in Re FamilyLink Treatment Services, Inc.
Date Filed2022-12-07
Docket03-22-00210-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-22-00210-CV
In re FamilyLink Treatment Services, Inc.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator FamilyLink Treatment Services, Inc. (FamilyLink) has filed a petition for
writ of mandamus, seeking relief from an order signed by the district court on March 9, 2022,
which adopted temporary orders signed by an associate judge. Relator contends that the district
court abused its discretion by not allowing it to present live witness testimony at the de novo
hearing that resulted in the order. Having reviewed the petition and the record provided, we will
conditionally grant mandamus relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
BACKGROUND
The dispute underlying this original proceeding arises from a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship filed by real party in interest, the Texas Department of Family
Protective Services (the Department), against B.B. (Father). 1 On July 14, 2021, following a
bench trial, the trial court signed a Final Decree of Conservatorship. 2 The decree appointed the
1
The Department also sought to terminate the parental rights of the childrenâs mother,
who died in April 2020, while the case was pending.
2
The procedural history in this case is lengthy and is well-known to the parties. We will
limit our discussion here to the relevant procedural history and undisputed factual background
necessary to decide the issue presented. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, .4.
Department as the sole managing conservator of the children and appointed Father as possessory
conservator. The decree provided that Father would initially have supervised visitation with his
children but that once he completed three sessions with a parent coach and had three clean
urinalysis drug tests, his visits could be unsupervised. Beginning in September 2021, after three
clean drug tests, Father was allowed unsupervised visits.
In November 2021, the Department filed a motion to remove Father as possessory
conservator, citing a series of incidences involving the children that the Department viewed as
concerning. That same month, the childrenâs foster mother and FamilyLink, a child-placement
agency, each filed a petition in intervention, requesting that the court terminate Fatherâs parental
rights or, in the alternative, remove him as possessory conservator. Conversely, Father filed a
motion for further orders, seeking a monitored return of his children.
On February 14, 2022, an associate judge conducted a hearing on Fatherâs motion
at which three witnesses testifiedâthe Department caseworker, the court-appointed special
advocate, and Father. At the conclusion of the hearing, the associate judge announced a âstep
up planâ that, according to the associate judge, would give the parties âa pathway forward.â
Specifically, the associate judge orally ruled that âabsent a recommendation from a child
therapist to the contrary,â beginning on February 21, 2022, Father could visit the children
weekly, for four hours, unsupervised. In addition, the judge announced that Fatherâs visitation
hours would increase monthly and that on May 16, 2022, the children would be returned to
Father, subject to monitoring by the Department. On February 25, 2022, the associate judge
signed temporary orders that incorporated her oral ruling.
FamilyLink timely filed a motion for a de novo hearing before the referring
district court, pursuant to Section 201.015 of the Family Code. Prior to the de novo hearing,
2
FamilyLink filed and served a list of witnesses that it expected to call at the de novo hearing.
In response, the district court informed the parties by e-mail that it would consider only
the evidence presented to the associate judge and that any new witness testimony would not
be permitted.
The de novo hearing was conducted on March 8, 2022. At the hearing, the district
court informed the parties that it had reviewed the transcript from the February 14 hearing before
the associate judge. The court then summarized the testimony and the associate judgeâs ruling
and, at the conclusion, asked the parties whether they agreed with the summary as presented. In
response, FamilyLinkâs attorney informed the district court that while she did not disagree with
the courtâs summary of the evidence, she did disagree with the courtâs decision not to allow any
evidence at the hearing. 3 In response, the district court stated that it did not believe that it was
3
In relevant part, the following exchange occurred between the district court and counsel
for FamilyLink:
[COUNSEL]: Your Honorâletâs see. My disagreement is not really with the evidence
that youâve summarized and presented; my disagreement is with your
interpretation of de novo. I believe that this is a de novo hearing on the
issues. I donât think its limited to what was presented in the last case; that
would just make it an appeal. . . . So I disagree with your interpretation
that weâre limited in scope as to the evidence, as to the parties, and to the
testimony that was presented in the past. This is a chance for us to do it
all again on the issues that were specifically de novoed. But given the
limitation that youâve presented to us, I am concerned aboutâmy biggest
concern is on the rulings regarding the childâs statements. . . .
COURT: Thereâs other mechanisms for that, right? I meanâbecause, I guessâI
understand that you [donât agree] with my interpretation of de novo. But I
donât understand how it makes any sense that a de novo hearing would be
a whole new matter. Thatâs just a new hearing.
[COUNSEL]: Itâs notâyouâre right. Itâs a brand new hearing on the sameâon the
limited issues that were actually de novoed.
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required by Section 201.015 to consider additional evidence and that, instead, it would only
consider the transcript from the February hearing before the associate judge. At the conclusion
of the de novo hearing, the district court adopted the associate judgeâs temporary orders.
FamilyLink then filed its petition for writ of mandamus.
MANDAMUS STANDARD
A writ of mandamus will issue to correct a clear abuse of a trial courtâs discretion
when the party has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 226 S.W.3d
400, 403(Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36
(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). When a trial court abuses its discretion in the issuance
of temporary orders, mandamus relief may be appropriate because there is no adequate appellate
remedy, as temporary orders are not appealable. See Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001(e) (âTemporary
orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory appeal.â). Therefore, whether
FamilyLink is entitled to mandamus relief in this case turns on whether the district court abused
its discretion by prohibiting FamilyLink from presenting live witnesses at the de novo hearing on
the temporary orders.
COURT: But the de novo is based on what the associate judge heard. . . . And I
getâwe may just disagree. Itâs justâI donât understand your reasoning
of the statute. And Iâm looking at the statute, and I think Iâm within the
statue right now, looking at the matters before [the Associate Court].
[COUNSEL]: And it specifically says that you can hear evidence, and it says that you
may consider the transcript, but that youâthatâs not what youâre limited
to, Your Honor. Thatâs why we have them.
COURT: Right. But it also doesnât say that there is a mandate to expand it beyond
that either. So I think it could be interpreted either way perhaps. . . .
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ANALYSIS
Under the Texas Family Code, a trial court may refer to an associate judge âany
aspect of a suit over which the court has jurisdictionâ under the family code. Tex. Fam. Code
§ 201.005. When a matter is referred to an associate judge, the judge may conduct a hearing,
hear evidence, make findings of fact, and recommend an order to be rendered. Id. § 201.007.
When an associate judge makes a recommendation or renders a temporary order, a party âmay
request a de novo hearing before the referring court.â Id. § 201.015(a), (b). Unlike a traditional
trial de novo, a de novo hearing under Section 201.015, when invoked, is âexpedited in time
frame and limited in scope.â In re A.M.L.F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 279 (Tex. 2019). The party requesting a de novo hearing must specify the issues that will be presented to the reviewing court, and issues not specified need not be reviewed.Id. at 280
.
As to evidence considered at the hearing, Section 201.015(c) states:
In the de novo hearing before the referring court, the parties may present
witnesses on the issues specified in the request for hearing. The referring court
may also consider the record from the hearing before the associate judge,
including the charge to and verdict returned by a jury.
Id.§ 201.015(c) This Court has previously recognized that under the clear language of this provision, the referring court must hold a hearing in which the parties may present witnesses, should they choose to do so. In re R.R.,537 S.W.3d 621, 624
(Tex. App.âAustin 2017, orig. proceeding). Therefore, while a referring court may consider the transcript from the hearing before the associate judge when conducting a de novo hearing, the court is not authorized to bar a party from calling witnesses to testify, and it abuses its discretion when it does so.Id.
In its response to the mandamus petition, the Department does not contend that
the district court could, within its discretion, prohibit FamilyLink from calling witnesses at the
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de novo hearing. Instead, the Department contends that FamilyLink failed to preserve the issue
because it did not actually attempt to formally call any witnesses. âDue to the extraordinary
nature of the remedy, the right to mandamus relief generally requires a predicate request for
action by the respondent, and the respondentâs erroneous refusal to act.â In re Coppola,
535 S.W.3d 506, 510(Tex. 2017). Based on the record before us, including the exchange at the de novo hearing between the district court and counsel for FamilyLink, we conclude that it was clear from the context that FamilyLink wished to present witnesses at the de novo hearing, that the district court would not allow or consider any evidence other than the transcript from the February 14 hearing, and that any attempt by FamilyLink to formally call witnesses would have been futile. See In re Perritt,992 S.W.2d 444, 446
(Tex. 1999) (noting that it has relaxed predicate-request-and-refusal requirement when âthe circumstances confirmed âthat the request would have been futile and the refusal little more than a formalityââ (quoting Terrazas v. Ramirez,829 S.W.2d 712, 723
(Tex. 1991)). As a result, we disagree with the Departmentâs
contention that FamilyLink failed to adequately present the district court with the issue of
whether it could call witnesses at the de novo hearing.
The Department has also filed a motion to dismiss FamilyLinkâs petition for writ
of mandamus on the ground that the issue of whether the district courtâs March 8 order should be
vacated is now moot. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)
(âA case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the
legal proceedings, including the appeal.â). Specifically, the Department asserts that the issue has
become moot because on April 11, 2022, the district court orally pronounced new temporary
orders superseding the challenged order regarding visitation. Thus, the Department reasons, the
February 25 orders are no longer in effect.
6
From the limited record before us, it appears that the courtâs April 11 orders
incorporate the same unsupervised visitation schedule (subject to change upon the
recommendation of a new therapist) that is the basis of the Departmentâs complaint for
mandamus relief. That is, FamilyLink seeks to compel the district court to conduct a de novo
hearing at which it may present witness testimony on the issue of whether Father is entitled to
unsupervised visitation with his children. Because this prospective relief is not moot, we deny
the Departmentâs motion to dismiss. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 655(Tex. 2007) (concluding that subsequent trial court order did not moot mandamus proceeding because discovery issue was âcapable of repetition in a manner that evades reviewâ); Davis v. Hays Cnty., No. 03-19-00925-CV,2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 8738
, at *10 (Tex. App.âAustin Nov. 6, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that âa defendantâs cessation of the challenged conduct does not, in
itself, deprive a court of the power to hear or determine claims for prospective reliefâ).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that FamilyLink is entitled to present witnesses at a de novo hearing
before the district court on the issue of whether Father should have unsupervised visitation
and that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow FamilyLink to do so. See
In re R.R., 537 S.W.3d at 624. Consequently, we lift the stay previously imposed by this Court,
conditionally grant FamilyLinkâs petition for writ of mandamus, and direct the district court to
vacate its March 9, 2022 order and to conduct a new de novo hearing. The writ will issue only if
the district court fails to comply.
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__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice
Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith
Filed: December 7, 2022
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