Esteras v. United States

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

                    ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                  THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

   No. 23–7483. Argued February 25, 2025—Decided June 20, 2025*
Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, and
 the District Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison followed by a
 6-year term of supervised release. While on supervised release,
 Esteras was arrested and charged with domestic violence and other
 crimes. The District Court revoked Esteras’s supervised release and
 ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, explaining that Esteras’s ear-
 lier sentence had been “rather lenient” and that his revocation sen-
 tence must “promote respect for the law,” a consideration enumerated
 in 

(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that
 a district court may consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised
 release.
Held: A district court considering whether to revoke a defendant’s term
  of supervised release may not consider §3553(a)(2)(A), which covers
  retribution vis-à-vis the defendant’s underlying criminal offense.
  Pp. 4–17.
     (a) In determining the appropriate sentence for a federal defendant,
  a district court must consider 10 factors set forth in §3553(a). Among
  those factors is §3553(a)(2)(A), which references “the need for the sen-
  tence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
  respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”
  This provision speaks to the retributive purpose of punishment.
     A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may also impose a
  post-imprisonment term of supervised release. Section 3583(c) enu-
  merates the factors that a court must consider when deciding to impose
——————
  *Together with Jaimez, fka Watters v. United States and Leaks v.
United States, also on certiorari to the same court (see this Court’s Rule
12.4).
2                     ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                                  Syllabus

    supervised release. Eight of the ten §3553(a) factors are listed. Sig-
    nificant here, §3583(c) excludes §3553(a)(2)(A), which covers retribu-
    tion vis-à-vis the defendant’s underlying criminal offense. When a
    court decides whether to revoke a defendant’s term of supervised re-
    lease, §3583(e) provides that the same eight factors apply. So the ques-
    tion is this: In determining whether to revoke supervised release, may
    a district court account for these omitted factors—and specifically
    §3553(a)(2)(A)? Esteras says no; the Government says yes. Pp. 4–8.
       (b) The Court agrees with Esteras. District courts cannot consider
    §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. That conclusion fol-
    lows from the well-established canon of statutory interpretation—“ex-
    pressio unius est exclusio alterius”—which means that expressing one
    item of an associated group excludes another item not mentioned. See
    Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 

. While Congress
    elsewhere set forth ten factors that must generally inform a district
    court’s sentencing decisions, it provided in §3583(e)—the provision
    governing the revocation of supervised release—that courts must con-
    sider only eight of those ten factors. The natural implication is that
    Congress did not intend courts to consider the other two factors, in-
    cluding §3553(a)(2)(A).
       The statutory structure confirms this negative inference. Neighbor-
    ing provisions governing the imposition and revocation of other kinds
    of sentences instruct courts to consider all the §3553(a) factors. But
    for supervised release—and supervised release only—Congress omit-
    ted §3553(a)(2)(A). This is a distinction with a difference. And Con-
    gress’s decision to exclude retribution from the calculus also comports
    with supervised release’s role in the criminal justice scheme. Super-
    vised release “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” United
    States v. Granderson, 

. Rather, it “fulfills rehabilita-
    tive ends” and “provides individuals with postconfinement assistance.”
    United States v. Johnson, 

, 59–60. So when a defendant
    violates a condition of supervised release, courts must consider the for-
    ward-looking sentencing ends, but may not consider the backward-
    looking purpose of retribution.
       The Court has twice interpreted the omission of §3553(a)(2)(A) from
    the provision governing the imposition of supervised release to mean
    that district courts may not consider that factor. See Tapia v. United
    States, 

; Concepcion v. United States, 

. Alt-
    hough Tapia and Concepcion both deal with the imposition of super-
    vised release under §3583(c), the same reasoning applies to revocation
    under §3583(e): the omission of §3553(a)(2)(A) means that courts may
    not consider it. Pp. 8–10.
       (c) The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. The
    Government reads the exclusion of §3553(a)(2)(A) from §3583(e) to
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                                Syllabus

  mean that district courts must consider enumerated factors and need
  not (but may) consider unenumerated ones. Given sentencing judges’
  discretion, the Government argues, Congress would have been more
  explicit had it intended to foreclose the consideration of retributive
  aims when revoking supervised release. But what Congress said is
  clear: The itemized list in §3583(e) is exhaustive and supplies the en-
  tire universe of factors courts may consider. And the Government’s
  reading trivializes the omission of §3553(a)(2)(A): As the Government
  recognizes, a court may “consider” an enumerated factor but give it no
  weight. Yet there is negligible difference between saying that a court
  must consider a given factor (but may give it no weight) and saying
  that a court may consider a given factor (if the court so chooses).
     Next, the Government argues that Esteras’s reading is unworkable
  because considering other enumerated factors—such as “the nature
  and circumstances of the offense” under §3553(a)(1)—will necessarily
  imply consideration of the retributive principles captured by
  §3553(a)(2)(A). While the Government asks how a court may consider
  the nature and circumstances of the offense without also considering
  the retributive principles captured by §3553(a)(2)(A), the answer is
  straightforward. Courts may consider the offense’s nature and circum-
  stances to inform the considerations set forth in §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C),
  and (D)—deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But courts
  cannot consider them as relevant to §3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive focus.
     Finally, the Government interprets §3583(g), which mandates revo-
  cation in certain circumstances, as subject to the full list of §3553(a)
  factors. And it would be anomalous, the Government says, if courts
  could consider retribution in mandatory revocations under §3583(g)
  but not in discretionary revocations under §3583(e)(3). The correct
  reading of §3583(g) does not affect the Court’s analysis. That §3583(e)
  might operate differently from §3583(g) is no reason to disregard
  §3583(e)’s plain meaning. Pp. 11–16.
       (d) When appellate courts review a claim that the district court
  has impermissibly relied on §3553(a)(2)(A), much will turn on whether
  the defendant has properly objected to the district court’s impermissi-
  ble reliance on §3553(a)(2)(A). If not, the defendant’s appeal will be
  governed by plain-error review. But if a court considers retribution for
  the original offense over the defendant’s objection, and the error was
  not harmless, then the court of appeals should vacate the order and
  remand for the court to apply the correct standard. None of this turns
  the Court’s reading of §3583(e) into a “substance-free reverse magic-
  words requirement,” as the Government suggests. Brief for United
  States 37. The Government conflates the proper interpretation of
  §3583(e) with an appellate court’s ability to enforce that interpreta-
  tion. Pp. 16–17.

, 

, vacated and remanded.
4                   ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                                Syllabus

   BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and THOMAS, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which
SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–B. SOTOMAYOR,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in
which JACKSON, J., joined. JACKSON, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 23–7483
                                   _________________


           EDGARDO ESTERAS, PETITIONER v.
                  UNITED STATES
    TIMOTHY MICHAEL JAIMEZ, FKA TIMOTHY M.
     WATTERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
         TORIANO A. LEAKS, JR., PETITIONER v.
                  UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                 [June 20, 2025]

  JUSTICE BARRETT delivered the opinion of the Court.
  A criminal sentence may include both time in prison and
a term of supervised release. 

(a). Super-
vised release comes with conditions—for instance, the de-
fendant must refrain from committing another crime.
§3583(d). If the defendant violates one of these conditions,
then the district court may revoke the term of supervised
release and require reimprisonment. But a court may do so
only “after considering” an enumerated list of sentencing
factors: those “set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” §3583(e).
Conspicuously missing from this list is §3553(a)(2)(A),
which directs a district court to consider “the need for the
sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish-
ment for the offense.” The Sixth Circuit held that a district
court may consider that factor nonetheless.
2                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

   We disagree. Congress’s decision to enumerate most of
the sentencing factors while omitting §3553(a)(2)(A) raises
a strong inference that courts may not consider that factor
when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised re-
lease. This inference is consistent with both the statutory
structure and the role that supervised release plays in the
sentencing process. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments
of the Sixth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.
                              I
  In 2018, Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to
distribute heroin. Varying downward from the 15-to-21-
month sentencing range, the District Court sentenced him
to 12 months in prison, to be followed by a 6-year term of
supervised release.
  When Esteras completed his term of imprisonment, his
period of supervised release began. Three years in, the pro-
bation office notified the District Court that Esteras had
been arrested. According to the mother of his children,
Esteras had threatened to kill her and had fired three
rounds into her vehicle. Esteras was charged in municipal
court with domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and
criminal damaging, although the charges were ultimately
dismissed at the request of the victim.
  The District Court held a revocation hearing, at which it
found that Esteras had violated the conditions of his super-
vised release. The District Court remarked that Esteras
was “no stranger to law violations and no stranger to fed-
eral court” and that his previous drug sentences had been
“rather lenient.” App. 96a. The District Court revoked his
supervised release and ordered 24 months of reimprison-
ment, an upward variation from the advisory 6-to-12-month
range, with three more years of supervised release to follow.
  At this point, Esteras’s counsel objected, arguing that the
District Court had impermissibly considered “the factor in
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                          Opinion of the Court

Section 3553(a)(2)(A).” 

 at 105a. While Esteras’s coun-
sel lodged his objection for the record, he recognized that
Sixth Circuit precedent allows district courts to consider
§3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised release.
See United States v. Lewis, 

, 399–400 (2007).
The District Court in turn acknowledged that part of its de-
cision “certainly [was] the need for the sentence imposed, to
promote respect for the law.” App. 105a. In a subsequent
written order, the District Court explained that it had “con-
sidered the factors and conditions for sentencing listed in

(a)” and had imposed the term of reimpris-
onment in part to “promote respect for the law.” 

 at
115a–116a.
   The Sixth Circuit affirmed, providing two justifications
for its view that district courts may consider §3553(a)(2)(A)
when revoking a term of supervised release. See 

 (2023). First, §3583(e) does not say “that the court
may consider ‘only’ those factors” specifically enumerated,
so there was no indication that Congress meant to displace
the “considerable discretion” that district courts typically
enjoy “over supervised-release decisions.” Id., at 1167. Sec-
ond, a rule prohibiting district courts from considering
§3553(a)(2)(A) would be unworkable. As the panel saw it,
“the purportedly forbidden considerations mentioned in
§3553(a)(2)(A) tend to be ‘essentially redundant’ with the
permitted ones,” so “[t]o think about the one requires the
judge to think about the other.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 

).
   The circuits are divided as to whether district courts may
consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking a term of supervised
release.1 We granted certiorari to resolve this split. 604
——————
  1 In addition to the Sixth Circuit, the First, Second, and Third Circuits

have held that district courts may consider §3553(a)(2)(A). See United
States v. Vargas-Dávila, 

, 131–132 (CA1 2011); United
States v. Williams, 

, 47–48 (CA2 2006); United States v.
Young, 

, 238–242 (CA3 2011). By contrast, the Fourth,
4                    ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                           Opinion of the Court

U. S. ___ (2024).2
                              II
                              A
   When a district court sentences a federal defendant, the
judge may impose a term of imprisonment, a term of proba-
tion, or a fine. See §3551(b). In determining the appropri-
ate sentence, the court must consider certain factors set
forth in §3553(a). Some are obvious: The court must con-
sider “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the
kinds of sentences available.” §§3553(a)(1), (3). Others re-
quire courts to consider guidelines or policies issued by the
Sentencing Commission. §§3553(a)(4)–(5). And still others
reflect discrete policy aims, such as “the need to avoid un-
warranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated
defendants and “the need to provide restitution to any vic-
tims of the offense.” §§3553(a)(6)–(7).
   While all these factors are important, §3553(a)(2) cap-
tures the traditional heartland of criminal sentencing. It
requires courts to consider:

——————
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that a court may not consider
§3553(a)(2)(A). See United States v. Crudup, 

 (CA4
2006); United States v. Miqbel, 

 (CA9 2006); United
States v. Booker, 

, 1259–1260 (CA10 2023). The Fifth and
Seventh Circuits have taken intermediate positions. See United States
v. Sanchez, 

, and n. 5 (CA5 2011) (while §3553(a)(2)(A)
is an impermissible factor for a district court to consider, “the forbidden
factor must be ‘dominant’ ” to constitute reversible error); United States
v. Clay, 

, 1108–1109 (CA7 2014) (allowing consideration
of §3553(a)(2)(A) if the district court “relies primarily” on the enumerated
factors).
   2 Timothy Jaimez and Toriano Leaks joined Esteras’s petition for cer-

tiorari. Jaimez and Leaks, like Esteras, argued that the District Courts
in their revocation proceedings had improperly considered
§3553(a)(2)(A). The Sixth Circuit held that these arguments were fore-
closed by Esteras and Lewis. See United States v. Jaimez, 

 (2024); United States v. Leaks, 

, *1 (Mar. 6, 2024).
                  Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

    “the need for the sentence imposed—
       “(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
    mote respect for the law, and to provide just punish-
    ment for the offense;
       “(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal con-
    duct;
       “(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
    defendant; and
       “(D) to provide the defendant with needed educa-
    tional or vocational training, medical care, or other cor-
    rectional treatment in the most effective manner.”
“These four considerations—retribution, deterrence, inca-
pacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes of
sentencing generally.” Tapia v. United States, 

 (2011). They speak to the questions at the core of
any system of criminal justice: What sentence does the de-
fendant deserve? What sentence will deter criminal con-
duct in the future? What sentence will protect the public?
And what sentence is most likely to help the defendant re-
habilitate for transition back into society?
   A judge who imposes a term of imprisonment may—and
sometimes must—impose a postimprisonment term of su-
pervised release. §3583(a). “Supervised release is ‘a form
of postconfinement monitoring’ that permits a defendant a
kind of conditional liberty by allowing him to serve part of
his sentence outside of prison,” subject to conditions on his
behavior. Mont v. United States, 

 (2019)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 

(2000)). Some conditions are mandatory, such as requiring
that the defendant not commit additional crimes and, in
most cases, that the defendant submit to drug testing.
§3583(d). Others are up to the discretion of the court. Ibid.
   When a court “determin[es] whether to include a term of
supervised release,” as well as the length and conditions of
such a term, it must “consider the factors set forth in section
6                    ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                           Opinion of the Court

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6),
and (a)(7).” §3583(c). Only two of the §3553(a) factors are
absent from this list. The first is §3553(a)(2)(A), which re-
quires the court to consider the need for the sentence im-
posed to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense,” i.e., the retributive purposes of sentencing. The
second is §3553(a)(3), which requires the court to consider
“the kinds of sentences available.” When a court decides
whether to revoke a defendant’s supervised release, the very
same subset of §3553(a) factors—that is, all but two—ap-
plies. §3583(e)(3).3
  The reason for excluding §3553(a)(3) from the list is self-
evident: When a district court decides whether to revoke a
term of supervised release, there is no need to consider “the
kinds of sentences available,” because supervised release is
the only matter at issue.4 The exclusion of §3553(a)(2)(A) is

——————
   3 The same list of factors also applies when a district court modifies the

terms of supervised release, such as by terminating supervised release
early, by extending the term of supervised release, or by altering the con-
ditions of supervised release. §§3583(e)(1)–(2), (4).
   4 The dissent offers a different view of §3553(a)(3). In its view, the ter-

mination, extension, modification, and revocation of supervised release
are all different “kinds of ” sentences. Post, at 7–8 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
The Government never makes this argument—and for good reason. To
begin, it is textually implausible. As the statute articulates, there are
three “kinds of sentences available” for an individual “found guilty of an
offense”: “a term of probation,” “a fine,” and “a term of imprisonment.”
§§3551(b)(1)–(3); §3553(a)(3). In fact, a term of supervised release is not
itself a “sentence” at all; it is a component of a defendant’s prison sen-
tence. See §3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of im-
prisonment . . . , may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that
the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprison-
ment” (emphasis added)). Thus, to the extent the dissent thinks that the
termination, extension, modification, and revocation of supervised re-
lease are different “kinds of sentences available” to the court, it is mis-
taken. §3553(a)(3).
   The dissent’s interpretation is perplexing for another reason too: It
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                          Opinion of the Court

more significant—and here, controversial. Esteras argues
that district courts cannot consider the retributive purpose
articulated in §3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised re-
lease. The Government insists that courts can consider it,
although they are not required to do so.
                               B
   To see what is at stake, keep in mind that §3553(a)(2)(A)
does not speak of retribution generally—it references the
need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense” and to “provide just punishment for the offense.”
(Emphasis added.) In the context of a revocation hearing,
the “offense” is the underlying crime of conviction, not the
violation of the supervised-release conditions. The opening
provision of Title 18’s sentencing chapter clearly uses “of-
fense” to refer to a criminal conviction. See §3551(a) (stat-
ing that the sentencing provisions apply to “a defendant
who has been found guilty of an offense described in any
Federal statute”). Yet conduct that constitutes a violation
of supervised release “need not be criminal.” Johnson, 529
U. S., at 700; see, e.g., §3583(g)(3) (mandating revocation
when a defendant fails to comply with drug testing imposed
as a condition of release). Furthermore, neighboring provi-
sions in §3583 consistently use the word “offense” to refer
to the defendant’s original crime of conviction, while using
the word “violation” to refer to the conduct that triggers rev-
ocation. Compare §3583(e)(3) (referencing the “offense that
resulted in the term of supervised release”); §3583(h) (“the
offense that resulted in the original term of supervised re-


——————
treats Congress’s omission of §3553(a)(3) from the set of factors that gov-
ern revocation proceedings as nothing more than an inexplicable drafting
error; under its view, not only may district courts consider §3553(a)(3),
they must do so. See post, at 7 (a judge “must consider exactly what is
set out in §3553(a)(3)”). Silence is an unusual way to convey such an
instruction.
8                    ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                           Opinion of the Court

lease”), with §3583(d)(3) (referencing a “violation of a con-
dition of supervised release”); §3583(i) (same).5
  So the question is this: In determining whether to revoke
a defendant’s term of supervised release (per §3583(e)), may
a district court account for the need to exact retribution for
the defendant’s underlying crime (per §3553(a)(2)(A))?
Esteras says no; the Government says yes.
                             III
                              A
   We agree with Esteras: District courts cannot consider
§3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release. This con-
clusion follows directly from the application of a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation: “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius”—in plain English, “ ‘expressing
one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another
left unmentioned.’ ” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 

 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 

 (2002); alteration in original). Here, §3553(a) lays
out 10 factors that inform a district court’s sentencing deci-
sion.6 Section 3583(e) provides that a district court may re-
voke a term of supervised release “after considering” 8 of
——————
   5 Because §3553(a)(2)(A) speaks only to the “offense,” and “offense”

here can mean only the underlying criminal conviction, we address only
whether §3583(e) precludes the court from considering retribution for the
underlying criminal conviction. “Offense” aside, the Government argues
that §3553(a)(4)(B) and §3553(a)(5) authorize courts to consider policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission that sound in retribu-
tion for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release. See Brief
for United States 11, 34; §3583(e) (requiring courts to consider
§3553(a)(4) and §3553(a)(5)). The Commission has adopted the view that
“the sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the vio-
lator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervi-
sion.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7,
pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024); see also ibid. (in revocation proceedings, a
court may “sanction” an offender’s “breach of trust”). We take no position
on whether this is a permissible consideration.
   6 For those counting: the six factors enumerated in §§3553(a)(1), (3),
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                        Opinion of the Court

these 10 factors. The natural implication is that Congress
did not intend for courts to consider the other two factors,
§3553(a)(2)(A) and §3553(a)(3). Indeed, the expressio unius
canon has particular force here because the §3553(a) sen-
tencing factors constitute an “established series,” such that
any “omission” from that series necessarily “bespeaks a
negative implication.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc., 

. And the fact that Congress included almost the entire
list makes the exclusion of §3553(a)(2)(A) and §3553(a)(3)
all the more glaring.
   The statutory structure confirms this negative inference.
Neighboring provisions that govern the imposition and rev-
ocation of sentences other than supervised release instruct
the court to consider all the factors in §3553(a). For in-
stance, when imposing a term of probation, the court “shall
consider the factors set forth in §3553(a) to the extent that
they are applicable.” §3562(a). And the court may revoke
such a term “after considering the factors set forth in sec-
tion 3553(a).” §3565(a); see also §3582(a) (same for imposi-
tion of term of imprisonment); §3572(a) (same for imposi-
tion of a fine).      So for supervised release—and for
supervised release only—Congress omitted §3553(a)(2)(A).
This, we think, is a distinction with a difference. After all,
our task is to “give effect to, not nullify Congress’ choice to
include” that factor “in some provisions but not others.”
Gallardo v. Marstiller, 

 (2022).
   Congress’s decision to exclude retribution from the calcu-
lus also comports with the role of supervised release in our
current criminal justice scheme. Fines, probation, and im-
prisonment are a court’s primary tools for ensuring that a
criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original of-
fense. Supervised release, by contrast, “is not a punish-
ment in lieu of incarceration.” United States v. Granderson,
——————
(4), (5), (6), and (7), plus the four factors separately enumerated in
§§3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).
10                  ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                          Opinion of the Court

 (1994). Rather, it “fulfills rehabilitative
ends” and “provides individuals with postconfinement as-
sistance.” United States v. Johnson, 

, 59–60
(2000). So when a defendant violates the conditions of his
supervised release, it makes sense that a court must con-
sider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider
the backward-looking purpose of retribution.
   Finally, our conclusion is consistent with this Court’s
precedent. We have twice interpreted the omission of
§3553(a)(2)(A) from the provision governing the imposition
of supervised release (§3583(c)) to mean that district courts
may not consider that factor when imposing supervised re-
lease. In Tapia, we stated that, “when imposing a term of
supervised release,” “a court may not take account of retri-
bution (the first purpose listed in §3553(a)(2)).” 

.7 So too, in Concepcion v. United States, we re-
marked that “in determining whether to include a term of
supervised release, and the length of any such term, Con-
gress has expressly precluded district courts from consider-
ing the need for retribution.” 

, 494 (2022). Alt-
hough Tapia and Concepcion both deal with the imposition
of supervised release under §3583(c), the same reasoning
applies to the revocation of supervised release under
§3583(e): The omission of §3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of fac-
tors means that courts may not consider it.
   Text, structure, and precedent all point in the same di-
rection: Congress’s decision to exclude §3553(a)(2)(A) from
§3583(e)’s list of sentencing factors means that district
courts cannot consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when deciding
whether to revoke supervised release.
——————
  7 The dissent suggests that when we said that “ ‘a court may not take

account of retribution,’ ” we may have actually meant that “a judge, as a
matter of discretion, may choose not to take retribution into account.”
Post, at 14. We leave it to the reader to judge whether this is a plausible
interpretation.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            11

                      Opinion of the Court

                               B
   We are unpersuaded by the Government’s and the dis-
sent’s counterarguments. First, the Government and the
dissent read the exclusion of §3553(a)(2)(A) as supporting a
different inference—namely, that a district court must con-
sider the enumerated factors but need not consider the un-
enumerated ones, such as §3553(a)(2)(A). Because “sen-
tencing judges ‘enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information
they may consider,’ ” the Government argues, Congress
would have used more explicit language had it wanted to
foreclose courts from considering retribution when revoking
supervised release. Concepcion, 

 (quoting
Dean v. United States, 

 (2017); alteration in
original). For example, Congress could have said that
courts may revoke supervised release “after considering
only” the enumerated factors. Brief for United States 23;
see also post, at 4–6 (ALITO, J., dissenting).
   When interpretive disputes arise, it is easy to imagine
how Congress could have drafted the statute to avoid them.
But Congress cannot anticipate (much less account for)
every future statutory skirmish—and even if it could,
courts have no authority to hold Congress to a “perfect as
we see it” standard of drafting. On the contrary, we have
“routinely construed statutes to have a particular meaning”
even when “Congress could have expressed itself more
clearly.” Luna Torres v. Lynch, 

 (2016).
What Congress said here gets its point across just fine: The
itemized list in §3583(e) is exhaustive. As we explained, the
provision allows district courts to consider all but two of the
§3553(a) factors, and because one is inapplicable in this con-
text (§3553(a)(3)), §3553(a)(2)(A) is the only consequential
omission. So it makes sense to read §3583(e) as supplying
the universe of factors that the district court can consider.
And while the Government is right that district courts gen-
erally enjoy discretion over sentencing, see Brief for United
States 21–22, Congress chose to limit that discretion here.
12               ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

   It makes much less sense to read §3583(e) as the Govern-
ment does—that is, as listing only the factors that a court
must consider, while leaving room for the court to consider
an additional factor if it so chooses. This reading of §3583(e)
trivializes the omission of §3553(a)(2)(A). After all, on the
Government’s view, a court may “consider” an enumerated
factor but give it no weight. Tr. of Oral Arg. 61. The differ-
ence between saying that a court must consider a given fac-
tor (but may give it no weight) and saying that a court may
consider a given factor (if the court chooses) is negligible.
Why would Congress have bothered to exclude
§3553(a)(2)(A) from the list?
   The dissent has no response to this point, so it instead
analogizes to different—and inapposite—contexts. For ex-
ample, the dissent says, suppose that a law clerk is directed
to complete a certain number of bench memos before a
deadline; surely that instruction would not carry the infer-
ence that the law clerk may not complete more work too.
Post, at 5. But the important difference between that con-
text and this one is that sentencing considerations, unlike
bench memos, can be zero sum: Adding a new consideration
to the mix reduces the role that the enumerated considera-
tions play. In fact, the new consideration might lead to a
different result altogether.
   A play on the dissent’s own analogy reveals its weak-
nesses. Imagine that a judge tells her hypothetical law
clerk to prepare a bench memo with a recommendation
formed “after considering” statutory text, context, and
structure, as well as any relevant precedent. Having looked
at these sources, the law clerk is inclined to recommend
that the judge reverse the court below. But the law clerk
decides to look elsewhere—say, to social science studies—
and she uses these sources to inform her recommendation.
In the end, she submits a memo recommending that the
judge vote to affirm the lower court’s decision. According to
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                    13

                          Opinion of the Court

the dissent, the law clerk has obeyed her boss’s instruc-
tions. Needless to say, we disagree.
   More to the point, the dissent never explains why Con-
gress omitted §3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of considerations
applicable to a revocation proceeding. After all, in the dis-
sent’s view, district courts will almost inevitably consider
that factor. See post, at 3–4, 8–11, 12–13, n. 7. So why did
Congress exclude it? In the dissent’s view, the omission is
just hortatory: “Congress may have sought to encourage
sentencing courts to give greater weight to the remaining
purposes of sentencing.” Post, at 12–13, n. 7.8 But omitting
consideration of §3553(a)(2)(A) altogether would be an odd
way of accomplishing that very limited goal. And one need
not “live in a world of airy abstractions,” post, at 1, to rec-
ognize that Congress’s drafting decisions have significance.
   Next, the Government and the dissent argue that
Esteras’s reading of §3553(a)(2)(A) is unworkable, because
consideration of the other enumerated factors will neces-
sarily imply consideration of the retributive principles cap-
tured by §3553(a)(2)(A). The Government relies primarily
on §3553(a)(1), which references “the nature and circum-
stances of the offense.” How, the Government asks, is a
court to consider the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense without also considering the “need for the sentence
imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense”? §3553(a)(2)(A).
   The answer is straightforward. A court may consider the

——————
  8 Alternatively, the dissent posits that Congress may have understood

each of the three §3553(a)(2)(A) factors to “apply in some, though not all,
hearings regarding the alteration of supervised release.” Post, at 12–13,
n. 7. Which hearings make the cut? Frankly, we are not sure. Some
parts of the dissent’s lengthy footnote suggest all; others suggest none;
and still others suggest that it “depends on context.” Ibid. In our view,
however, “[t]he Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges in
such a predicament.” Post, at 1–2.
14                  ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                          Opinion of the Court

nature and circumstances of the offense as relevant for the
considerations set forth in §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)—
namely, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—but
a court cannot consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense as relevant to §3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive focus. For
instance, if the defendant’s original offense was particularly
violent, that fact might inform the court’s judgment as to
whether revocation is necessary “to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant.” §3553(a)(2)(C). But the
court could not revoke based on the view that, given the vi-
olent nature of the underlying offense, the defendant de-
serves additional punishment.9
   The dissent, for its part, argues that we are simply wrong
to understand §3553(a)(2)(A) as synonymous with retribu-
tion.    Post, at 8–11.          Under the dissent’s view,
§3553(a)(2)(A) serves an extensive (if amorphous) role: The
phrase “ ‘to promote respect for the law’ ” encompasses “the
whole point of deterrence,” while the reference to the “ ‘seri-
ousness of the offense’ ” invokes the “heightened need for
deterrence and incapacitation.” Post, at 8–9. But this ap-
proach renders §3553(a)(2)(A) largely duplicative of the
clear references to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabili-
tation that follow in §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D). Recall,
too, that there are four traditional purposes of sentencing.
Given that §§3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and(D) set forth three of
these purposes, it is no wonder that §3553(a)(2)(A) provides
——————
  9 The dissent suggests that this will be an impossible task for district

courts. See post, at 1 (Courts must “engage in mind-bending exercises”);
post, at 10 (They must “probe their mental processes to ensure that no
thoughts of retribution entered in”); post, at 11 (We require a “soul-
searching obligation”). Not so. We routinely require judges and juries to
attend to some considerations while ignoring others. See, e.g., Samia v.
United States, 

 (2023) (“Evidence at trial is often ad-
mitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting instruction,” and
“our legal system presumes that jurors will ‘ “attend closely the particu-
lar language of [such] instructions in a criminal case and strive to under-
stand, make sense of, and follow” ’ them” (alteration in original)).
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                    15

                          Opinion of the Court

the fourth. Not to mention that the provision speaks in re-
tributive terms: the “seriousness of the offense,” the need
“to promote respect for the law,” and, in particular, the need
“to provide just punishment for the offense.”
§3553(a)(2)(A). In any event, we say nothing about the
meaning of §3553(a)(2)(A) today that we have not already
said before. See Tapia, 

 (“retribution” is
“the first purpose listed in §3553(a)(2)”); Concepcion, 

.
   Finally, the Government suggests that §3583(g), which
mandates revocation in certain circumstances, undermines
Esteras’s interpretation of the statute. Section 3583(g) does
not specify which factors apply when a court determines the
length of the defendant’s postrevocation term of imprison-
ment.10 So, the Government reasons, reimprisonment un-
der §3583(g) must be subject to the general rule for prison
sentences articulated in §3582(a), and that provision di-
rects courts to the full list of §3553(a) factors. It would be
anomalous, the Government says, if a district court could
consider retribution as part of a mandatory revocation un-
der §3583(g) but not as part of a discretionary revocation
under §3583(e)(3). Esteras, for his part, argues for con-
sistency in the other direction: He argues that §3583(e)’s
abbreviated list governs in both contexts.
   We need not resolve the dispute because it does not affect
our analysis. To begin, the Government’s reading of
§3583(e) does not solve the problem that the Government
has identified. As the Government sees it, if revocation is
discretionary and thus governed by §3583(e), the court may
consider §3553(a)(2)(A), but if revocation is mandatory and
thus governed by §3583(g), the court must consider
——————
   10 Section 3583(g) states that, if the defendant violates certain condi-

tions of supervised release, “the court shall revoke the term of supervised
release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not
to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsec-
tion (e)(3).” (Emphasis added.)
16               ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

§3553(a)(2)(A). So while the Government says that it would
be “highly anomalous to have different regimes for deter-
mining the length of prison terms under Sections 3583(e)(3)
and 3583(g),” that anomaly persists under the Govern-
ment’s own reading of the statute. Brief for United States
26. In any event, that §3583(e) might operate differently
from §3583(g) is not reason to disregard §3583(e)’s plain
meaning.
                              IV
  At oral argument, the Government expressed concern
that it would be difficult for appellate courts to determine
whether a district court has impermissibly relied on
§3553(a)(2)(A). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49–50. So we conclude
with a few observations about appellate review.
  Much will turn on whether the defendant objects. If the
defendant does not make the district court aware that it
may be impermissibly relying on §3553(a)(2)(A), then the
defendant’s appeal will be governed by plain-error review.
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). In that event, the district
court’s order revoking supervised release and requiring re-
imprisonment will be affirmed unless it is “ ‘clear’ ” or “ ‘ob-
vious’ ” that the district court actually relied on
§3553(a)(2)(A)—because it did so either expressly or by un-
mistakable implication. United States v. Olano, 

 (1993).
  If the defendant does object to the district court’s reliance
on §3553(a)(2)(A), we anticipate that the district court will
recognize its potential error and clarify its revocation deci-
sion to make clear that it is not taking account of
§3553(a)(2)(A). For example, the district court could with-
draw any impermissible justification or explain that a stray
reference to a §3553(a)(2)(A) factor was intended to bear on
another §3553(a) factor or merely prefatory. If the court
nonetheless considers the need to exact retribution for the
defendant’s original criminal offense, and if the error was
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                      17

                           Opinion of the Court

not harmless, then the court of appeals should vacate the
court’s order and remand for the court to apply the correct
standard. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a).
   This does not mean, as the Government suggests, that
our reading of §3583(e) amounts to a “substance-free re-
verse magic-words requirement.” Brief for United States
37. The Government conflates the proper interpretation of
§3583(e) with an appellate court’s ability to enforce that in-
terpretation. The “requirement” here is very much sub-
stantive: District courts may not consider the retributive
purpose of §3553(a)(2)(A) before revoking supervised re-
lease. We trust that district courts will heed that instruc-
tion regardless of the practical likelihood of reversal.11
                        *    *    *
  District courts may revoke a term of supervised release
after considering the factors enumerated in §3583(e). Be-
cause §3553(a)(2)(A) is excluded from that list, district
courts may not consider it. The judgments of the Sixth Cir-
cuit are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                        It is so ordered.




——————
   11 The dissent takes a curious tack here. It suggests that we lack the

courage of our convictions because we explain that defendants bear the
burden of preserving objections, that district courts will generally comply
with the law once an objection is raised, and that plain-error review ap-
plies to unpreserved claims. See post, at 18–19. But there is nothing
“remarkable” about our explanation, which simply articulates orthodox
principles of party presentation and appellate review. Post, at 18. And
it is surprising that the dissent opens its discussion by suggesting that
we are insufficiently attuned to “the practical effec[t] of [our] holdin[g],”
post, at 1, yet closes by complaining that we are overly sensitive to its
consequences, post, at 18–19.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             1

                    Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 23–7483
                          _________________


          EDGARDO ESTERAS, PETITIONER v.
                 UNITED STATES
    TIMOTHY MICHAEL JAIMEZ, FKA TIMOTHY M.
     WATTERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
        TORIANO A. LEAKS, JR., PETITIONER v.
                 UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 20, 2025]

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
  I join all but Part II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that
district courts may not rely on the retributive sentencing
factor set forth in 

(a)(2)(A) to revoke su-
pervised release. In my view, however, district courts re-
voking a term of supervised release should not consider ret-
ribution for any purpose.
  The question in these cases is whether, despite Con-
gress’s omission in the supervised-release statute of any
reference to retribution, courts may consider retribution
when they decide whether to revoke a term of supervised
release. The answer is no. In specifying the factors courts
should consider before revoking a term of supervised re-
lease, Congress cross-referenced eight out of the ten famil-
iar §3553(a) factors, including three of the four purposes of
sentencing: deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
“Conspicuously missing” from the supervised-release stat-
ute, however, “is §3553(a)(2)(A),” which describes the re-
2                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                    Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

tributive purpose of punishment. Ante, at 1. The straight-
forward inference, as we have said twice before, is that
“Congress has expressly precluded district courts from con-
sidering the need for retribution” in supervised release pro-
ceedings. Concepcion v. United States, 

(2022); see also Tapia v. United States, 

(2011). That resolves this case.
   The majority approaches the question differently. “In the
context of a revocation hearing,” it reasons, the word “ ‘of-
fense’ ” in §3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the underlying crime of
conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release con-
ditions.” Ante, at 7. So (the majority continues) by exclud-
ing §3553(a)(2)(A) from the supervised-release statute,
Congress precluded courts from accounting “for the need to
exact retribution for the defendant’s underlying crime.”
Ante, at 8.
   The problem with that framing is that it relies on an in-
terpretive question with no clear answer. The term “of-
fense” in §3553(a)(2)(A) has no meaning “[i]n the context of
a revocation hearing,” because the supervised-release stat-
ute contains no reference to §3553(a)(2)(A) or its directive
to “provide just punishment for the offense.” Cf. ante, at 7.
At most, then, the majority could ask what Congress would
have meant by “offense” if it had included a reference to
§3553(a)(2)(A) in this statute. Yet such speculation is un-
necessary to resolve this case. Congress studiously omitted
all reference to retribution from the supervised-release
statute, so retribution should play no role in revocation
hearings.
   Because the majority frames the question as one about
retribution for the original offense, it never decides whether
the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exact-
ing retribution for the defendant’s supervised-release viola-
tion. Yet the answer to that question is straightforward.
As the Court holds today, the supervised-release statute
does not permit consideration of §3553(a)(2)(A). That
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            3

                    Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.

means courts may consider only the remaining eight enu-
merated factors, none of which contain any reference to ret-
ribution. See §3583(e). As the majority recognizes, moreo-
ver, the retributive interest in punishment is ill suited to
supervised-release proceedings. Supervised release “ ‘ful-
fills rehabilitative ends’ and ‘provides individuals with
postconfinement assistance.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting United
States v. Johnson, 

, 59–60 (2000)); see also
S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 124 (1983) (Senate Report noting
that “the primary goal” of supervised release “is to ease the
defendant’s transition into the community . . . or to provide
rehabilitation”). Thus, “when a defendant violates the con-
ditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court
must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (de-
terrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not
consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution.”
Ante, at 10.
   In sum, when a court considers whether a supervised-
release violation warrants revocation and reimprisonment
(its primary task during revocation hearings), it must look
only to the forward-looking ends mentioned in the statute.
As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying
offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of
bounds. Although I would have made this point explicit,
nothing in the Court’s opinion is inconsistent with it. Ac-
cordingly, I otherwise join the Court’s opinion.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                    Opinion of JACKSON, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                         No. 23–7483
                         _________________


         EDGARDO ESTERAS, PETITIONER v.
                UNITED STATES
    TIMOTHY MICHAEL JAIMEZ, FKA TIMOTHY M.
     WATTERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
       TORIANO A. LEAKS, JR., PETITIONER v.
                UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                        [June 20, 2025]

   JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
   The question presented in this litigation is whether sen-
tencing courts can reference and rely upon the retributive
concerns outlined in 

(a)(2)(A) when revok-
ing a previously imposed term of supervised release.
“Esteras argues that district courts cannot consider the re-
tributive purpose articulated in §3553(a)(2)(A) when revok-
ing supervised release,” while “[t]he Government insists
that courts can consider it, although they are not required
to do so.” Ante, at 7. Like the Court, I agree with Esteras:
Courts cannot consider this omitted sentencing purpose
when revoking supervised release.
   That answer is straightforward and responsive. But the
majority goes further, appearing to opine as to the precise
contours of the retributive concerns that Congress has
taken off the table. Ante, at 7–8. Venturing into this terri-
tory is not necessary in the context of this litigation. As
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR explains, whatever §3553(a)(2)(A)
calls for when Congress has authorized its use, all that the
2                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of JACKSON, J.

Court properly decides today is that Congress has forbidden
sentencing judges to rely on that same set of considerations
in the supervised-release-revocation context.
   I disagree with the Court’s discussion of the scope of “of-
fense” in §3553(a)(2)A) as it relates to §3583(e) because, in
my view, that part of the opinion confuses more than it clar-
ifies. As sentencing judges know, revocation of supervised
release occurs in response to new—often criminal—con-
duct. It is entirely conceivable, and perhaps even likely,
that when Congress removed from the list of permissible
revocation considerations §3553(a)(2)(A)’s “need for the sen-
tence imposed” to exact retribution, it sought to prevent the
promotion of retribution with respect to whatever new of-
fense triggered the call for revocation of supervised release.
At the very least, that possibility counsels against defini-
tively asserting that §3553(a)(2)(A)’s conspicuous omission
only speaks to whether a district court can “account for the
need to exact retribution for the defendant’s underlying
crime.” Ante, at 8 (emphasis added).
   In any event, because §3553(a) requires district courts to
impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to promote certain purposes of punishment, the
kind of hairsplitting that the majority’s opinion invites is
entirely impractical. Sentences either “reflect,” “afford,” or
“provide” for the listed purposes of punishment (retribu-
tion, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation) or they
don’t. §3553(a)(2). It is hard to fathom that Congress
meant for retribution to be both operable and inoperable as
it relates to the imposition of a single revocation sanction,
and it is even harder to imagine how a sentencing court can
effectively achieve that binary objective.
   Part II–B of the majority’s opinion is both unnecessary to
the outcome of this litigation and inscrutable in light of how
revocation sentences are actually determined and imposed.
Therefore, I cannot join that Part of the opinion.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                          No. 23–7483
                          _________________


         EDGARDO ESTERAS, PETITIONER v.
                UNITED STATES
    TIMOTHY MICHAEL JAIMEZ, FKA TIMOTHY M.
     WATTERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
       TORIANO A. LEAKS, JR., PETITIONER v.
                UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 20, 2025]

  JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dis-
senting.
  Veteran trial judges often complain that their appellate
colleagues live in a world of airy abstractions and do not
give enough thought to the practical effects of their hold-
ings. Today’s decision is likely to earn the rank of Exhibit
A in the trial bench’s catalog of appellate otherworldliness.
The Court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean
that a federal district-court judge, when considering
whether to impose or alter a term of supervised release,
must engage in mind-bending exercises. The judge must
take into account “the nature and circumstances” of a de-
fendant’s offense but is forbidden to consider “the serious-
ness of the offense.” 

(a). The judge must
consider what is needed to “dete[r]” violations of the law or
to rehabilitate a defendant, i.e., to cause him to lead a law-
abiding life, but cannot be influenced by a desire “to pro-
mote respect for the law.” 

  The Sentencing Reform Act does not place district judges
2                   ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                          ALITO, J., dissenting

in such a predicament. Neither the statutory text, the in-
terpretive canon on which the Court relies, nor the struc-
ture of the Act supports the Court’s interpretation.
                                 I
                                 A
  In order to understand these cases and the points on
which the majority and I disagree, some background infor-
mation about federal sentencing is required. When a de-
fendant is “found guilty of an offense,” he may be sentenced
to “a term of probation,” “a fine,” or “a term of imprison-
ment.” §3551(b). And in crafting a sentence, the court is
required to consider the 10 factors that are set out in
§3553(a). (For convenience, I will call these the sentencing
factors.)
  If a sentencing court imposes a term of imprisonment, the
court generally has discretion to include “as a part of the
sentence” a term of supervised release. §3583(a).1 “Super-
vised release is ‘a form of postconfinement monitoring’ that
permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by allow-
ing him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison.”
Mont v. United States, 

 (2019) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 

 (2000)). In de-
ciding whether to impose and in devising a term of super-
vised release, a judge is required to consider 8 of the 10 sen-
tencing factors noted above, specifically, §§3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).
(For convenience, I will call these the supervised-release
factors.)
  During a term of supervised release, a defendant must
comply with certain standard conditions, such as reporting
to a probation officer, as well as any special conditions that

——————
   1 In some cases, the imposition of supervised release is mandatory.

See, e.g., 

(k) (kidnapping offenses); §3583(j) (terrorism
offenses); 

(b), 960(b) (drug-trafficking offenses).
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            3

                     ALITO, J., dissenting

are “tailored specifically” to “the individual case.” Admin-
istrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Overview of Probation
and Supervised Release Conditions 8 (2024). If a defendant
fails to comply with these conditions, revocation of super-
vised release is sometimes mandatory, see, e.g., §3583(g),
but in most cases, the court has discretion to choose the ap-
propriate response. For example, it may “extend” super-
vised release “if less than the maximum authorized term
was previously imposed”; “modify, reduce, or enlarge the
conditions of supervised release”; or, more seriously, “re-
voke” supervised release and “require the defendant to
serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release
authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such
term of supervised release.” §§3583(e)(2), (3). In deciding
whether to alter a term of supervised release, the court is
required to consider the same eight factors that had to be
taken into account in imposing the term of supervised re-
lease in the first place.
   In these cases, the lead petitioner, Edgardo Esteras, vio-
lated a term of his supervised release by assaulting the
mother of his children and shooting at her vehicle. The sen-
tencing judge revoked supervised release and, in doing so,
referred to Esteras’s criminal history and the need to “en-
courage [him] to be respectful of the law.” App. 96a. Citing
these remarks, Esteras contends that the judge based his
decision on an impermissible factor, namely, a desire to
“promote respect for the law.” This factor, which appears
in §3553(a)(2)(A), is one of the two sentencing factors omit-
ted from the list of supervised-release factors. Esteras ar-
gues, and the Court now agrees, that the omission of
§3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release factors
means that it cannot be considered. In other words, the
judge in Esteras’s case was obligated to put out of his mind
any desire “to promote respect for the law.” Before today,
one might have thought that every aspect of a federal
judge’s work should aim to “promote respect for the law.”
4                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

Apparently, that is no longer true.
                               B
   The question in these cases is what to make of the omis-
sion of §3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of supervised-release fac-
tors. The Court infers that consideration of this factor is
forbidden, and, in so doing, relies almost entirely on a canon
of interpretation that bears the Latin name expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. In English, that means “[t]he expres-
sion of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” A. Scalia
& B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 107 (2012) (Scalia & Garner). To modify a classic ex-
ample slightly, suppose a sign at the entrance of a park
said: “No gasoline- or electric-powered vehicles allowed.”
Under the expressio unius canon, it would be fair to infer
that standard bikes are permitted. See H. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 

, 607 (1958).
   Although this canon has its place, Reading Law empha-
sizes that it “must be applied with great caution, since its
application depends so much on context.” Scalia & Garner
107. Our cases have made the same point and have often
rejected use of the canon because of the context in which the
expression appeared. See, e.g., NLRB v. SW General, Inc.,

 (2017) (“The expressio unius canon ap-
plies only when circumstances support[ ] a sensible infer-
ence that the term left out must have been meant to be ex-
cluded” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barnhart v.
Peabody Coal Co., 

 (2003) (“[T]he canon
expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every
statutory listing or grouping”). Reading Law also contains
this important warning: “Even when an all-inclusive sense
seems apparent, one must still identify the scope of the in-
clusiveness (thereby limiting [the] implied exclusion).”
Scalia & Garner 108 (emphasis added).
   In these cases, I agree with the Court that the omission
                  Cite as: 

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                      ALITO, J., dissenting

of two of the sentencing factors from the list of supervised-
release factors gives rise to a negative inference, but I disa-
gree with the Court about the nature of that inference. The
most likely—and in my view, the appropriate—inference is
simply that §3583(e), the provision listing the supervised-
release factors, sets out an exclusive list of mandatory fac-
tors. That is “the scope of the inclusiveness.” The Court,
however, goes further and infers not just that there are no
other mandatory factors but that there are no other permis-
sible factors. That aggressive application of the expressio
unius canon goes too far. While the inference produced by
that canon is always dependent on context, the enumera-
tion of things that must be done generally does not suggest
that no other things may be done.
   Consider this example. Suppose I tell my law clerks on a
Monday that by the end of the week they must complete the
bench memos in 6 of the 12 cases scheduled for argument
during the next sitting. That statement would strongly im-
ply that completion of other bench memos by the end of the
week is not mandatory. But the statement would not sug-
gest that finishing other bench memos is forbidden. Many
other similar examples could be provided.
   To salvage its far-reaching inference, the Court offers its
own variation on the law-clerk hypothetical. In the Court’s
hypothetical, a judge tells a clerk “to prepare a bench memo
with a recommendation formed ‘after considering’ statutory
text, context, and structure, as well as any relevant prece-
dent.” Ante, at 12. As the Court sees it, if the law clerk also
reviews secondary sources “to inform her recommendation,”
the law clerk did not “obe[y] her boss’s instructions.” Ante,
at 12–13.
   But nothing about the Court’s hypothetical suggests the
law clerk must exclusively consider those four factors.
Would the clerk necessarily infer from the judge’s instruc-
tion that nothing else could be considered? I doubt it. And
if the clerk knows that the judge thinks that other factors,
6                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

such as statutory purpose or legislative history, are rele-
vant considerations, the inference is unlikely.
   For this reason, the Court’s use of the expressio unius
canon exceeds its customary and proper use, and the Court
provides no good reason for its aggressive use of that inter-
pretive tool. The Court finds it significant that Congress
included in the list of supervised-release factors “almost the
entire list” of sentencing factors but left out §3553(a)(2)(A).
Ante, at 9. According to the Court, this makes “all the more
glaring” Congress’s intention that sentencing courts should
not consider §3553(a)(2)(A) when modifying a term of su-
pervised release. Ibid.
   This is illogical. When a provision sets out a rule and lists
items to which the rule applies, the length of the list may
bolster the strength of the inference that the list is exhaus-
tive, but it does not alter the scope of the rule. Suppose I
tell friends who are visiting Washington, D. C., for the first
time that they must visit a list of enumerated sites. If the
list is long, they might infer that I do not think that there
are any other sites that they should necessarily try to
squeeze in. But it is doubtful that they would infer that I
am suggesting that they should necessarily avoid seeing
anything else that might catch their interest.
   In short, the expressio unius canon is insufficient to sup-
port the Court’s interpretation.
                             II
  The Court’s interpretation is also inconsistent with the
text and structure of the Sentencing Reform Act.
                               A
  Starting with the text, I note three features that counsel
against acceptance of the Court’s interpretation.
  First, the relevant provisions of the Sentencing Reform
Act lack language like that included in other provisions of
the Act that limit a court’s consideration of specified factors.
                  Cite as: 

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                      ALITO, J., dissenting

For example, §3582(a)—the provision that directly precedes
the provision setting out the mandatory supervised-release
factors in §3583—expressly states that a judge’s decision
whether to impose a term of imprisonment may not be
based on a desire to “promot[e] correction and rehabilita-
tion.” When “Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts in-
tentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or ex-
clusion.” Russello v. United States, 

 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Or take §3565(b),
which (as amended in 1988) contains an implicit prohibition
on consideration of the sentencing factors. See 

. That provision mandates revocation of probation if
certain conditions are met, and Congress apparently gave
courts no discretion to even consider the sentencing factors.
As a result, the absence of any even remotely similar lan-
guage in §3583(e) is telling.
   Second, we can infer that the Sentencing Reform Act al-
lows a judge to consider all the sentencing factors because
there are some situations in which factors omitted from the
list of supervised-release factors must be considered. One
such situation occurs when a judge decides how to respond
to a defendant’s violation of the terms of supervised release
because in that situation the judge must consider exactly
what is set out in §3553(a)(3), which is one of the sentencing
factors omitted from the list of supervised-release factors.
That provision refers to “the kinds of sentences available,”
and when a judge is deciding what to do about a defendant
who has violated the terms of supervised release, the judge
must consider the available options, which include termi-
nation, extension, modification, and revocation. §3583(e).
Because a term of supervised release is “part of a sentence,”
each one of these options changes the defendant’s sentence.
And therefore, this list of options constitutes a list of “the
8                    ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                           ALITO, J., dissenting

kinds of sentences available.”2
   Consideration of “the kinds of sentences available” may
be required during a revocation proceeding for yet another
reason. When a sentencing court revokes a term of super-
vised release and sends the defendant back to prison, the
maximum period of additional confinement authorized de-
pends on the class of the underlying offense.              See
§3583(e)(3). So a sentencing court determining the permis-
sible range of reimprisonment will necessarily consider the
“kinds of sentences” authorized under the statute of convic-
tion.
   Third, and most important, the Court’s interpretation
cannot account for the inextricable relationship between
the omitted sentencing factor at issue in these cases, i.e.,
§3553(a)(2)(A), and the sentencing factors that a judge must
consider in deciding whether to alter a term of supervised
release. Recall that §3553(a)(2)(A) requires, among other
things, consideration of “the seriousness of the offense,” and
according to the Court, taking that factor into account is
prohibited. But it is undisputed that a judge must consider
“the nature and circumstances of the offense” when altering
a term of supervised release. §§3553(a)(1), 3583(e). Since
“the seriousness of the offense” is part of “the nature of the
offense,” the Court’s interpretation gives district judges ir-
reconcilable instructions.
   Another part of §3553(a)(2)(A) creates a similar problem
for the Court. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) refers to “the need . . .
to promote respect for the law,” and because that provision
is omitted from the supervised-release factors, the Court
——————
   2 The Court argues that these options are not “kinds of sentences” be-

cause the Sentencing Reform Act recognizes only three types of sen-
tences: probation, fines, and imprisonment. See ante, at 6, n. 4. Accord-
ing to the Court, supervised release is not a “ ‘kin[d] of sentence’ ” but is
instead merely “a component of a defendant’s prison sentence.” Ibid. But
the Sentencing Reform Act never says that there are only three “kinds”
of sentences. See §3551(b).
                  Cite as: 

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                      ALITO, J., dissenting

holds that consideration of this factor is not allowed either.
But the Sentencing Reform Act demands consideration of
factors that are hard to separate from “promot[ing] respect
for the law.” In deciding whether to alter a term of super-
vised release, a judge must consider “the need . . . to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” §3553(a)(2)(B),
and the whole point of deterrence is to encourage respect
for and compliance with the law.
   The Court struggles in vain to explain away this clash
between what its interpretation forbids and what the Sen-
tencing Reform Act demands. It entirely ignores the rela-
tionship between “afford[ing] adequate deterrence” (a man-
datory consideration) and “promot[ing] respect for the law”
(outlawed under its interpretation). And as for the conflict
between requiring consideration of the “nature and circum-
stances of the offense” and banning consideration of “the se-
riousness of the offense,” the Court’s response is an elabo-
rate theory that has no grounding in the statutory text.
   The Court begins by claiming that §3553(a)(2)(A) relates
solely to retribution and not to any of the other three per-
mitted goals of punishment—deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation. See ante, at 13–14. But that is simply
not true with respect to two of the objectives to which
§3553(a)(2)(A) refers, i.e., the need for a sentence to reflect
“the seriousness of the offense” and “to promote respect for
the law.” These two factors implicate other purposes of
punishment too. For example, if the offense in question is
very serious, there is a heightened need for deterrence and
incapacitation, and rehabilitation may be harder. So the
Court’s theory veers off course at the start.
   After that flawed beginning, the Court tells us that the
supervised-release factors operate as a kind of purpose fil-
ter. Section 3553(a)(2) enumerates four factors that, in the
Court’s view, reflect the four recognized purposes of punish-
ment. The Court tells us that the “nature and circum-
stances of the offense” must be considered in light of one of
10                   ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                           ALITO, J., dissenting

those four purposes. See ante, at 13–14; accord, Brief for
Petitioners 34–35. The supervised-release factors, how-
ever, include only three of those four purposes and exclude
the goal of retribution supposedly encapsulated in
§3553(a)(2)(A). So, in the Court’s view, the supervised-
release statute filters out §3553(a)(2)(A) and thereby pro-
hibits a court from any consideration of the “nature and cir-
cumstances of the offense” in light of §3553(a)(2)(A)’s sup-
posedly “retributive focus” and concern with the
“seriousness of the offense.” Ante, at 14
  None of this has any textual support, and it does not solve
the problem faced by a judge who is compelled to consider
the nature and circumstances of an offense but forbidden to
consider its seriousness. If taken seriously, it does not alter
in any way the information that judges may consider. In-
stead, it merely calls on them to probe their mental pro-
cesses to ensure that no thoughts of retribution entered in.3

——————
  3 Here is an example. Suppose a defendant’s offense of conviction was

interstate travel in violation of a protective order prohibiting threats,
harassment, or contact with his former wife. See 

(a).
And suppose that the trial evidence showed the defendant engaged in
conduct that caused his former wife very severe emotional distress. After
serving his sentence, the defendant is given supervised release but
quickly violates a condition of release by resuming the very conduct that
landed him in prison in the first place. The judge must decide what to
do. Heeding the requirement to consider “the nature and circumstances
of the offense,” the judge calls to mind the trial evidence. Then, as re-
quired by the Sentencing Reform Act, the judge considers whether this
information suggests that reimprisonment is needed either to “afford ad-
equate deterrence,” §3553(a)(2)(B) (i.e., to cause the defendant to leave
his former wife alone), or to “protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” §3553(a)(2)(C) (i.e., to keep the defendant’s former wife safe
during the period of reimprisonment).
  The effect of the Court’s filtering scheme is to complicate the judge’s
consideration of all these matters by demanding that he search his con-
science and ask: “Have I let any thought of retribution enter into my
thinking? I am inclined to send the defendant back to prison for x
months, and I think I’m doing that to achieve deterrence and incapacita-
                      Cite as: 

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                           ALITO, J., dissenting

Imposing such a soul-searching obligation as a requirement
that may be enforced in litigation is utterly impractical.
                              B
   No more is needed to reject the Court’s interpretation, but
I note for good measure that the structure of the Sentencing
Reform Act also weighs against the Court’s interpretation.
The Act gives express instructions about the way in which
the sentencing factors apply to decisions regarding the im-
position of each of the Act’s three primary penalties (i.e.,
imprisonment, probation, fines). These instructions fall
into one of two categories. Instructions in the first category
either mandate consideration of all the sentencing factors4
or require their consideration to the extent they are rele-
vant to the type of sentence in question.5 By contrast, in-
structions in the second category expressly prohibit consid-
eration of specific sentencing factors.6
——————
tion. But was I somehow influenced by moral disapproval of the defend-
ant’s conduct and the feeling that at least part of the x additional months
is simply what he deserves?”
   4 See §3572(a) (requiring the consideration of all sentencing factors in

imposing fines); §3584(b) (same for the decision whether to run sentences
concurrently or consecutively).
   5 See §3562(a) (requiring the consideration of all sentencing factors “to

the extent that they are applicable” in imposing an initial term of proba-
tion); §3564(c) (same for early termination of probation); §3565(a) (same
for the revocation of probation).
   6 Section 3582(a) prohibits consideration of rehabilitation in deciding

on a sentence of imprisonment. See Tapia v. United States, 

 (2011). Similarly, in §3563(b), Congress confined the discretion
of sentencing courts to a particular subset of the §3553(a) factors. Under
that provision, sentencing courts may set conditions of probation “to the
extent that such conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth
in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such conditions
involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably
necessary for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2).” Congress’s
use of limiting language (“to the extent that” and “as are reasonably nec-
essary”) makes its restrictive intent clear. Another provision of the Act
appears to go even further by removing a sentencing court’s discretion to
12                  ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                          ALITO, J., dissenting

   What is remarkable about §3583(e), which lists the man-
datory supervised-release factors, is that it does not fall into
either of these categories. It neither demands consideration
of all relevant sentencing factors nor prohibits considera-
tion of some or all of them. Instead, it requires considera-
tion of some of the mandatory sentencing factors but says
nothing about the rest. The appropriate inference is that
§3583(e) is meant to have a different effect: namely, to give
sentencing courts discretion to consider the omitted factors.
   Such discretion is consistent with the Sentencing Reform
Act’s general approach to supervised release, which confers
broad discretion on trial judges. In most cases, sentencing
courts “may include” a term of supervised release “as a
part” of “a sentence to a term of imprisonment,” §3583(a),
and “may” terminate, extend, or revoke supervised release,
§3583(e).
   This grant of discretion tracks the background principles
against which the Act was drafted, namely, “the established
tradition of district courts’ sentencing discretion.” Concep-
cion v. United States, 

 (2022). As we re-
cently noted, “[t]he only limitations on a court’s discretion
to consider any relevant materials at an initial sentencing
or in modifying that sentence are those set forth by Con-
gress in a statute or by the Constitution.” 

; see
§3661. “Congress is not shy about placing such limits” on
sentencing discretion, id., at 494, and its failure to do so in
§3583(e) permits the inference that sentencing courts re-
tain discretion to consider “any relevant materials,” includ-
ing the omitted §3553(a) factors, ibid.7
——————
consider the §3553(a) factors at all. Section 3565(b) provides that a sen-
tencing court “shall revoke [a] sentence of probation” if the defendant
possesses controlled substances or firearms, refuses to comply with drug
testing, or fails a drug test more than three times over the course of a
year. No mention of the §3553(a) factors is made.
  7 Congress’s decision to omit §3553(a)(2)(A) specifically has its own

logic. Congress may have sought to encourage sentencing courts to give
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                            ALITO, J., dissenting

                             III
                              A
  The Court attempts to buttress its interpretation by cit-
ing statements made in two of our prior cases, but the hold-
ings in those cases were far afield from the question pre-
sented here, and the comments in question simply provided
background. In Tapia v. United States, 

(2011), we held that a sentence of imprisonment cannot be
imposed or extended to foster a defendant’s rehabilitation.
Before directly addressing that issue in Part III of the opin-
ion, Part II provided “statutory background.” 

.
After noting the four purposes of sentencing, the opinion
stated that under the Sentencing Reform Act, “a particular

——————
greater weight to the remaining purposes of sentencing set forth in
§3553(a)(2) to ensure that “[s]upervised release fulfills [its] rehabilitative
ends.” United States v. Johnson, 

 (2000). But in doing
so, Congress likely understood that sealing off any discretion to consider
§3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive factors would be impracticable. Supervised
release is “a part of ” “a term of imprisonment for” the defendant’s of-
fense, §3583(a), and when a sentencing court imposes a term of impris-
onment for the offense, it must consider §3553(a)(2)(A), see §3582(a).
   Congress may have rendered the three §3553(a)(2)(A) factors discre-
tionary because it understood that each factor may apply in some, though
not all, hearings regarding the alteration of supervised release. The need
“to promote respect for law” strikes me as an evergreen concern when a
court is considering what remedy best enables a defendant to “learn to
obey the conditions of his supervised release.” 

, 1167 (CA6
2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the need “to provide just
punishment for the offense” seems less relevant when a sentencing court
addresses a violation of supervised release. And the relevance of the re-
maining §3553(a)(2)(A) factor—the need “to reflect the seriousness of the
offense”—depends on context. If, for example, a sentencing court decides
to revoke supervised release following a defendant’s violation, it must,
as already explained, examine how Congress categorized the offense’s
“seriousness” to determine the authorized term of reimprisonment. See
§3583(e)(3). But if the court instead opts for a less-severe sanction, such
as the modification of a condition of release, it is not necessarily required
to consider how Congress scored the underlying offense’s “seriousness.”
See §3583(e)(2).
14               ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                     ALITO, J., dissenting

purpose may apply differently, or even not at all, depending
on the kind of sentence under consideration.” Id., at 326.
As an example, the opinion stated that under §3583(c), “a
court may not take account of retribution (the first purpose
listed in §3553(a)(2)) when imposing a term of supervised
release.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). Because the wording
of §3583(c) is similar to that of §3583(e)—the provision that
controls alteration of a term of supervised release—the
Court today treats Tapia’s statement as strong support for
its decision.
   This reads too much into what is plainly peripheral dicta.
For one thing, it is not even clear that the statement means
what the Court claims. The verb “may” sometimes denotes
“permission” and sometimes denotes “possibility.” Random
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1189 (2d ed. 2001).
The Court reads the statement in Tapia to mean permis-
sion: a judge may not consider retribution because that is
not allowed. But the statement could also mean “possibil-
ity”: a judge, as a matter of discretion, may choose not to
take retribution into account. It is debatable which reading
is better, and in any event, as the opinion stated twice, the
statement was merely “statutory background.” 

. Moreover, Tapia “dealt with a different sen-
tencing law” concerned with imposing imprisonment, not
supervised release, and the Court’s drive-by analysis of
§3583(c) did nothing to reckon with Congress’s lack of “ex-
plicit directions” as to the omitted sentencing factors. 

, 1168 (CA6 2023). Such “[d]ictum settles noth-
ing, even in the court that utters it.” Jama v. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, 

 (2005).
   The Court’s other precedent, Concepcion v. United States,

, is no better. The holding in that case—that
sentencing courts adjudicating motions to reduce a sen-
tence under the First Step Act have discretion to consider
intervening changes in the law or relevant facts—is far re-
                 Cite as: 

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                     ALITO, J., dissenting

moved from the question here. After emphasizing that sen-
tencing judges have generally exercised broad discretion re-
garding the facts considered in sentencing determinations,
the opinion noted that Congress has sometimes imposed re-
strictions; as an illustration, it simply cited the statement
made in Tapia. See 

.
   Whatever weight these dicta merit, they are surely insuf-
ficient to support today’s decision.
                              B
   The Court attempts to justify its interpretation by draw-
ing a hard line between the Act’s primary penalties—
“[f]ines, probation, and imprisonment”—and supervised re-
lease. Ante, at 9. In its view, the former are a court’s main
“tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives just
deserts for the original offense.” 

 But “[w]hen a de-
fendant violates the conditions of his supervised release,”
the Court reasons, “it makes sense that a court must con-
sider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider
the backward-looking purpose of retribution.” Ante, at 10.
   This argument exaggerates the distinction between the
two classes of penalties to which the Court refers. Contrary
to the Court’s suggestion, a decision about the revocation of
supervised release may call for consideration of certain
backward-looking factors. For example, under §3583(e)(3),
the limits of the discretion enjoyed by a court considering
the revocation of supervised release depend on the class (A,
B, C, or D) of the “statute for the offense that resulted in
[the] term of supervised release.” Section 3583(e) also man-
dates consideration of §3553(a)(6), which, in turn, requires
consideration of “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct.” In assessing
that factor, a sentencing court must necessarily look back
to the defendant’s offense conduct and also consider the
16               ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                      ALITO, J., dissenting

past offense conduct of similarly situated defendants.
   A defendant’s original offense may also be important
when a judge is considering whether a violation of a condi-
tion of supervised release is serious enough to justify send-
ing the violator back to prison for a particular length of
time. Consider a defendant convicted for the possession of
child pornography who later violates a special condition of
his release restricting his viewing of any sexually explicit
materials, including material that depicts teenagers who
are not actually under the age of 18. In such a case, the
serious nature of the original crime may be thought to have
a bearing on the implications of the later violation and the
need for reimprisonment to deter the defendant from future
backsliding, to protect society from the consequences of
child pornography, or to provide the opportunity for further
rehabilitation efforts in prison.
   It is revealing that the Court only half-heartedly buys its
forward-looking/backward-looking distinction. In a foot-
note, the Court refuses to take a position on the question
whether a sentencing court may revoke supervised release
in retribution “for the violation of the conditions of the su-
pervised release.” Ante, at 8, n. 5 (emphasis deleted).
                              IV
  In addition to all these faults, the Court’s interpretation,
as I emphasized at the outset of this opinion, defies common
sense.
  The Court’s interpretation of which sentencing factors a
court may consider in altering a term of supervised release
must also apply when a court is initially imposing a term of
supervised release. The relevant wording in §3583(c),
which governs the imposition of supervised release, and
§3583(e), which governs the alteration of supervised re-
lease, cannot be meaningfully distinguished. But applying
the Court’s interpretation to the original imposition of su-
pervised released creates a huge practical problem. A term
                 Cite as: 

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                     ALITO, J., dissenting

of imprisonment and a term of supervised release are often
imposed at the same time. In imposing a prison term, a
court must consider all of the 10 sentencing factors, but un-
der today’s reading of the Sentencing Reform Act, the court
is prohibited from considering 2 of those factors when it
turns to the issue of supervised release. How this will work
in practice is anyone’s guess. Must sentencing courts “ad-
journ the hearing after imposing” imprisonment and then
“start over with a new unblemished inquiry” and without
giving any thought to the omitted §3553(a) factors? 88
F. 4th, at 1168. The Sixth Circuit feared that might be re-
quired. Many district judges may soon face this problem
because “[t]he vast majority (95.1%)” of offenders convicted
of a felony or Class A misdemeanor are also “sentenced to
terms of supervised release.” United States Sentencing
Commission, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised
Release 50 (2010). Indeed, in 2024, supervised release was
imposed in 50,865 cases. See United States Sentencing
Commission, 2024 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Sta-
tistics 41.
   Other daunting practical problems will arise when judges
are deciding whether to alter a defendant’s term of super-
vised release. When sending a violator of supervised re-
lease back to prison, a court must carefully control every
word that is uttered to explain the decision. Avoiding the
language of §3553(a)(2)(A)—“the seriousness of the of-
fense,” “respect for the law,” and “just punishment for the
offense”—is obviously essential. But what about synonyms
and other arguably related words and phrases? Not only
must sentencing judges avoid verbal missteps, they must
do so while heeding the requirement to consider mandatory
supervised-release factors that are essentially inseparable
from the factors that are fatal. See supra, at 9.
   The potential consequences of the Court’s interpretation
are so alarming that many of the lower courts that have
adopted today’s interpretation have squirmed to avoid its
18                ESTERAS v. UNITED STATES

                       ALITO, J., dissenting

effects. See, e.g., United States v. Miqbel, 

 (CA9 2006) (“[A] sentence would be unreasonable if
the court based it primarily on an omitted factor, such as a
factor provided for in §3553(a)(2)(A). . . . We do not suggest
that a mere reference to promoting respect for the law would
in itself render a sentence unreasonable” (emphasis
added)); United States v. Sanchez, 

(CA5 2018) (“Of course, this is not to say that any use of
words like ‘punish,’ ‘serious,’ or ‘respect’ automatically ren-
ders a revocation sentence void. Mere mention of impermis-
sible factors is acceptable; to constitute reversible error . . .
the forbidden factor must be ‘dominant’ ” (quoting United
States v. Rivera, 

 (CA5 2015))).
   Today’s decision is similar. After adopting an impractical
interpretation, the decision takes the remarkable step of
outlining ways in which sentencing judges and courts of ap-
peals can avoid strict compliance. At the trial level, if the
defense objects that a comment made by the judge crosses
the line, the Court counsels that the judge can easily ward
off reversal. The judge can “withdraw any impermissible”
remark or recast any “stray reference to a §3553(a)(2)(A)
factor” as “merely prefatory.” Ante, at 16. In addition, the
judge may “explain that a stray reference” to a prohibited
factor was actually “intended to bear on” a mandatory fac-
tor with which it is closely related. Ibid.
   After providing this roadmap for district judges, the
Court turns to the courts of appeals. The Court reminds
circuit judges that an appeal based on today’s decision “will
be governed by plain-error review,” assuming the defendant
fails to object in the district court. Ibid. And plain-error
review, as we have long observed, is an “exacting” standard
and is meant to correct “only particularly egregious errors”
that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public repu-
tation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Young, 

 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
   Reading between the lines, the Court’s message is clear.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)           19

                     ALITO, J., dissenting

Unless a district judge obdurately fails to backtrack as rec-
ommended when there is an objection based on today’s de-
cision, there should be few problems. The Court’s outline
shows that it has a low opinion of the value of its handi-
work, and that should seal the case that the whole effort is
a mistake.
                         *    *     *
  For these reasons, I cannot agree with the Court’s deci-
sion, and I therefore respectfully dissent.