In the Interest of S.R.T., Children v. the State of Texas

                                  Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                               No. 04-23-00600-CV

                    IN THE INTEREST OF S.R.T., R.L.M., and M.S.G., Children

                      From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2022-PA-00098
                            Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 27, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant M.M. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her

children, S.R.T., R.L.M., and M.S.G. 1 She argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s best interest finding. Because we conclude the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient, we affirm the trial court’s order.

                                                   BACKGROUND

           After confirming allegations M.M. had been exposing her children to alcohol abuse and

domestic violence, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”)

initiated emergency removal proceedings on January 21, 2022, seeking temporary managing



1
 To protect the identity of the minor children in this appeal, we refer to the parent and children by their initials. See
TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
                                                                                            04-23-00600-CV


conservatorship of the children and termination of M.M.’s parental rights. The Department also

sought termination of the parental rights of the children’s fathers, H.R.T. and D.V.G. 2 The trial

court signed an emergency removal order naming the Department temporary sole managing

conservator of the children. The Department then placed the children with R.L.M. and M.S.G.’s

paternal aunt and her wife; it also created a family service plan for M.M. The plan required M.M.

to contact the Texas Workforce Commission and find stable employment; actively participate in

and complete parenting and domestic violence classes; find a supportive and positive community;

complete a psychosocial assessment; and continue working with the Bexar County Drug Court or

take an outreach assessment.

        In June 2023, the case proceeded to a four-day bench trial after the Department determined

M.M. did not complete her service plan and continued seeing D.V.G. The trial court heard

testimony from several witnesses, including the Department caseworkers and the CASA volunteer

assigned to the case, M.M., counselors who treated M.M., S.R.T.’s therapist, and the foster parents

with whom the children had been initially placed. The trial court ultimately ordered M.M.’s

parental rights terminated based on statutory grounds (D), (E), and (O) in subsection 161.001(b)(1)

of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D) (knowingly placed or

allowed child to remain in conditions which endanger physical or emotional well-being), (E)

(engaged in conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who engaged in conduct which

endangers physical or emotional well-being), and (O) (failure to comply with court-ordered service

plan). It further found termination of M.M.’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

See id. § 161.001(b)(2). M.M. now appeals, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the

trial court’s best interest finding.


2
  Neither H.R.T. nor D.V.G. are parties to this appeal. The record shows H.R.T. died during the course of the
proceeding, and D.V.G. executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment.


                                                    -2-
                                                                                     04-23-00600-CV


                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW

          An order terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence

showing (1) the parent has committed one of the grounds for involuntary termination as listed in

section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest.

See id. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.C., 

, 261 (Tex. 2003). “‘Clear and convincing

evidence’ means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM.

CODE § 101.007; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. To determine whether this heightened burden of proof

was met, we use a heightened standard of review to decide whether a “factfinder could reasonably

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 

 (Tex. 2002); see, e.g., In re O.N.H., 

 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,

no pet.). “This standard guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while

retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.” O.N.H., 

.

          A legal sufficiency review of the evidence requires us to “look at all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.O.A., 

(Tex. 2009) (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266) (internal quotation marks omitted). We assume

“the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do

so,” and we “disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found

to have been incredible.” Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We do not disregard undisputed evidence even if it does not support the trial court’s

finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).


                                                 -3-
                                                                                                         04-23-00600-CV


         Under a factual sufficiency review, we perform “an exacting review of the entire record”

and consider disputed or conflicting evidence. In re A.B., 

 (Tex. 2014);

J.O.A., 

. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could

not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.”

J.O.A., 

 (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under both standards, the factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.

See id. at 346; In re H.R.M., 

 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

                                                   BEST INTEREST

                                                   Applicable Law

         There is a strong presumption a child’s best interest is served by keeping the child with the

parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut this presumption with clear and convincing

evidence. In re R.R., 

 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); In re I.I.T., 

,

476 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). In determining whether the Department has satisfied

this burden, we consider whether the Department produced evidence of the statutory factors set

forth in section 263.307(b) of the Texas Family Code 3 and the factors outlined in Holley v. Adams,

, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 4 Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are


3
  These factors include: (1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and nature of
out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4) whether the
child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the Department; (5) whether the
child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological, or
developmental evaluations of the child or the child’s parents; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive
conduct by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance
abuse by the child’s family or others who have access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to
the child is identified; (10) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling
services and to cooperate with and facilitate an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability
of the child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time;
(12) whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills; and (13) whether an adequate social support
system is available to the child. See 

4
  These factors are (1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future emotional and physical needs of the child;
(3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals


                                                           -4-
                                                                                                        04-23-00600-CV


exhaustive, and “[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a

reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest—especially when the

evidence shows the parental relationship endangered the child’s safety.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-

00181-CV, 

, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.).

         Additionally, evidence that proves a statutory ground for termination is probative on the

issue of best interest. C.H., 

. And “[a] trier of fact may measure a parent’s future

conduct by his past conduct and determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s

best interest.” In re E.D., 

 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). “A

best-interest analysis may [also] consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the

totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” 

 Finally, we presume “the prompt and

permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.” TEX.

FAM. CODE § 263.307(a).

                                                     Application

Emotional & Physical Danger to the Children

         The Department produced evidence it became involved with the family after it received a

referral M.M. had been abusing alcohol and exposing the children to domestic violence episodes.

Department caseworker Bianca Martinez testified she was the removal worker, and she received

allegations the children were living with M.M. and D.V.G., who were engaging in domestic

violence and abusing alcohol. Martinez specified she received the referral after S.R.T. made

statements at school describing M.M. as overconsuming alcohol and becoming violent toward



seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the
plans held by the individuals seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home of the parent and the individuals seeking
custody; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper
one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See id.


                                                          -5-
                                                                                       04-23-00600-CV


D.V.G., R.L.M., and M.S.G., who was a newborn at the time. S.R.T. further indicated he was

primarily responsible for caring for his siblings, and he did not feel safe at home. Martinez testified

she interviewed S.R.T., and he told her M.M. had grabbed R.L.M. by her hair on one occasion and

on another occasion, M.M. held M.S.G. upside down by his leg and swung him around after she

had been drinking. Martinez further testified M.M. denied the allegations when confronted and

told her she had not been drinking anymore because she was on probation “for an incident with

alcohol.” Martinez testified she ran a criminal history search on M.M., and the search revealed

charges for marijuana possession, assault bodily injury, violation of a protection order, assault

stalking, and reckless injury to a child; it also revealed M.M. had been convicted for every charge

except one. Martinez did not specify which charge M.M. had not been convicted of. During

Martinez’s investigation, she also learned D.V.G. was under a no contact order prohibiting him

from seeing M.M. Martinez’s investigation further revealed S.R.T. had been regularly missing

school because he did not want to leave his siblings alone with M.M. and wanted to “make sure

they were safe.” Martinez further added the Department had removed another child, who is not

the subject of this case, from M.M.’s care due to allegations of domestic violence, substance abuse,

neglectful supervision, and physical abuse.

       The trial court also heard testimony from S.R.T.’s therapist, who confirmed S.R.T. had

been living in an abusive household and responsible for protecting his siblings. According to the

therapist, S.R.T. told her he witnessed M.M. and D.V.G. yell and hit each other often. As a result,

he was afraid to leave his siblings alone with M.M. He indicated M.M. would yell at them, and

on one occasion, she pulled one of his sibling’s hair. The therapist further testified S.R.T. told her

M.M. did not physically abuse him, but she and D.V.G. would direct physical violence at him by

destroying his possessions, which would make him scared.




                                                 -6-
                                                                                     04-23-00600-CV


       Accordingly, the evidence produced by the Department showed M.M. had a history of

violence, which included criminal convictions. Such evidence weighs in favor of termination, and

the trial court could have reasonably inferred such past conduct subjected the children to emotional

and physical danger. See In re M.L.C., No. 04-17-00459-CV, 

, at *5 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Dec. 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding evidence showing Mother

had history of criminal conduct subjected children to emotional and physical danger). This court

has recognized evidence of a parent’s history of domestic violence supports a trial court’s best

interest finding. See In re A.H., No. 04-15-00416-CV, 

, at *7 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Nov. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). “A parent’s abusive or violent conduct can produce

a home environment that endangers a child’s well-being.” 

 (quoting In re T.R.M., No. 14-14-

00773-CV, 

, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 10, 2015, no pet.)

(mem. op.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).         Additionally, “[c]riminal conduct, prior

convictions, and incarceration affects a parent’s life and her ability to parent, thereby subjecting

her child to potential emotional and physical danger.” M.L.C., 

, at *5. And,

finally, the evidence concerning the removal of another child from M.M.’s care weighs in favor of

termination, and the trial court could have taken this history into account when considering the

danger or potential danger to the subject children. 

 (“A fact finder may consider a parent’s

history with her other children in considering the danger or potential danger to a child.”).

Emotional & Physical Needs of the Children/Parenting Abilities

       The trial court also heard testimony concerning whether M.M. was able to meet the

children’s physical and emotional needs and had adequate parenting abilities. When the children

entered the Department’s care, S.R.T. was underweight and missing school regularly. Testimony

from several Department caseworkers, the CASA volunteer assigned to the case, and S.R.T.’s

therapist established S.R.T. experienced anxiety and depression due to his stressful home


                                                -7-
                                                                                    04-23-00600-CV


environment with M.M. Specifically, the CASA volunteer testified he observed S.R.T.’s visits

with M.M., and he stated S.R.T. played a “parentified” role during the visits; specifically, he

watched S.R.T. prompt M.M. on how and when to care for the younger children. Similarly,

S.R.T.’s therapist testified S.R.T. had been “parentified” and expected to care for the children

because according to S.R.T., M.M. “cares about her own life over her children.” In fact, during

the third visit, M.M. told S.R.T. she was upset with him, and it was his fault the Department was

involved with their family. After this visit, S.R.T. stopped attending visitations and “expressed

[an] extreme amount of anxiety in facing his mother again.”

       As to M.M.’s interaction with R.L.M. and M.S.G., the CASA volunteer testified although

M.M. regularly attended visitations with them, “it was extremely difficulty for her to recognize

the needs of her children throughout the visits.” He testified R.L.M., who was three years old at

the time, was “parentified” when S.R.T. was not around, and R.L.M. would prompt M.M. when to

feed M.S.G. The CASA advocate testified it was difficult for M.M. to manage the children during

the visits, and R.L.M. often exhibited aggressive behavior toward M.S.G. M.M. also did not bring

any items to care for the children during the visits, and she depended solely on the foster parents

to provide diapers, wipes, snacks, and changes of clothes for the children. On occasion, M.M.

would bring toys for the children; however, the toys were not age appropriate.

       Finally, the CASA volunteer testified when he addressed his concerns with M.M. regarding

her parenting abilities, M.M. declined any assistance or therapy. The CASA advocate also

expressed concern to M.M. about her relationship with D.V.G., but she denied having a

relationship with him. However, the CASA volunteer noted he would see M.M. leave with D.V.G.

after visitations, and other Department caseworkers testified they believed M.M. and D.V.G.

continued seeing each other. According to the CASA volunteer, M.M. was in complete denial of

the Department’s allegations concerning domestic violence and alcohol abuse, and she stated the


                                               -8-
                                                                                      04-23-00600-CV


Department removed her children solely because of S.R.T.’s statements. The CASA volunteer

concluded by stating he believed M.M. did not express any concerns for her children. Based on

this evidence, the trial court could have determined M.M. was unable to meet the children’s needs

and lacked adequate parenting skills, weighing in favor of termination of her parental rights.

Programs Available

       As to the availability of programs offered by the Department to assist M.M. and promote

the best interest of the children, the record shows the Department prepared a service plan for M.M.,

and the trial court ordered M.M. to comply with the plan’s requirements. A parent’s compliance

with a court-ordered service plan is relevant to a best interest analysis as it shows the parent’s

willingness to seek out, accept, and complete services as well as the parent’s willingness and ability

to effect positive changes within a reasonable time. M.L.C., 

, at *5; see also

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(10) (providing courts may consider willingness and ability of the

child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services); id. § 263.307(b)(11)

(willingness and ability of child’s family to effect positive environmental and personal changes

within reasonable time); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re A.M.S., No. 04-18-00973-CV, 

, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A parent’s

non-compliance with the court-ordered service plan is probative with regard to a best interest

determination.”); In re I.L.G., 

, 355–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,

pet. denied) (pointing out a parent’s failure to comply with a court ordered service plan goes to the

best-interest determination).

       Here, the Department produced several witnesses who testified M.M. did not comply with

the plan. Specifically, Department caseworker Annabelle Arambula testified she reviewed the

service plan with M.M., and she believed M.M. understood the importance of completing the plan.

A copy of the service plan was admitted into evidence for the trial court to review. According to


                                                 -9-
                                                                                     04-23-00600-CV


Arambula, M.M. was living with D.V.G. at D.V.G.’s mother’s house when she started services.

She first engaged in the plan by taking parenting classes, but she never submitted a certificate of

completion. She also began substance abuse treatment at Elite Counseling because she had a

“drinking problem,” but she was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Arambula added,

however, M.M. complied with submitting to random drug tests, and she was not concerned with

M.M.’s results. But, on cross-examination, Arambula confirmed M.M. was not tested for alcohol

use. With respect to M.M.’s requirement to take domestic violence classes, Arambula testified she

started the classes in April 2022, but she did not know whether M.M. completed the classes.

       Department caseworker Therese Cornwell took over the case by August 2022, and she

testified between August 2022 and January 2023, M.M.’s level of engagement with the service

plan declined.    Initially, M.M. had been participating in parenting classes, completed a

psychosocial evaluation, and was attending individual counseling; however, she continued to live

with D.V.G. despite evidence he was under a no contact order. Cornwell testified she discussed

her concern with M.M. about her living arrangement, but it did not change. Cornwell further

testified M.M. had tested positive for alcohol in October 2022, had been unsuccessfully discharged

from her drug and alcohol outpatient treatment program by July 2022, and never reengaged in a

drug and alcohol treatment program. Cornwell further added M.M. had completed her domestic

violence classes, but during the case, M.M. was involved in a new domestic violence incident,

making Cornwell opine M.M. “did not learn very much” from the classes.

       The Department also produced evidence showing M.M. engaged in therapy at different

times during the case, but she failed to complete her required sessions. First, the Department heard

testimony from Elizabeth Hixon, a counselor who began meeting with M.M. after M.M. had been

admitted into an outpatient program in February 2022. She testified M.M. actively participated in

group therapy, admitted she had been using alcohol and marijuana before her children were


                                               - 10 -
                                                                                      04-23-00600-CV


removed from her care, but remained sober since the children had been removed. Hixon also

testified M.M. tested negative when given a random drug test during the program. However, M.M.

was unsuccessfully discharged in July 2022 after she failed to obtain a sponsor and did not verify

whether she had been participating in twelve-step meetings. Hixon explained an important part of

the program required participants to have a strong support system in place to help them with

recovery, and sponsorship and twelve-step meetings were part of that process. Hixon testified she

expressed the importance of these requirements to M.M. and extended the program to allow M.M.

more time to complete the program successfully, but M.M. did not comply or attempt to reengage

in the program.

       The trial court also heard testimony from Yvette Longoria, a counselor who began treating

M.M. and D.V.G. in June 2022. She testified they saw their relationship as “stressful” and “toxic,”

and M.M. told her she wanted to improve communication with D.V.G. and her relationship with

her children. Longoria testified M.M. expressed interest in making changes to her life, but after

three sessions, M.M. stopped attending therapy. She testified she unsuccessfully discharged M.M.

two months later in August 2022. Accordingly, based on the testimony from Arambula, Hixon,

and Longoria, the trial court could have inferred M.M. did not have the ability to motivate herself

to utilize and complete the resources required to regain possession of her children. See In re J.M.T.,

 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

       In contrast, however, M.M.’s third counselor, Adriana Botero, testified M.M. was utilizing

the services offered to her and making progress. Botero testified she began seeing M.M. in March

2023, and M.M. explained she had turned to alcohol and marijuana to cope with her depression

and loneliness. According to Botero, M.M. recognized her level of alcohol consumption was the

reason the Department removed her children from her home, and it made her a “negative role

model for the children.” Botero also testified M.M. had been in an unhealthy relationship with


                                                - 11 -
                                                                                    04-23-00600-CV


D.V.G., but M.M. was not seeing him anymore. Botero testified except for two appointments,

M.M. attended her weekly therapy sessions and expressed motivation to reunite with her children.

Botero also testified she believed M.M. was in a mentally stable place and not under the influence

of illegal drugs. She described M.M. as actively participating in her weekly sessions, meeting her

service plan goals, and ready for discharge. The trial court could have determined, however,

M.M.’s efforts were not made within a reasonable amount of time. See In re S.R., 

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“[T]he factfinder may conclude

that a parent’s changes shortly before trial are too late to have an impact on the best-interest

determination.”).

Parent’s Excuses for Acts or Omissions

       At trial, M.M. denied the allegations concerning domestic violence and alcohol abuse. She

testified she did not neglect or abuse her children, and she never had an issue with alcohol. She

admitted she had been arrested for bodily injury to a child due to an incident with her daughter,

who had been removed from her care in 2017, but she denied hitting her daughter. She explained

the incident arose when she and her ex-partner had a disagreement, and the situation “escalated”

when she hit her ex-partner, which resulted in another charge for assault bodily injury to a family

member. M.M. explained she pled guilty to the charges because she “didn’t want to go through

the process of having to deal with my ex and fight custody over her because of this.”

       M.M. also testified she had been in a romantic relationship with D.V.G. starting in early

2019 until November 2022. She stated during their relationship, she was involved in an altercation

with D.V.G. because D.V.G.’s mother accused her of not feeding and abusing her children. She

also testified she was a victim of domestic violence, and D.V.G. had a “pending felony domestic

violence charge.” She continued to live with him, however, and they chose not to discuss their

legal issues with each other. According to M.M., the Department never told her she had to end


                                               - 12 -
                                                                                    04-23-00600-CV


her relationship with D.V.G., and she admitted she would bring D.V.G. to some of her visitation

sessions to see the children. She claimed she ended their relationship by November 2022. When

pressed whether she continued to see D.V.G. after November 2022, she stated she did not continue

living with him, but she wanted him involved in the children’s lives. As a result, they would visit

the children together despite the no contact order. When asked whether her decision to continue

seeing D.V.G. in this respect was a wise choice, she stated it was not. She was also unaware S.R.T

had any anxiety about her relationship with D.V.G.

       When asked about her service plan, M.M. admitted she did not complete it. She testified

she intended to complete her outpatient drug treatment program, but she never did because she did

not know if she would receive credit for completing it. She also testified she did not have a

problem with alcohol, and she had not consumed it since New Years’ 2022. However, she

admitted she tested positive for alcohol in October 2022 and April 2023. She stated she had

consumed it around those times because she was grieving H.R.T.’s death, who had suddenly

passed away while living in Mexico during the proceeding. She also confirmed she did not

complete her counseling sessions with any of her counselors due to “technical issues.” She added,

however, she had complied with most of the service plan requirements, and it was important to her

to see her children.

       Overall, based on this testimony, the trial court could have drawn an adverse inference

against M.M. and determined M.M.’s excuses for her ongoing relationship with D.V.G. and

decision not to complete her service plan weighed in favor of termination of her parental rights.

See In re A.J.D.-J., 

, 824–25, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.)

(explaining trial court may draw adverse interest against parent who fails to provide valid excuses

for acts or omissions). Furthermore, the trial court was free to conclude M.M.’s denial that she

abused alcohol and subjected the children to domestic violence showed she failed to take


                                               - 13 -
                                                                                       04-23-00600-CV


responsibility for her conduct. See, e.g., In re H.R., 

 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2002, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to sustain rejection of proffered excuses where parent

failed to take responsibility for conduct).

Desires of the Children/Children’s Ages and Physical and Mental Vulnerabilities/Plans Held
by Foster Family

       At the time of trial, S.R.T. was fifteen years old and old enough to express his desires. In

this case, the Department produced evidence showing S.R.T. did not want to reunite with M.M.

and wanted to remain with his foster family permanently. Specifically, the trial court heard

testimony from Department caseworker Myrna Calzada, who testified S.R.T. was “very vocal

about his desires to be adopted[,] to remain with his caregivers[,] and not return home to his

mother.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)(1) (child’s age); id. § 263.307(b)(5) (whether child is

fearful of living in or returning to home); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (desires of the child). She

testified when she discussed the potential outcomes of the case with S.R.T., he “expressed that he

did not want to return back home, that he wanted to be adopted.” Department caseworker Morgan

Nava-Munoz also testified S.R.T. “feels uncomfortable with being around his mother, and that he

is unwilling to meet with her.” When asked about S.R.T.’s bond with M.M., she described it as

“estranged.” Additionally, the trial court heard testimony from S.R.T.’s therapist, who testified

S.R.T. had been exposed to a violent and toxic environment that had been emotionally stressful

for him. He was constantly afraid M.M. was upset with him and would remind him it was his fault

the family was not together. According to the therapist, M.M. had “parentified” S.R.T., and as a

result, S.R.T. had developed a desire to care for and protect his siblings; he also exhibited a strong

bond with them. The therapist further confirmed S.R.T. did not want to return home and would

only return if the court required his siblings to return home so he could protect them.




                                                - 14 -
                                                                                      04-23-00600-CV


       With respect to S.R.T.’s current placement, the Department produced evidence S.R.T. was

living with his siblings and their paternal aunt and her wife. According to S.R.T.’s therapist, S.R.T.

was doing very well in the environment and felt safe. His aunts “have been very supportive,” and

have provided him a home where he feels comfortable doing everyday tasks; in his previous

environment he was nervous and anxious due to the emotional stress he endured. The therapist

further testified S.R.T. described his current living environment as giving him “a future,” and he

did not believe he had a future in M.M.’s home.

       Turning to R.L.M. and M.S.G., R.L.M. was three years old and M.S.G. was one year old

at the time of trial, and they were too young to express their desires. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b)(1) (child’s age); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (desires of the child). In such

circumstances, courts, including this one, have held a fact finder may consider whether the children

have bonded with their foster family, are well cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with

the parent. In re A.F.C., No. 04-17-00080-CV, 

, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

July 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re J.D., 

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, no pet.); In re J.M., 

 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); In re

U.P., 

 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Here, the trial

court heard testimony from R.L.M. and M.S.G.’s paternal aunt, who was currently fostering all

three of the children. She testified she and her wife were bonded with the children, particularly

M.S.G. because they had been caring for him since he was an infant. She testified the children

were very attached to her and her wife, and when the children had to visit M.M., the children were

“not ready to really go.” After visits, they would “run out the door to” them. The CASA volunteer,

who witnessed the visitations, also confirmed R.L.M. and M.S.G. were not bonded to M.M., and

he testified they were not excited to see her when they attended visitations.




                                                - 15 -
                                                                                        04-23-00600-CV


        R.L.M. and M.S.G.’s paternal aunt also testified R.L.M. and M.S.G. were attending

occupational therapy, speech therapy, and physical therapy, and they were “doing great.” She

explained there were concerns regarding R.L.M.’s level of speech when she came into their home,

and “[s]he talks so much” now. Regarding M.S.G., they were concerned he was not responding

to sounds, but his therapy had been helping. She testified the children were doing well in their

home, and she and her wife were interested in immediately adopting all the children. Accordingly,

this evidence weighs in favor of termination, and the trial court could have inferred the children

were doing well in their current placement with the prospect of being adopted.

Summation

        After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we

conclude a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction termination of

M.M.’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Here, the

evidence showed S.R.T. had been caring for his siblings while living in a physically and

emotionally dangerous environment, and despite the Department’s attempts at reunification, M.M.

did not complete her service plan or show progress. Specifically, the evidence showed M.M. did

not successfully complete her parenting classes or a substance abuse treatment program, and she

did not show any behavioral improvement despite completing her domestic violence courses. The

trial court also heard testimony indicating S.R.T. feared M.M., and the children were thriving in

their current placement with relatives, who were interested in immediately adopting them.

Accordingly, when considering M.M.’s conduct before and after the Department’s removal of the

children, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s best interest finding.

See In re S.J.R.-Z., 

 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied.) (“This court

considers a parent’s conduct before and after the Department’s removal of the children.”).




                                                 - 16 -
                                                                                    04-23-00600-CV


        Moreover, after reviewing all the evidence, we conclude the evidence contrary to the trial

court’s finding is not so significant that a factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or

conviction in favor of that finding. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Although M.M. argues there was

evidence she had completed part of her required services and denied using alcohol and remaining

in a relationship with D.V.G., the trial court also heard testimony M.M. had a history of criminal

convictions and involvement with the Department, which resulted in the removal of one of her

children. The trial court also heard testimony M.M. did not effect positives changes or demonstrate

adequate parenting skills within a reasonable amount of time. And, while the most recent

Department caseworker highlighted M.M.’s improvement, the trial court, as the sole judge of the

weight and credibility of the evidence, could have chosen to weigh the contrary evidence more

heavily and could have formed a reasonable belief termination was in the children’s best interest.

See H.R.M., 

. We therefore hold the evidence is also factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding termination of M.M.’s parental rights was in her children’s best

interest.

                                           CONCLUSION

        Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

                                                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice




                                               - 17 -