S. v. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



                                     NO. 03-22-00482-CV



                                        S. V., Appellant

                                               v.

               Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee


              FROM THE 53RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
  NO. D-1-FM-20-007029, THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING



                             MEMORANDUM OPINION


              Appellant Father appeals from a final decree terminating his parental rights to his

daughter, “Danielle,” aged 11 years at the time of the jury trial. The jury found by clear and

convincing evidence that termination is in Danielle’s best interest and that the Department of

Family and Protective Services had satisfied its burdens under predicates (D) (endangerment),

(E) (placement in circumstances resulting in endangerment), and (O) (failure to comply with

court-ordered service plan). See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). The trial

entered final judgment consistent with those findings; the court also terminated Mother’s rights,

but Mother did not appeal.

              Counsel for Father has filed a brief arguing that the record reveals only frivolous

challenges to the final decree. See Anders v. California, 

 (1967) (stating that

court-appointed counsel who believes appeal is wholly frivolous should file motion to withdraw
“accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the

appeal”); In re P.M., 

, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use of

Anders procedure in appeals from termination of parental rights). We will affirm the decree

of termination.

                  Father’s court-appointed attorney has a filed brief concluding that any appeal is

frivolous and without merit. See Anders, 

; P.M., 

 & n.10. This

brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record

demonstrating that there are no arguable grounds for reversal to be advanced on appeal. See

; Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 

, 646–47

(Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in parental-rights termination

case). Counsel has also certified to this Court that Father was provided with a copy of the

Anders brief and notice of the right to file a pro se brief, which he did.

                  Upon receipt of an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 

 (1988). After reviewing the record and the briefing, including the trial court’s findings under

subsections (D) and (E), see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re N.G., 

,

236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam), we find nothing that would arguably support a meritorious

appeal. We thus agree with counsel that any appeal is frivolous and without merit.


                                           CONCLUSION

                  For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the final decree of termination.




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                                            __________________________________________
                                            Edward Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: December 30, 2022




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