Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION
This case involves the impact of the federal Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006 (âReform Actâ) on claims for violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act (âTOMAâ). See Pub.L. No. 109-353, §§ 1-7, 120 Stat.2011 (2006); Tex. Govât Code Ann. §§ 551.001-.146 (Vernon 2004 & Supp.2007). Love Terminal Partners, L.P. and Virginia Aerospace, LLC (collectively, âTerminal Partnersâ) sued the City of Dallas, its mayor, Laura Miller, and six city council members 1 , Angela Hunt, Linda Koop, Pauline Medrano, Ron Natinsky, Ed Oakley and Steve Salazar (collectively, âCity Defendantsâ), for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning TOMA violations the Terminal Partners claim arose from the City Defendantsâ closed-door negotiations of an agreement to limit passenger air traffic at Love Field. 2 Small Community Airlines, Inc. (âSCAâ) intervened alleging TOMA claims as well as violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. §§ 15.01-26 (Vernon 2002). The City Defendants filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction seeking dismissal of the lawsuit on the basis, among others, of mootness. The trial court granted the plea as to SCAâs TOMA allegations and all of the Terminal Partnersâ claims. The trial court then entered an order severing SCAâs non-TOMA claims into a separate case.
Terminal Partners and SCA appealed the dismissal. In three issues, the Terminal Partners contend the trial court erred in granting the plea because (1) the doctrine of mootness does not apply to their claims or the relationship between the Love Field Agreement and the Reform Act; (2) the City Defendantsâ TOMA violations render the Love Field Agreement void; and (3) their claims are not moot. SCA raises its own three issues relating to the trial courtâs personal jurisdiction over the City Defendants and its subject matter jurisdiction to interpret the federal Reform Act. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial courtâs judgment.
Background
There are two principal airports serving passenger traffic in Dallas: Dallas Love Field Airport (âLove Fieldâ) and Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (âDFWâ). In order to encourage use of DFW, Congress has always imposed limits on traffic at Love Field. 3 The need for *896 this protection, however, has decreased over time, and in early 2006, members of Congress suggested that Dallas and Fort Worth jointly propose a long-term solution to the statutory limits on passenger air traffic at Love Field. 4
After several months of secret negotiations, Dallas, among others, issued the âJoint Statement among the City of Dallas, the City of Fort Worth,. Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and DFW International Airport to Resolve the Wright Amendment Issuesâ â (âJoint Statementâ). A few weeks later, the Dallas City Council authorized execution of an agreement that was consistent with the terms of the Joint Statement. On July 11, 2006, Dallas executed the Love Field Agreement. Under the contract, Dallas bound itself to the terms of the Joint Statement, with certain modifications.
Both the Joint Statement and the Love Field Agreement provided for the demolition of a private passenger terminal at Love Field (âLTP Terminalâ) in which the Terminal Partners hold a leasehold interest and from which SCA had planned to operate. Under the LoVe Field Agreement, specifically, Dallas is required to use its governmental powers to dismantle or demolish the LTP Terminal to ensure it is not used for passenger service.
In September 2006 the United States Senate and United States House of Representatives passed the Reform Act and, in October 2006, the President signed the bill into law. The Reform Act explicitly incorporates many of the Love Field Agreementâs provisions. Among other pertirient provisions, the Reform Act confers on Ă)al-las the authority to âdetermine the allocation of leased gates and manage Love Field in accordance with contractual rights and obligations existing as of the effective date of this Act for certificated air carriers providing scheduled passenger service at Love Field on July 11, 2006.â Reform Act § 5(a).
In multiple actions, the Terminal Partners sued the City and its council members. In this case, the Terminal Partners and SCA claim the City Defendants violated TOMA in reaching the Love Field Agreement. The- trial court dismissed the case as moot because Congress gave the contract the force of law when it passed the Reform Act.
Discussion
We will consider the Terminal Partnersâ third issue first. They contend that the trial court erred when it decided their claims are moot and granted the City Defendantsâ plea to the jurisdiction. A plea questioning the trial courtâs jurisdiction raises a question of law that we review de novo. City of Farmers Branch v. Ramos, 235 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no. pet.) (citing State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex.2007)). 5 We focus first on a plaintiffs petition to determine whether the facts pled affirmatively demonstrate that jurisdiction exists. Id. We construe pleadings liberally, looking to the pleaderâs intent. Id. If relevant undisputed evidence negates jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted. Id. Accordingly, for the purposes of determining the merits of the trial courtâs dismissal, we will assume the City Defen *897 dants violated TOMA before issuing the Joint Statement and signing the Love Field Agreement.
The Terminal Partners contend that because the City Defendantsâ conduct leading up to Dallasâ execution of the Love Field Agreement violated TOMA, the resulting contract is void 6 and, therefore, the Reform Act does not render their TOMA claims moot. We disagree. TOMA expressly provides â[a]n action by a governmental body in violation of this chapter is voidableâ â not void or void ab initio. 7 Tex. Govât Code Ann. § 551.141 (Vernon 2004). The terms have distinct legal meanings. Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 179 S.W.3d 589, 618 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied). If an action is void or void ab initio, the transaction is a nullity. Swain, 74 S.W.3d at 146. If, however, conduct is merely voidable, the act is valid until adjudicated and declared void. Id.
Before the Reform Act was enacted, there had been no adjudication declaring the Love Field Agreement void. When the Reform Act incorporated the contract, Dallasâ obligations, including demolition of the LTP Terminal, became a matter of federal law. Reform Act § 5. The City Defendants argue that since Dallasâ performance is now compelled by federal law, any challenge to the Love Field Agreement is moot. We agree.
The mootness doctrine dictates that courts avoid rendering advisory opinions by only deciding issues that present a âliveâ controversy at the time of the decision. Farmers Branch, 235 S.W.3d at 469 (citing CamarerĂa v. Tex. Employment Commân, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988); Young v. Young, 168 S.W.3d 276, 287 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.)). An issue becomes moot when (1) it appears that one seeks to obtain a judgment on some controversy, which in reality does not exist or (2) when one seeks a judgment on some matter which, when rendered for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect on a then-existing controversy. Id. (citing Young, 168 S.W.3d at 287). Any decision by the trial court on the validity of the Love Field Agreement would have been advisory and, thus, improper. We overrule Terminal Partnersâ third issue. Our resolution of the Terminal Partnerâs third issue obviates our need to reach their first and second issues and SCAâs issues as to the trial courtâs personal jurisdiction over the City Defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over the TOMA claims relating to the Reform Act.
Conclusion
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial courtâs judgment.
. Angela Hunt, Linda Koop, Pauline Medra-no, Ron Natinsky, Ed Oakley and Steve Salazar were members of the Dallas City Council and the ad hoc negotiating committee for Dallas.
. ⢠The agreement resulting from the closed-door negotiations is entitled the "Contract Among the City of Dallas, the City of Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines Co., American Airlines, Inc., and DFW International Airport Board Incorporating the Substance of the Terms of the June 15, 2006 Joint Statement Between the Parties to Resolve the 'Wright Amendment Issuesâ â ("Love Field Agreementâ).
.An exhaustive history of the federal governmentâs regulation of Love Field traffic is contained in Judge Sidney Fitzwaterâs memorandum opinion and order in Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, et al, 527 F.Supp.2d 538 (N.D.Tex.2007). Judge Fitzwater dismissed the Terminal Partnersâ federal lawsuit concluding "the Reform Act manifests Congressâ intent to incorporate all of the [Love Field Agreementâs] terms, including demolition of the LTP Terminal and the Contractâs specific allocation of Love Field gates.â Id. at 557.
. The primary passenger air traffic limits were first enacted as Section 29 of the federal International Air Transportation Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35 (1980) (âWright Amendment").
. The Terminal Partners and SCA argue that our decision in the Farmers Branch case should compel us to reverse the trial court's dismissal of their TOMA claims. Their argument is misguided because the essential fact that renders their claims moot â the Reform Act â was not present in our earlier decision.
. To argue that a TOMA violation, renders a municipal act void ab initio, Terminal Partners rely on City of San Marcos v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 508 S.W.2d 403, 412 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1974), affd as modified, 523 S.W.2d 641, 642-43 (Tex.1975), which was decided not only before TOMA was codified, but also thirteen years before the term "voidableâ was added to TOMAâs predecessor.
. The distinction between "voidableâ and "voidâ is the same for the present purposes as the distinction between "voidableâ and "void ab initioâ. Swain v. Wiley Coll., 74 S.W.3d 143, 146 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (void â voidable distinction); Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Tex.App.Houston[lst Dist.] 1985, writ refâd n.r.e.) (void â void ab initio distinction).