Webb Consolidated Independent School District v. Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall
Date Filed2023-12-13
Docket04-22-00178-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-22-00178-CV
WEBB CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Appellant
v.
Robert MARSHALL and Amy Marshall,
Appellees
From the County Court at Law No. 1, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2020CVK001053C1
Honorable Hugo Martinez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 13, 2023
AFFIRMED
Pursuant to subsection 11.1512(c-2) of the Texas Education Code, former school board
members Robert Marshall and Amy Marshall (collectively, âthe Marshallsâ) 1 filed suit against
appellant Webb Consolidated Independent School District (âWebb CISDâ) seeking injunctive
relief to access documents they believed were withheld by Webb CISD following multiple requests
for the documents. Webb CISD appeals the trial courtâs order denying its plea to the jurisdiction,
1
The record reflects Amy Marshallâs final term on the school board expired in November 2020. Webb Consolidated
ISD filed a request that we take judicial notice that Robert Marshallâs final term on the school board expired in
November 2022.
04-22-00178-CV
motion for traditional summary judgment, and motion for no-evidence summary judgment. 2 We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
According to their first amended petition, the Marshallsâacting in their official capacities
as school board membersâmade several requests for information and documents from Webb
CISD in 2019 and 2020. Webb CISD asserts it provided the Marshalls with all the requested
information and documents maintained by the district. However, the Marshalls maintain Webb
CISD has withheld documents that were requested pursuant to subsection 11.1512(c) of the Texas
Education Code. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.1512(c).
On June 12, 2020, the Marshalls filed suit in Webb County seeking injunctive relief to
obtain the requested information. On August 16, 2021, Webb CISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction
and no-evidence and traditional summary judgment motions. In its plea to the jurisdiction, Webb
CISD asserted: (1) the Marshallsâ claims regarding documents requested in 2019 are precluded
from the suit because they were previously adjudicated before the Commissioner of Education in
an administrative hearing, and the Marshalls did not timely appeal the decision to a Travis County
district court; (2) the Marshalls cannot file suit in the courts regarding the documents requested in
2020 because the Marshalls failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit; and
(3) Amy Marshallâs claims are moot because she is no longer a member of the school board.
In its traditional summary judgment motion, Webb CISD asserted âthe attached evidence
conclusively establishes that [the Marshallsâ] claims are meritlessâ because it had provided all the
requested information that is maintained by the school district. Webb CISD further asserted in its
2
âA person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law . . . that: . . . grants or denies
a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in [s]ection 101.001â of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8). Section 101.001 defines âgovernmental
unitâ as âa political subdivision of this state, including any . . . school district . . . .â Id. § 101.001(3)(B).
-2-
04-22-00178-CV
no-evidence summary judgment motion that âthere is no evidence that [the Marshalls] have not
been provided with the information, documents, or records maintained by the school district that
they requested.â
In their response to the plea to the jurisdiction, the Marshalls argued
subsection 11.1512(c-2) allows them to file suit in the courts for appropriate injunctive relief to
obtain the requested information without having to first exhaust their administrative remedies.
They also argued that Amy Marshallâs suit is not moot because she was a school board member
âat all relevant times when the [s]tatutory [r]equests were made and when the [l]awsuit was filed.â
In response to the summary judgment motions, the Marshalls attached their various 2019 and 2020
documents requests and their own affidavits attesting to the documents they aver Webb CISD has
withheld.
On March 22, 2022, the trial court denied Webb CISDâs plea to the jurisdiction and denied
its no-evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment. Webb CISD appeals.
MOOTNESS
We first address Webb CISDâs third issue because it implicates our jurisdiction to entertain
this appeal. In its third issue, Webb CISD argues the Marshallsâ suit is moot because the Marshalls
are no longer school board members.
In its opening brief, Webb CISD asserted Amy Marshall is no longer a school board
member. The Marshalls do not dispute this assertion. In a filing on February 1, 2023, Webb CISD
requests we take judicial notice that Robert Marshall is no longer a school board member as of
November 15, 2022. We have the power, âon affidavit or otherwise,â to âascertain the matters of
fact that are necessary to the proper exercise of [our] jurisdiction[,]â even if evidence establishing
those facts is not in the appellate record. See TEX. GOVâT CODE ANN. § 22.220(c); see also State
ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6â7 (Tex. 2018) (holding a reviewing court may look at
-3-
04-22-00178-CV
election results outside the appellate record to determine whether an issue is moot due to an elected
official leaving office). Here, Webb CISDâs February 1, 2023 filing states the school board
canvassed election results on November 15, 2022, included a link to the agenda for the
November 15, 2022 board meeting, and a link to Webb CISDâs website showing the current school
board members. Robert Marshall is not listed as a current school board member. The Marshalls
did not file a response disputing Webb CISDâs assertion that Robert Marshall is no longer a school
board member. Because we have the power to ascertain matters of fact necessary to the proper
exercise of our jurisdiction, we take notice that Robert Marshall is no longer a school board
member of Webb CISD. See Best, 562 S.W.3d at 7.
Webb CISD contends subsection 11.1512(c) provides only current school board members
with the inherent right of access to information, documents, and records maintained by the school
district. Because Robert and Amy Marshal are not current school board members, Webb CISD
argues the Marshallsâ suit for injunctive relief to obtain this information is moot.
âA case becomes moot when there ceases to be a justiciable controversy between the parties
or when the parties cease to have âa legally cognizable interest in the outcome.ââ Best, 562 S.W.3d
at 6(quoting Williams v. Lara,52 S.W.3d 171, 184
(Tex. 2001)). âMootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant the relief requested or otherwise affect the partiesâ rights or interests.â Best,562 S.W.3d at 6
(internal quotation marks omitted). âWhen a case becomes moot, the court loses jurisdiction and cannot hear the case, because any decision would constitute an advisory opinion that is âoutside the jurisdiction conferred by [article II, section 1 of] the Texas Constitution . . . .ââId.
(quoting Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist.,484 S.W.3d 416, 418
(Tex. 2016)). But â[a] case is not rendered moot simply because some of the issues become moot during the appellate process.â In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,166 S.W.3d 732, 737
(Tex. 2005)
-4-
04-22-00178-CV
(orig. proceeding). âIf only some claims or issues become moot, the case remains âlive,â at least
as to other claims or issues that are not moot.â Best, 562 S.W.3d at 6.
We agree that any outstanding requests for information under subsection 11.1512(c) and
pending request for injunctive relief under subsection 11.1512(c-2) have been rendered moot by
the expiration of the Marshallsâ respective terms as school board members because they no longer
have an inherent right of access to the information, and the school district is no longer required to
produce the outstanding information, if any. However, the Marshallsâ request for attorneyâs fees
and court costs in its live pleadings presents an issue that is separate from the request for
information.
The Texas Supreme Court recently recognized, in some cases, âa claim for attorneyâs fees
âbreathes lifeâ into a suit that has become moot in all other respects.â Best, 562 S.W.3d at 7. âWhether an attorneyâs-fees claim breathes life into an otherwise moot appeal depends first on whether the claimant seeks the fees under a statute that authorizes fees only for a prevailing party or, alternatively, under a statute that permits fees based on equitable principles regardless of who prevails.âId.
When the party seeks attorneyâs fees under a prevailing-party statute, the determination of
whether the attorneyâs-fees claim is moot depends on whether the movant prevailed before the
underlying substantive claim became moot. OâHern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594, 600(Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing Best,562 S.W.3d at 7
.). â[I]f the party prevailed before the substantive claim became moot, the partyâs claim for attorneyâs fees under a prevailing- party statute remains a live controversy and a court must consider the claimâs merits to determine whether the party properly prevailed.â Best,562 S.W.3d at 7
; see also Camarena v. Tex. Empât Commân,754 S.W.2d 149, 151
(Tex. 1988) (concluding when the claimants prevailed in the trial
court before their underlying claims became moot, their claim for attorneyâs fees as prevailing
-5-
04-22-00178-CV
parties remained live even though the underlying claims were moot). â[I]f the party did not prevail
before the substantive claim became moot, the partyâs claim for attorneyâs fees is also moot
because the party can never prevail and thus can never be entitled to attorneyâs fees.â Best,
562 S.W.3d at 7â8; see also Speer v. Presbyterian Childrenâs Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d
227, 229â30 (Tex. 1993) (holding an attorneyâs-fees claim under a prevailing-party statute had
become moot along with the underlying claim because the claimant had not prevailed before
mootness occurred).
Subsection 11.1512(c-2) of the Texas Education Code entitles a prevailing school board
member to recover court costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 11.1512(c-2) (âA [school board] member who prevails in a suit under this subsection is entitled
to recover court costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees.â). Thus, the determination of whether the
claim for court costs and attorneyâs fees âbreathes lifeâ into this otherwise moot case depends on
whether the Marshalls prevailed before their substantive claims for injunctive relief became moot.
Here, the trial court granted the Marshallsâ request for injunctive relief under subsection
11.1512(c-2)âfor at least some of the information requestedâon September 15, 2020. Robert
and Amy Marshall attached affidavits to their response to Webb CISDâs plea to the jurisdiction
and motions for summary judgment. Robertâs affidavit, signed November 23, 2021, states that
Robert was a current board member of Webb CISD as of that date. Amyâs affidavit states that
Amy was a school board member serving Webb CISD âfrom November 2008 through
November 2020.â Because the Marshalls prevailed on their claim for injunctive reliefâat least
for the information in the trial courtâs temporary injunction orderâbefore either of the Marshallsâ
departure from the school board rendered their pending claims for information moot, we conclude
the Marshallsâ claims for attorneyâs fees and court costs breathe life into this appeal. See Best,
562 S.W.3d at 8.
-6-
04-22-00178-CV
Accordingly, we overrule Webb CISDâs third issue.
PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION: ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Initially, Webb CISD argues the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the Marshallsâ
suit because they failed to first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial
review. In its first issue, Webb CISD argues the Marshalls were required to seek administrative
relief from the Commissioner of Education before they could file suit regarding the 2020 requests
for information. In its second issue, Webb CISD argues the Marshalls properly sought
administrative relief from the Commissioner of Education regarding the 2019 requests for
information, but the Marshalls failed to appeal to a Travis County district court the
Commissionerâs decision denying relief. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(d) (âA person
aggrieved by an action of the agency or decision of the commissioner may appeal to a district court
in Travis County.â). Because Webb CISDâs first two issues hinge on whether a party must exhaust
administrative remedies before filing suit for injunctive relief under subsection 11.1512(c-2), we
address these two issues together.
We must decide whether a school board member is required to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies before filing a suit for injunctive relief to obtain information from the
school district pursuant to subsection 11.1512(c-2) of the Texas Education Code. We have found
no authority addressing this issue and the parties do not point us to any authority that is directly
on point. Thus, this is an issue of first impression.
A. Standard of Review
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial courtâs authority to determine the subject
matter of a specific cause of action. City of San Antonio v. Rogers Shavano Ranch, Ltd.,
383 S.W.3d 234, 241 (Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2012, pet. denied). Because subject matter
-7-
04-22-00178-CV
jurisdiction presents a question of law, we review the trial courtâs decision under a de novo
standard of review. Id.
âIn order to prevail, the party asserting the plea to the jurisdiction must show that even if
all the allegations in the plaintiffâs pleadings are taken as true, there is an incurable jurisdictional
defect apparent from the face of the pleadings, rendering it impossible for the plaintiffâs petition
to confer jurisdiction on the trial court.â Tex. Parks & Wildlife Depât v. Dearing, 150 S.W.3d 452, 457â58 (Tex. App.âAustin 2004, pet. denied). âWhen a defendant challenges jurisdiction, a court is not required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.â Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson,590 S.W.3d 544
, 550 (Tex. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We also review issues of statutory construction de novo. See Tex. Lottery Commân v. First
State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010).
B. The General Rule: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
âWhen the [l]egislature creates an administrative agency, it may grant the agency authority
to resolve disputes that arise within the agencyâs regulatory arena.â Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 544(Tex. 2016). âIf the [l]egislature expressly or impliedly grants an agency sole authority to make an initial determination in such disputes, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, and a party must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking recourse through judicial review.âId.
(internal quotation marks omitted). When the outcome of the administrative process leaves the party dissatisfied, the party may file suit and have the courts review the agencyâs decision.Id.
However, â[i]f the party files suit before exhausting exclusive administrative remedies, the courts lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.âId.
-8-
04-22-00178-CV
C. Administrative Remedies for School-Law Violations
To fulfill its duty to support and maintain an efficient system of public free schools, the
legislature has established the Texas Education Agency, the office of the Commissioner of
Education, the State Board of Education, and local school districts throughout the state. Id. at 545.
Regarding disputes that arise within the education system, the [l]egislature has
provided that, with limited statutory exceptions . . . ,
a person may appeal in writing to the commissioner if the person is aggrieved
by:
(1) the school laws of this state; or
(2) actions or decisions of any school district board of trustees that violate:
(A) the school laws of this state; or
(B) a provision of a written employment contract between the school
district and a school district employee, if a violation causes or would
cause monetary harm to the employee.
Id. (quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(a)).
âSchool laws of this stateâ means the provisions of titles 1 and 2 of the Texas Education
Code and the administrative ârules adopted under those titles.â TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 7.057(f)(2); see also Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 546. Subsections 11.1512(c)â(c-2) are within title
2 of the Texas Education Code and are therefore considered âschool laws of this state.â See TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 11.1512(c)â(c-2), 7.057(f)(2).
Although subsection 7.057(a) provides that a person âmayâ appeal to the Commissioner,
the courts âhave interpreted the statute to require a person who chooses to appeal to first seek relief
through the administrative process.â Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 545(emphasis in original); see also Gutierrez v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist.,139 S.W.3d 363, 366
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2004, no
pet.) (âGenerally, under Texas law, an aggrieved party, whose claim relates to the administration
of school laws and involves disputed fact issues, must exhaust his administrative remedies with
the Commissioner of Education before turning to the courts for relief.â); Jones v. Clarksville Indep.
-9-
04-22-00178-CV
Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 471(Tex. App.âTexarkana 2001, no pet.) (âSubject to certain exceptions, Texas law requires a party whose claim concerns the administration of school laws and involves disputed fact issues to exhaust the statutorily provided administrative remedies with the [C]ommissioner of [E]ducation before turning to the courts for relief.â). âFor well over one hundred years, [the Texas Supreme Court has] held that persons complaining about the management of the school system or the administration of school laws must exhaust their administrative remedies before courts can exercise jurisdiction.â Marquez,487 S.W.3d at 546
(internal quotation marks omitted).
D. Subsections 11.1512(c)â(c-2) of the Texas Education Code
Subsection 11.1512(c) of the Texas Education Code provides:
A member of the board of trustees of the [school] district, when acting in the
memberâs official capacity, has an inherent right of access to information,
documents, and records maintained by the district, and the district shall provide the
information, documents, and records to the member without requiring the member
to submit a public information request . . . . The district shall provide the
information, documents, and records to the member without regard to whether the
requested items are the subject of or relate to an item listed on an agenda for an
upcoming meeting.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.1512(c). The school district is required to provide the member with
the information, documents, and records requested within twenty business days after the school
district receives the request. Id. § 11.1512(c-1). âIf a district does not provide requested
information to a member of the board of trustees in the time required under [s]ubsection (c-1), the
member may bring suit against the district for appropriate injunctive relief.â Id. § 11.1512(c-2).
In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislatureâs intent.
First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d at 635. âWe rely on the plain meaning of the text as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results.âId.
âWe presume the
- 10 -
04-22-00178-CV
[l]egislature selected language in a statute with care and that every word or phrase was used with
a purpose in mind.â Id.
E. Analysis
We begin by recognizing the general rule that when a person is aggrieved by a violation of
the school laws of this state, the person must first exhaust their administrative remedies before he
or she can seek relief from the courts. However, the supreme court has plainly stated there are
limited statutory exceptions to the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement when certain school laws
are violated. See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 545 (âRegarding disputes that arise within the education
system, the [l]egislature has provided that, with limited statutory exceptions not at issue here, a
personâ must exhaust his or her administrative remedies). Such an exception exists in subsection
11.1512(c-2), which permits a school board member to seek injunctive relief directly from the
courts when the school district does not comply with the statutory requirements to provide
information maintained by the school district that is requested by the school board member.
Subsection 11.1512(c) of the Texas Education Code states school board members have an
inherent right of access to information, documents, and records maintained by the district. TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.1512(c). It further provides the school district must provide requested
information that is maintained by the school district without regard to whether the requested items
are the subject of or relate to an item listed on an agenda for an upcoming school board meeting.
Id. This is because the school board member is part of the governing body overseeing the school
district and must make decisions affecting the school district. See generally id. §§ 11.1511,
11.1512. When making these decisions, the school board member should be well informed and
able to exercise his or her judgment based on accurate, timely information.
Accordingly, in subsection (c-1), the legislature enacted limitations on how long the school
district can take to respond to the request for information. Id. § 11.1512(c-1) (providing the school
- 11 -
04-22-00178-CV
district shall respond to the request for information no later than the twentieth business day after
the date the district receives the request and, even if compliance with the timing requirements
would be unduly burdensome, the time to comply shall not exceed the thirtieth business day after
the date the district receives the request to respond).
Clearly, the legislature intended school board members to have access to requested
information quickly. Looking at the plain language of subsection (c-2), we conclude the legislature
provided for quick relief through the courts should the school district fail to comply with its duty
to provide the requested information under subsection (c) or the timing requirements of subsection
(c-1). See id. § 11.1512(c-2).
The plain language of subsection (c-2) states âthe [school board] member may bring suit
against the [school] district for appropriate injunctive reliefâ if the school district does not provide
the requested information to the school board member. The legislature used specific words in this
statute that lead us to conclude it did not intend for school board members to exhaust their
administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. First, the statute states the school board
member âmay bring suit against the district[.]â Id. When the legislature refers to a dispute being
brought before the Commissioner of Educationâor the dispute is otherwise subject to the
exhaustion of administrative remediesâit has consistently used the word âappealâ rather than the
word âsuit.â 3 We find further support in the supreme courtâs jurisprudence distinguishing between
3
Compare TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(a)(1) (â[A] person may appeal in writing to the commissioner if the person
is aggrieved by . . . the school laws of this state[.]â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(a-1) (âA person is not
required to appeal to the commissioner before pursuing a remedy under a law outside [the school laws of this state].â),
and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.064 (âA parent of a student enrolled in a school district offering bilingual education
or special language programs may appeal to the commissioner if the district fails to comply with the requirements
established by law . . . .â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.209 (âA teacher who is aggrieved by a decision of a board
of trustees on the nonrenewal of the teacherâs term contract may appeal to the commissioner for a review of the
decision . . . .â), and TEX. GOVâT CODE ANN. § 2001.145 (âA timely motion for rehearing is a prerequisite to an appeal
[to a district court] in a contested [administrative] case . . . .â), with TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.0085(b) (âA court
shall grant a suit described by [s]ubsection (a) precedence over other pending matters to ensure prompt resolution of
- 12 -
04-22-00178-CV
pursuing administrative remedies through the Commissioner of Education and âfiling suitâ in
court. See Marquez, 487 S.W.3d at 544 (emphasis added) (â[I]f the outcome of the administrative
process leaves the party dissatisfied, it may file suit and have the courts review the agencyâs
decision.â). And, even when a party may seek judicial review after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the legislature still uses the word âappealâ when referring to the action
initiating judicial review. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.057(d) (âA person aggrieved by an
action of the agency or decision of the commissioner may appeal to a district court in Travis
County.â); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.307(a) (âEither party may appeal the commissionerâs
decision to: (1) a district court in the county in which the districtâs central administrative offices
are located; or (2) if agreed by all parties, a district court in Travis County.â); TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 39.007 (listing the procedures to be followed when a school district appeals the decision
of the Commissioner of Education to a district court).
Next, subsection 11.1512(c-2) states the board member may bring suit against the district
âfor appropriate injunctive relief.â Id. § 11.1512(c-2). The Commissioner of Education cannot
provide injunctive relief; injunctive relief is not listed among the powers given to the
Commissioner of Education by the legislature. See id. § 7.055 (listing the Commissioner of
Educationâs powers and duties). Rather, injunctive relief is a power wielded by the courts. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.021(a) (âThe judge of a district or county court in term
or vacation shall hear and determine applications for writs of injunction.â); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
the subject matter of the suit.â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.0514 (âA person may not file suit against a
professional employee of a school district unless the person has exhausted the remedies provided by the school district
for resolving the complaint.â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.0513(c) (âThe court shall abate the suit if the court,
after a hearing, finds that the person is entitled to an abatement because notice was not provided as required by this
section.â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.61 (âA rehabilitation district may sue and be sued in its name. In any suit
against a district, process may be served on the president or vice president.â), and TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.06(b)
(âOn good cause shown, within the discretion of the court where such suit is pending, it shall be lawful to enjoin and
restrain such person from acting as trustee during the pendency of the suit.â).
- 13 -
04-22-00178-CV
REM. CODE ANN. § 65.021(b) (emphasis added) (âThis section does not limit injunction
jurisdiction granted by law to other courts.â); see also generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 680â693a
(providing rules regulating a courtâs issuance of injunctive relief).
Finally, subsection 11.1512(c-2) provides for the recovery of âcourt costs and reasonable
attorneyâs feesâ to a school board member âwho prevails in a suit under this subsection . . . .â It
is axiomatic that a party must first file suit in court for there to be a recovery of âcourt costs.â
Courts routinely award court costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees to the prevailing party in suits
before the court when authorized by contract or statute. In contrast, we find no such authority
vested in the Commissioner of Education. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7.055 (listing the
Commissioner of Educationâs powers and duties).
According to the plain language of the statute, we conclude the legislature created an
exception to the general exhaustion-of-remedies rule for school board members who are seeking
to compel a school district to comply with its statutory obligations under subsections 11.1512(c)
and 11.1512(c-1) of the Texas Education Code. See First State Bank of Dequeen, 325 S.W.3d at
635 (stating a reviewing courtâs primary objective when construing statutes is to give effect to the
legislatureâs intent as expressed by the plain meaning of the text).
Accordingly, we overrule Webb CISDâs first and second issues.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In its fourth issue, Webb CISD argues the trial court erred when it denied Webb CISDâs
motions for summary judgment because the evidence conclusively establishes that Webb CISD
provided all requested documents maintained by Webb CISD and there is no evidence that Webb
CISD withheld requested documents it maintained.
In this interlocutory appeal, we question whether we have jurisdiction over the trial courtâs
order denying Webb CISDâs motions for summary judgment. See Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d
- 14 -
04-22-00178-CV
173, 188 (Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (âThe general rule is appellate courts do not
have jurisdiction to hear the denial of a motion for summary judgment on appeal.â); see also
Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996) (holding the denial of a
summary judgment motion is generally not appealable because the order is not a final judgment).
However, Webb CISDâs motions for summary judgmentâwhich were asserted in the same filing
as the plea to the jurisdictionâstate the trial court âlacks jurisdiction over [the Marshallsâ] claims
because the attached evidence conclusively establishes that [the Marshallsâ] claims are meritlessâ
and âthere is no evidence that [the Marshalls] have not been provided with the information,
documents, or records maintained by the school district that they requested.â In its prayer, Webb
CISD requested the trial court dismiss the Marshallsâ claims with prejudice.
Although not a model of clarity, it appears Webb CISD argued in its motions for summary
judgment that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the Marshallsâ claims because
subsection 11.1512(c-2) only authorizes suit after a failure to provide requested documents and
information in violation of subsections 11.1512(c)â(c-1). Because it provided the requested
documents and information, Webb CISD argues subsection 11.1512(c-2) does not authorize the
Marshallsâ suit and the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the Marshallsâ claims. To the extent
Webb CISDâs motions for summary judgment raised jurisdictional arguments, we have
jurisdiction to review the order denying the motions. See PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Depât,
593 S.W.3d 296, 301 n.1 (Tex. 2019) (âFor purposes of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders, the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the denial of the combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, regardless of how the trial-court pleading was styled, because the substance of the pleading was to raise sovereign immunity, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction.â); see also City of Magnolia 4A Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Smedley,533 S.W.3d 297, 299
(Tex. 2017) (citations omitted) (âA party may appeal an interlocutory order that grants or denies a
- 15 -
04-22-00178-CV
plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit. This Court considers âplea to the jurisdictionâ not
to refer to a âparticular procedural vehicle,â but rather to the substance of the issue raised.â);
Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. 2006) (âThe [l]egislature provided for an
interlocutory appeal when a trial court denies a governmental unitâs challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction, irrespective of the procedural vehicle used.â); see also Swanson, 590 S.W.3d at 551
(holding a jurisdictional challenge may be asserted through a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment).
We review a trial courtâs ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo. Tarr v.
Timberwood Park Owners Assoc., Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274, 278(Tex. 2018). âWhen the motion asserts both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we first review the no-evidence grounds.â Cmty. Health Sys. Prof. Svcs. Corp. v. Hansen,525 S.W.3d 671, 680
(Tex. 2017); see also Covarrubias v. Diamond Shamrock Refining Co., LP.,359 S.W.3d 298, 301
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2012,
no pet.) (âIf the nonmovant fails to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, there is no need to
analyze whether the movantâs proofâ satisfies the traditional summary judgment burden).
When reviewing a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, âwe review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.â
Covarrubias, 359 S.W.3d at 301(quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,118 S.W.3d 742, 751
(Tex. 2003)). â[T]he movant must first assert that no evidence exists as to one or more elements of a claim the nonmovant would have the burden of pro[ving] at trial.â Covarrubias,359 S.W.3d at 301
. Once the movant has alleged no evidence exists as to one or more elements, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present more than a scintilla of evidence which raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements.Id.
âLess than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is âso weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicionâ of a fact.âId.
(quoting Chapman,118 S.W.3d at 751
).
- 16 -
04-22-00178-CV
To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant must show that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215â16 (Tex. 2003). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovantâs favor. Knott,128 S.W.3d at 215
.
Relevant to the analysis here, Webb CISD attached to its motions for summary judgment
documents it claims to have provided to the Marshalls pursuant to their requests, the declaration
of Superintendent Beto D. Gonzalez, and the declaration of Webb CISDâs counsel, David
Campbell. Superintendent Gonzalezâs declaration identifies each of the Marshallsâ requests for
information and then generally states for each request that: âAll information and documents
responsive [to the respective request] and maintained by Webb CISD was provided to Plaintiffs
prior to [various dates specific to each request,]â all responsive documents that are maintained by
Webb CISD were produced, or that Webb CISD does not maintain the records or audio recordings
requested. Campbellâs declaration likewise states that he has provided the Marshalls with all
responsive documents that were requested, and the Marshalls have not responded to Campbellâs
inquiries on what documents they believe have not been produced.
In their response, the Marshalls identified documents they believe are or should be
maintained by Webb CISD but have not been produced in response to their various requests. The
Marshalls supported their response with their own affidavits.
In his affidavit, Robert Marshall attests he has been a school board member at Webb CISD
for over twenty-five years and has âover 1,000 hours of Certified School Board Training in school
operation and law.â Robert further aversâbased on his experience as a school board member at
Webb CISDâhe has âpersonal knowledge of what reports, documents[,] and information Webb
CISD keeps and should keep in its regular day-to-day operations as a school district in Texas.â In
- 17 -
04-22-00178-CV
his affidavit, Robert lists the various requests for information that were made to the school district
and, in detail, lists the information that has not been produced in response to the requests. In his
affidavit, Robert expressly states he has ânot received the documents that Webb CISD claimsâ to
have given him prior to school board meetings held in 2020.
Amy Marshallâs affidavit states that she has been a school board member for twelve years
and has âabout 350 hours of School Board Training[.]â Amy attests she has âbeen the Finance
Committee Chairperson for about 4 years and Curriculum and Instruction Committee Chairperson
for about 4 or 5 years.â Amy further avers that during her twelve years as a school board member
she has âgained personal knowledge of what reports, documents[,] and information Webb CISD
keeps and should keep in its regular day-to-day operations as a school district in Texas.â Amy
states in her affidavit that she and Robert âmade numerous requestsâ for information that were
ignored by Webb CISD, or the information provided was incomplete or not relevant.
Under the appropriate standard of review, we must take as true all evidence favorable to
the Marshalls and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubt in the Marshallsâ
favor. See Hansen, 525 S.W.3d at 680. With this deference in mind, we hold the Marshallsâ affidavits present more than a scintilla of evidence on their claims for injunctive relief and directly dispute the assertions made by Superintendent Gonzalez and Campbell on whether the school district has provided the Marshalls with all documents responsive to the Marshallsâ requests and that are maintained by Webb CISD. Accordingly, we conclude the Marshallsâ response to Webb CISDâs motions for summary judgment presented more than a scintilla of evidence and raised genuine issues of material fact. Seeid.
Accordingly, we overrule Webb CISDâs fourth issue.
- 18 -
04-22-00178-CV
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial courtâs order denying Webb CISDâs plea to the jurisdiction and motions
for summary judgment. Because Robert and Amy Marshall are no longer school board members,
and thus no longer entitled to information under subsection 11.1512(c) of the Texas Education
Code, our holding bears only on the trial courtâs determination of the Marshallsâ entitlement to
court costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees, if any. See Best, 562 S.W.3d at 20.
Irene Rios, Justice
- 19 -