Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



                                    NO. 03-22-00218-CR



                                   Aaron Riley, Appellant

                                               v.

                                 The State of Texas, Appellee


            FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 9 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
      NO. C-1-CR-20-400695, THE HONORABLE KIM WILLIAMS, JUDGE PRESIDING



                           MEMORANDUM OPINION


              A jury convicted appellant Aaron Riley of the misdemeanor offense of violation

of a protective order. See Tex. Penal Code 25.07(a)(2)(C). Punishment was before the trial

court, which sentenced Riley to 364 days in the Travis County Jail. This appeal followed.

              Riley’s court-appointed counsel on appeal has filed a motion to withdraw and a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744
 (1967).         The brief meets the

requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why

there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See
id. at 744-45
; see also Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75
, 81–82 (1988); Garner v. State,
300 S.W.3d 763, 766
 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Counsel has certified to this Court that she has provided Riley with a copy of the motion and

brief, advised him of his right to examine the appellate record and file a pro se response, and

supplied him with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Kelly v. State,
436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20
 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).          No pro se brief or other response has

been filed.

               Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record

to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75, 80

(1988); Bledsoe v. State,
178 S.W.3d 824
, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Stafford v. State,
813 S.W.2d 503, 511
 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The record reflects that Heather Boyett, Riley’s

ex-girlfriend, applied for a protective order against Riley in December 2018. At trial, Boyett

testified that she and Riley had dated “[o]ff and on between 2016 and 2018” and that after their

relationship ended, Riley had “continued contact” with her, which Boyett eventually “couldn’t

handle . . . on [her] own.” 1 A temporary ex parte protective order, filed under the authority of

Chapter 83 of the Texas Family Code, see Tex. Fam. Code §§ 83.001, .002, was issued on

December 28, 2018, was extended on January 11, 2019, and expired on January 28, 2019. The

order prohibited Riley from, among other things, communicating or attempting to communicate

with Boyett “in any manner whatsoever except through attorneys.”

               In January 2019, Riley was arrested for a family-violence offense committed

against Boyett. As a result of this offense, a second protective order was issued against Riley,

this one under the authority of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. art. 17.292. This order, which was issued on January 18, 2019, and expired on March 18,

2019, similarly prohibited Riley from “communicating in any manner” with Boyett except

through his attorney. Copies of both this protective order and the temporary ex parte protective

       1  In a proffer made by the State outside the presence of the jury, Boyett testified that
before she obtained the protective order, Riley had been verbally aggressive and violent with her,
including by hitting her head against a car window, trying to enter her locked home and throwing
a rock through her window, attempting to force her to have sex with him, threatening to hit her if
she did not give him a copy of the key to her home, and threatening to kill her.
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order were admitted into evidence, and the evidence shows that Riley was served with and had

notice of both orders.

               The State presented evidence that despite the prohibition against communicating

with Boyett, Riley called Boyett from jail, using the jail’s recorded telephone system, three times

on January 18 and one time on January 19, 2019. According to the system’s call log, a copy of

which was admitted into evidence, Boyett did not accept or refused the calls on January 18 but

accepted Riley’s call on January 19. A recording of the approximately ten-minute call was

admitted into evidence. On the call, Riley can be heard asking Boyett to tell him where she was,

asking her if she wanted to “do lunch or something” “when [he] got out,” asking her if she was

going to attend his upcoming court hearing, asking her if the State “bribed” her into applying for

the protective order, and asking her if he could call her again. This call formed the basis for

Riley’s conviction.

               We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with counsel that the

appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support

the appeal. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of conviction.




                                             __________________________________________
                                             Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: December 29, 2022

Do Not Publish


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