Riley v. Bondi

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

            RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

     No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre
  Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited
  procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26,
  2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO)
  directing Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Under 

(b)(3), al-
  iens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did
  not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under
  the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
  ing Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration officer
  that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Ja-
  maica. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasona-
  ble fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and
  concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which pro-
  hibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley’s
  case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could
  be removed to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible
  and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS
  appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated
  the IJ’s order and allowed the FARO’s enforcement. Three days later,
  Riley filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir-
  cuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1)
  aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro-
  ceedings by filing within 30 days of that decision, and (2) §1252(b)(1)’s
  30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims-
  processing rule.
Held:
    1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro-
 ceedings are not “final order[s] of removal” under §1252(b)(1).
2                             RILEY v. BONDI

                                   Syllabus

       An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat.
    3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the
    alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” §1101(a)(47)(A). The
    FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the final order of re-
    moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and
    directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was
    also the Executive’s final determination on the question of removal.
    An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a
    determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration
    of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for
    review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined
    removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or
    the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is
    issued—meaning that the order becomes final immediately upon issu-
    ance.
       The Court’s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 

, and John-
    son v. Guzman Chavez, 

, buttress this conclusion. In
    Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal or-
    ders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order
    deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not
    “disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not
    merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a
    final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judi-
    cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be
    released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings.
    The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become
    “administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings,
    and “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way
    on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533,
    539–540.
       The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was
    whether the removal order in that case was “administratively final”
    for purposes of detention, not whether a removal order constitutes “the
    final order of removal” for purposes of filing. But this argument con-
    flates when a petition for review must be filed with the issues that may
    be adjudicated in that proceeding. The Government then compares
    the purposes of finality in §§1252(b)(1) and 1231, arguing that the
    meaning differs. Although finality may serve different purposes under
    different statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of finality nec-
    essarily varies. The Government raises legitimate practical concerns
    about removal orders becoming final before withholding-only relief is
    decided, but the Court must follow statutory text and precedent. The
    text and precedents make clear that the FARO is the final order of
    removal, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality
                    Cite as: 

 (2025)                      3

                               Syllabus

of otherwise final removal orders. Pp. 5–11.
   2. The 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-
processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.
   Categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences
that may disrupt the orderly and efficient adjudication of cases in the
federal courts. Court precedent shows reluctance to label rules “juris-
dictional” unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress
need not use “magic words” to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional,
Henderson v. Shinseki, 

, the Court’s recent decisions
require an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classification.
That demanding requirement is not met here.
   Section 1252(b)(1) states petitions “must be filed not later than 30
days after the date of the final order of removal.” This language tells
aliens what to do to obtain judicial review, but it provides no directives
to courts. It does not reference jurisdiction and lacks any language
“demarcat[ing] a court’s power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 

. The placement of the statute also suggests it is not
jurisdictional because neither the particular subsection nor the
broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction.
   Precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying
§1252(b)(1)’s deadline as a claims-processing rule. Before Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 

, the Court occasionally classified “nonex-
tendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. 

 at 510 (citing United
States v. Robinson, 

). In Arbaugh, however, the
Court made clear that courts should only treat statutory limitations as
jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states” that they have jurisdictional
consequences. Id., at 515. The Court’s cases since Arbaugh have al-
most uniformly found that the provisions at issue fail this demanding
test. The one exception is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,

, where the Court would not overturn a “definitive
earlier interpretation” of a statute as jurisdictional without clear con-
gressional directive. There, century-old decisions held that the provi-
sion was truly jurisdictional. 

 at 134–135.
   While Stone v. INS, 

, characterized §1252(b)(1)’s
predecessor provision as “jurisdictional,” it used the term loosely and
did not “atten[d] to the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ rules (as we
understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but mandatory ones.”
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 

. Since Stone, the Court
has repeatedly found that filing deadlines, including mandatory ones,
are not jurisdictional.
   Section 1252’s 30-day filing rule is not jurisdictional, but because
the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal the
4                          RILEY v. BONDI

                                Syllabus

    Court’s holding does not preclude this case from proceeding on re-
    mand. Pp. 11–16.
Vacated and remanded.

  ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
THOMAS, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined in full, and in which
SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined only as to Part
II–B. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an
opinion dissenting in part, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined in
full, and in which GORSUCH, J., joined except as to Part IV.
                        Cite as: 

 (2025)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 23–1270
                                   _________________


  PIERRE YASSUE NASHUN RILEY, PETITIONER v.
      PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
                                 [June 26, 2025]

   JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
   In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner Pierre
Riley’s petition for review on jurisdictional grounds. And in
order to make that decision, we must decide two subsidiary
questions: (1) whether the 30-day filing deadline for judicial
review of a “final order of removal,” 

(b)(1),
is a jurisdictional requirement or simply a mandatory
claim-processing rule; and (2) whether an alien can obtain
review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in
a “withholding-only” proceeding (i.e., one in which removal
from the United States is not at issue) by filing a petition
for review within 30 days of that decision.
   The answers to these questions matter in this case be-
cause Riley filed a petition for review within 30 days after
a BIA order in his withholding-only proceeding but long af-
ter the issuance of a “final administrative review order”
(FARO) that commanded his removal from the United
States. The Court of Appeals held that Riley’s petition was
filed too late, and because it viewed the 30-day deadline as
jurisdictional, it dismissed his petition. We now vacate and
remand.
2                      RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

  Taking the second question first, we hold that a BIA or-
der in a withholding-only proceeding is not a “final order of
removal,” and therefore the 30-day filing deadline cannot
be satisfied by filing a petition for review within 30 days of
the BIA’s withholding-only order. Second, we hold that the
30-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Because the
Government has chosen not to seek dismissal of Riley’s case
on that ground, we vacate the judgment below and remand
for further proceedings.
                               I
  In 1995, Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the
United States on a B–2 tourist visa that allowed him to stay
for six months, but he did not depart when that time was
up. 

. He became a member of “a far-reaching and
well-organized” drug trafficking gang and was convicted in
2008 for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent
to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, as
well as for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking crime. See United States v. Riley, 

, *1–*2 (SDNY, July 7, 2008). He was sentenced to
25 years’ imprisonment but was released in January 2021.
Riley v. Garland, 

, *1 (CA4, Apr. 26, 2024)
(per curiam).
  Shortly thereafter, immigration authorities took Riley
into custody and sought his removal. Because he had been
convicted of an aggravated felony, his case proceeded along
the supposedly streamlined track that Congress created in
1996. See 

; Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, §440, 110 Stat. 1277–1279. Un-
der this process, if an immigration officer concludes that an
alien was convicted of an aggravated felony, the officer is-
sues a “Notice of Intent” to deport. 

(b)(1)
(2024). The alien may challenge that determination in writ-
ing within 10 days after the notice of intent is issued.
§238.1(c)(1). If the immigration officer finds that the alien
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            3

                      Opinion of the Court

is removable, or if the alien declines to challenge remova-
bility, the officer issues a FARO specifying the country to
which the alien must be deported. §§ 238.1(d)(1), (f )(2). The
alien may then petition a court of appeals for review. See 

(b)(3).
   In this case, it was undisputed that Riley had been con-
victed of an aggravated felony, and therefore on January
26, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is-
sued a FARO directing that Riley be sent back to Jamaica.
   Riley did not contest his removal from the United States,
but he resisted return to Jamaica under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), Dec. 10,
1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Ar-
ticle Three of the Convention prohibits a signatory state
from sending a person to another nation if “there are sub-
stantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.” The United States became a
full party to the CAT in 1994, see United Nations, General
Assembly, Report of the Committee Against Torture, 55
U. N. GAOR Supp. No. 55, p. 44, U. N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000),
and as subsequently required by legislation, see Foreign Af-
fairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, §2242(b), 112
Stat. 2681–822, regulations implementing the CAT’s re-
quirements were then adopted. As relevant here, these reg-
ulations prohibit the removal of an alien to a country where
torture is likely. See generally 

.
   Seeking relief under the CAT, Riley told an immigration
officer that a wealthy and powerful Jamaican drug kingpin
had it in for Riley’s family, had killed two of his cousins,
was influential with the police and politicians in Jamaica,
and would likely kill Riley if he was returned to any place
in that country. See 2 App. 66–70. The officer concluded
that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecu-
tion, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and therefore
4                       RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

sent Riley’s case to what is called a “withholding-only” pro-
ceeding—that is, a proceeding at which the only issue is
whether the alien may be removed to his home country.
   At Riley’s withholding-only proceeding, the IJ found Ri-
ley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica un-
der the CAT. 

, *1.
   The DHS appealed that decision to the BIA, which found
that Riley’s claim was “not supported by sufficient objective
evidence.” 

. Accordingly, the BIA vacated the IJ’s
order and thus allowed the FARO to be enforced. 

, *1.
   Three days after the issuance of that order, Riley filed a
petition for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, but the court dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction. It held that the final order of removal in
Riley’s case was the FARO issued on January 26, 2021, not
the later BIA order denying CAT relief. This meant that
Riley’s petition had not been filed on time, and because the
court thought that the 30-day filing deadline in §1252(b)(1)
is jurisdictional, it dismissed Riley’s petition. Id., at *1–*2.
   In holding that the 30-day filing deadline is jurisdic-
tional, the Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit, but its
holding conflicted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits. Compare Martinez v. Garland, 

, 571–
572 (CA4 2023); F. J. A. P. v. Garland, 

, 626
(CA7 2024), with Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 

, 705 (CA5 2023); Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 

, 1046–1047 (CA9 2023). And in holding that the 30-
day filing deadline begins to run when a FARO is issued,
the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit, see
Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 

, 192–194 (CA2
2022), but its decision was at odds with decisions of numer-
ous other Circuits, most of which were handed down before
our decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 

 (2020),
and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 

 (2021), ana-
lyzed related issues. See Jimenez-Morales v. Attorney Gen.,
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)              5

                      Opinion of the Court

 (CA11 2016); Garcia v. Sessions, 

 (CA1 2017); Bonilla v. Sessions, 

 (CA3 2018); Argueta-Herandez, 87 F. 4th, at 706;
F. J. A. P., 94 F. 4th, at 635–636; Alonso-Juarez, 80 F. 4th,
at 1046; Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 

,
1142–1143 (CA10 2023); Kolov v. Garland, 

,
918–919 (CA6 2023).
  We granted certiorari to resolve these two splits. Riley v.
Garland, 

 (2024). Because the Government
agreed with Riley’s position on both issues, we appointed
Stephen J. Hammer as amicus curiae to defend the judg-
ment below. 

 (2024). He has ably discharged
his responsibilities.
                             II
                             A
   Under 

(b)(1), a petition for review of a “fi-
nal order of removal” must be filed within 30 days of that
order. Riley and the Government argue that Riley’s peti-
tion was filed on time because it was filed within 30 days of
the BIA order denying deferral of removal, and we must
therefore decide whether that order is a “final order of re-
moval.” We conclude that it is not.
                              1
  The statutory text speaks directly and clearly to this
question. While the Immigration and Nationality Act does
not define the term “order of removal,” any statutory refer-
ence to “an order of removal” is “deemed to include a refer-
ence to . . . an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
§309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation,”
in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is
deportable or ordering deportation.”             

(a)(47)(A). So an “order of removal” must have those
same characteristics.
6                      RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

   We must therefore identify which order concluded that
Riley is “deportable” and commanded his deportation, and
it is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by
DHS on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was
deportable and directed that he be removed from the United
States. See 

.
   The order was also the Executive’s final determination on
the question of removal. An order of removal becomes final
at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the
[BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the pe-
riod in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for
review of the order. §1101(a)(47)(B). This statutory defini-
tion ties finality to agency review. Because an alien in
streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his
FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review
“expir[es]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that
the order becomes final immediately upon issuance. There-
fore, under a straightforward reading of the statutory text,
Riley’s FARO constituted “the final order of removal” in this
case.
                              2
   Our decisions in Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez buttress
this conclusion. Although the ultimate issue in each of
those cases differed from the question now before us, both
decisions are instructive.
   In Nasrallah, the question was whether the alien could
mount a factual challenge to the denial of relief under the
CAT. Because the alien had been convicted of aggravated
felonies, §1252(a)(2)(C) prevented him from challenging the
factual findings on the basis of which his removal had been
ordered. See 590 U. S., at 576–577, 581. But the Govern-
ment argued that §1252(a)(2)(C), in combination with
§1252(b)(9) (the so-called “zipper clause,” see Guerrero-
Lasprilla v. Barr, 

, 230 (2020)), also barred the
alien from raising a factual challenge to his CAT order. See
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            7

                      Opinion of the Court

Brief for Respondent in Nasrallah v. Barr, O. T. 2019,
No. 18–1432, p. 35. The zipper clause provides that judicial
review of any “questions of law and fact” that arise in re-
moval proceedings may occur “only in judicial review of a
final order under this section.” §1252(b)(9). As the Govern-
ment saw it, the zipper clause merged the disposition of the
CAT claim into the final order of removal, and since the al-
ien could not challenge the removal decision on factual
grounds, the alien should also be unable to challenge the
factual basis for the denial of CAT relief. See 590 U. S., at
584–585.
   We disagreed. See id., at 582–583. We noted that a CAT
order is not a final order of removal because “it is not an
order ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering
deportation.’ ” Id., at 582. And what is more, we held, a
CAT order “does not disturb” or “affect the validity” of a fi-
nal order of removal. Ibid. We therefore held that the BIA’s
CAT order “d[id] not merge into” a final order of removal for
purposes of judicial review because only “rulings that affect
the validity of the final order of removal” merge into that
order. Ibid.
   Our reasoning in Guzman Chavez was similar. The ques-
tion there was whether the aliens in question could be re-
leased during the pendency of their withholding-only pro-
ceedings, and the answer to that question hinged on
whether the aliens were being detained under §1226(a)(2),
which allows release before an alien is ordered removed, or
under §§1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), which make detention
mandatory after removal has become “ ‘administratively fi-
nal.’ ” 594 U. S., at 527–528. In Guzman Chavez, the aliens’
removal had been ordered by DHS, and that determination
was not being challenged, but proceedings in which they
were seeking withholding of removal were still in progress.
Id., at 532.
   We held that the aliens were detained under
8                      RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

§§1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) and, as a result, could not be re-
leased. Id., at 533. We reasoned that the directive that
they be removed had become “administratively final” and
that the pendency of the withholding-only proceedings did
not alter that fact. See id., at 540. Withholding-only pro-
ceedings, we said, do not “affec[t]” a removal order’s “valid-
ity,” and an alien’s initiation of such proceedings “does not
render non-final an otherwise ‘administratively final’ . . .
order of removal.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he finality of the order of removal,” we explained, “does
not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-
only proceedings.” See id., at 539.
   For present purposes, the lessons taught by Nasrallah
and Guzman Chavez are clear. An order denying relief un-
der the CAT is not a final order of removal and does not
affect the validity of a previously issued order of removal or
render that order non-final. That teaching dooms Riley’s
argument here.
                               3
   Riley and the Government struggle to escape the reason-
ing of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, but their efforts are
unconvincing. Riley begins by arguing at length that in a
case like his, an order denying withholding of removal or
CAT relief should be regarded as marking the point in time
of a final order because it occurs last and enables the FARO
to be executed. See Brief for Petitioner 29–34. But as al-
ready explained, this argument runs headlong into Nasral-
lah and Guzman Chavez.
   The Government, while agreeing with the court below
that a CAT or withholding-only relief order is not itself a
final order of removal, also contends that a previously is-
sued removal order cannot become final “until the conclu-
sion of withholding-only proceedings.” Brief for Respondent
in Support of Petitioner 42–43. But Guzman Chavez makes
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            9

                      Opinion of the Court

clear that “the finality of [an] order of removal does not de-
pend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only
proceedings.” See 594 U. S., at 539.
   The Government responds that the question in Guzman
Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was
“administratively final” for purposes of detention under
§1231(a)(1)(B), not whether, as in this case, a removal order
constitutes “the final order of removal” under §1252(b)(1)’s
30-day filing rule. See Brief for Respondent in Support of
Petitioner 44–45. The Government notes that the language
in these two provisions is not exactly the same, and it ar-
gues that there are two good reasons why the concept of fi-
nality should be seen as having different meanings under
§§1252(b)(1) and 1231.
   The first of these arguments analogizes review under
§1252(b)(1) to an appeal from a district court’s “final deci-
sio[n]” under 

. See Brief for Respondent
in Support of Petitioner 46. Since an appeal from a final
district court decision provides the vehicle for reviewing all
prior district court rulings, the Government argues that
there should be a single review proceeding in a case like
this. 

   This argument conflates two separate issues: (1) when a
petition for review must be filed and (2) the issues that may
be adjudicated in that proceeding. We agree that there can
be only one review proceeding in a case like Riley’s, and we
also agree with the obvious proposition that review of the
denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the BIA has de-
nied such relief. That does not mean, however, that an or-
der denying CAT relief is the final order of removal in a case
like Riley’s or that a previously issued removal order re-
mains non-final until CAT relief is denied. Instead, the
only conclusion that the Government’s argument supports
is that review of removability and withholding of removal
should occur in a single appellate proceeding.
10                     RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

  The Government’s second argument regarding the mean-
ing of finality in §§1252(b)(1) and 1231 rests on its under-
standing of the reasons why finality is important under
those two provisions. Under §1252(b)(1), the Government
asserts, finality is important because it marks the point at
which judicial review may be sought, whereas under §1231,
the finalization of administrative review is an event that
heightens the risk that an alien, if not detained, will simply
disappear. See id., at 47.
  We appreciate this difference, but just because finality
may serve different purposes under different statutes, it
does not follow that the meaning of finality necessarily var-
ies. Here, Riley’s argument does not provide an adequate
reason to disregard the lessons of Nasrallah and Guzman
Chavez.
                               4
   The Government’s final submission concerns the practi-
cal problems that it fears will arise if a removal order be-
comes final before the issue of withholding-only relief is de-
cided. The Government worries that aliens like Riley who
wish only to contest removal to their native country will not
file a petition for review until their request for withhold-
ing of removal to that destination is denied. And if an
alien files a petition for review before the question of
withholding-only relief is settled, the Government fears
that the proceeding in the court of appeals may be wrapped
up before the BIA denies withholding-only relief, and the
alien may thus be deprived of any judicial review of that
denial. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner
36–38.
   These are legitimate practical concerns, but we must nev-
ertheless follow the statutory text and our prior precedents.
And in any event, these problems are not unavoidable. In
a case like this, the Government can inform aliens of the
need to file a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a
                     Cite as: 

 (2025)                  11

                         Opinion of the Court

FARO, and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency
of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can
wait until that issue is decided. And if requests for with-
holding of removal in cases like Riley’s are decided expedi-
tiously—and that was the whole point of the supposedly
streamlined procedure adopted by Congress to effect the
quick removal of dangerous aliens*—petitions for review of
removal orders should not linger long on a court of appeals
docket before the withholding issue is ready for review. Fi-
nally, if Government makes a general practice of what it
has done in Riley’s case, i.e., declining to press for enforce-
ment of the 30-day filing rule, aliens who are mistaken
about when a petition for review must be filed will not be
hurt.
   In sum, the statutory text and our precedents make clear
that the FARO is the final order of removal in this case, and
withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of
an otherwise final order of removal.
                              B
   We turn next to the question whether §1252(b)(1)’s 30-
day deadline for filing a petition for review is “jurisdic-
tional.”
   This question is important because categorizing a rule as
jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt
the orderly and efficient adjudication of cases in the federal
courts. Courts generally decide only the questions that are
presented by the parties. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 

 (2011). If a party neglects to raise, concedes,
or waives an issue, a court generally has no obligation to

——————
  *The Government reminds us that such proceedings have often lasted
many months and even years. See Brief for Respondent in Support of
Petitioner 37 (citing Martinez v. Garland, 

, 574 (CA4 2023)
(Floyd, J., concurring in judgment); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 

, 552 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). That is surely not what
Congress anticipated when it enacted the streamlined procedure.
12                      RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

consider it. See Wilkins v. United States, 

,
157–158 (2023); see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive
Engineers, 

, 81–82 (2009) (noting that non-
jurisdictional matters are “ordinarily forfeited if the party
asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
   True jurisdictional requirements, however, are different.
A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has juris-
diction. See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 

,
408–409 (2015). Thus, even if the parties fail to spot a ju-
risdictional issue or agree that the court has jurisdiction,
the court cannot proceed unless it makes an independent
determination that it has jurisdiction. See Henderson, 

; see also 33 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure §8316, p. 50 (2018) (“[A] litigant’s
failure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court
of all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equi-
table considerations.” (internal quotation marks and alter-
ation omitted)).
   Relying on a string of decisions issued during the past 19
years, Riley and the Government argue that the 30-day fil-
ing deadline in §1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule but is
instead a “quintessential claim-processing rul[e].” Brief for
Petitioner 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief
for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 18–21. Amicus, on
the other hand, maintains that the 30-day deadline is juris-
dictional, and because Riley did not file within 30 days of
the final order of removal, he agrees with the Fourth Circuit
that Riley’s petition had to be dismissed. See Brief for
Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment
Below 15–22. Riley and the Government have the better
argument on this issue.
                               1
     Because jurisdictional rules have a unique capacity to
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)           13

                      Opinion of the Court

disrupt the orderly adjudication of disputes, we are reluc-
tant to label a rule “jurisdictional” unless Congress has
clearly signaled that the rule is meant to have that status.
See Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 409–410; Henderson, 562
U. S., at 435–436. We have said that Congress “need not
use magic words in order to speak clearly” on the question
whether a provision is jurisdictional, 

, but our
pattern of recent decisions shows that we will not categorize
a provision as “jurisdictional” unless the signal is exceed-
ingly strong.
   And in this case, that demanding requirement is not met.
   We start with the text of the statute. Section 1252(b)(1)
provides that “[t]he petition for review must be filed not
later than 30 days after the date of the final order of re-
moval.” This language tells aliens what they must do if
they want judicial review, but it provides no directives to
courts. It makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any
language “demarcat[ing] a court’s power.” Harrow v. De-
partment of Defense, 

 (2024); see Hender-
son, 

; Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411.
   The placement of the 30-day filing rule also weighs
against amicus’s argument. Neither the particular subsec-
tion nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed
concerns jurisdiction, but there are other sections in which
the deadline could have been housed if it had been meant
to have jurisdictional status. One possibility is §1252(b)(4),
which delineates the bounds of an appellate court’s review
authority. Another is §1252(a)(2), which is entitled “Mat-
ters not subject to judicial review.” (Boldface deleted.) But
Congress eschewed those logical homes for a true jurisdic-
tional provision.
                             2
  Our precedents extending back nearly 20 years support
classifying §1252(b)(1)’s filing deadline as a claims-
processing rule. Prior to our decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H
14                     RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

Corp., 

 (2006), we had occasionally classified
“nonextendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. 

 at 510
(citing United States v. Robinson, 

(1960)). And in several other cases, we had issued what we
have called “ ‘drive-by’ ” jurisdictional statements—that is,
we had loosely stated that “ ‘jurisdictio[n]’ ” was lacking
without considering whether the defect really concerned a
limitation on the court’s capacity to decide as opposed to a
threshold requirement that a party had to satisfy in order
to go forward. 

 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for Better Environment, 

 (1998)).
   Since Arbaugh, however, we have been more disciplined
in our use of the term “jurisdictional.” In that case, we were
required to decide whether satisfying Title VII’s definition
of a covered “employer,” which turns on the number of em-
ployees in a work force, was a jurisdictional requirement.

. In holding that this coverage requirement
is not jurisdictional, we made clear that courts should treat
a “statutory limitation” as jurisdictional only if Congress
“clearly states” that the provision has jurisdictional conse-
quences. 

 at 515–516. And since Arbaugh, our cases
have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue
failed to meet this very demanding test. See, e.g., Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 

 (2010); Hen-
derson, 562 U. S., at 441–442; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
Medical Center, 

, 154–155 (2013); Kwai Fun
Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411; Boechler v. Commissioner, 

, 211 (2022); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 158–159; Har-
row, 

.
   The one exception to this pattern is John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 

 (2008)—and, not
surprisingly, that decision is the centerpiece of amicus’s ar-
gument. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in
Support of Judgment Below 17–22, 26–30. But the situa-
tion in John R. Sand was quite different from the situation
here. In John R. Sand, decisions going back more than a
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             15

                      Opinion of the Court

century had held that the provision in question and its pre-
decessors were truly jurisdictional. 552 U. S., at 134–135.
They did not simply use that term but referred to the
unique characteristics of jurisdictional provisions. See Ken-
dall v. United States, 

, 125–126 (1883); Finn
v. United States, 

, 232–233 (1887). And we
held that we will not overturn a “definitive earlier interpre-
tation” of a statute as jurisdictional unless Congress has
provided a clear contrary directive. See John R. Sand, 552
U. S., at 137–138.
   Here, amicus argues that Stone v. INS, 

(1995), is like the earlier jurisdictional decisions on which
we relied in John R. Sand. In Stone, the Court character-
ized §1252(b)(1)’s predecessor as “jurisdictional,” 

, and amicus argues that this is a “definitive inter-
pretation” that should be accepted, see Brief for Court-
Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below
11. But we see critical differences between Stone and the
established precedents in John R. Sand.
   Stone, to be sure, did describe a predecessor provision’s
filing deadline as “jurisdictional.” 

; see also
Henderson, 

. As we later explained, how-
ever, Stone used the term “jurisdictional” loosely and did
not “atten[d] to the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ rules
(as we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but
mandatory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 

 (2023). Stone suggested that all mandatory filing
requirements are jurisdictional, see 

, but
since that time, we have repeatedly found that filing dead-
lines, including some couched in mandatory terms, are not
jurisdictional. In Henderson, we unanimously held that 

(a)—which provides that “a person adversely
affected” by a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
“shall file a notice of appeal . . . within 120 days”—is not a
jurisdictional time bar. 562 U. S., at 441–442. We reached
16                     RILEY v. BONDI

                      Opinion of the Court

the same conclusion in Boechler, where the provision at is-
sue, 

(d)(1), set the deadline for filing a pe-
tition for review in the Tax Court. 596 U. S., at 211. And
most recently, in Harrow, we held that 

(b)(1)(A), which provides that “any petition for re-
view” of an order of the Merit Systems Protection Board
“shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice
of the final order or decision,” is non-jurisdictional. 

.
   In these cases, like the present case, the statutes imposed
requirements on litigants, not the courts; but even when the
relevant statutory language was not litigant-focused, we
have found that our clear statement rule was not satisfied.
See, e.g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411 (holding
that 

(b), which provides that “[a] tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless it
is presented . . . within two years after such claim accrues,”
is non-jurisdictional); Wilkins, 

 (holding
mandatory time bar non-jurisdictional).
   In sum, we hold that §1252’s 30-day filing rule is not ju-
risdictional, but because the Government does not wish to
press that ground for dismissal, it does not preclude this
case from proceeding on remand.
                       *    *     *
  For these reasons, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
                                            It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 23–1270
                          _________________


  PIERRE YASSUE NASHUN RILEY, PETITIONER v.
      PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 26, 2025]

   JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
   The Court today holds that the Fourth Circuit erred in
treating the 30-day deadline in 

(b)(1) as ju-
risdictional. Ante, at 2. I agree and join the Court’s opinion
in full. I write separately to note that the Fourth Circuit
may nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a dif-
ferent reason. Petitioner Pierre Riley sought review of an
“Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on
May 31, 2022.” 

 (emphasis deleted). Today’s opin-
ion makes clear that this May 31 order is not a “ ‘final order
of removal.’ ” Ante, at 5. Instead, it is an order denying
relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT). Congress has specified that federal courts of appeals
lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders “except as part of the
review of a final order of removal.” §2242, 112 Stat. 2681–
822, note following 

 (emphasis added).
Thus, on remand, the Fourth Circuit should consider
whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when the
court is not conducting that review “as part of the review of
a final order of removal.” 

                            I
  Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has
2                      RILEY v. BONDI

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

established a comprehensive framework for “[j]udicial re-
view of a final order of removal.” 

(a)(1). “[A]
‘final order of removal’ is a final order ‘concluding that the
alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’ ” Nasrallah v.
Barr, 

, 579 (2020) (quoting 

(a)(47)(A)).
   The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the federal courts of ap-
peals jurisdiction to review an alien’s “final order of re-
moval.” §1252(a)(1). The statute makes the filing of a
“petition for review” in accordance with the procedures out-
lined in IIRIRA the “sole and exclusive means” for an alien
to obtain judicial review of such an order. §1252(a)(5).
   IIRIRA contemplates that an alien facing removal may
bring a “claim” under the CAT. §1252(a)(4). The CAT is an
international human rights treaty that, as relevant here,
prohibits the removal of an alien to a country where the al-
ien is likely to be tortured. CAT claims are addressed in the
first instance by an immigration judge. The immigration
judge’s decision is appealable to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, an administrative body within the Executive
Branch.
   This Court has made clear that “CAT orders are not the
same as final orders of removal.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at
582 (emphasis deleted). “An order granting CAT relief
means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the
[alien] may not be removed to the designated country of re-
moval, at least until conditions change in that country.”
Ibid. “A CAT order is not itself a final order of removal be-
cause it is not an order ‘concluding that the alien is deport-
able or ordering deportation.’ ” Ibid.
   While IIRIRA acknowledges that an alien may bring a
“claim” under the CAT, see §1252(a)(4), jurisdiction for ju-
dicial review of CAT claims comes from a different statute—
the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
(FARRA), see §2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

U. S. C. §1231. FARRA specifies that no federal court shall
have “jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under
the [CAT] except as part of the review of a final order of
removal pursuant to [

].” §2242(d), 112 Stat.
2681–822; see also 

(a)(4) (stating that the
filing of “a petition for review filed with an appropriate
court of appeals in accordance with [§1252]” is the “sole and
exclusive means for judicial review” of any CAT claim).
   IIRIRA also contains a “zipper clause,” which provides for
consolidation in judicial review. The zipper clause states
that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” judicial
review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien”
shall be “available only in judicial review of a final order
under this section.” §1252(b)(9). The upshot is straightfor-
ward: Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over all
questions of law and fact that arise from removal proceed-
ings unless the court is reviewing “a final order” under
§1252(a)(1) or exercising jurisdiction “otherwise provided”
in §1252. §1252(b)(9).
   The zipper clause plainly covers CAT claims because CAT
claims “aris[e] from” removal proceedings. Ibid.; see also
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 585. It follows that federal courts
lack jurisdiction to review CAT claims “unless they are re-
viewing ‘a final order’ under §1252(a)(1) or exercising juris-
diction ‘otherwise provided’ in §1252.” Jennings v. Rodri-
guez, 

, 316 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). Section 1252 does not
contain “a specific grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.”
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 591–592 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
FARRA—not §1252—“provides for judicial review of CAT
claims.” Id., at 580 (majority opinion). Thus, on my reading
of the relevant statutes, courts cannot review CAT claims
unless they are reviewing a final order of removal.
4                      RILEY v. BONDI

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

                               II
   Riley has never petitioned for judicial review of a final
order of removal. See Brief for Petitioner 10–12. He peti-
tioned the Fourth Circuit only for “review of the Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31,
2022.” 

 (emphasis deleted). And, as the Court
today holds, this May 31 order addressing Riley’s CAT
claim is not a final order of removal. Ante, at 5.
   I do not see how the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to re-
view a CAT order in isolation when the petitioner does not
seek review of a final order of removal. Congress has pro-
vided that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to re-
view an order denying CAT relief “except as part of the re-
view of a final order of removal.” §2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–
822 (emphasis added). “In other words, a final order of re-
moval is required if a court is to review a CAT order at all.”
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 592 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
   Riley has undoubtedly received a final order of removal.
But, he has never sought judicial review of that order pur-
suant to the procedures outlined in §1252. This Court has
held that “CAT orders may be reviewed together with final
orders of removal in a court of appeals.” Id., at 581 (empha-
sis added). But, as far as I am aware, we have never held
that judicial review of CAT orders is available when an al-
ien does not petition for review of a final order of removal.
   “[W]e can address jurisdictional issues in any order we
choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 

(2023); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

 (1999) (there is no mandatory “sequencing of juris-
dictional issues”). In this case, we decide only the issue on
which we granted certiorari: the correctness of the Fourth
Circuit’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction based on the
timing of Riley’s petition for review. We do not decide
whether Riley’s case is otherwise free of jurisdictional de-
fects.
   On remand, the Fourth Circuit must assure itself of its
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             5

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

jurisdiction before it can proceed to the merits of Riley’s pe-
tition. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 

, 101–102 (1998). I encourage the Fourth Circuit to
consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT or-
der—and only a CAT order—when the petitioner does not
seek review of a final order of removal.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             1

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 23–1270
                          _________________


  PIERRE YASSUE NASHUN RILEY, PETITIONER v.
      PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 26, 2025]

   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, and with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH
joins as to all but Part IV, dissenting in part.
   Sometimes, to ask a question is to answer it. When peti-
tioner Pierre Riley received an order from the Department
of Homeland Security notifying him it would seek to deport
him to Jamaica, he timely sought deferral of that removal
on the ground that he would likely be killed upon his return
there. After initially winning such relief from an Immigra-
tion Judge, Riley lost before the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. The question is when Riley should have petitioned
for judicial review of the Board’s order. Was his petition
due 30 days after the Government first notified him he
would be deported, well over a year before the Board issued
the order Riley sought to challenge? Or was it instead due
30 days after the order denying his claim for deferral of re-
moval? The answer is clear: One should not be required to
appeal an order before it exists.
   Incomprehensibly, the Court disagrees. It acknowledges
that the immigration laws required Riley to appeal the De-
partment’s decision that he was “deportable” together with
the Board’s (much later) order denying him relief from re-
moval to Jamaica. It admits that the only way to review
both orders is to do so after the latter of the two issues. Yet
it concludes Riley’s appeal was due before the Board issued
2                          RILEY v. BONDI

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

the second order. Because Congress did not write so inco-
herent a judicial-review provision, I respectfully dissent.1
                                I
                                A
  Petitioner Pierre Riley grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. In
1995, at age 16, he entered the United States on a visitor’s
visa to live with his father, a U. S. citizen. Riley overstayed
his visa, because (he says) he thought his father had ar-
ranged for his naturalization. Eventually, Riley got in-
volved in marijuana trafficking, and in 2008, a federal jury
convicted him of conspiring to distribute marijuana and
possessing a firearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. For
those offenses, a Federal District Court sentenced him to 25
years’ imprisonment.
  In January of 2021, after serving nearly 15 years of his
sentence, Riley moved for compassionate release, arguing
that his Type 2 diabetes and the COVID–19 pandemic con-
stituted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying
his release. The District Court agreed.
  A few days later, the Department of Homeland Security
served Riley with notice that it would seek to remove him
from the United States. Because Riley had been convicted
of an aggravated felony, the Government could pursue his
removal “without a hearing before an immigration judge.”

(b)(2)(i) (2024); 

(c). Instead,
after providing Riley an opportunity to contest his remova-
bility in writing, an immigration officer simply issued a “Fi-
nal Administrative Removal Order,” finding him “deporta-
ble” and ordering him “removed from the United States t[o]
Jamaica.” 1 App. 7–8. Riley received this removal order on
January 28, 2021.


——————
  1 The majority correctly holds that the deadlines in this case are not

jurisdictional, ante, at 11–16, so I join Part II–B of its opinion.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            3

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

                               B
   The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3,
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S.
113, categorically prohibits signatory states from returning
any person “to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.” The United States has been a party
to the Convention since 1994, and federal statutes and reg-
ulations implement its requirements. See ante, at 3; 

(c). “A conviction of an aggravated felony has no ef-
fect on CAT eligibility” and “the Attorney General has no
discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who establishes his
eligibility.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 

(2013). That is why even noncitizens like Riley, who are
statutorily ineligible for administrative hearings on remov-
ability, are nonetheless entitled to a hearing before an im-
migration judge if they express a credible fear of torture in
their country of removal. Such hearings are known as with-
holding-only or CAT proceedings, and their result can be
appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

(e).
   After receiving his removal order, Riley told an asylum
officer that a powerful drug dealer affiliated with the Ja-
maican Government had been targeting his family and had
murdered two of his cousins. 

. Riley feared that
he, too, would be killed upon his return to Jamaica. The
officer found Riley “credible,” but nonetheless concluded he
was ineligible for CAT relief. Id., at 59.
   At a subsequent hearing before an Immigration Judge,
Riley again testified that he feared removal to Jamaica. Ri-
ley explained that, following his compassionate release, “a
big drug kingpin” who functioned as a major political leader
in his Kingston neighborhood and was “tied in with all fac-
ets of law enforcement” had threatened repeatedly to kill
him. Administrative Record in Riley v. Garland, No. 22–
4                      RILEY v. BONDI

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

1609 (CA4), p. 194; see id., at 204–207. In 2008, Riley said,
the same kingpin had ordered the killing of his cousin,
Oneil Spencer, after Spencer stopped “donat[ing]” money
“to fund political campaigns and pay off government offi-
cials.” Id., at 201. When another cousin, Darrel Scott, was
deported from the United States to Jamaica two years later
and urged the local police to investigate Spencer’s murder,
he too was shot and killed. Id., at 203–204.
   After Riley’s release made the Jamaican news, his
mother, sister, and brother each began receiving a constant
stream of death threats directed at Riley. Id., at 207–209,
280–289. His mother reported the threats to the police, but
(Riley testified) she was told that “the reason why your son
is getting threats is because it’s payback,” that Riley was a
“criminal,” and that he would have to “pay for protection.”
Id., at 208. Riley also explained that he could not evade
these threats by moving elsewhere in Jamaica. As a depor-
tee with a criminal record, Riley would be required under
Jamaican law to register his address upon his return,
meaning he would be easily located.
   Along with his CAT application for deferral of his removal
to Jamaica, Riley submitted letters from his mother, sister,
brother, and stepfather corroborating his testimony. See
id., at 280–289. Riley also submitted Spencer’s death cer-
tificate, which lists “multiple gunshot wounds” as the cause
of death. Id., at 292.
   The Immigration Judge found Riley’s testimony credible,
concluded that he was more likely than not to face torture
or death upon his return to Jamaica, and granted CAT de-
ferral of removal.
                            C
   The Department of Homeland Security appealed the Im-
migration Judge’s deferral order to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals. The Board discerned “no clear error in the
Immigration Judge’s credibility determination.” 

.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)              5

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

Nevertheless, it concluded that Riley’s claim was “based on
the stringing together of a series of suppositions.” 

. Accordingly, the Board once again ordered Riley re-
moved to Jamaica. The Board filed its order on May 31,
2022, 16 months after the first administrative removal or-
der. Three days after the Board denied relief, Riley peti-
tioned the Fourth Circuit for review.
    On its own motion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court recognized that an
order “denying CAT relief is reviewable ‘as part of the re-
view of a final order of removal.’ ” Riley v. Garland, 

, *2 (Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting
Nasrallah v. Barr, 

, 582 (2020)). By statute,
noncitizens must file their “petition[s] for review” of such
final removal orders “not later than 30 days,” 

(b)(1), a deadline the Fourth Circuit believed to be
“ ‘jurisdictional and . . . not subject to equitable tolling,’ ”

, *1. The court concluded this 30-day win-
dow began to run on the date the original order of removal
issued in January 2021, regardless of whether the associ-
ated CAT proceedings had concluded. By that logic, Riley
would have been required to file his appeal of both the Jan-
uary 2021 final order of removal and the Board’s May 2022
order denying CAT relief in February of 2021. Because he
did not, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. 

                             II
   Should Riley have appealed the Board’s order denying de-
ferral of removal before the Board issued it? The answer
ought to be easy. Yet the majority today renders the statute
incoherent, holding that Riley should have appealed the or-
der one year and three months before the Board entered it.
   According to the majority, “statutory text and our prior
precedents” require this absurd result. Ante, at 10. Our
Nation’s immigration laws may be complex, but the irra-
tional scheme the Court endorses today is a product entirely
6                      RILEY v. BONDI

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

of its own creation. Statutory text and precedent over-
whelmingly confirm what common sense tells us: Riley’s ap-
peal was timely.
                               A
   Although the majority purports to be bound by the stat-
ute, its cursory analysis elides all but one of the relevant
provisions. Ante, at 5–6. Background on the statutory
scheme is accordingly necessary to understanding why the
question in this case arises.
   Early versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view “all final orders of deportation,” Act of Sept. 26, 1961,
§5(a), 

, an undefined term this Court inter-
preted to include “order[s] denying suspension of deporta-
tion,” Foti v. INS, 

 (1963). Under that
framework, a noncitizen who received an order denying re-
lief from removal (such as the Board’s order denying Riley’s
CAT claim) could have appealed it as a standalone order of
deportation, regardless of whether a prior order had re-
solved the issue of removability. Cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v.
INS, 

 (1968) (allowing separate petitions
for review of “denials of discretionary relief ” following an
initial removal order).
   A number of amendments intended to streamline the im-
migration laws changed that analysis. See Kolov v. Gar-
land, 

, 922–924 (CA6 2023) (Murphy, J., con-
curring) (describing these developments). Specifically,
Congress “ ‘consolidate[d] judicial review of immigration
proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.’ ”
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

, 230 (2020) (quot-
ing INS v. St. Cyr, 

 (2001)). It did so by
enacting the so-called zipper clause, ibid., which channels
judicial review of all claims “arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States” into a single appeal: the appeal of a “final order [of
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            7

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

removal],” 

(b)(9); see also §1252(a)(1). The
zipper clause does not change the substance of what noncit-
izens may appeal. Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 

, ___, and n. 1 (2025) (slip op., at 11, and n. 1). Rather,
it ensures that “a noncitizen’s various challenges arising
from the removal proceeding” are “ ‘consolidated in a peti-
tion for review and considered by the courts of appeals.’ ”
Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580.
   “Importantly,” the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 expressly “provides for judicial review of
CAT claims.” Id., at 580. Thus, noncitizens (including
those whose opportunities for judicial review are otherwise
limited on account of criminal convictions) can obtain judi-
cial review of orders denying CAT relief. Id., at 580–581.
Because such challenges “aris[e]” out of the removal pro-
ceedings, however, the zipper clause applies to them.
§1252(b)(9). And the zipper clause would not achieve its
goal, of “[c]onsolidat[ing]” the relevant appeals, ibid., if
noncitizens had to appeal each issue separately. That is
why, as the Act directs, “a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with” the statute
governing final orders of removal “shall be the sole and ex-
clusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim un-
der the [CAT].” §1252(a)(4). A petition for review under
§1252, in turn, “must be filed not later than 30 days after
the date of the final order of removal.” §1252(b)(1).
   All this explains why, though Riley seeks to appeal the
denial of CAT relief and not the finding that he is remova-
ble, the appellate deadline in his case nonetheless depends
on identifying the “order of removal” and determining when
it became “final.” Ibid.
   An “order of removal” is the same as an “ ‘order of depor-
tation.’ ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 579, 584. Along with the
other 1990s amendments, Congress enacted a statutory
definition of that term, defining it as the order “concluding
that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.”
8                       RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

§1101(a)(47)(A). Subsequently, this Court held that a CAT
order “is not itself a final order of removal” as defined in the
statute. Id., at 582. In light of that holding, the majority
correctly identifies the relevant “order of removal” as the
January 2021 administrative order holding Riley remova-
ble.
  The only question, then, is when that order became final
for purposes of the 30-day appeal window.
                                B
    Riley’s order of removal did not became final, for purposes
of appeal, until the Board issued its order denying CAT re-
lief. Congress expressly provided for judicial review of “any
cause or claim” under CAT. §1252(a)(4). Self-evidently,
such review “cannot take place until the [Board] has denied
. . . relief.” Ante, at 9. Meanwhile, Congress directed that
CAT orders must be appealed alongside the underlying or-
der of removal. The only way to adhere to both instructions
is to hold that removal orders do not become final until
withholding-only proceedings are complete. Centuries of
precedent on finality confirm that conclusion.
                                 1
   Immigration laws define finality, but only with respect to
orders of removal subject to direct Board review. Congress
provided that orders of removal “shall become final upon
the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review
of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.”
§1101(a)(47)(B). Sensibly, then, the statute ties finality to
the close of the relevant agency proceedings.
   In the mine run of cases, an immigration judge hears
claims about removability together with claims about pro-
tection from or deferral of removal (such as CAT claims) in
a single proceeding, which ends in a consolidated appeal to
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            9

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

the Board. The finality provision makes clear that, in those
cases, the underlying removal order becomes final once the
Board has concluded its review.
   Expedited removal orders like the one issued in Riley’s
case, however, are not subject to Board review at all.
§1228(b). Rather, a noncitizen subject to expedited removal
can appeal only a withholding claim to the Board, and not
the removal order itself. By its plain terms, the statute’s
finality provision does not apply to such removal orders.
That is because, in such cases, there will never be “a deter-
mination by the Board” affirming the removal order, nor is
there any “period in which the alien is permitted to seek
review” of it. §1101(a)(47)(B). Thus, the statutory defini-
tion alone does not resolve this case.
   The majority claims the statutory definition renders the
order of removal final immediately upon its issuance. That
is so, the majority says, because when a removal order is
not appealable, “the period to seek review [of it] ‘expire[s]’
as soon as the [order] is issued.” Ante, at 6. In other words,
the majority treats a nonexistent appeals period as if it
were merely an infinitesimally short period, one so short as
to “expir[e]” instantaneously.
   That makes no sense. “Expiration,” after all, means the
“conclusion [or] termination of a limited time.” See Web-
ster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary 645 (2d ed. 1979);
Black’s Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (“Cessation; ter-
mination from mere lapse of time, as the expiration date of
a lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like”); Black’s
Law Dictionary 722 (12th ed. 2024) (“The ending of a fixed
period of time”). A period of time cannot “expire” if it never
begins in the first place. For example, a statute fining those
who apply for a driver’s license after “the expiration of the
period” for which they hold the license plainly would not
apply to a first-time applicant. As to that applicant, there
is no “period” (much less a limited or fixed one) that could
“expir[e].” 

(a)(47)(B)(ii). So too here.
10                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

   The majority gives no argument for reaching the opposite
conclusion. It stands alone, moreover, in asserting that a
“straightforward reading of the statutory text” resolves this
case. Ante, at 6. Even the courts of appeals that have at-
tempted to defend the majority’s position admit that “[t]he
definition of finality in §1101(a)(47)(B) does not squarely
apply” to expedited orders of removal because noncitizens
“may not appeal [those] decision[s] to the BIA (or even to an
immigration judge).” Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 

, 192 (CA2 2022); Martinez v. Garland, 

, 568 (CA4 2023) (“An alien cannot appeal an immigra-
tion officer’s reinstatement decision to the Board, so at first
blush the definition appears inapposite”).
                                2
    Absent an unambiguous answer in the statute’s defini-
tion of finality, the Court should turn to tools of statutory
construction: the “ ‘ordinary or natural’ meaning” of the
term “final,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 

 (2004), “ ‘ “the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice” ’ ” asso-
ciated with finality, Lackey v. Stinnie, 

, ___
(2025) (slip op., at 5), and the relevant provisions’ “ ‘place in
the overall statutory scheme,’ ” West Virginia v. EPA, 

, 721 (2022).
    Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “final,” this
Court has previously recognized that term “clearly denotes
some kind of terminal event.” Smith v. Berryhill, 

, 479 (2019). Thus, an order becomes “final” when it
“ ‘leav[es] nothing to be looked for or expected,’ ” when it
“ ‘leav[es] no further chance for action, discussion, or
change.’ ” Ibid., and n. 8 (quoting 5 Oxford English Diction-
ary 920 (2d ed. 1989) and Webster’s New World College Dic-
tionary 542 (5th ed. 2016)).
    Of course, an order can be terminal in one sense and not
another. Consider a conviction. Once a jury delivers, and
the court enters, a guilty verdict, nothing remains “to be
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             11

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

looked for or expected” from that court with respect to the
conviction. In that sense, a conviction is as final as its gets.
Nevertheless, “appellate review” is prohibited “until convic-
tion and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United
States, 

 (1984). So for purposes of appeal,
a conviction remains nonfinal until sentencing is complete
as well. Yet another rule of finality applies to the availabil-
ity of collateral review. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 

 (2009) (noting that, under 

(d)(1)(A), a state-court conviction is not final for pur-
poses of federal collateral review until the end of direct re-
view or of the time for seeking such review).
   This multiplicity of finality rules makes clear that it is
not enough to muse about finality in the abstract. Rather,
the Court must focus on the specific sense of finality rele-
vant here, which (all agree) is finality for purposes of ap-
peal. Because “ ‘[f]inality as a condition of review is an his-
toric characteristic of federal appellate procedure,’ ”
Flanagan, 

, centuries of precedent and
practice inform that analysis.
   As a general matter, an order is final for purposes of ap-
peal “when the district court disassociates itself from the
case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first instance
save execution of the judgment.” Clay v. United States, 

 (2003). That understanding of finality serves
one central purpose: preventing piecemeal litigation. As
this Court put it long ago, “[f]rom the very foundation of our
judicial system,” rules of finality have ensured that “the
whole case and every matter in controversy in it” is “decided
in a single appeal.” McLish v. Roff, 

, 665–666
(1891). That is why this Court’s finality jurisprudence is
grounded “not in merely technical conceptions of ‘finality,’ ”
but rather in the policy “against piecemeal litigation.” Cat-
lin v. United States, 

, 233–234 (1945).
   The reason for that focus is simple: The only way to en-
12                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

sure that orders are appealed together is to have them be-
come final together as well. Otherwise, an expiring dead-
line on an earlier order (say, a conviction) would force indi-
viduals to appeal that order before the remaining issues in
the case (say, a criminal sentence) have been resolved. So
when two orders must be consolidated into the same appeal,
it follows inescapably that they become final together, as
well. Whether a ruling is final for purposes of appeal there-
fore depends principally on whether that ruling can, con-
sistent with the policy against piecemeal review, be ap-
pealed independently. See Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp., 

, 152–153 (1964) (collecting cases).
   An example illustrates the point. Sometimes, a dispute
over an award of attorney’s fees follows the conclusion of
litigation on the merits. At present, “[t]here is no question
that awards of attorney’s fees may be appealed separately
as final orders after a final determination of liability on the
merits.” García-Goyco v. Law Environmental Consultants,
Inc., 

 (CA1 2005). Thus, for example, when
a party loses a civil case at trial, it may appeal the jury ver-
dict before the fee litigation has concluded. See Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat. Bank, 

, 168–169 (1939). Because
separate appeals are permitted, the finality of the merits
judgment does not depend on the status of the attorney’s
fees dispute.
   Suppose, now, that Congress passed a law providing that
an appeal from final judgment “shall be the sole and exclu-
sive means for judicial review of ” an order awarding attor-
ney’s fees. Cf. 

(a)(4). That law should have
the effect of overruling the courts’ present assessment that
such orders are best appealed separately. Courts would un-
doubtedly recognize that merits judgments could no longer
become final while fee litigation remained pending, because
a statute now directs otherwise. The perceived need for
separate appealability was, after all, the basis for the prior
finality rule. Keeping the old finality rule in place in the
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)           13

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

face of the hypothetical statute, moreover, would force liti-
gants to choose between appealing the merits judgment on
time, thus forgoing their appeal of any eventual fee award,
or filing their only appeal late. No court would adopt such
a scheme.
   Yet that is precisely what the Court does today with re-
spect to appeals from CAT orders. Recall that withholding-
only decisions (which now include CAT orders) once were
independently appealable as orders of deportation. See su-
pra, at 6. Congress then enacted §1252(a)(4), which says
that “a petition for review” under the section governing fi-
nal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].”
In other words, Congress directed that appeals from orders
of removal and CAT orders be “ ‘consolidated in a [single]
petition for review.’ ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580. That
should only mean one thing. Because a statute ties appeals
of the CAT order to appeals of the removal order, their fi-
nality should be tied together, too. Accordingly, the order
of removal in this case should become final, for purposes of
appeal, only after the Board issued its order denying CAT
relief.
                              3
   That the majority nonetheless adopts the opposite posi-
tion, contrary to every one of this Court’s finality prece-
dents, might suggest there is reason to doubt that CAT or-
ders are appealable at all. Yet statutory text and this
Court’s precedent are crystal clear on this point: Congress
provided for judicial review of CAT claims.
   Section 1252(a)(4) provides that “a petition for review”
under that section “shall be the sole and exclusive means
for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].”
No “exclusive means” for review would be possible if review
were unavailable. That is why this Court held in Nasrallah
14                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

that “a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of . . . CAT or-
ders,” 590 U. S., at 583, even as the dissent complained that
the Court wrongly “view[ed] §1252(a)(4) as a specific grant
of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Id., at 591 (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting).
   Perhaps the idea is that noncitizens may seek judicial re-
view of their CAT claims only if, by luck or happenstance,
they also have a challenge to the underlying order of re-
moval. The majority’s finality rule, however, prevents CAT
appeals even under those circumstances. After all, courts
will likely finish reviewing the removal order before the
Board ever hears the associated CAT claim. Section
1252(a)(4) also does not direct courts to limit review of CAT
claims in this way; it simply requires that review of the two
kinds of orders be consolidated. Nor would this reading
make any sense. Consider its effect on the attorney’s fees
hypothetical, where that reading would mean litigants
could appeal a fee award only if, by luck or happenstance,
they also had a meritorious challenge to the unrelated mer-
its judgment.
   Importantly, this Court rejected a nearly identical argu-
ment about §1252 just months ago. In Monsalvo Velázquez,
the Government argued that noncitizens seeking judicial
review of questions arising out of their orders of removal
could do so only by challenging their removability. 604
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9); see also id., at ___
(BARRETT, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (“[J]udicial review
is available under §1252(a)(1) only if there is a challenge to
a ‘final order of removal’ ”). This Court held that, “[i]nstead,
§1252 authorizes courts to review ‘final order[s] of removal’
and address ‘questions of law . . . arising from’ them.” Id.,
at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10) (quoting §§1252(a)(1), (b)(9);
emphasis added). Nasrallah, the zipper clause, and
§1252(a)(4) each make clear that questions about one’s eli-
gibility for CAT relief are questions “arising from” the order
of removal. Thus, “§1252 authorizes courts to review” such
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             15

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

questions. 

 at ___ (slip op., at 9).
    Under the “ ‘well-settled’ and ‘strong presumption’ ” favor-
ing judicial review, “when a statutory provision ‘is reasona-
bly susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the
reading that accords with traditional understandings and
basic principles: that executive determinations generally
are subject to judicial review.’ ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589
U. S., at 229. “The presumption can only be overcome by
‘clear and convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to
preclude judicial review.” Ibid.; see also Bowen v. Michigan
Academy of Family Physicians, 

 (1986)
(“ ‘[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason
to believe that such was the purpose of Congress’ ”(quoting
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 

 (1967))).
It is hard to imagine any plausible reading of §1252(a)(4) on
which it cuts off judicial review of CAT claims (either com-
pletely or in the arbitrary sense rejected in Monsalvo Veláz-
quez), much less a “ ‘clear and convincing’ ” one. Guerrero-
Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229; see also Parrish v. United
States, 

, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 7) (reiterating
this Court’s consistent holdings “that ‘decisions on the mer-
its’ ought not be ‘avoided on the basis of . . . mere technical-
ities’ ” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 

 (1962))).
    The majority, perhaps aware of precedent’s constrains,
does not dispute any of this. It acknowledges, as it must,
that CAT claims are reviewable. Ante, at 10–11. Yet once
the majority accepts that premise, it is left with no way to
justify its construction of the judicial-review provision as
requiring petitions for review to be filed well before the rel-
evant CAT orders are issued. If judicial review is available,
then it must be available after the relevant order is issued
and not before. And if review is available after the relevant
orders issue, then there is no conceivable reason to require
applicants to file their petitions beforehand.
16                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

                              III
                               A
   Besides its halfhearted attempt to invoke the inapplica-
ble statutory definition, the majority offers a single thought
about the dispositive issue of finality. The original order, it
says, “was . . . the Executive’s final determination on the
question of removal,” so it “constituted ‘the final order of
removal’ in this case.” Ante, at 6. The implication is that,
because this order was a “final determination,” ibid., it be-
came final the moment it was issued.
   This argument conflates two different questions: when
the agency made its final decision on the question of remov-
ability, and when the “order of removal” became final for
appellate purposes. This Court explained just months ago
that “a finding of ‘removability’ ” is only “one term in a final
order of removal.” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 9). That the agency’s removability finding is
final therefore does not mean that the order containing it is
final for purposes of appeal.
   The majority’s skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the final-judgment principle. Every
interlocutory order finally determines the limited question
it decides, but of course that does not mean every order be-
comes instantly final for purposes of appeal. When a dis-
trict court declines to certify an expert witness, that is its
final word on the matter, yet the order remains nonfinal for
purposes of appeal until the entire case has been litigated
to judgment. When a district court disqualifies a litigant’s
counsel, that order is the court’s “final determination on the
question” of disqualification, ante, at 6; counsel could not
show up to trial again the next day. Yet the order remains
nonfinal for purposes of appeal until the underlying case is
over. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 

 (1985); Flanagan, 

. Few decisions,
moreover, are more final than a guilty verdict, yet a convic-
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             17

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

tion remains nonfinal for purposes of appeal until the dis-
trict court has pronounced a sentence. See supra, at 11.
    In failing to recognize as much, the majority breaks with
basic principles of finality and appellate review, holding
(seemingly for the first time) that two orders that statuto-
rily must be appealed together nonetheless do not become
final together. Inexplicably, the majority admits that “re-
view of removability and withholding of removal should oc-
cur in a single appellate proceeding,” and that “review of
the denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the [Board]
has denied such relief.” Ante, at 9. Yet it refuses to accept
the inevitable conclusion: If the orders must be reviewed “in
a single appellate proceeding,” ibid., then they become final
for purposes of appeal together as well. The result: Noncit-
izens facing expedited removal will be forced to file imme-
diate appeals of their removal orders in every case, simply
to protect their right to judicial review in the event they lose
their ongoing withholding-only proceedings.
    Across a wide variety of statutory contexts, courts have
recognized that protective appeals are “procedural hoops”
that “serve no function.” West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 

 (CA3 1988) (explaining, in Clean Air Act
case, the need “to avoid a de facto requirement of protective
appeals”); Outland v. CAB, 

, 227–228 (CADC
1960) (declining to read the Administrative Procedure Act
to require protective appeals while reconsideration is pend-
ing); Newark, New Castle and Seaford, Del. v. FERC, 

, 544–545 (CA3 1985) (same, in Federal Power Act
case); Rosler v. Derwinski, 

, 245–246 (1991)
(explaining, in Veterans Judicial Review Act case, that
reading protective appeal requirement into statute “would
. . . pose a substantial administrative problem” and cause
“many” claimants to “lose their right to judicial review”).
Protective appeal requirements “set a trap for the unwary,
who, if they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies
of the finality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right
18                     RILEY v. BONDI

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

to judicial review.” West Penn Power Co., 

.
   For that reason, too, this Court has rejected statutory
readings that would result in similar protective-appeal re-
quirements, even in the face of seemingly contrary textual
commands. Consider §704 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly re-
quired by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for
purposes of this section whether or not there has been pre-
sented or determined an application . . . for any form of re-
consideration.” 

. Taken literally, “[t]his
would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration
motions does not render [agency] orders nonfinal for pur-
poses of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period.” ICC
v. Locomotive Engineers, 

 (1987). Yet
“[t]hat language has long been construed by this and other
courts merely to relieve parties from the requirement of pe-
titioning for rehearing before seeking judicial re-
view . . . but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration
that are actually filed from rendering the orders under re-
consideration nonfinal.” 

 at 284–285; see also American
Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 

(1970). By contrast, in Stone v. INS, 

 (1995),
we held that motions to reopen orders of removal did not
render nonfinal the underlying removal order, precisely be-
cause petitioners “[c]ould file a separate petition to review
that second final [reconsideration] order.” 

.
   More recently, this Court has twice refused to read a
protective-appeal requirement into §1252. In Santos-
Zacaria v. Garland, 

 (2023), the Government
advanced a reading of that section that would “flood the
Board with reconsideration motions that noncitizens other-
wise would not file” and “flood the courts with pointless
premature petitions,” filed simply to preserve the right to
review. 

. This Court declined to “render the stat-
utory scheme incoherent” in that way. 

. And ear-
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             19

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

lier this year, the Government argued that, under the zip-
per clause, noncitizens could challenge the terms of their
removal order only if they “press[ed] a challenge to [the]
finding of ‘removability.’ ” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 9). This Court rejected that argument,
too, noting it would have put noncitizens to the choice of
“either adorn[ing] their judicial petitions with a pointless
challenge . . . or forfeit[ing] the right to review altogether.”
Ibid. Mere months later the Court seems to have forgotten
all these lessons.

                               B
   The Court overlooks Santos-Zacaria, Monsalvo Veláz-
quez, and the wealth of precedent on finality, claiming in-
stead that two other cases are “instructive” and require a
different outcome here. Ante, at 6. Neither case supports
the majority’s conclusion.
   First, the majority points to Nasrallah’s holding that “a
CAT order is not a final order of removal,” does not disturb
or affect the validity of a final order of removal, and does
not merge into such an order. Ante, at 6–7. The majority
does not explain, however, why this holding supports its
conclusion. An order need not “ ‘affect the validity’ ” of a de-
cision (or merge into it) to impact its finality for purposes of
appeal. Ante, at 7. As noted, a sentence does not affect the
validity of a conviction (and the two do not “merge”), yet a
conviction cannot be final for purposes of appeal until the
sentence is final as well. Notably, Nasrallah itself com-
pared the relationship between removal and CAT orders to
that between a criminal conviction and sentence. 590 U. S.,
at 583. Nasrallah is therefore hardly dispositive here.
   In any event, it should be clear by now that the majority’s
discussion of Nasrallah misses the point. Whether CAT or-
ders disturb or affect the substance of removal orders would
certainly be relevant if the Court conducted its finality
analysis without guidance from Congress, as it did in the
20                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

case of fee awards. See Trustees v. Greenough, 

 (1882) (fee orders are “so far independent” of the
merits “as to make the decision substantially a final decree
for the purposes of an appeal”). But here, Congress dictated
that the two orders must be consolidated for purposes of ap-
peal. 

(a)(4). The Court is required to re-
spect that decision and move on.
   The majority next points to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,

 (2021), as supporting its conclusion. Ante, at
7–8. That case concerned the 90-day removal period follow-
ing an order of removal, during which the Government is
required to detain noncitizens. See §1231(a)(2). The point
of such detention is to provide the Government with a rea-
sonable period of time to “secure [the noncitizen’s] re-
moval.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 

 (2001). The
removal period does not begin, Congress has specified, until
the      removal     order    is   “administratively     final.”
§1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The question was whether ongoing with-
holding-only proceedings prevented a removal order from
being administratively final for purposes of the mandatory
detention period.
   This Court held that the administrative finality of an or-
der of removal “does not depend in any way on the outcome
of the withholding-only proceedings.” Guzman Chavez, 594
U. S., at 539. Thus, the detention period begins after the
agency has finalized its removability finding, not after fur-
ther proceedings over the specific country of removal have
concluded. Id., at 534–535. Yet whether an order is “ad-
ministratively final” for purposes of detention and whether
it is “final” for purposes of appeal are two entirely different
questions. “Finality is variously defined; like many legal
terms, its precise meaning depends on context.” Clay, 

. That is why this Court recognized in Guzman
Chavez that §1252 “uses different language than §1231 and
relates to judicial review of removal orders rather than de-
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             21

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

tention.” 594 U. S., at 535, n. 6. The Court thus “ex-
press[ed] no view on” the question of finality for purposes of
appeal. Ibid.
   Nor is it at all surprising that “administratively final” in
§1231 and “final” in §1252 should have different meanings.
“In a given statute, the same term usually has the same
meaning and different terms usually have different mean-
ings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 

 (2024).
Because the point of detention is to ensure that a noncitizen
does not flee pending his deportation, moreover, arguably
all that matters for purposes of the detention statute is that
the noncitizen is removable from the United States, not
whether he is removable to any particular country. Guz-
man Chavez, 594 U. S., at 536, 539. There is “no reason to
import the understanding of finality that applies” to deten-
tion into the separate “field” of appellate review. Waetzig v.
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 

, ___ (2025)
(majority opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 9) (discussing the
different “role[s]” of finality across contexts). Indeed, pre-
cisely the same two senses of finality apply to criminal con-
victions. A conviction becomes final for purposes of presen-
tencing detention once the jury has delivered its verdict. 

(a). Yet it does not become final for purposes
of appeal until the district court has imposed a sentence.
   The majority claims to “appreciate th[e] difference” be-
tween the two sorts of finality. Ante, at 10. But, the major-
ity explains, “the meaning of finality” is not “necessarily”
different, even when Congress uses different words to serve
different purposes. 

 That truism hardly helps. The
majority gives up shortly afterward, simply asserting by
ipse dixit that the differences do not matter here. In light
of 

(a)(4) and our finality precedents, they
clearly should.

                           IV
  Today’s holding deals untold damage to basic principles
22                      RILEY v. BONDI

                 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

of finality and judicial review. Time will tell whether the
Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored
noncitizens. Cf. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc.
v. McKesson Corp., ___ U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2025) (slip op.,
at 11, n. 4) (recognizing “unfairness . . . potentially ris[ing]
to the level of a constitutional due process problem,” of rule
that would require regulated businesses to seek judicial re-
view before the applicability of an agency order to them was
“reasonably foreseeable”).
    As it stands, the chaos the majority causes to our system
of immigration appeals is considerable. The effects on
noncitizens subject to expedited removal proceedings
should by now be clear enough. The majority suggests a
number of workarounds for that chaos, including by allow-
ing protective appeals and notice about the need to file such
appeals long before CAT proceedings have concluded. See
ante, at 10–11. To be clear, the Government is obligated by
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to provide
noncitizens with adequate notice about the need for an im-
mediate appeal to preserve the right to judicial review of
CAT claims. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 

, ___
(2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (“ ‘[T]he Fifth Amend-
ment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of
removal proceedings’ ” (quoting Trump v. J. G. G., 

, ___ (2025) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3); alteration in
original)). That guarantee includes “notice that is ‘reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances,’ ” to enable
“ ‘interested parties’ ” to “pursue appropriate relief.” A. A.
R. P., 605 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4) (quoting Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 

 (1950)). So too, courts of appeals should not arbitrarily
decline to hold in abeyance any premature appeals of yet-
to-be-decided withholding claims. See ante, at 10.
    In addition, the courts of appeals should consider apply-
ing standard principles of equitable tolling, which are likely
available now that the Court has recognized that
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            23

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

§1252(b)(1)’s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional. See ante,
at 11–16.
   Today’s decision may have consequences beyond expe-
dited removal proceedings, too. Recall that, in the typical
case, an immigration judge decides all questions related to
both removal and withholding in the same proceeding. See
supra, at 8–9. The Board of Immigration Appeals then re-
views all aspects of the immigration judge’s decision. As
things stand today, the noncitizen may petition for review
of the Board’s decision once agency review has completed.
See ibid.; §1101(a)(47)(B). Yet what if the Board affirms
“an immigration judge’s removability finding but remand[s]
for further consideration of withholding claims”? Kolov, 78
F. 4th, at 927 (Murphy, J., concurring). Would the majority
hold as well that such findings become final before the re-
mand is concluded, requiring noncitizens to file premature
protective appeals whenever a CAT claim is remanded? As
with so much else, the majority does not say. To avoid fur-
ther chaos, the Board would be well counseled to remand
cases in their entirety.
   Finally, lest one think today’s decision will at least allow
the Government to conduct its immigration policies more
cheaply or efficiently, even that is not the case. It is not by
accident that the Government, across the past and present
administration, stands firmly with Riley here, even as it
rarely fails to press colorable jurisdictional objections. See
Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, ___ U. S. ___, ___
(2025) (slip op., at 5). As the Government knows, “[a] whole
train of unnecessary consequences” follows from requiring
noncitizens to appeal in every expedited removal case,
simply to protect their eventual right to appeal future
withholding-only decisions. Outland, 

. In
each of these unnecessary appeals, “the Board and other
parties may be called upon to respond and oppose the mo-
tion for review; when the Board acts, the petition for review
24                     RILEY v. BONDI

                SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting in part

must be amended to bring the petition up to date,” or dis-
missed if the Board grants the noncitizen’s CAT claim.

 All the while, courts must manage countless cases
that otherwise might never have been opened. The Govern-
ment recognizes all these consequences. Brief for Respond-
ent 36–38. This Court is blind to them. Today’s decision is
the rare holding that benefits no one.

                        *    *     *
  Not long ago, this Court described delays in regulatory
approvals of construction projects as “ ‘borde[ring] on the
Kafkaesque.’ ” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Ea-
gle County, 

, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 13). In
holding that Riley was required to file his appeal 16 months
before the order he sought to challenge existed, the Court
surely moves from the border well into the heartland of il-
logic and absurdity. Respectfully, I dissent.