Ashley Coslett v. the State of Texas
Date Filed2023-12-22
Docket05-22-00173-CR
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Affirmed and Opinion Filed December 22, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00173-CR
ASHLEY COSLETT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-80156-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
Opinion by Justice Molberg
Ashley Coslett appeals a judgment adjudicating her guilt and sentencing her
to one year of confinement in state jail on a charge of abandoning or endangering a
child under penal code Ā§ 22.041, a state jail felony as alleged in the indictment.
Following entry of that judgment, Coslett moved for a new trial. In five issues,
Coslett claims the trial court erred by denying her motion for new trial and in
excluding certain evidence at the hearing on that motion, and she asks us to reverse
the judgment and remand for a new trial. We affirm the judgment in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
In January 2018, the State charged Coslett with abandoning or endangering a
child under Texas Penal Code Ā§ 22.041. The indictment alleged that, on or about
April 26, 2017, in Collin County, Coslett did,
then and there intentionally, knowingly, recklessly and with criminal
negligence, engage in conduct that placed [S.W.], a child younger than
15 years of age, in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical
or mental impairment, by supervising [S.W.] while impaired by
alcohol, and [Coslett] did not voluntarily deliver the child to a
designated emergency infant care provider under Section 262.302,
Family Code;
See TEX. PENAL CODE Ā§ 22.041(c), (f), (h) (describing offense under Subsection (c)
as a state jail felony and describing exception to application).1
Subject to a plea agreement, Coslett pleaded guilty, and the court entered an
order that deferred adjudication of Coslettās guilt, required payment of a $500 fine
1
Section 22.041 has been amended several times, but we need not belabor the legislative history in
light of the issues presented. Below, we quote the pertinent subsections currently in effect. Aside from
very slight changes in wording that have no impact on our analysis here, we note that the portions we quote
below were in effect prior to the alleged offense.
(c) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child . . . in
imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment.
....
(f) An offense under Subsection (c) is a state jail felony.
....
(h) It is an exception to the application of this section for abandoning or endangering a
child that the actor voluntarily delivered the child to a designated emergency infant care
provider under Section 262.302, Family Code.
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and $349 in court costs, and placed Coslett on community supervision for a period
of three years, subject to certain conditions. Time passed.
About eleven weeks before her community supervision period was to end, the
State filed a motion for an order to adjudicate Coslettās guilt, alleging Coslett had
violated five of the community supervision conditions.2 The trial court heard the
Stateās motion on December 2, 2021. In that hearing, Coslett made an open plea of
ātrueā to the Stateās allegations and expressed her understanding that she had the
right to appeal her punishment but not her plea of true to the Stateās allegations.
Coslett and her probation officer testified, and the trial court admitted the plea packet
into evidence without objection. Coslett offered no exhibits. After both sides rested
and closed, the trial court found Coslett sufficiently competent to make a plea, found
Coslettās plea was freely and voluntarily entered, found the Stateās allegations true,
adjudicated Coslettās guilt, and sentenced her to one year in state jail with credit for
certain time served.
After the trial court rendered its decision and sentenced her in open court, the
trial court made the following comments, to which Coslett responded:
[TRIAL COURT]: Ms. Coslett, I didnāt believe a word you said.
Youāve been having positive tests for alcohol throughout your time on
probation throughout this time. As far as I can tell youāve had it all the
way through August of this past year.
2
Although we are paraphrasing, the State alleged Coslett used alcohol, failed to perform community
service hours, failed to submit to testing on a portable alcohol-testing device, and failed to pay the fine and
court costs within 30 days as required under her community supervision conditions.
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Your lockout doesnāt make sense. This idea that somehow your at-
home device isnāt working or you couldnāt get one is inexplicable as it
relates to this stuff. I donāt believe in terms of the situation that you
gave me with regard to your concerns about your life and your daughter
being detrimental. Your decisions in these cases ā excuse me, this case,
has been detrimental to her and specifically yourself.
I disagree with [Coslettās trial counsel] as it relates to throwing away
the key. At some point in time we have to take responsibility for what
weāve done and all the chances that everybody has given you.
If it wasnāt clear enough, probation was tired [sic] after every single
time they filed motions and sanctions, asked to place you in jail, having
you do all of these extra things time after time after time and you kept
coming up with excuses and issues.
And your behavior at the probation department at previous times makes
me think that you are not taking any of this seriously and have not ever
taken it seriously, so Iām not going to take anything you say seriously.
And so ā
[COSLETT, individually, not through counsel]: I have my records.[3]
[TRIAL COURT]: That is the order, judgment, and decree of the Court.
And you may go with the bailiff. Thank you. Go with the bailiff, Ms.
Coslett.
The trial court signed the judgment adjudicating Coslettās guilt on December
9, 2022. Coslett, through new counsel, then filed various motions seeking a new
trial.4 The trial court heard Coslettās motion for new trial on February 10, 2022,
while it still had plenary power, and denied it the same day. Coslett timely appealed.
3
As indicated, Coslett offered no exhibits into evidence during the December 2, 2021 hearing.
4
The post-judgment motions in which Coslett sought a new trial included: (1) a December 31, 2022
motion for new trial, which asserted that āthe verdict is contrary to the law and evidence[,]ā see TEX. R.
APP. P. 21.3(h); (2) a February 3, 2022 āAmended Motion for New Trial and Motion for Leave to File,ā
which contained no such assertion or any other grounds listed in rule of appellate procedure 21.3; and a
February 3, 2022 āMotion to Modify, Vacate, or Amend Sentence,ā which similarly lacked any grounds
listed in rule of appellate procedure 21.3. Unless context indicates otherwise, we refer to those motions
together as Coslettās āmotion for new trial.ā
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
Coslett describes herself as a recovering alcoholic. She has expressed one
consistent theme since the trial court rendered its judgment adjudicating her guilt,
namely, that she is more committed to her recovery and probation than what the trial
court apparently believed at the time of adjudicating her guilt. In five issues, Coslett
argues that, by erroneously excluding certain evidence in the motion for new trial
hearing (second, third, and fourth issues), the trial court improperly deprived her of
her due process right to the trial courtās fair exercise of sentencing discretion (first
issue) and based its sentence on inaccurate information regarding her integrity and
commitment to probation (fifth issue). We disagree.
Exclusion of Evidence
In her second through fourth issues, Coslett argues the trial court erred by
excluding three exhibits in the motion for new trial hearing: (1) defense exhibit one,
a six-page journal entry she wrote while in jail, after the trial court imposed her
sentence and before she filed an appellate bond (second issue), (2) defense exhibit
two, records from an intensive outpatient program Coslett attended through Aspire
Recovery Center of Frisco in the first quarter of 2020, more than a year before the
trial court heard the Stateās motion (third issue), and (3) defense exhibit four, a report
of a mental health screening of Coslett done by Jennifer Goodwin-Golden, LPC on
November 13, 2020, also more than a year before the trial court heard the Stateās
motion (fourth issue). The State objected to these exhibits on the grounds they were
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hearsay and did not constitute Coslettās own business records, as she argued. See
TEX. R. EVID. 803(6).5 The trial court sustained the Stateās objections and did not
admit the exhibits into evidence except for record purposes as an offer of proof.
We review a trial courtās decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of
discretion. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760(Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Burden v. State,55 S.W.3d 608, 615
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). If the trial courtās ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we should affirm. Moses v. State,105 S.W.3d 622, 627
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Based on the record before us, we
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits in the
motion for new trial hearing despite Coslettās arguments under rule 803(6). Even if
we concluded otherwise, Coslett failed to show the alleged error was harmful. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). We overrule Coslettās second, third, and fourth issues.
5
Under rule 803, certain things are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, including:
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time byāor from information transmitted byā
someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by an affidavit or unsworn declaration that complies with Rule
902(10); and
(E) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. āBusinessā as used in
this paragraph includes every kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for
profit or not.
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Denial of Motion for New Trial
In her first and fifth issues, Coslett argues the trial court violated her due
process rights by denying her motion for new trial.
In criminal cases, a defendant must be granted a new trial, or a new trial on
punishment, for any of the following reasons:
(a) except in a misdemeanor case in which the maximum possible
punishment is a fine, when the defendant has been unlawfully tried in
absentia or has been denied counsel;
(b) when the court has misdirected the jury about the law or has
committed some other material error likely to injure the defendant's
rights;
(c) when the verdict has been decided by lot or in any manner other
than a fair expression of the jurorsā opinion;
(d) when a juror has been bribed to convict or has been guilty of any
other corrupt conduct;
(e) when a material defense witness has been kept from court by force,
threats, or fraud, or when evidence tending to establish the defendant's
innocence has been intentionally destroyed or withheld, thus preventing
its production at trial;
(f) when, after retiring to deliberate, the jury has received other
evidence; when a juror has talked with anyone about the case; or when
a juror became so intoxicated that his or her vote was probably
influenced as a result;
(g) when the jury has engaged in such misconduct that the defendant
did not receive a fair and impartial trial; or
(h) when the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3. Here, as indicated previously, Coslettās December 31, 2022
motion for new trial asserted āthe verdict is contrary to the law and evidence[,]ā see
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id. 21.3(h), but the other two motions in which she asked for a new trial contained
no such assertion and asserted none of the other grounds listed in the rule.
We review denials of motions for new trial for abuse of discretion. Burch v.
State, 541 S.W.3d 816, 820(Tex. Crim. App. 2017); McQuarrie v. State,380 S.W.3d 145, 150
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Webb v. State,232 S.W.3d 109, 112
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We āview the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courtās rulingā and ārevers[e] only if no reasonable view of the record could support the trial courtās ruling[,]ā and we must not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court and āmust uphold the trial courtās ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.ā Burch,541 S.W.3d at 820
; see State v. Simpson,488 S.W.3d 318, 322
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (āAn appellate court may reverse a trial courtās decision
on a motion for new trial when the trial courtās decision is so clearly wrong as to lie
outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.ā).
The trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge of witness credibility with
respect to both live testimony and affidavits at a hearing on a motion for new trial.
Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
A trial court abuses its discretion if it grants a new trial for a non-legal or a
legally invalid reason and cannot grant a new trial based on mere sympathy, an
inarticulate hunch, or because the judge believes the defendant is innocent or
received a raw deal. State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no
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reasonable view of the record could support the trial courtās ruling. See McQuarrie,
380 S.W.3d at 150; Webb,232 S.W.3d at 112
.
That is not the case here. While we appreciate Coslettās counselās efforts to
convey Coslettās commitment to her recoveryāa commitment we hope continuesā
his efforts in the trial court amounted, in terms of practical effect, to nothing more
than a request that the trial court reassess Coslettās credibility based on her additional
testimony and information Coslett did not present at the hearing on the Stateās
motion to adjudicate guilt. In light of the record before us, we agree with the State
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Coslettās motion for new
trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3; Okonkwo, 398 S.W.3d at 695(trial court is sole judge of witness credibility as to both live testimony and affidavits at a hearing on a motion for new trial); Thomas,428 S.W.3d at 103
(trial court abuses its discretion if it grants
a new trial for a non-legal or a legally invalid reason and cannot grant a new trial
based on mere sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or because the judge believes the
defendant is innocent or received a raw deal).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial courtās judgment.
/Ken Molberg/
KEN MOLBERG
220173f.u05 JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
ASHLEY COSLETT, Appellant On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-00173-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 366-80156-
2018.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Opinion delivered by Justice
Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and
Miskel participating.
Based on the Courtās opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 22nd day of December, 2023.
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