted on August 21, 2023
Opinion Delivered December 14, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.




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