Lindsey Humes v. John Zachariah Cobb
Date Filed2022-12-15
Docket01-21-00133-CV
Cited0 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
Opinion issued December 15, 2022
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-21-00133-CV
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LINDSEY HUMES, Appellant
V.
JOHN ZACHARIAH COBB, Appellee
On Appeal from the 247th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-36721
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Lindsey Humes and appellee John Zachariah Cobb share a
daughter, A.C., who was the subject of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
(“SAPCR”). After each party petitioned to modify the court’s order in the suit, the
court held a bench trial in December 2020. After trial, the court entered an order
modifying the SAPCR. On appeal, Humes contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by reducing the amount of child support paid by Cobb. Cobb concedes
that the trial court’s order regarding child support should be reversed. We reverse
the trial court’s order as to child support and remand for further proceedings.
Procedural Background
In March 2017, the trial court entered an agreed order in the SAPCR
concerning A.C. In 2019, Cobb petitioned to modify the order. Humes filed a
counter-petition to modify in November 2020. After a bench trial, the trial court
entered an order modifying the SAPCR in February 2021.
Among other items, the February 2021 order provides that “the child support
obligation of John Zachariah Cobb owed to [Humes] previously ordered is hereby
terminated as of December 31, 2020 except as provided in this order.” The court
also terminated the wage withholding order for child support. In the same order,
the trial court found that “[t]here is good cause to deviate from the award and
assessment of guideline child support due to the additional costs that will be
incurred by the parties for family therapy.” The court ordered that Cobb, “in lieu of
direct child support, is ORDERED to instead pay 50% of the costs of family
therapy child support.” The court also ordered Humes to pay half of the cost of
family therapy.
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On appeal, Humes argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering child support that deviates from the statutorily mandated child support
guidelines without making a factual finding to support the deviation. She argues
that the court’s order finds that there is a need for additional support to cover the
costs of family therapy while simultaneously reducing child support owed by Cobb
to only 50 percent of the cost of therapy. She contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by acting in opposition to the guiding principles of the Texas Family
Code and deviating from the child support guidelines.
Rather than filing a brief, Cobb submitted a letter entitled, “Appellee’s
Stipulation That the Trial Court’s Order as to Child Support Should be Reversed
and Remanded.” He states that he cannot make a good faith legal argument in
opposition to Humes’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering that child support be terminated. He writes, “Accordingly, Appellee
stipulates that the trial court’s order only as to child support be reversed.” He
requests that the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings,
including calculating child support.
Standard of Review and Applicable
We review a trial court’s decision regarding child support for abuse of
discretion. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). “The test
for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any
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guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or
unreasonable.” Id.A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. Iliff v. Iliff,339 S.W.3d 74, 78
(Tex. 2011).
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence are not independent grounds of error but are merely factors to be
considered in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Cline v.
Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810, 813(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). “Consequently, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of that discretion.”Id.
The focus of the first step is the sufficiency of the evidence.Id.
Under the second step, we must decide whether, based on the evidence before it, the trial court made a reasonable decision.Id.
Generally, child support is calculated by applying statutory guidelines to the
obligor’s monthly net resources. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.125. For one child, the
guidelines provide that child support is to equal 20 percent of the obligor’s net
resources. Id. § 154.125(b). The trial court may deviate from the guidelines if
evidence rebuts the presumption that application of the guidelines is in the best
interest of the child. Id. § 154.123. If the guidelines are not followed, a trial court
must make specific findings as to (1) the net resources of the obligor and the
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oblige, (2) the percentage applied to the obligor’s net resources, and (3) if
applicable, the specific reasons for the deviation from the guidelines.
Id. §§ 154.130(a)(3), (b). Modification orders must be in accordance with the
statutory requirement that such an order is based on a showing of a material and
substantial change in circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order.
Id. § 156.401(a)(1); Nellis v. Haynie, 596 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
Analysis
The evidence at trial included Cobb’s testimony that he was paid a salary of
$95,000 per year or approximately $7,500 per month. There is nothing in the
record regarding any additional children or additional income. The record also
reflects that prior to the court’s February 2021 order, Humes received $1,200 per
month child support from Cobb.
The court’s February 2021 order finds that “there is good cause to deviate
from the award and assessment of guideline child support due to the additional
costs that will be incurred by the parties for family therapy.” The order modifies
support by terminating the prior support order and ordering that Cobb pay half of
the cost of family therapy. Humes argues that this reduces the total financial
support for A.C. by terminating the $1,200 per month payment and ordering that
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Humes and Cobb each pay half of the cost of family therapy. The record does not
state the cost of family therapy.
In his letter filing, Cobb stipulates that the trial court’s findings as to child
support are erroneous. He states that he did not request that his child support be
terminated and that he testified that he would comply with the child support
guidelines. We agree that the record does not contain facts to support the trial
court’s modification of the child support award.
Moreover, because the trial court determined that the evidence supported
deviating from the child support guidelines, the trial court was required to make
specific findings required by the Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§§ 154.130(a)(3), (b). The trial court did not make the required findings, either in
writing or orally at the hearing.
We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the
child support order.
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Conclusion
The trial court erred by: (1) terminating John Zachariah Cobb’s obligation to
pay child support to Lindsey Diane Humes, and (2) terminating wage withholding
for child support from the pay of John Zachariah Cobb; and (3) ordering John
Zachariah Cobb to pay 50 percent of the costs of family therapy “in lieu of direct
child support.” Accordingly, we reverse the “Child Support” paragraph on page 16
of the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Peter Kelly
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.
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