Justin Russell Murdoch v. State
Date Filed2017-12-28
Docket07-17-00291-CR
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-17-00291-CR
JUSTIN RUSSELL MURDOCH, APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 54th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-1351-C2, Honorable Matt Johnson, Presiding
December 28, 2017
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Justin Russell Murdoch (appellant) appeals his two convictions on two counts of
indecency with a child by contact. Three issues lie before us, which issues will be
addressed in turn. We modify in part and affirm. 1
1 Because this appeal was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals, we decide the case in
accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee
courtâs decision would be inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
Issue One â No Fine
Under his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in stating within
the judgment on count two that appellant was assessed a fine of $10,000. The State
agrees. The jury did not levy a fine as part of its punishment. Thus, the issue is sustained,
and the judgment on count two is modified to redact mention of a $10,000 fine.
Issue Two â Lesser Included Offense
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to submit an instruction
on the lesser included offense of attempted indecency with a child by contact. As
acknowledged in his brief, the instruction was not requested by appellant. This is of import
since the trial court has no duty to submit one sua sponte. Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d
776, 781(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Bright v. State, No. 07-15-00118-CR,2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6885
, at *21 (Tex. App.âAmarillo June 29, 2016, pet. refâd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, the issue was not preserved for review. Goggins v. State, __S.W.3d __, __,2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 11123
, at *6-7 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] Nov. 30, 2017, no pet. h.); accord, Darnes v. State,118 S.W.3d 916, 921
(Tex. AppâAmarillo 2003, pet. refâd) (holding that âthe failure to ask the trial court to charge the jury on a lesser-included offense does not preserve the issue for reviewâ); see also Tolbert v. State,306 S.W.3d at 781-82
(stating that because the appellant did not request the
instruction, there was âno jury-charge âerrorâ to which Almanzaâs egregious harm analysis
would applyâ).
Issue Three â Evidence of Extraneous Offense
In his final issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
of an extraneous bad act when the State failed to provide reasonable notice of its intent
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to do so under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2). See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (West
2016) (stating that â[o]n timely request by a defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor
must provide reasonable notice before trial that the prosecution intends to introduce such
[extraneous offense] evidence . . . in its case-in-chiefâ). We overrule the issue.
The State sought to admit evidence of appellant touching the buttocks of another
child in rebuttal to the defensive theory of fabrication. The trial court eventually granted
leave to do so on that basis and instructed the jury that it âmay only consider the same in
rebutting the defensive theory of fabrication, if any, in connection with the offense, if any,
alleged against him in the indictment in this case and for no other purpose.â Because the
evidence was offered in rebuttal to a defensive theory raised by appellant, the prior notice
requirement of Rule 404(b)(2) did not apply. See Jaubert v. State, 74 S.W.3d 1, 4(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that âwhen the State presents extraneous offense evidence in rebuttal to mitigation evidence offered by the defendant, advance notice of intent to offer the extraneous offense evidence is not possible: âIn such a situation, the defendant, rather than the State, determines whether a contested issue will be raised, and his determination will not be made known until he presents his case. It would be practically impossible for the State to give notice until that time.ââ); Chung v. State, No. 10-16-00242-CR,2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 10006
, at *4-5 (Tex. App.âWaco Oct. 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (citing Jaubert and reiterating that the notice provision did not
apply to evidence of extraneous offenses offered in rebuttal to a defensive theory).
Furthermore, appellant does not attempt to explain why the holding in Jaubert is
inapplicable here.
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To the extent that appellant invokes the umbrella of due process as basis for
contending that he was entitled to prior notice, that argument went unmentioned at trial.
Thus, it was not preserved. See Chapman v. State, No. 10-14-00350-CR, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 7432, at *6 (Tex. App.âWaco July 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (stating that the complaint on appeal must correspond with objections and
arguments made at trial, and when a trial objection does not comport with the issue raised
on appeal, the issue is not preserved for review). Nor does he attempt to now explain
how and why due process would mandate the provision of prior notice when, as said in
Jaubert, it would be rather âimpossible for the State to give notice untilâ it became aware
of the need to defend against a particular defensive theory raised by the accused at trial.
We redact from the judgment on count two the reference to appellant being
assessed a fine of $10,000 and affirm that judgment as modified. We also affirm the
judgment on count one.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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