Lynne C. Renfo and G. Lee Finley v. New Rez LLC D/B/A Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing
Date Filed2022-12-15
Docket05-22-00843-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
DISMISS and Opinion Filed December 15, 2022
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00843-CV
LYNNE C. RENFRO AND G. LEE FINLEY, Appellants
V.
NEW REZ LLC D/B/A SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING AND
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellees
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-04946-2019
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Carlyle, and Justice Garcia
Opinion by Justice Garcia
This appeal challenges three summary judgment orders. Because the orders
are not appealable, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
The underlying suit stems from a home equity loan obtained by Lynne Renfro
and secured by a deed of trust on a house she now shares with Lee Finley. Renfro
filed the suit after she defaulted on the loan and was threatened with foreclosure.
She asserted various claims, including breach of contract, against New Rez LLC
d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“Shellpoint”), the “current” mortgagee and
mortgage servicer, and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Shellpoint’s predecessor-in-
interest. Nationstar and Shellpoint answered, seeking attorney’s fees. In addition,
Shellpoint asserted counterclaims against Renfro for breach of contract, judicial
foreclosure, and “equitable lien/subrogation,” and asserted the latter two claims as
third-party claims against Finley as well.
The first appealed order granted Shellpoint an equitable lien on the house.
The second order granted Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary
judgment motions on Renfro’s claims and its remaining claims and read, in relevant
part: “The court having reviewed the motions, responses and replies, if any, and
arguments of counsel, GRANTS the motions in their entirety. Judgment will follow
by separate order.”
The third order addressed Nationstar’s joinder and adoption by reference in
Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions. It read, in
relevant part, as follows
The Court, having considered the Motions, any responses or replies and
oral argument, finds that the Motions have merit and are hereby
GRANTED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Nationstar Mortgage
LLC is granted summary judgment on all claims asserted against it by
Plaintiff . . .
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall bear all costs.
Because the orders did not determine the amount of fees to which Shellpoint
was entitled or address Nationstar’s request for fees and the order granting
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Shellpoint’s no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions specifically
stated that judgment would follow by separate order, we questioned our jurisdiction
over the appeal. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205(Tex. 2001) (when no conventional trial has been held, judgment is final for purposes of appeal only if it actually disposes of all pending claims and parties or unequivocally states it finally disposes of all parties and claims). In a letter brief filed at our direction, Shellpoint and Nationstar agree their requests for attorney’s fees remain pending and note the second order is not definite with respect to Shellpoint’s other affirmative claims. See Hinde v. Hinde,701 S.W.2d 637, 639
(Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (to be appealable, judgment must not only be final but also “sufficiently” definite and certain concerning parties’ rights) (quoting Steed v. State,183 S.W.2d 458, 460
(Tex.
1944)). Renfro and Finley respond that Shellpoint and Nationstar “waived” their
requests for fees because they failed to submit supporting evidence. Renfro and
Finley further argue the third order is the “separate order” referenced in the second
order as it awarded costs.
An award of costs, by itself, however, does not make a judgment final, and
even if Shellpoint and Nationstar “waived” their fees, their requests would still need
to be denied by written order. See id.; see also Farmer v. Ben E. Keith, 907 S.W.2d
495, 496 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (appellate timetable runs from signing of order
even when signing order is ministerial). Because the appealed orders do not actually
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dispose of the requests for fees or unequivocally state that they do, they are not final.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
/Dennise Garcia/
DENNISE GARCIA
JUSTICE
220843F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
LYNNE C. RENFRO AND G. LEE On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
FINLEY, Appellants District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-04946-
No. 05-22-00843-CV V. 2019.
Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia,
NEW REZ LLC D/B/A Chief Justice Burns and Justice
SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE Carlyle participating.
SERVICING AND NATIONSTAR
MORTGAGE, LLC, Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.
We ORDER that appellees New Rez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage
Servicing and Nationstar Mortgage, LLC recover their costs, if any, of this appeal
from appellants Lynne C. Renfro and G. Lee Finley.
Judgment entered December 15, 2022.
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