Randy K. Smith v. Lawrence Reid, Royce Reid, Jennifer Heath and THL GP Inc.
Date Filed2014-12-23
Docket04-13-00550-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00550-CV
Randy K. SMITH,
Appellant
v.
Lawrence REID, Royce Reid, Jennifer
Lawrence REID, Royce Reid, Jennifer Heath and THL GP Inc.,
Appellees
From the 63rd Judicial District Court, Edwards County, Texas
Trial Court No. 3798
Honorable M. Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 23, 2014
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Randy K. Smith appeals the trial courtâs judgment enjoining him from using a road located
on property owned by Lawrence Reid, Royce H. Reid, Jennifer Heath, and THL GP, Inc.
(collectively, the Reids). In four issues, Smith argues that the trial court erred in: (1) declaring that
the road is not a public road; (2) determining that Smith did not have an easement by estoppel; (3)
determining that Smith is liable for breach of covenant; and (4) awarding attorneyâs fees. We
modify the trial courtâs judgment to condition the award of appellate attorneyâs fees on an
unsuccessful appeal by Smith. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
04-13-00550-CV
BACKGROUND
The Reids are the owners of approximately 1,231.6-acres of real property located in
Edwards County known as the Reid Ranch. The Reid Ranch consists of nine tracts of land. The
Reids trace their ownership of the ranch to Royce I. Reid, who acquired the ranch by General
Warranty Deed dated May 14, 1953. The May 14, 1953 Warranty Deed does not contain any
exception for any easement benefiting adjoining property.
Smith owns 720.222 acres of land adjoining the Reid Ranch (âSmith Ranchâ). The Smith
Ranch includes two tracts: a 639.192-acre tract and an 81.03-acre tract (hereinafter referred to as
the 640-acre tract and the 81-acre tract). Smith acquired the 640-acre tract from Denman L. Cloudt
by General Warranty Deed dated May 8, 2003 (âCloudt Deedâ). The 81-acre tract was acquired
by General Warranty Deed dated February 19, 2010. Neither Warranty Deed contains reference
to conveyance of an easement or other appurtenant right over and across any portion of the Reid
Ranch.
Edwards County Road 330 originates at a point of intersection with State Highway 55 on
the southeastern boundary of Reid Ranch. County Road 330 traverses Reid Ranch. There is a
road known as âthe spur roadâ which departs from Edwards County Road 330 in a generally
westerly direction crossing from east to west across portions of the Reid Ranch. Specifically, the
spur road crosses the sixth tract and the third tract of the Reid Ranch. The spur road then enters
into the Smith Ranch at a point such that it intersects the boundary line between the Reid Ranch
and the Smith Ranch. For a number of years, the Reids permitted Smith and his predecessors in
title to use the spur road to conveniently access his 640-acre tract. The following map was admitted
at trial:
-2-
04-13-00550-CV
(The thick black line is the spur road; the yellow line is County Road 330; and the blue line is
Pulliam Creek).
Bay-Houston Towing Co. owned property south of the Smith Ranch. In 2007, Bay-
Houston sued Smith in an attempt to establish the right to use the spur road to travel across Smithâs
property. Because Bay-Houston also had to use a portion of the Reid Ranch to reach its property,
Smith asked for leave of court to join the Reids in the litigation, and pointed out that both the Reids
and âEdwards County officials . . . contest and dispute that this roadway over the Reid Ranch is a
public highway.â In their answer to Smithâs Third Party Petition, the Reids denied âthat all or any
portion of the roadway in question is a public road.â To avoid litigation, the Reids entered into a
-3-
04-13-00550-CV
Rule 11 agreement with Bay-Houston providing that they would give Bay-Houston permission to
use the spur road across Reid Ranch if Bay-Houston won its suit against Smith. Smith then non-
suited his third party claim against the Reids. Bay-Houston lost at trial and was not allowed to use
the spur road across Smithâs property, thus rendering the Rule 11 agreement moot.
In February 2010, Smith purchased an additional 81-acre tract bordering his 640-acre tract
and the Reid Ranch to the east. The 81-acre tract gave Smith direct access from State Highway
55 to his 640-acre tract. Smith installed a gate to access his property from the state highway.
Upon noticing the new gate and learning that Smith no longer needed to cross Reid Ranch
to access his property, Lawrence Reid wrote a letter to Smith dated March 11, 2010. The letter
congratulates Reid on his recent purchase of land and further states:
Since your new acquisition provides direct access to State of Texas Highway 55, I
request we speak soon to discuss your current ingress through our property. We
have acted neighborly in the past and wish to continue in such manner, however
any necessity of yours to cross our property has now ceased. It is my belief and
desire that an acceptable time frame for you to complete your new entrance be
reached to accommodate everyoneâs needs and wishes.
The letter was posted on Smithâs gate. 1 Smith did not respond to the letter; at trial, he claimed he
never received the letter. Having never heard from Smith, in late May 2010, the Reids blocked
the spur road with a tractor to prevent Smith from using it. Royce was at the house when Smith
attempted to access the road. Royce informed Smith that he no longer needed to use the road.
Smith responded that âhe thought he had some type of right to traverse that property.â Smith could
not explain what right he thought he had, so Royce then moved the tractor and told Smith he had
two months to find his proof of access. The Reids left the road unblocked all summer, but Smith
never contacted the Reids, so the Reids blocked the road again on Labor Day weekend. This time
they blocked the road with rocks and a gooseneck trailer. Smith still did not contact the Reids.
1
Royce Reid testified that the letter was posted on the gate ânumerous times.â
-4-
04-13-00550-CV
On November 18, 2010, the Reids filed suit against Smith, asking for a temporary
injunction and for a declaration that Smith has no right to use the spur road. The Reids were
granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting Smith from using the spur road across the Reid
Ranch. Smith then began exclusively using his property to access the 640-acre tract from State
Highway 55.
A few months later, Smith approached the Edwards County Commissionersâ Court and
asked the court to declare that the spur road is a county road. On February 8, 2011, the
commissionersâ court adopted a resolution titled âSmith Road Spur to County Road 330.â The
resolution provides that:
[T]here is evidence that [the spur road] has been and remains a County Road, to-
wit: (1) Resolution of the Edwards County Commissionersâ Court dated June 11,
1998 and recorded in Vol. 12, Pg[.] 543 of the Minutes of the Commissionersâ
Court of Edwards County, Texas, (2) Written statement of Marshall Craig, former
Precinct #2 Commission of Edwards County, Texas, recorded April 12, 1978 in
Vol[.] 6 at [P]g[.] 29 of the Deed Records of Edwards County, Texas, and (3) verbal
statement of Lee Sweeten, current Precinct #2 Commissioner of Edwards County,
Texas, that he performed road maintenance work on said spur while employed by
the Edwards County Road Department in the mid-1970s[.]
Based on this evidence, the commissionersâ court found and ordered that the spur road âhas been
and continues to be a county road for all purposes,â and that the âspur shall hereinafter be included
as part of the county road inventory[.]â However, the resolution concludes that the spur road âshall
not be added to the official County Road map until such future time as [Transportation Code]
proceedings are completed . . . and adding said spur road to the map is expressly ordered by this
Court.â The June 11, 1998 minutes reflect that the commissioners passed a motion providing that
âthe spur off of road #204 2 that goes to the Moore Ranch has been considered part of the County
road system . . . and has been historically worked as a county road, therefore, be it resolved that it
2
County Road 330 was previously assigned the number 204; the Reids do not concede, however, that the âMoore
Ranchâ mentioned in the 1998 order is the same property as that currently located within the 640-acre tract.
-5-
04-13-00550-CV
is hereby confirmed that it be part of the County Road system and shall remain as such for all
purposes.â There is no evidence that the spur road was subsequently added to the official County
road map.
Smith did not inform the Reids or the trial court that he was seeking action from the County
in 2011. He also failed to inform the commissioners that a lawsuit was pending and a temporary
restraining order had been issued preventing him from using the spur road across the Reid Ranch.
At trial, County Judge Souli Shanklin testified that the commissioners had no knowledge that the
spur road was the subject of pending litigation, and that had they known, they would not have
adopted the resolution. Shanklin testified that the commissionersâ court learned about the lawsuit
and temporary restraining order immediately after the February 8, 2011 meeting recessed, when
the sheriff asked Smith âto go out with him to show him what needed to be done, and Smith told
him that he could not because there was a restraining order against him on that deal.â
When the Reids learned about the 2011 resolution, they joined Edwards County as a third-
party defendant in the underlying lawsuit and challenged the validity of the resolution. On May
19, 2012, Edwards County entered into an agreed judgment with the Reids wherein the County
agreed that the February 8, 2011 resolution âwas not intended to acquire any public rights in any
road spur off of County Road 330 as described in the resolution; and to the extent the resolution is
alleged to be an act acquiring or attempting to acquire public rights in the spur under Chapters [sic]
281 or Chapter 258 of the Texas Transportation Code,â the resolution is invalid, unenforceable,
and void. Further, the County agreed that âthe Resolution specifically withheld the addition of the
spur as a county road on the Countyâs Texas Transportation Code Chapter 258 County Road Map.â
Finally, the County agreed that it âmade no effort to comply with the notice and other procedures
required by Chapters 281 and 258 of the Texas Transportation Code.â By entry of the agreed
-6-
04-13-00550-CV
judgment, the Reids nonsuited the County. The County, therefore, did not participate in the
underlying trial, and stipulated that it would agree to be bound by the trial courtâs judgment.
In May 2011, the Reids amended their petition to add an allegation related to a small, 1.165-
acre piece of land located near the southern boundary of Reid Ranch and the northern boundary of
Smithâs 640-acre tract. The 1.165-acre tract of land has been referred to throughout this litigation
as the âbubble.â The âbubbleâ contains a natural spring that was fenced in to avoid washouts. The
Reidsâ new claim alleged prior owners of the two ranches had agreed the âbubbleâ was a part of
the Reid Ranch and that future owners would not claim the âbubbleâ by adverse possession. Smith
filed an answer asserting the affirmative defenses of easement by estoppel, adverse possession,
and impermissible collateral attack.
After multiple summary judgment motions were denied, the case proceeded to a bench trial
on March 26, 2013. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated on the record that: there is no record access,
easements, or agreements across the Reid tracts in favor of the Smith tracts; and there are no
recorded dedications, purchases, condemnation, or final judgment of adverse possession in favor
of the public as to any portion of the Reid Ranch as it relates to the spur road. 3 The trial court
heard testimony from multiple witnesses and admitted documentary evidence. Following the
bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Reids, finding that: the spur road is not a public
road; the spur road is not an easement appurtenant to the Smith tract; the Cloudt Deed creates a
cloud upon the Reidsâ title to the sixth and third tracts (i.e., the âbubbleâ); Smith claimed the
bubble by adverse possession; the claim by Smith to adverse possession of the bubble was a breach
of an express covenant not to so claim the land by adverse possession; and the Reids are entitled
to enforce the terms of the express covenant not to claim the land by adverse possession. The trial
3
The parties further stipulated that Smith abandoned his claim that the spur road is a public road by virtue of the
doctrine of implied dedication and his claim of easement by necessity across the Reid property.
-7-
04-13-00550-CV
court therefore ordered that the parties are authorized to place boundary fences and that the Reids
are granted a permanent injunction against Smith prohibiting him from utilizing any portion of the
Reid Ranch to access the Smith Ranch. The trial court also awarded the Reids court costs and
attorneyâs fees in the amount of $79,171.30 for trial and $20,000 for appeal. The trial court signed
two sets of findings of fact conclusions of law in support of its judgment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in: (1) declaring that the spur road is not
a public road; (2) determining that Smith did not have an easement by estoppel; (3) determining
that Smith is liable for breach of covenant; and (4) awarding attorneyâs fees to the Reids.
Standard of Review
In an appeal from a judgment rendered after a bench trial, the trial courtâs findings of fact
have the same weight as a juryâs verdict, and we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence used to support them, just as we would review a juryâs findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881
S.W.2d 295, 297(Tex. 1994). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson,168 S.W.3d 802, 822
(Tex. 2005). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the finding under review, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could consider it, and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable factfinder could not disregard it.Id. at 827
. When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Croucher v. Croucher,660 S.W.2d 55, 58
(Tex. 1983). We will sustain a legal-sufficiency or âno evidenceâ
challenge if the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital
fact, (2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
-8-
04-13-00550-CV
prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4)
the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
810.
In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light
and will reverse only if the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the finding is so against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242(Tex. 2001). In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnessesâ credibility, and it may choose to believe one witness over another; a reviewing court may not impose its own opinion to the contrary. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson,116 S.W.3d 757, 761
(Tex. 2003).
We review a trial courtâs conclusions of law de novo. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v.
Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794(Tex. 2002). Although a trial courtâs conclusions of law may not be challenged for factual sufficiency, we may review the legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine whether the conclusions are correct.Id.
If we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous, but the trial court nevertheless rendered the proper judgment, the error does not require reversal.Id.
Declaration of the spur road as private
Smith first argues that the trial court erred by declaring the spur road is a private road.
Smith contends the declaration flies in the face of 30 years of official documents, including a 1998
order and a 2011 resolution from the Edwards County Commissionersâ Court, showing that the
spur road is a county road as a matter of law. Smith further argues that the Reids cannot collaterally
attack the commissionersâ actions, such that the 2012 agreed judgment between the Reids and
Edwards County does not nullify the 2011 resolution. The Reids respond that the spur road is not
a public road because the County failed to utilize any of the statutorily-authorized methods of
-9-
04-13-00550-CV
acquiring the spur as public, and because the County clarified by way of a November 10, 1986
order that the spur is not a public road by omitting it from its official list of county roads.
Chapter 281 of the Texas Transportation Code sets out four methods by which a county
with a population of 50,000 or less, such as Edwards County, may acquire a public interest in a
private road. Under section 281.002, a county may acquire a public interest in a private road only
by: (1) purchase; (2) condemnation; (3) dedication; or (4) a courtâs final judgment of adverse
possession. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 281.002 (West 2013). A public interest in a private
road may not be asserted until the commissionersâ court has complied with the resolution
requirement of section 281.005 and provided written notice to the owner of the road. Id.
§§ 281.005-.006 (West 2013); see also id. § 258.002 (West 2013) (outlining procedures for
adoption of county road map). It is undisputed that Edwards County did not comply with any of
the statutorily-authorized methods of road creation as it relates to the spur road in either 2011 or
1998. Most notably, the County failed to comply with the notice provisions. Actions by a
commissionersâ court may be declared void for failure to comply with statutory requirements. See
Johnson v. Krieg, 175 S.W.2d 102, 103-04 (Tex. Civ. App.âAustin 1943, writ refâd w.o.m.)
(affirming trial courtâs finding that commissionersâ court order was void because it was made
without notice to landowner). Lawrence Reid testified that, prior to filing the lawsuit at issue,
neither he nor any other member of his family was notified that Edwards County was
contemplating the status of the road. He further stated that they never received any notice from
the County with respect to the spur road, meaning that the Reids had no notice of the 1970s
commissionersâ statements or the 1998 order or the 2011 resolution. Jennifer Reid Smith testified
similarly. The trial court was free to consider the evidence that no notice was provided to the
Reids before designating the spur road as a county road, as well as the fact that the spur road was
- 10 -
04-13-00550-CV
never added to the official county road map, 4 in concluding that the spur road is in fact a private
road.
In addition, the trial court was free to consider the 2012 agreed judgment memorializing
an agreement between the County and the Reids in which the County disavowed any interest the
public might have in the spur road and agreed that the 2011 resolution is invalid, unenforceable,
and void. The agreed judgment leaves no doubt that the County did not intend to acquire any
public rights in the spur road. We also note that the 2011 resolution relied on the 1978 statement
of former commissioner Marshall Craig and the âmid-1970sâ verbal statement of current
commissioner Lee Sweeten in finding that the spur road is a county road. Because individual
members of the commissionersâ court have no authority to bind the county by their separate
actions, these statements do not constitute conclusive proof that the spur road is a public road. See
Ex parte Conger, 163 Tex. 505,357 S.W.2d 740, 743
(1962); Canales v. Laughlin,147 Tex. 169
,214 S.W.2d 451, 455
(1948). The 1998 order similarly does not constitute conclusive proof that
the spur road was public because, as earlier discussed, the order was made without prior notice to
the Reids. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 281.005-.006 (commissionersâ court must comply
with resolution requirement of section 281.005 and provide written notice to landowner before
asserting public interest in a private road).
Finally, we reject Smithâs argument that the 2012 agreed judgment is an impermissible
collateral attack on an order of the commissionersâ court. See Hanks v. Smith, 74 S.W.3d 409, 412(Tex. App.âTyler 2001, pet. denied). 5 A collateral attack is an âattempt to avoid the effect of a 4 The 2011 resolution specifically provided that the spur road would not be added to the official county road map until the proper statutory requirements were satisfied and âadding said spur to the map is expressly ordered by this Court.â 5 In Hanks, a landowner sought a declaration that a certain road was public despite a commissionersâ court ruling to the contrary. Hanks,74 S.W.3d at 410-11
. The appellate court recited the general rule that âabsent a showing of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion in the commissionersâ courtâs opening of a road, the order of the commissionersâ court is binding and conclusiveâ and the judgment is not subject to collateral attack.Id. at 412
. The appellate court
- 11 -
04-13-00550-CV
judgment in a proceeding brought for some other purpose. A direct attack on a judgment,
conversely, is an attempt to change that judgment in a proceeding brought for that specific purpose,
such as an appeal or a bill of review.â Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Carroll Indep. Sch. Dist., 441
S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. App.âFort Worth 2014, pet. denied). Because the County was joined in
the lawsuit filed by the Reids, the 2012 agreed judgment between the County and the Reids cannot
constitute a collateral attack on the 2011 resolution.
Mindful of the fact that the fact-finder is the sole judge of the witnessesâ testimony and of
the weight to be given to their testimony under both a legal and a factual sufficiency review, we
conclude that the evidence presented at trial would allow âreasonable and fair-minded people to
reach theâ decision made by the trial court, and that the trial courtâs findings regarding the private
nature of the road are not âso contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly
wrong and unjust.â City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819, 827; Cain v. Bain,709 S.W.2d 175, 176
(Tex. 1986). Accordingly, we overrule Smithâs sufficiency complaint and hold that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support the trial courtâs declaration that the spur road is not a
public road.
Easement by Estoppel
Smith next argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
courtâs denial of an easement by estoppel. The trial court found that:
The Reids never made any representation of the existence of an easement in favor
of Smith or Smithâs property across and over any portion of the Reidsâ property or
the spur road; and
therefore held that the order of the commissionersâ court reaffirming that the road was a county road was conclusive
evidence on the issue of the status of the road, and that the trial court therefore erred in finding that the road was
private. Id.The court went on, however, to note that a subsequent order of the commissionersâ court âreleased all claimâ the County had in the road, thereby abandoning the road.Id.
Thus, the appellate court ultimately affirmed the
trial courtâs declaration that the road was private. Id. at 414. To the extent that Smith contends that the Hanks court
reversed the trial courtâs summary judgment, he is mistaken.
- 12 -
04-13-00550-CV
The Reids never made any false or fraudulent statements or representations to
Smith regarding access or use of the spur road, or represented to Smith that the
Reids had or would dedicate the road to the public, or grant to Smith a private
easement.
Three elements are necessary to the creation of an easement by estoppel: 1) a representation
communicated, either by word or action, to the promisee; 2) the communication was believed; and
3) the promisee relied on the communication. Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 452(Tex. 1979); Holden v. Weidenfeller,929 S.W.2d 124, 131
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 1996, writ denied). Under this doctrine, a landowner may be estopped from denying the existence of an easement created by ârepresentationsâ upon which another has detrimentally relied. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc.,364 S.W.2d 196, 209
(Tex. 1963).
Smith contends that he proved the elements of easement by estoppel by way of the
following undisputed evidence at trial: Smith, his predecessors in interest, and other landowners
regularly used the spur road without contest by Reid; the spur road was the only way in and out of
the Smith Ranch due to frequent washouts and floods. Smith leased the 640-acre tract for three
years before purchasing it from Cloudt, and relied on the unimpeded use of the spur road when
deciding to purchase the property. Smith made improvements to his land, and relied on use of the
spur road in doing so. He contends that the Reidsâ silence regarding the status of the road, and his
reliance on such, constitutes an easement by estoppel. 6
An easement by estoppel may not be predicated upon silence and passive acquiescence
alone. See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721(Tex. App.âAustin 1998, pet. denied) (mere silence cannot create an easement by estoppel except where there is a vendor-vendee relationship between the parties); see also Stallman v. Newman,9 S.W.3d 243, 247
(Tex. App.âHouston [14th
6
Smith also argues that the Reidsâ affirmative actions in the Bay-Houston litigation (i.e., agreeing to give Bay-Houston
an easement over the spur road) operated to create an easement by estoppel.
- 13 -
04-13-00550-CV
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (finding that passive acquiescence in and of itself cannot rise to the level
of a âmisrepresentationâ so as to create an easement by estoppel where there has never been any
unity of title between the two tracts of land). In the absence of a vendor/vendee relationship, there
was no duty on the Reids to caution or warn Smith or his predecessors-in-title that they should
make no improvements upon their property without a secure right of ingress and egress
appurtenant to their land. See Roberts v. Allison, 836 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. App.âTyler 1992,
writ denied).
It is undisputed that the Reids never made an affirmative representation to Smith that the
spur road was public, or that an easement existed in favor of Smith. It is further uncontested that
Smithâs use of the road across the Reidsâ property was always permissive, up until the time he
purchased the 81-acre tract. The Reids made no misrepresentation, nor did they engage in
overreaching conduct by their silence; they had no duty to speak. See Wilson v. McGuffin, 749
S.W.2d 606, 610-11 (Tex. App.âCorpus Christi 1988, writ denied). Although Smith may have
made improvements upon his property, the record contains no evidence that he made the
improvements in reliance on any express promise by the Reids. Further, this case does not involve
a landlocked tract, and once Smith purchased the additional acreage in 2010, alternative means of
ingress and egress to the Smith property were available without use of the spur road across the
Reid Ranch. Accordingly, Smith has failed to establish any of the elements of an easement by
estoppel and we therefore overrule his second issue.
Breach of Covenant Not to Adversely Possess the âBubbleâ
Smith took title to his 640-acre tract subject to a covenant not to claim the Reidsâ land by
adverse possession. The Reidsâ and Smithâs predecessors in title executed the agreement because
the terrain of their ranches required the fence-line to deviate from the true boundary line in several
places, and neither wanted the deviation to turn into a claim of adverse possession. The Reidsâ
- 14 -
04-13-00550-CV
predecessor in title, R.T. Craig, and Smithâs predecessor in title, J.A. Blalack, struck the following
agreement:
WHEREAS, it was and is the intention of said parties to claim their respective lands
according to survey lines and according to the description contained in the several
deeds of conveyance under which said parties own and possess said respective
lands and not to claim said lands as differently divided by the division fence
between said parties as above shown . . . .
WHEREAS, said parties desire to evidence in writing said arrangement and to show
that they did not and do not intend to claim and possess said premises adversely to
each other:
NOW, THEREFORE KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That we, R.T.
Craig and J.A. Blalack, in consideration of the premises, hereby mutually agree that
we do not claim adversely to each other . . . J.A. Blalack for himself likewise
contracts and agrees to and with the said R.T. Craig that he, the said J.A. Blalack
has not claimed . . . the said portion of the South West one-fourth of Survey 50
which is cut into the outside inclosure [of] the said J.A. Blalack and further likewise
agrees that he does not and will not claim or assert any interest or title therein but
holds said premises subject to the claim and ownership of the said R.T. Craig and
the said parties agree that this contract is binding upon their heirs and assigns.
The Reids pleaded that Smithâs deed, which contained a âbubbleâ of land within their boundary,
constituted a cloud on their title and constituted a breach of the covenant not to adversely possess.
In the final judgment, the trial court found that âSmith claimed such âbubbleâ by virtue of adverse
possessionâ and that assertion of this claim is âin fact a breach of an express covenant not to so
claim land . . . by adverse possession.â On appeal, Smith asserts that this finding is not supported
by legally or factually sufficient evidence.
First, Smith argues that the Reidsâ breach of covenant claim is barred by a four-year statute
of limitations. See Malmgren v. Inverness Forest Residents Civic Club, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 875, 877
(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (âActions to enforce restrictive covenants are
controlled by the four-year statute of limitations.â). The Reids respond that Smith has waived his
affirmative defense of limitations because he failed to plead or argue it below. Smithâs âFourth
Amended Original Answer, Counter-Claim and Affirmative Defenses,â contains a section titled
- 15 -
04-13-00550-CV
âClaims/Affirmative Defenses.â Under this heading are two claims/affirmative defenses: (A)
Easement by Estoppel and (B) Adverse Possession. The âadverse possessionâ heading contains
the following language:
The Defendant, relying on his own deed from D.L. Cloudt in 2003, claims
ownership of âthe bubble,â which lies at the entrance to the Smith tract, further
states that Plaintiffsâ alleged cause of action is barred by limitations set forth in
Sections 16.024, 16.025[,] and 16.026 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. The deed to Smith dated May 2003 is recorded in Volume 212, Page 821 of
the Edwards County deed records.
Moreover, âthe bubbleâ was conveyed to Smithâs predecessor, Denman L.
Cloudt (âCloudtâ) by Deed dated November 16, 1998, recorded at Volume 161,
Page 364 of the Edwards County deed records. âThe bubbleâ is described by metes
and bounds in the Deed to Cloudt. âThe bubbleâ has been under fence and
considered part of what is the Smith Ranch since the 1970âs, prior to both Cloudt
and Smithâs ownership.
(Emphasis added). 7 Sections 16.024-.026 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code pertain
to adverse possession; none of the sections contain a four-year limitations period. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024-.026 (West 2002) (providing three, five, and ten-year
limitations period for adverse possession claims).
We agree that Smithâs pleadings, which only briefly mention limitations under the adverse
possession heading, failed to put the Reids on notice that he was claiming a limitations defense.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47. A review of Smithâs live pleading would not have provided notice to
a reasonably competent attorney of Smithâs intent to assert the affirmative defense of limitations.
See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897(Tex. 2000); Broom v. Brookshire Bros., Inc.,923 S.W.2d 57, 60
(Tex. App.âTyler 1995, writ denied). Smith contends
that absent the Reidsâ failure to specially except to his pleading, his pleading is sufficient and he
7
The pleading also contains a second section titled âAffirmative Defenses.â Under this heading, four affirmative
defenses are listed as follows: â(A) Estoppel; (B) Estoppel / Silence / Duty to Speak; (C) Adverse Possession; and (D)
Impermissible Collateral Attack.â There is no mention of the term âlimitationsâ within the discussion of these
affirmative defenses.
- 16 -
04-13-00550-CV
did not waive his affirmative defense of limitations. We disagree that there was any defect in the
pleadings calling for special exceptions. See Auld, 34 S.W.3d at 896(stating an opposing party should use special exceptions to identify defects in a pleading so that they may be cured, if possible, by amendment). The Reids were entitled to rely on Smithâs specific pleading of âadverse possession,â and were not required to alert Smith to another possible theory of recovery. See Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,341 S.W.3d 323, 345
(Tex. 2011) (âA party is not required to specially except to a pleading defect if it lacks notice of the other partyâs intent.â). Because limitations is an affirmative defense that is waived unless affirmatively pleaded, Smith has failed to preserve his limitations complaint for our review. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk,361 S.W.3d 602, 611
(Tex. 2012).
Second, Smith contends that he is not bound by the Craig-Blalack agreement and that the
agreement is not tied to the âbubble.â We again disagree. The Craig-Blalock agreement provides
that the âparties agree that this contract is binding upon their heirs and assigns.â Because the
original parties to the agreement intended it to be binding upon their heirs and assigns, the covenant
runs with the land. See Inwood N. Homeownersâ Assân, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635(Tex. 1987) (âIn Texas, a covenant runs with the land when it touches and concerns the land; relates to a thing in existence or specifically binds the parties and their assigns; is intended by the original parties to run with the land; and when the successor to the burden has notice.â); see also Montfort v. Trek Res., Inc.,198 S.W.3d 344, 355
(Tex. App.âEastland 2006, no pet.) (intent to run with
the land may be evidenced by language stating that covenant binds draftersâ âsuccessors and
assignsâ). As such, Smith was bound by the covenant not to adversely possess the bubble.
Third, Smith argues the trial courtâs negative finding as to adverse possession precludes a
finding of breach of covenant. This argument is disingenuous, because the agreement merely
prohibits a âclaimâ or assertion of interest in the propertyâit is immaterial that the claim of
- 17 -
04-13-00550-CV
adverse possession turns out to be unmeritorious or unsuccessful. We therefore cannot agree that
the trial court erred in finding that Smith claimed the âbubbleâ by adverse possession and that
assertion of this claim constituted a breach of an express covenant. We overrule Smithâs issue
related to breach of the covenant not to adversely possess the âbubble.â
Attorneyâs Fees
Finally, Smith contends we should vacate the award of attorneyâs fees. The trial courtâs
judgment provides: âUnder the discretionary powers of the Court to award attorneys fees under
Chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practices [sic] and Remedies Code, the Plaintiffs are awarded
attorneys fees against the Defendant, Randy K. Smith through the trial in the amount of
$79,171.30, and are conditionally awarded attorney fees against Defendant, Randy K. Smith in the
event that the Defendant Smith appeals this matter to the 4th Court of Appeals in the amount of
$20,000.â Smith claims that although the trial court awarded attorneyâs fees under Chapter 38 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the Reids did not succeed on any Chapter 38 claims.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2008). 8 We disagree. The Reidsâ claim
for breach of the covenant not to adversely possess the âbubbleâ sounds in contract. See id.
§ 38.001(8); Davis v. Canyon Creek Estates Homeowners Assân, 350 S.W.3d 301, 313(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (âA restrictive covenant is a contract subject to the same rules of construction and interpretation as any other contract.â); Candlewood Creek Neighborhood Assân v. Gashaye, No. 05-11-00380-CV,2012 WL 3135721
, at *2 (Tex. App.âDallas Aug. 2,
2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a covenant is a contract between the parties, and that
recovery of attorneyâs fees is permitted on a breach of contract action under section 38.001(8));
8
Section 38.001 provides: âA person may recover reasonable attorneyâs fees from an individual or corporation, in
addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for . . . an oral or written contract.â TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West 2008).
- 18 -
04-13-00550-CV
but see Tanglewood Homes Assân, Inc. v. Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 74-75(Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed) (holding that breach of deed restriction cannot authorize award of attorneyâs fees under Chapter 38). Smithâs reliance on Perez v. Tex. Disposal Sys., Inc.,103 S.W.3d 591, 592
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2003, pet. denied), is misplaced because it pertains to
the recovery of attorneyâs fees under section 15.51 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51 (West 2011) (âProcedures and Remedies in Actions to
Enforce Covenants Not to Competeâ). Accordingly, we conclude the award of attorneyâs fees
under Chapter 38 was proper.
In any event, the trial court was authorized to award attorneyâs fees under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act. Section 37.009 of the UDJA provides: âIn any proceeding under this
chapter, the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorneyâs fees as are equitable
and just.â TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (West 2008). In a declaratory judgment
action, the trial court may award either party costs and reasonable attorneyâs fees as are equitable
and just. See Arthur M. Deck & Assocs. v. Crispin, 888 S.W.2d 56, 62(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The question, then, is not whether the Reidsâ pleadings include a specific request for attorneyâs fees under the UDJA, but whether the action between the Reids and Smith was one âunder this chapter,â i.e., whether it was a declaratory judgment action. It is undisputed that the Reids sought declaratory relief against Smith under the UDJA. Thus, the trial court was authorized to award attorneyâs fees to any party with pleadings requesting them. See Purvis Oil Corp. v. Hillin,890 S.W.2d 931, 939
(Tex. App.âEl Paso 1994, no writ) (concluding that party
moving for attorneysâ fees in declaratory judgment action need not specify statutory authority for
award so long as that party has pleaded for attorneysâ fees). The Reids sought recovery of
attorneysâ fees under section 38.001, the UDJA, and under common law.
- 19 -
04-13-00550-CV
We review a trial courtâs decision to award attorneyâs fees under the UDJA for an abuse of
discretion. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163(Tex. 2004) (citing Bocquet v. Herring,972 S.W.2d 19, 21
(Tex. 1998)). We employ a hybrid analysis in which the âreasonable and necessaryâ requirements are questions of fact determined by the factfinder but the âequitable and justâ requirements are questions of law for the court. Ridge Oil Co.,148 S.W.3d at 161
. The party seeking to recover attorneyâs fees bears the burden of proof. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling,822 S.W.2d 1, 10
(Tex. 1991). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial
court abused its discretion when it awarded attorneyâs fees to the Reids for trial.
As to the amount of the attorneyâs fees, Smith argues that the Reids should only recover
10% of $87,613.30. Specifically, Smith alleges that evidence was presented that the Reids
incurred a total of $87,613.30 in attorneyâs fees at trial, but counsel testified that only 10% of the
fees were incurred in relation to the Smithâs claim of adverse possession of the âbubble.â Again,
we disagree. Itemized invoices were presented in support of the entire amount awarded
($79,171.30), and Smith lodged no objection to the evidence at trial. Thus, Smith has waived his
segregation complaint on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Green Intâl., Inc. v. Solis, 951
S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997). Nonetheless, the Reids were entitled to all of their requested fees
because the facts underlying their breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims
encompassed 100% of the fees. Counsel testified that he spent 10% of his time on the adverse
possession claim; 30% on the abandoned claims of easement by necessity and public road by
implied dedication; 30% on the 2011 resolution; and 30% on the temporary restraining order,
request for declarations, and defending the easement by estoppel. Accordingly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in awarding $79,171.30 in attorneyâs fees for trial.
We do, however, agree with Smith that the award of appellate attorneyâs fees should have
been conditioned on Smithâs unsuccessful appeal to this court. Appellate attorneyâs fees must be
- 20 -
04-13-00550-CV
conditioned on success in the appeal. Gilbert v. City of El Paso, 327 S.W.3d 332, 337-38(Tex. App.âEl Paso 2010, no pet.). We therefore modify the judgment to make the award of appellate attorneyâs fees contingent upon an unsuccessful appeal by Smith. See Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore,354 S.W.3d 507, 515
(Tex. App.âFort Worth 2011, pet. denied). As such, Smithâs final
issue is sustained in part.
CONCLUSION
The trial courtâs judgment is modified to condition the award of appellate attorneyâs fees
on an unsuccessful appeal by Smith. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
- 21 -