In Re Christus Health
In Re CHRISTUS HEALTH and Christus Health Gulf Coast D/B/A Christus St. Catherine Hospital, Relators
Attorneys
Charles D. Brown, Krystal P. Scott, Robert J. Swift, Traci Carr Dvorak, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P, Houston, TX, for Relators., Carl D. Shaw, John M. OāQuinn, The OāQuinn Law Firm, Charles W. Lyman, Lyman, Twining, Weinberg & Ferrell, P.C., William C. Book, Tekell, Book, Matthews & Limmer, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Real Party Interest.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
OPINION
On March 19, 2008, relators, Christus Health and Christus Health Gulf Coast d/b/a Christus St. Catherine Hospital, filed an emergency motion for temporary relief and a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the trial courtās
After reviewing the mandamus petition, we conclude that relators have not demonstrated both a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal.
The Court further orders that its March 20, 2008 order temporarily staying all proceedings in the underlying cause, including the trial courtās Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Discovery Sanctions, be vacated.
Justice ALCALA, dissenting.
. The Honorable Elizabeth Ray, judge of the 165th District Court of Harris County, Texas. The underlying lawsuit is Linda Carswell, Jn-dividually and as Representative of the Estate of Jerry L. Carswell, deceased, Robert J. Carswell, and Jordon D. Carswell v. Christus
. In their petition for writ of mandamus before this Court, relators have not contended that they have no adequate remedy by appeal as to the monetary sanctions. The portion of relatorsā petition that is dedicated to arguing that relators have no adequate remedy by appeal (entitled, "Christus Has No Adequate Remedy at Lawā) specifically addresses the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal for the four non-monetary sanctions imposed, but any reference to the monetary sanctions is conspicuously absent. Similarly, in the portion of relators' petition entitled, "WHY MANDAMUS RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED,ā relatorsā arguments specifying why immediate relief is necessary reference only the imposition of the four non-monetary sanctions. The only mention of the monetary sanctions in this section is the following sentence:
Adding insult to injury, the trial court also imposed an extraordinary and completely arbitrary fine of $250,000 (payable directly to Plaintiffs in ten days) that it did not even attempt to tie to any fees or expenses that Plaintiffs claims [sic ] to have incurred due to Christusā alleged misconduct.
This statement does not raise a complaint that relators lacked an adequate remedy by appeal as to the monetary sanctions. The petition before us contains no assertions, arguments, or authorities pertaining to a claim of no adequate remedy by appeal as to the monetary sanctions. The only assertions, arguments, and authorities advanced by relators regarding the monetary sanctions pertain to their contention that the trial court abused its discretion.
Relators do not contend that the courtās imposition of monetary sanctions is a "significant rulin[g] in [an] exceptional cas[e]ā for which mandamus review would be "essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, [or] spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.ā See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.2004). Relators likewise do not contend that the benefits to mandamus review outweigh the detriments. See id. Relators also do not assert that the imposition of the monetary sanctions would totally or significantly preclude their further access to the court, nor have they complained that the requirement of pre-judgment payment makes a remedy on appeal inadequate. See Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928-29 (Tex.1991) (holding that ordinary appeal is adequate remedy for imposition of monetary sanctions unless litigant contends that imposed sanctions preclude litigantās access to court; noting that uncertainty of recovering money on appeal did not render ordinary appeal inadequate remedy; opining that if all monetary sanctions imposed for discovery abuse were reviewable by mandamus, "it would soon cease to be an extraordinary writā; and declining to review propriety of sanctions by mandamus); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728, 734, 736 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, orig. proceeding) (holding that when party subject to monetary sanctions does not contend that imposition of monetary sanctions would preclude party's access to court, adequate remedy by normal appeal exists); Prime Gr., Inc. v. OāNeill, 848 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (holding that court of appeals was without power to issue writ of mandamus when relator did not contend that pre-judgment payment of monetary sanction would prevent relator from continuing litigation).