Office of the Attorney General v. Blanca De Leon
Date Filed2014-12-31
Docket04-13-00501-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00501-CV
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Appellant
v.
Blanca DE LEON,
Appellee
From the 49th Judicial District Court, Zapata County, Texas
Trial Court No. 8,248
Honorable Paul Canales, Judge Presiding 1
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 31, 2014
REVERSED AND RENDERED
Appellant Office of the Attorney General (OAG) was sued by Appellee Blanca De Leon
for its liens against certain real property. In its judgment on Blancaâs declaratory judgment action,
the trial court awarded Blanca the relief she requested including attorneyâs fees. OAG moved for
a new trial solely on attorneyâs fees. At the hearing on OAGâs motion, the trial court denied
OAGâs motion and then orally stated the attorneyâs fees were sanctions; OAG appeals. Because,
1
The Honorable Jose A. Lopez is the presiding judge of the 49th Judicial District Court. Judge Canales was the
visiting judge who conducted the bench trial, signed the declaratory judgment, and conducted the hearing on OAGâs
motion for new trial.
04-13-00501-CV
in this case, the trial court could not properly award attorneyâs fees against OAG under the Family
Code, the UDJA, or as sanctions, we reverse the trial courtâs judgment and render judgment that
Blanca take nothing.
BACKGROUND
Blanca married Jose De Leonâa man with child support obligations for children not of his
marriage to Blanca. After their marriage, Blanca used proceeds from her personal injury settlement
to purchase several pieces of real property. The property titles were initially issued in both her
name and Joseâs name, and OAG put liens on the properties. Blanca insisted the properties were
her separate property, and sued OAG using a declaratory judgment action. Blanca asked the court
for certain relief from the liens and for attorneyâs fees. The trial court granted Blancaâs requested
relief and awarded attorneyâs fees against OAG.
In its motion for new trial, OAG argued the Family Code statute under which Blanca sought
relief bars an award of attorneyâs fees, and a declaratory judgment action was improperly
duplicative. At the conclusion of the hearing on OAGâs motion, the trial court denied OAGâs
motion and then orally stated âif I did not specifically say it was a sanction on the record before, I
should have.â
Raising three issues, OAG appeals.
NO BASES FOR AWARDING ATTORNEYâS FEES
In its first issue, OAG argues Blanca is not entitled to attorneyâs fees against it under the
Family Code, the UDJA, or as sanctions. We recite the standard of review and then address each
argument in turn.
A. Standard of Review
We review an award of attorneyâs fees under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act for
an abuse of discretion. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Oake v. Collin County,
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692 S.W.2d 454, 455(Tex. 1985). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to properly interpret and apply the law. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,84 S.W.3d 198, 211
(Tex. 2002); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,701 S.W.2d 238
, 241â42 (Tex. 1985) (âThe test for abuse of
discretion is . . . whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles.â).
B. Attorneyâs Fees Under UDJA on Family Code Claims
1. Blancaâs Arguments
Blanca sued OAG and others for relief from the child support liens on what she asserted
was her separate property. In her suit, Blanca expressly sought relief under Texas Family Code
sections 157.322, .323, and .326, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 157.322, .323, .326 (West 2014),
but petitioned under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 37.001â.011 (West 2014). She sought the following relief by declaratory judgment:
A. Declare that the child support liens number (1), (2), and (3) have
been paid and order the Attorney General to sign releases of liens
pursuant to section 157.322 of the Texas Family Code.
B. Declare that the above properties are the separate property of Ms.
[Blanca] De Leon and Order that child support liens from any
obligation due from Mr. [Jose] De Leon be released as to the above
properties.
C. In the alternative, declare what if any of the above properties are
subject to the child support liens and declare the portion that is the
separate property of Ms. [Blanca] De Leon provided in section
157.323 of the Texas Family Code.
She also sought attorneyâs fees under section 37.009. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 37.009.
2. OAGâs Arguments
In response, OAG argued that Blanca could not be awarded attorneyâs fees under the UDJA
because the Family Code expressly prohibits award of attorneyâs fees against it in a Title IV-D
case, and she cannot tack on a UDJA claim to get attorneyâs fees.
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We begin by reviewing the applicable law.
3. Relief Against Child Support Lien under Family Code
Under section 157.326, an obligorâs spouse may seek relief from a child support lien
against property in which the spouse claims an ownership interest as follows:
(a) A spouse of an obligor . . . having an ownership interest in property that is
subject to a child support lien may file suit under Section 157.323 to determine the
extent, if any, of the spouseâs . . . interest in real . . . property that is subject to . . .
a lien perfected under this subchapter.
(b) After [the required] notice . . . , the court shall conduct a hearing and determine
the extent, if any, of the ownership interest in the property held by the obligorâs
spouse . . . .
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.326.
However, the trial court may not award attorneyâs fees against the OAG in a Title IV-D
case. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.211 (stating that in a Title IV-D case, âthe court may not assess
[attorneyâs fees] against the Title IV-D agencyâ); Office of Attây Gen. of Tex. v. Scholer, 403
S.W.3d 859, 862(Tex. 2013) (identifying the OAG as Texasâs Title IV-D agency and recognizing child support enforcement actions as falling under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act); In re Naylor,160 S.W.3d 292, 295
(Tex. App.âTexarkana 2005, pet. denied) (recognizing that, in a Title IV-D case, the trial court may not award attorneyâs fees against the Office of the Attorney General); Attây Gen. of Tex. v. OâQuinn,938 S.W.2d 542, 543
(Tex. App.âBeaumont 1997, no
writ) (same); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 651â69b (2006) (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act).
Further, âa party cannot use the [UDJA] as a vehicle to obtain otherwise impermissible
attorneyâs fees.â MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669(Tex. 2009); accord Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings,351 S.W.3d 290, 301
(Tex. 2011).
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04-13-00501-CV
4. No Attorneyâs Fees under Family Code or UDJA
In her suit, Blanca sought relief from child support enforcement liens under the Family
Codeâs provisions for enforcement of such liens. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 157.322, .323,
.326. Except for attorneyâs fees, all the relief Blanca sought was available to her under the Family
Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 157.322, .323, .326. She could get a determination that
certain liens were paid in full, a release of those liens, and a determination that her property was
separate property. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.326 (bring suit, determine ownership interest,
release of lien); id. § 157.322 (mandatory release of lien); id. § 157.323 (resolve ownership
interest). Thus, her declaratory judgment action seeking attorneyâs fees was merely incidental to
her claims for relief under the Family Code, see Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 301(citing John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Memâl Found. v. Dewhurst,90 S.W.3d 268, 289
(Tex. 2002)), and it sought relief under the UDJA that was otherwise impermissible, contra MBM Fin. Corp.,292 S.W.3d at 669
.
Further, the Family Code expressly prohibits an award of attorneyâs fees against OAG in a
Title IV-D case such as this, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.211; In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at 295; OâQuinn,938 S.W.2d at 543
, and Blanca cannot use the UDJA to circumvent the statute, see Jackson,351 S.W.3d at 301
; MBM Fin. Corp.,292 S.W.3d at 669
.
Therefore, we necessarily conclude Blanca cannot recover attorneyâs fees under the Family
Code, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 231.211; In re Naylor, 160 S.W.3d at 295; OâQuinn,938 S.W.2d at 543
, or the UDJA, see Jackson,351 S.W.3d at 301
; John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Memâl Found.,90 S.W.3d at 289
.
We turn to Blancaâs remaining basis for attorneyâs fees: sanctions.
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04-13-00501-CV
C. Attorneyâs Fees as Sanctions
1. OAGâs Argument
On appeal, OAG does not assert it is immune from sanctions but instead argues the trial
court failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of the applicable sanctions rule. See TEX.
R. CIV. P. 13; Parker v. Walton, 233 S.W.3d 535, 539â40 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Baty,946 S.W.2d 851, 852
(Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.]
1997, no writ). It contends that Blancaâs petition, the bench trial, and the trial courtâs declaratory
judgment each addressed attorneyâs fees, and none addressed sanctions. To support its point, it
noted Blanca did not seek sanctions in her petition, it had no notice of any proposed sanctions
against it, the trial courtâs declaratory judgment did not order sanctions, there was no separate
written sanctions order, and there is no mention of sanctions in the trial courtâs order denying
OAGâs motion for new trial.
2. Standard of Review
We review the imposition of sanctions under Rule 13 for an abuse of discretion. Nath v.
Tex. Childrenâs Hosp., No. 12-0620, 2014 WL 4252269, at *3(Tex. Feb. 5, 2014) (citing Low v. Henry,221 S.W.3d 609, 614
(Tex. 2007)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to properly interpret and apply the law. In re Depât of Family & Protective Servs.,273 S.W.3d 637, 642
(Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); Jorgensen v. Tex. MedClinic,327 S.W.3d 285, 287
(Tex. App.âSan
Antonio 2010, no pet.).
3. Hearing on OAGâs Motion for New Trial
During the hearing on OAGâs motion for new trial, Blanca argued the trial court could
assess attorneyâs fees as sanctions under In re A.C.B. See In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d 570, 575â76
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (awarding sanctions against OAG in a Title IV-
D case). The trial court agreed and, citing In re A.C.B., stated âI think it allows me to assess
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04-13-00501-CV
attorneyâs feesâ against OAG and âIâm going to use that case for grounds for being able to do it.â
Referring to OAGâs argument that the trial courtâs written declaratory judgment awarded
attorneyâs fees and not sanctions, the trial court stated âif I did not specifically say it was a sanction
on the record before, I should have.â Relying on In re A.C.B., the trial court denied OAGâs motion.
See In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 575â76.
We begin by examining the basis In re A.C.B. used to award sanctions against OAG. 2
4. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13
In In re A.C.B., this court affirmed sanctions against OAG in a Title IV-D case based on
OAGâs violation of Rule 13. In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 575â76. Rule 13 reads in relevant part
as follows:
The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that
they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument
is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose
of harassment. . . . If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing,
shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215, upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both.
Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in
good faith. No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause,
the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
We must determine whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied Rule 13 and
the applicable law. See Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 762(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, 2 The declaratory judgment does not order sanctions; it awards attorneyâs fees based on âgood cause.â In the hearing on OAGâs motion for new trial, the trial court expressly stated it was ordering attorneyâs fees under In re A.C.B.; In re A.C.B. affirmed sanctions under Rule 13. See In re A.C.B.,103 S.W.3d 570
, 575â76 (Tex. App.âSan Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding). Thus, like Baty and Metzger, âwe limit our review to determining whether the sanctions meet the requirements of Rule 13.â Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Baty,946 S.W.2d 851, 852
(Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); accord Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones,192 S.W.3d 581, 583
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing approvingly Metzger v. Sebek,892 S.W.2d 20, 51
(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (âWhen an
order of sanctions refers to one specific rule, either by citing the rule, tracking its language, or both, we are confined
to determining whether the sanctions are appropriate under that particular rule.â)).
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04-13-00501-CV
pet. denied) (â[W]e note that rule interpretation is âa pure question of law over which the judge
has no discretion.ââ (quoting Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437(Tex. 1997))); see also Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones,192 S.W.3d 581, 583
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(noting that appellate courts must âexamine[] the entire record . . . to determine whether the trial
court properly [ordered] sanction[s]â).
5. Notice and Hearing Requirements
The trial courtâs power to impose sanctions under Rule 13 is subject to due process
requirements. Nath v. Tex. Childrenâs Hosp., No. 12-0620, 2014 WL 4252269, at *6(Tex. Feb. 5, 2014) (applying due process requirements to Rule 13 sanctions); In re Bennett,960 S.W.2d 35, 40
(Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (applying due process requirements to court-imposed sanctions). Rule 13 requires the trial court to give notice to the party or attorney who may be sanctioned and hold an evidentiary hearing on the question. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Parker v. Walton,233 S.W.3d 535
, 539â40 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Baty,946 S.W.2d 851, 852
(Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ); see In re L.A.M. & Assocs.,975 S.W.2d 80, 83
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 1998, no pet.). The potential sanctionee must have notice of the complaint and an opportunity to respond. In re Bennett,960 S.W.2d at 40
; Baty,946 S.W.2d at 852
.
6. No Notice
Here, the record does not show that either Blanca or the trial court gave OAG notice of
possible Rule 13 sanctions. Blanca did not move for sanctions in her petition or by separate
motion. Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 573(noting the plaintiff sought sanctions in his motion for declaratory judgment). The trial court did not give OAG notice that it intended to address sanctions sua sponte. Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; In re Bennett,960 S.W.2d at 40
(relating the trial court, acting sua sponte, set a hearing on sanctions and ordered defendant to
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show cause why sanctions should not be imposed); Baty, 946 S.W.2d at 853 (concluding trial court
abused its discretion because it âspontaneously ordered sanctions on its own motion at the
conclusion of the hearing, without providing either notice or a hearing to appellantsâ).
At the hearing on its motion for new trial, OAG protested to the trial court that Blancaâs
petition, the arguments during the bench trial, and the trial courtâs declaratory judgment were about
attorneyâs fees, not sanctions, but the trial court orally stated its intention to award the attorneyâs
fees as a sanction. Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Baty, 946 S.W.2d at 853.
7. Failure to Comply with Rule, Due Process Requirements
Under Rule 13, the trial court could not impose sanctions without, inter alia, prior notice.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Nath, 2014 WL 4252269, at *6. The record shows OAG did not have prior notice of possible sanctions before the hearing on its motion for new trial. Blanca contends OAG had many monthsâ notice of her declaratory judgment action, but her petition did not seek sanctions. Further, the trial court did not either issue a show cause order or set a hearing on sanctions. Contra Parker, 233 S.W.3d at 539â40; Baty,946 S.W.2d at 852
; see In re L.A.M. & Assocs.,975 S.W.2d 80, 83
(Tex. App.âSan Antonio 1998, no pet.).
Because the trial court relied on Rule 13 but failed to comply with its requirement for prior
notice, we conclude the trial court failed to properly apply the law. See Parker, 233 S.W.3d at
539â40; Baty, 946 S.W.2d at 852.
8. Particulars of Good Cause
The Rule also requires the trial court to state in the sanction order the âparticularsâ of good
cause it found to impose sanctions. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 761(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Murphy v. Friendswood Dev. Co.,965 S.W.2d 708, 710
(Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). If no particulars are stated in the sanction
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04-13-00501-CV
order, postjudgment findings of fact that are supported by the record may satisfy the particulars
requirement. In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 576.
Here, the record shows no written sanction order, no written order we may construe as a
sanction order, and no findings of fact to support a sanction order. Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 13;
Murphy, 965 S.W.2d at 710.
The declaratory judgment signed by the trial court merely states âgood cause exists to
award BLANCA DE LEON, Petitioner judgment in the amount of three thousand eight hundred
[dollars] ($3,800.00) for attorneyâs fees, expenses, and costs.â The judgment does not state that
any party moved for sanctions; it also does not state that the trial court considered evidence on
sanctions, found any facts supporting sanctions, or ordered sanctions. In fact, the word sanction
does not appear in the judgment, and the court did not issue postjudgment findings of fact of any
kind. Contra In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 576. Likewise, the trial courtâs order denying OAGâs motion does not mention, discuss, or order sanctions. Contraid.
The only mention of sanctions by the trial court came after it denied OAGâs motion. Cf.
Cherry Petersen Landry Albert LLP v. Cruz, 443 S.W.3d 441, 455 (Tex. App.âDallas 2014, pet.
filed) (âThe sanctions order contained many conclusions about [sanctioneeâs conduct], but did not
include facts to justify those conclusions.â). In its single sentence comment the trial court stated
âAnd if I did not specifically say it was a sanction on the record before, I should have.â
Because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 13âs requirement to state particular facts
evidencing good cause, the trial court did not properly apply the law. See Murphy, 965 S.W.2d at
709â10; cf. In re A.C.B., 103 S.W.3d at 576 (affirming sanctions order supported by postjudgment
findings of fact).
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04-13-00501-CV
ISSUES TWO, THREE
In its second issue, OAG argued the trial court had no authority to award attorneyâs fees
against it because the legislature has not waived its sovereign immunity under these facts.
In its third issue, OAG argued the trial court erred because, by statutory constraint, OAG
could not pay the judgment for attorneyâs fees within ten days of the judgment date as ordered.
Because we have already concluded the trial court had no authority to award attorneyâs
fees as it did, we need not address OAGâs second and third issues.
CONCLUSION
Although Blanca sought, and the trial court awarded, attorneyâs fees under the UDJA, all
the relief Blanca requested was available under the Family Code, and the Code expressly prohibits
the trial court from awarding attorneyâs fees against OAG in a Title IV-D case. Thus, Blanca could
not use the UDJA to circumvent the Family Codeâs prohibition on attorneyâs fees.
Because OAG had no notice of sanctions and the trial court failed to state any facts
supporting good cause to impose sanctions, the trial court could not award attorneyâs fees as
sanctions against OAG under Rule 13.
Therefore, because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the law,
we reverse the trial courtâs judgment and render judgment that Blanca take nothing on her claim
for attorneyâs fees.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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