A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

   A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T., ET AL. v.
   OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
                  DISTRICT NO. 279, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

       No. 24–249.      Argued April 28, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025


Multiple federal laws afford protections for children with disabilities in
 public schools. Three statutory schemes are particularly relevant to
 this case. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that
 no qualified individual with a disability shall be excluded from partic-
 ipation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under
 any federally funded program solely by reason of her or his disability.
 Similarly, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) pro-
 hibits qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from
 or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activi-
 ties by reason of disability. While the antidiscrimination guarantees
 of Section 504 and Title II apply in a variety of contexts, the Individu-
 als with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers federal funds to
 States in exchange for the commitment to furnish the core guarantee
 of a “free appropriate public education” to children in public schools
 with certain physical or intellectual disabilities. The centerpiece of the
 IDEA is the provision of an “individualized educational program,”
 (IEP) which “spells out” a plan to meet all of the educational needs of
 a child with a qualifying disability. Fry v. Napoleon Community
 Schools, 

, 158.
    Petitioner A. J. T. is a teenage girl with a rare form of epilepsy that
 severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. She suffers
 from seizures that are so frequent in the mornings that she cannot
 attend school before noon, though she is alert and able to learn from
2          A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                          SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                                Syllabus

    noon until 6 p.m. For the first few years of her schooling, school offi-
    cials accommodated A. J. T.’s condition by permitting her to avoid
    morning activities and instead receive evening instruction. But when
    A. J. T.’s family moved to Minnesota in 2015, her new school district—
    Osseo Area Public Schools, Independent District No. 279—denied her
    parents’ repeated requests to include evening instruction in A. J. T.’s
    IEP. Between 2015 and 2018, A. J. T. received only 4.25 hours of in-
    struction daily compared to the typical 6.5-hour school day for nondisa-
    bled students in the district. After even further cuts to A. J. T.’s school
    day were proposed, her parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Min-
    nesota Department of Education, alleging that the school’s refusal to
    provide afterhours instruction denied A. J. T. a free appropriate public
    education. An Administrative Law Judge determined that the school
    district had violated the IDEA and ordered the school to provide com-
    pensatory education and evening instruction. Federal courts subse-
    quently affirmed A. J. T.’s IDEA victory.
       A. J. T. and her parents then sued under the ADA and the Rehabil-
    itation Act, requesting a permanent injunction, reimbursement for cer-
    tain costs, and compensatory damages. The District Court granted
    summary judgment for the school, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In
    so holding, the Eighth Circuit stated that a school district’s failure to
    provide a reasonable accommodation was not enough to state a prima
    facie case of discrimination under Monahan v. Nebraska, 

, which requires a plaintiff to prove conduct by school officials ris-
    ing to the level of bad faith or gross misjudgment.
Held: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims re-
 lated to their education are not required to make a heightened showing
 of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” but instead are subject to the same
 standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. Pp.
 7–14.
    (a) Outside the educational services context, courts of appeals per-
 mit plaintiffs to establish violations and obtain injunctive relief under
 the ADA and Rehabilitation Act without proving intent to discrimi-
 nate. To obtain compensatory damages, courts generally require a
 showing of intentional discrimination, which most circuits find satis-
 fied by “deliberate indifference”—a standard requiring only a showing
 that the defendant disregarded a strong likelihood that the challenged
 action would violate federally protected rights. Nothing in the text of
 the applicable substantive protections or remedial provisions of Title
 II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that
 claims based on educational services should be subject to a distinct,
 more demanding analysis. Pp. 7–8.
    (b) Some courts, however, have come to apply a heightened intent
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                                 Syllabus

  standard to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the educational ser-
  vices context. This standard traces back to the “bad faith or gross mis-
  judgment” rule articulated by the Eighth Circuit in its 1982 decision
  in Monahan, in which the Eighth Circuit reasoned that to prove dis-
  crimination under the Rehabilitation Act in the educational context, a
  plaintiff must show “something more than a mere failure to provide” a
  free appropriate public education. 687 F. 2d, at 1170. The court ex-
  plained a heightened showing of bad faith or gross misjudgment was
  necessary to “harmonize” the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA and to
  reflect the proper balance between disabled children’s rights, state of-
  ficials’ responsibilities, and courts’ competence in technical fields. Id.,
  at 1171.
     In Smith v. Robinson, 

, this Court similarly tried to
  “harmonize” the IDEA’s specific guarantee of a free appropriate public
  education with the protections of other antidiscrimination laws, ulti-
  mately concluding that the IDEA’s comprehensive statutory scheme
  was the exclusive avenue by which a disabled child or his parents could
  challenge the adequacy of his education. Within two years, however,
  Congress enacted a new provision of the IDEA overturning Smith.
  That provision, now codified at 

(l), provides that noth-
  ing in the IDEA “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, pro-
  cedures, and remedies available under” the ADA, Rehabilitation Act,
  or other federal laws protecting disabled children’s rights. This provi-
  sion makes clear that the IDEA does not restrict or limit rights or rem-
  edies that other federal antidiscrimination statutes independently
  confer on children with disabilities. The bad faith or gross misjudg-
  ment rule derived from Monahan is irreconcilable with the unambigu-
  ous directive of §1415(l). In imposing a higher bar for discrimination
  claims based on educational services as compared to other sorts of dis-
  ability discrimination claims, the Eighth Circuit effectively read the
  IDEA to implicitly limit the ability of disabled schoolchildren to vindi-
  cate their independent ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights, thereby
  making it more difficult to secure the statutory remedies provided by
  Congress. Pp. 8–12.
     (c) The school district no longer defends Monahan’s asymmetric
  rule, and contends instead that bad faith or gross misjudgment is the
  correct standard of intent for all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims,
  whether in or out of schools. This argument was not resolved below,
  was not raised in the brief in opposition to certiorari, and is outside
  the question presented. The Court declines the invitation to inject into
  this case significant issues that have not been fully presented. Pp. 12–
  14.

, vacated and remanded.
4       A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                       SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                             Syllabus

   ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined. SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined.
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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 24–249
                                   _________________


  A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T.,
        PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS,
           INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
                     NO. 279, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                                 [June 12, 2025]

   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
   Petitioner A. J. T. is a teenage girl who suffers from a
rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and
cognitive functioning. When school administrators denied
her certain educational accommodations, A. J. T.’s parents
sued the school district, alleging discrimination on the basis
of disability. The courts below held that A. J. T.’s claims
could not go forward because she had not shown that school
officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” That
standard, the courts explained, applies uniquely in the ed-
ucational services context and requires a more demanding
showing compared to other sorts of disability discrimina-
tion claims. We consider whether the courts below were
right to require this heightened showing.
                            I
                            A
  Multiple federal laws afford “diverse” (and occasionally
overlapping) protections for children with disabilities in
2       A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                       SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                         Opinion of the Court

public schools. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 

, 170 (2017); see 

 at 170–171. Three are partic-
ularly relevant to this case. Beginning with two broadly
applicable such laws, both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 

, as amended, 

, and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), 

, as amended, 

et seq., prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in
a wide variety of contexts. See Fry, 580 U. S., at 159. Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: “No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by rea-
son of her or his disability, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 

(a). Similarly, under
Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from partic-
ipation in or be denied the benefits of the services, pro-
grams, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to dis-
crimination by any such entity.” 

. Both
Section 504 and Title II “authorize individuals to seek re-
dress for violations of their substantive guarantees by
bringing suits for injunctive relief or money damages.” Fry,
580 U. S., at 160; see 29 U. S. C. §794a(a)(2); 

.
   Beyond these generally applicable antidiscrimination
laws, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 

, as amended, 

 et seq.,
“offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commit-
ment to furnish” the core guarantee of a “ ‘free appropriate
public education’ . . . to all children with certain physical or
intellectual disabilities.” Fry, 580 U. S., at 158 (quoting
§1412(a)(1)(A)).1 To that end, once a State accepts the
——————
 1 The IDEA was previously called “the Education of the Handicapped
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                        Opinion of the Court

IDEA’s financial assistance, it must provide “ ‘special edu-
cation and related services,’ ” including “ ‘instruction’ tai-
lored to meet a child’s ‘unique needs’ and sufficient ‘support
services’ to permit the child to benefit from that instruc-
tion.” 

 at 158 (quoting §§1401(9), (26), (29)).
   The IDEA’s “primary vehicle for implementing these con-
gressional goals is the ‘individualized educational program’
(IEP).” Honig v. Doe, 

 (1988). An IEP
“spells out” for each child with a qualifying disability “a per-
sonalized plan to meet all of the child’s ‘educational needs.’ ”
Fry, 580 U. S., at 158 (quoting §1414(d)(1)(B)). It is devel-
oped through a collaborative process between a child’s par-
ents, teachers, and school officials. See id., at 158. But
since “parents and school representatives sometimes can-
not agree” on all aspects of an IEP, “the IDEA establishes
formal procedures for resolving disputes,” starting with ad-
ministrative review in a local or state educational agency,
followed by the availability of judicial review in state or fed-
eral court. Id., at 159.
                               B
  Petitioner A. J. T. “requires assistance with everyday
tasks like walking and toileting,” and suffers from seizures
throughout the day that create safety concerns and inter-
fere with her capacity to learn. 

, 1064 (CA8
2024); see App. 515. Although A. J. T.’s seizures are so fre-
quent in the morning that she “can’t attend school before
noon,” she is “alert and able to learn” from noon until about
6 p.m. 96 F. 4th, at 1064.2
  For the first few years of her schooling, A. J. T.’s parents
——————
Act.” Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 

, 160, n. 1
(2017). Congress renamed the law in 1990. See 

 We refer to the
statute and its predecessor versions as the IDEA throughout this opin-
ion.
  2 Because this case comes to us on review of respondents’ motion for

summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
A. J. T. Tolan v. Cotton, 

 (2014) (per curiam).
4      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
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                        Opinion of the Court

and educators accommodated her condition by permitting
her to avoid activities before midday and to receive evening
instruction at home. See 

 That changed in 2015 when
A. J. T., then ten years old, moved with her family to Min-
nesota. A. J. T.’s new school district, Osseo Area Public
Schools, Independent School District No. 279, denied her
parents’ repeated requests to include evening instruction in
her IEP. See 

 As a result, between 2015 and 2018,
A. J. T. received 4.25 hours of instruction each day, as com-
pared to the typical 6.5 hour school day for other students.
Ibid.; No. 21–cv–1760 (D Minn., Feb. 1, 2023), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 8a.
  In 2018, as the district prepared for A. J. T. to enter mid-
dle school, it proposed further cutting back the length of her
school day. 96 F. 4th, at 1064. A. J. T.’s parents again re-
quested that she receive evening instruction and schooling
hours comparable to her nondisabled peers. See ibid.
School administrators again denied those requests, and
also rejected proposals to maintain at least the same length
instructional day that A. J. T. had been receiving in ele-
mentary school. Ibid.
  “Realizing that an agreement was beyond reach,”
A. J. T.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minne-
sota Department of Education, alleging that the school’s re-
fusal to provide afterhours instruction denied A. J. T. a free
appropriate public education. See id., at 1064–1065. After
a five day evidentiary hearing, an Administrative Law
Judge determined that the district had violated the IDEA.
Id., at 1065. The judge ordered the school to provide several
hundred hours of compensatory education and “add certain
services to [A. J. T.’s] IEP, including at-home instruction
from 4:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. each school day.” Ibid.
  The school district sought judicial review, and a Federal
District Court affirmed. 

, *21 (D Minn.,
Sept. 13, 2022). The court agreed with the agency that
school officials’ “steadfas[t] refus[al]” to provide A. J. T.
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                       Opinion of the Court

evening instruction, and “shifting reasons” for doing so,
were based not on A. J. T.’s needs but on concerns of
“[a]dministrative convenience”—namely, maintaining “the
regular hours of the faculty.” Id., at *1, *13. The Eighth
Circuit subsequently affirmed A. J. T.’s IDEA victory,
agreeing with the District Court that the evidence showed
that the school district’s “choice to prioritize its administra-
tive concerns had a negative impact on A. J. T.’s learning”
and that she “would have made more progress with evening
instruction.” 96 F. 4th, at 1067.
                                C
   A. J. T. and her parents then sued the school district and
the Osseo School Board (collectively, the District) in federal
court, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See App. 28–29. They re-
quested a permanent injunction, reimbursement for certain
costs, and compensatory damages. Ibid.
   The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary
judgment. It acknowledged that A. J. T. is a “qualified in-
dividual with a disability” who “was denied the same length
school day as her nondisabled peers based on her disabil-
ity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. But the court held that
A. J. T. failed to state a prima facie case under Section 504
or the ADA because she did not show that school officials
“acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Id., at 35a–
36a.
   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 

, 1060 (2024).
It explained that, under Circuit precedent, when “alleged
ADA and Section 504 violations are ‘based on educational
services for disabled children,’ a school district’s simple fail-
ure to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough
to trigger liability.” 

 at 1061 (quoting B. M. v. S. Calla-
way R–II School Dist., 

 (CA8 2013)). Ra-
ther, “a plaintiff must prove that school officials acted with
‘either bad faith or gross misjudgment,’ which requires
6      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                        Opinion of the Court

‘ “something more” than mere non-compliance with the ap-
plicable federal statutes.’ ” 96 F. 4th, at 1061 (first quoting
Monahan v. Nebraska, 

, 1171 (CA8 1982);
then quoting B. M., 

; citation omitted). The
panel explained that, while “A. J. T. may have established
a genuine dispute about whether the district was negligent
or even deliberately indifferent,” under the Eighth Circuit’s
controlling standard, “that’s just not enough.” 96 F. 4th, at
1061. Since A. J. T. “failed to identify conduct” rising to the
level of bad faith or gross misjudgment, the court said it was
“constrained to hold that summary judgment was proper.”
Ibid.
    The panel itself, however, went on to question why the
Eighth Circuit imposes “such a high bar for claims based on
educational services,” when it “require[s] much less in other
disability-discrimination contexts.” Ibid., n. 2 (citing cases
requiring “no intent” for a “failure-to-accommodate claim”
and “deliberate indifference” for damages). “The answer,”
the panel said, “is a lesson in why ‘[w]e do not . . . add pro-
visions to . . . federal statute[s].’ ” Ibid. (quoting Alabama
v. North Carolina, 

 (2010); alterations in
original). The Circuit’s “bad faith or gross misjudgment
rule,” the panel opined, added “without any anchor in stat-
utory text . . . a judicial gloss on Section 504,” based on
“speculat[ion] that Congress intended the IDEA’s predeces-
sor to limit Section 504’s protections.” 96 F. 4th, at 1062,
n. 2 (citing Monahan, 687 F. 2d, at 1170–1171). The panel
observed that this rule had “spread like wildfire” in the
lower courts, although it “ha[d] been questioned” along the
way. 96 F. 4th, at 1062, n. 2. And since the rule “remain[ed]
the law” in the Eighth Circuit, the panel was bound to fol-
low it. Ibid. A. J. T.’s petition for rehearing en banc was
denied, with three judges dissenting. App. to Pet. for Cert.
44a–45a.
    We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement in the
Courts of Appeals over whether schoolchildren bringing
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                          Opinion of the Court

ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims relating to their educa-
tion must make this heightened showing of “bad faith or
gross misjudgment.” 

 (2025).3
                               II
                               A
   Outside the context of elementary and secondary educa-
tion, the Eighth Circuit—in line with the general approach
of the courts of appeals—permits plaintiffs to establish a
statutory violation and obtain injunctive relief under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act without proving intent to dis-
criminate. See, e.g., Hall v. Higgins, 

, 1180–
1181 (CA8 2023); Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metropolitan Transp.
Dist. of Ore., 

 (CA9 2001). To obtain com-
pensatory damages, however, courts of appeals generally
agree that a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination.
See Hall, 77 F. 4th, at 1181; see also S. H. v. Lower Merion
School Dist., 

 (CA3 2013) (collecting
cases). On that score, “a majority” of the Courts of Appeals
to have weighed in on the question—including the Eighth
Circuit—find the requirement to show “intentional discrim-
ination” satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with
“deliberate indifference.” 

 at 262–263.4 That standard
“does not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity
toward the disabled person.” Meagley v. Little Rock, 639


——————
  3 Compare I. Z. M. v. Rosemount–Apple Valley–Eagan Public Schools,

 (CA8 2017) (collecting cases applying this stand-
ard to “alleged discrimination regard[ing] the education of disabled stu-
dents”), with, e.g., D. E. v. Central Dauphin School Dist., 

 (CA3 2014) (applying deliberate indifference standard for compensa-
tory damages).
  4 Lower courts appear to have derived this standard from our caselaw

applying Title IX (which, like the Rehabilitation Act and ADA, was “mod-
eled after Title VI”). Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 

 (1998); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
15–20.
8      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                        Opinion of the Court

F. 3d 384, 389 (CA8 2011). Rather, to show deliberate in-
difference, it is enough that a plaintiff prove the defendant
disregarded a “strong likelihood” that the challenged action
would “result in a violation of federally protected rights.”

   We hold today that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
based on educational services should be subject to the same
standards that apply in other disability discrimination con-
texts. Nothing in the text of Title II of the ADA or Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that such claims
should be subject to a distinct, more demanding analysis.
The substantive provisions of both Title II and Section 504,
by their plain terms, apply to “qualified individual[s]” with
disabilities. 

(a); 

. There
is no textual indication that the protections of either disa-
bility discrimination statute apply with lesser force to cer-
tain qualified individuals bringing certain kinds of claims.
   Nor do the applicable remedial provisions suggest any
such distinction. Both Title II and Section 504 make the
“remedies, procedures, and rights” provided therein availa-
ble to “any person.” 29 U. S. C. §794a(a)(2) (“any person ag-
grieved”); 

 (“any person alleging discrim-
ination”). That language is expansive and unqualified,
confirming applicability to every such person, “without dis-
tinction or limitation.” SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 

, 363 (2018) (quoting Oxford English Dictionary
(3d ed., Mar. 2016)).
   How, then, did some courts of appeals come to apply a
heightened intent standard to ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims concerning educational opportunities? The bad faith
or gross misjudgment rule traces to the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion in Monahan v. Nebraska, 

. See 96 F.
4th, at 1061, n. 2. There the Eighth Circuit—in a case in-
volving an IDEA claim and a Rehabilitation Act claim al-
leging “improper educational placement”—explained its
view that “in order to show a violation of the Rehabilitation
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                         Opinion of the Court

Act, something more than a mere failure to provide” the free
appropriate public education “required by [the IDEA] must
be shown.” Monahan, 687 F. 2d, at 1169–1171. That
“something more,” the Eighth Circuit said, is “bad faith or
gross misjudgment,” which in its view “should be shown be-
fore a §504 violation can be made out, at least in the context
of education of handicapped children.” Id., at 1170–1171.5
   The Eighth Circuit explained that the bad faith or gross
misjudgment “standard of liability” was consistent with its
“duty to harmonize the Rehabilitation Act and the [IDEA]
to the fullest extent possible, and to give each of these stat-
utes the full play intended by Congress.” Id., at 1171. The
court also concluded that this standard “reflect[ed] . . . a
proper balance between the rights of handicapped children,
the responsibilities of state educational officials, and the
competence of courts to make judgments in technical
fields.” Ibid. (“So long as the state officials involved [did
not] depart grossly from accepted standards among educa-
tional professionals, we cannot believe that Congress in-
tended to create liability under §504.”).
                              B
  The Monahan court was not alone in its instinct to try to
“harmonize” the IDEA’s specific guarantee of a free appro-
priate public education, on the one hand, with more broadly
applicable antidiscrimination laws, on the other. Indeed,
just two years later in Smith v. Robinson, 

(1984), this Court applied virtually identical reasoning to
hold that the IDEA was “ ‘the exclusive avenue’ through
which a child with a disability (or his parents) could chal-
lenge the adequacy of his education.” Fry, 580 U. S., at 160
(quoting Smith, 

).
  The plaintiffs in Smith sued a school district under the
——————
  5 The Eighth Circuit subsequently extended this standard to education

related claims brought under the ADA. See Hoekstra v. Independent
School Dist. No. 283, 

, 626–627 (1996).
10     A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                        Opinion of the Court

IDEA “to secure a ‘free appropriate public education’ ” for
their handicapped child, id., at 994, and “appended” to their
complaint “virtually identical claims . . . under §504 of the
Rehabilitation Act,” Fry, 580 U. S., at 160 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). In “consider[ing] the interaction be-
tween” the two statutes, ibid., the Smith Court looked to
“the comprehensive nature of the procedures and guaran-
tees” set out in the IDEA, which the Court thought evinced
“Congress’ express efforts to place on local and state educa-
tional agencies the primary responsibility for developing a
plan to accommodate the needs of each individual handi-
capped child,” 

; see 

. In light
of this “comprehensive scheme,” this Court found it “diffi-
cult to believe that Congress also meant to leave undis-
turbed the ability of a handicapped child to go directly to
court” with a Rehabilitation Act claim. 

. Such a result, the Court said, would effectively per-
mit a plaintiff “to circumvent” and “render superfluous
most of the detailed procedural protections outlined” in the
IDEA. 

 at 1011–1012. And “more important, it would
also run counter to Congress’ view that the needs of handi-
capped children are best accommodated” through the
IDEA’s “carefully tailored scheme.” 

.
   Congress apparently did not agree. Within two years, it
enacted a new provision of the IDEA, “overturn[ing]” Smith
and “ ‘reaffirm[ing] the viability’ of federal statutes like the
ADA or Rehabilitation Act ‘as separate vehicles,’ no less in-
tegral than the IDEA, ‘for ensuring the rights of handi-
capped children.’ ” Fry, 580 U. S., at 161 (quoting H. R. Rep.
No. 99–296, pp. 4, 6 (1985)). Now codified at 

(l), that provision states in relevant part:
       “Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict
     or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available
     under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Reha-
     bilitation Act [including §504], or other Federal laws
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                          Opinion of the Court

     protecting the rights of children with disabilities, ex-
     cept that before the filing of a civil action under such
     laws seeking relief that is also available under [the
     IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures shall
     first be exhausted].”
   The plain text of §1415(l) accordingly “makes clear that
nothing in the IDEA ‘restrict[s] or limit[s] the rights [or]
remedies’ that other federal laws, including antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, confer on children with disabilities.” Fry, 580
U. S., at 157 (quoting 

(l)). And that ex-
plicit edict applies “even” to a plaintiff who—“as in Smith
itself ”—seeks relief “that is also available under” the IDEA.
Fry, 580 U. S., at 161.
   In imposing a higher “bar for claims based on educational
services” as compared to “other disability-discrimination
contexts,” however, the Eighth Circuit in Monahan effec-
tively read the IDEA to implicitly limit the ability of chil-
dren with disabilities to vindicate their independent ADA
and Rehabilitation Act rights. 96 F. 4th, at 1061, n. 2 (rec-
ognizing that Congress “rejected Monahan’s premise” in en-
acting §1415(l)). And the court thereby made it more diffi-
cult for disabled schoolchildren to secure the statutory
remedies provided by Congress in Title II and Section 504.
That approach is irreconcilable with the unambiguous di-
rective of §1415(l).6
   The District maintains that Monahan’s rule survives
§1415(l). That is so, it says, because the Eighth Circuit de-
rived the bad faith or gross misjudgment standard based
solely on Section 504’s text, rather than anything to do with


——————
  6 Because we address only the application of the heightened bad faith

or gross misjudgment standard of intent to education related ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims, our opinion should not be read to speak to any
other showing that a plaintiff must make in order to prove a violation of
the respective requirements of those statutes or the IDEA.
12       A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                        SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                          Opinion of the Court

the IDEA. Brief for Respondents 24–25. The District in-
sists that the court’s statements that its chosen standard
best harmonized and gave full play to the two statutes,
while also balancing the interests of disabled schoolchildren
and state educational officials, were mere observations of
“the salutary policy benefits” of an analysis otherwise
driven by the text of Section 504. Id., at 25. And the court’s
repeated references to education of “handicapped children,”
it says, were simply descriptions of the “fact pattern at
hand”—not suggestions that the bad faith or gross misjudg-
ment standard should apply only in that context. Id., at 24.
   The District’s reading of Monahan is difficult to square
with what that opinion said. The Monahan court’s discus-
sion of Section 504 was inextricably bound with concomi-
tant references to the IDEA. And its reasoning, at bottom,
was grounded—much like this Court’s in Smith—in an ef-
fort to strike what it believed was the appropriate balance
between the two statutes. See Monahan, 687 F. 2d, at
1170–1171. The District’s take on Monahan is simply nei-
ther the most natural nor the most persuasive one. Besides,
it conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s own interpretation of
its precedent, including in the case before us. See 96 F. 4th,
at 1062, n. 2 (noting that Monahan’s rule was rooted in
“specula[tion] that Congress intended the IDEA’s predeces-
sor to limit Section 504’s protections”); see, e.g., I. Z. M. v.
Rosemount–Apple Valley–Eagan Public Schools, 

 (1996); Hoekstra v. Independent School Dist. No.
283, 

 (1996) (“In applying a bad
faith/gross misjudgment standard to §504, the Monahan
court reasoned that such a standard harmonizes the [IDEA]
and §504.”). So too with the understandings of other Courts
of Appeals. See, e.g., Knox Cty. v. M. Q., 

, 1002
(CA6 2023).
                                C
     Perhaps sensing the likely fate of Monahan’s asymmetric
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)               13

                       Opinion of the Court

rule, the District no longer seeks to defend it. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 88 (stating that “the parties are in radical agree-
ment” on the question “whether you have a different stand-
ard in the educational context” (counsel for respondents));
id., at 78 (agreeing “there’s no two-tier test” (same)). The
District now contends instead that bad faith or gross mis-
judgment is “the correct standard across the board” for in-
junctive relief and damages, “both in schools and out.” Brief
for Respondents 2 (emphasis added). The “infirmity,” the
District says, is not “with Monahan’s original interpreta-
tion,” but with “the logic of ” later cases that imposed lower
intent standards in other disability discrimination con-
texts. Id., at 24.
   “As a general rule,” however, “we do not decide issues”
that were not “resolved below” and are “outside the ques-
tio[n] presented by the petition for certiorari.” Glover v.
United States, 

 (2001). The District’s po-
sition fails on both counts. A. J. T. asked us to review the
“uniquely stringent ‘bad faith or gross misjudgment’ stand-
ard,” which she characterized throughout her petition as an
“arbitrar[y] depart[ure] from the more lenient standards
that all courts—including the Eighth Circuit—apply to
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs
outside the school setting.” Pet. for Cert. i; see also, e.g., id.,
at 32. For its part, the District never suggested at the cer-
tiorari stage that it thought this case was about anything
other than the two-tiered approach set forth in Monahan.
   We agree with A. J. T. that “it would be unfair at this
point” to allow the District “to switch gears and seek a rul-
ing from us that the standard should be” bad faith or gross
misjudgment “across the board.” Norfolk Southern R. Co.
v. Sorrell, 

 (2007); see Tr. of Oral Arg.
101. We will not entertain the District’s invitation to inject
into this case significant issues that have not been fully pre-
sented. See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama,

 (1999); Sorrell, 

. The
14     A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                        Opinion of the Court

question before us “is a narrow one, and we see no need to
do more than answer that question in today’s decision.” 

at 171−172.
                          *    *     *
   That our decision is narrow does not diminish its import
for A. J. T. and “a great many children with disabilities and
their parents.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 

 (2023). Together they face daunting chal-
lenges on a daily basis. We hold today that those challenges
do not include having to satisfy a more stringent standard
of proof than other plaintiffs to establish discrimination un-
der Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.
   The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                             It is so ordered.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                    THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                          No. 24–249
                         _________________


  A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T.,
        PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS,
           INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
                     NO. 279, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                        [June 12, 2025]

   JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins,
concurring.
   The Court’s opinion correctly resolves the question pre-
sented. I write separately to note that in an appropriate
case, I would be willing to consider the additional issues
raised by the respondents (collectively, the District) at the
merits stage. Although those issues were not properly be-
fore us in this case, they are important and merit our atten-
tion in the future.
   We granted certiorari to decide whether Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act require disabled schoolchildren to satisfy a
“uniquely stringent” standard when seeking relief under
those statutes. Pet. for Cert. i. In other words, we took the
case to decide whether Title II and Section 504 permit
courts to subject one subset of plaintiffs to a higher legal
standard than other plaintiffs, simply because their claims
arise in the school context. At the merits stage, both sides
agreed that the answer must be “no.” Brief for Petitioner
2–3; Brief for Respondents 2; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 78.
The Court today agrees with the parties, holding that
school-related claims are subject to the same legal stand-
ards as other claims. Ante, at 8.
2      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                       THOMAS, J., concurring

   At the merits stage, the District asked us to go beyond
the question presented. Specifically, it urged us to clarify
the particular standards that should apply in Title II and
Section 504 litigation. In most courts of appeals, the oper-
ative standard for discrimination claims under these stat-
utes turns on the kind of relief sought. To establish a vio-
lation or to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff need not
prove intentional discrimination. E.g., Hall v. Higgins, 

, 1180–1181 (CA8 2023); Midgett v. Tri-County
Metropolitan Transp. Dist. of Ore., 

 (CA9
2001). But, to obtain compensatory damages, courts gener-
ally agree that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
was at least “deliberately indifferent” to federally protected
rights. E.g., Hall, 77 F. 4th, at 1180–1181; Silberman v.
Miami Dade Transit, 

 (CA11 2019).
The District challenges the no-intent standard, arguing
that intent to discriminate should be required to establish
a violation or to obtain any kind of relief. It presses its the-
ory on both statutory and constitutional grounds.
   To start, the District argues that the plain text of the un-
derlying statutes prohibit only intentional discrimination.
Section 504 states that individuals with disabilities shall
not “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” under any fed-
erally funded “program or activity” “solely by reason of her
or his disability.” 

(a). Title II provides that
individuals with disabilities shall not, “by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a pub-
lic entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such en-
tity.” 

. The District asserts that this
statutory language—which prohibits “discrimination” “by
reason of ” disability—requires a showing of intent to dis-
criminate before a violation can be established.
   Relatedly, the District contends that the underlying stat-
utes do not permit one standard for damages and another
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

standard for injunctive relief. Title II incorporates the
“remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [Section
504].” §12133. And, Section 504, in turn, incorporates the
“remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI” of the
Civil Rights Act. 29 U. S. C. §794a(a)(2). Title VI “prohibits
only intentional discrimination.” Alexander v. Sandoval,

 (2001); accord, Students for Fair Admis-
sions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 

, 288–290 (2023) (GORSUCH, J., concurring). This
Court has held that private individuals thus may “not re-
cover compensatory damages under Title VI” unless they
prove “intentional discrimination.” Sandoval, 532 U. S., at
282–283. The District argues that if the incorporation of
Title VI’s rights and remedies requires intent for an award
of damages, it should equally require intent for an award of
injunctive relief. I share the District’s skepticism that the
same statutory language can mean two different things de-
pending on the relief sought.
    The District also raises a constitutional objection, argu-
ing that the Constitution compels a plaintiff to prove intent
to discriminate before a court may find a violation of Title
II or Section 504 or award any kind of relief. See also Brief
for State of Tennessee et al. as Amici Curiae 17–23 (arguing
that constitutional considerations “weigh against Peti-
tioner’s no-intent reading” (boldface deleted)). Here too, I
think the District may have a point.
    Congress enacted Section 504 pursuant to the so-called
Spending Clause. “We have repeatedly characterized . . .
Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a con-
tract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions.’ ” Barnes v. Gor-
man, 

 (2002). “Just as a valid contract
requires offer and acceptance of its terms, ‘[t]he legitimacy
of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power
. . . rests on whether the [recipient] voluntarily and know-
ingly accepts the terms of the “contract.” ’ ” 

 Thus, this
4      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                      SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                       THOMAS, J., concurring

Court has held that “if Congress intends to impose a condi-
tion on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambig-
uously.” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder-
man, 

 (1981). But, the District argues,
Section 504 unambiguously covers only intentional discrim-
ination; nothing in the text conveys Congress’s intent to im-
pose liability on schools for unintentional discrimination.
    The District tells us that a no-intent violation of Title II
is even more dubious. As an initial matter, the District ob-
serves, it is unclear what constitutional authority Congress
has to require a public school, by way of an injunction, to
take an affirmative action such as providing additional in-
struction to a student. Congress enacted the ADA under its
“power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regu-
late commerce.” 

(b)(4). But, the Com-
merce Clause does not give Congress sweeping power to
protect “the learning environment” in schools. United
States v. Lopez, 

 (1995). And, the Four-
teenth Amendment does “not requir[e]” schools to “make
special accommodations for the disabled.” Board of Trus-
tees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 

 (2001).
Instead, it prohibits only conduct that lacks a rational ba-
sis, such as decisions motivated by a “ ‘bare . . . desire to
harm.’ ” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 

 (1985).
    The District contends that Title II, which targets “State
[and] local government[s],” §12131(1)(A), cannot be read to
“ ‘compe[l]’ ” States to “ ‘expend . . . state funds’ ” to accom-
modate people with disabilities “in accordance with federal
standards.” See Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic
Assn., 

, 463, 476 (2018). After all, the Consti-
tution “has never been understood to confer upon Congress
the ability to require the States to govern according to Con-
gress’ instructions.” New York v. United States, 

 (1992). In the District’s view, requiring a plaintiff
to prove intent to discriminate before finding a violation or
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

awarding an injunction is necessary to mitigate these anti-
commandeering concerns.
   I express no definitive views on the additional issues
raised by the District here. And, I agree with the Court’s
decision to answer only the question presented today. See
this Court’s Rule 14.1(a). But, in a case where the District’s
additional issues are properly before us, I would be willing
to address them. Whether federal courts are applying the
correct legal standard under two widely utilized federal
statutes is an issue of national importance, and the District
has raised serious arguments that the prevailing standards
are incorrect.
   Of course, this Court’s resolution of these issues could
have significant ramifications for both disability law and
discrimination law more generally. See Reply for Petitioner
24 (explaining that adopting the District’s position would
“cause a sea change in disability law”). That these issues
are consequential is all the more reason to wait for a case
in which they are squarely before us and we have the bene-
fit of adversarial briefing. Until then, I hope lower courts
will carefully consider whether the existing standards com-
port with the Constitution and the underlying statutory
text.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 24–249
                          _________________


  A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T.,
        PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS,
           INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
                     NO. 279, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 12, 2025]

   JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins,
concurring.
   I join in full the Court’s opinion, which holds that ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims regarding educational ser-
vices are subject to the same standards applied in other dis-
ability discrimination contexts. In reaching that conclu-
sion, the Court rightly declines to entertain respondents’
newly raised argument that “bad faith or gross misjudg-
ment” is the correct standard for all disability discrimina-
tion claims under Title II and Section 504 of those Acts. See
ante, at 12–15. I write separately, however, to highlight a
foundational flaw in respondents’ theory. Respondents con-
tend that the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard is
appropriate because the statutes require a showing of “im-
proper purpose” or “ ‘animus.’ ” Brief for Respondents 11–
12, 16–17. That is incorrect. The statutes’ text and history,
as well as this Court’s precedent, foreclose any such pur-
pose requirement.
   Recall that Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disabil-
ity, be excluded from participation in or be denied the ben-
efits of the services, programs, or activities of a public en-
tity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
2        A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                         SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                        SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

 (emphasis added). The Rehabilitation
Act’s similarly worded prohibition uses the same “by reason
of ” language, with the modifier “solely.” 

(a).*
   That statutory language contains no reference to im-
proper purpose. To the contrary, the phrase “by reason of ”
requires no more than a causal link between the individ-
ual’s disability and her “exclu[sion] from” participating in
or receiving the benefits of a covered service, program, or
activity. Ibid.; 

. That is the ordinary
meaning of the phrase “by reason of.” See Merriam-Web-
ster’s Dictionary (11th ed. 2025), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/by%20reason%20of (defining “by
reason of ” as “because of: due to”); Merriam-Webster’s Col-
legiate Dictionary 101 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “because
of ” as “by reason of ”); Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 194 (1971) (same). It is also the reading this
Court has afforded the statutory phrase on numerous occa-
sions. See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 

, 769 (2018) (“The phrase ‘by reason of ’ denotes
some form of causation”); University of Tex. Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 

 (2013) (de-
scribing “ ‘by reason of ’ ” as another way to say “ ‘because,’ ”
which indicates a “ ‘causal relationship’ ”).
   Persons with disabilities can, of course, lose access to ben-
efits and services “by reason of,” or “because of,” their disa-
bilities absent any invidious animus or purpose. Stairs may
prevent a wheelchair-bound person from accessing a public
space; the lack of auxiliary aids may prevent a deaf person
——————
   *Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: “No otherwise quali-
fied individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.” 

(a).
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

from accessing medical treatment at a public hospital; and
braille-free ballots may preclude a blind person from voting,
all without animus on the part of the city planner, the hos-
pital staff, or the ballot designer. See, e.g., Tennessee v.
Lane, 

 (2004) (Title II claim brought by
paraplegic individual who was forced to “craw[l] up two
flights of stairs to get to [a] courtroom”); Liese v. Indian
River Cty. Hospital Dist., 

, 340–341
(CA11 2012) (Section 504 claim brought by deaf individual
against hospital for failure to provide adequate methods to
communicate with doctors before they performed a major
surgery); National Federation of Blind v. Lamone, 

 (CA4 2016) (Title II and Section 504 claims regarding
access for blind people to an absentee voting system). The
statutes’ plain text thus reaches cases involving a failure to
accommodate, even where no ill will or animus toward peo-
ple with disabilities is present.
   There can be no question, too, that the statutes impose
an affirmative obligation on covered entities to provide rea-
sonable accommodations, undercutting any improper-pur-
pose requirement. Title II of the ADA defines a “ ‘qualified
individual with a disability’ ” to mean an individual who,
with “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or prac-
tices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids
and services,” is able to “mee[t] the essential eligibility re-
quirements for the receipt of services or participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 

(2) (emphasis added). A separate provision
also contemplates that “a public entity under [Title] II”
must provide “reasonable accommodation[s],” subject to
certain exceptions. §12201(h). For its part, Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act makes clear that accommodations,
such as architectural alterations, may be required “for the
purpose of assuring program accessibility” if alternative ac-
commodations are not available. 

(c). These
4      A. J. T. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT
                       SCHOOL DIST. NO. 279
                      SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

affirmative obligations underscore that the statutes do not
require improper purpose to prove liability. Entities can
violate the Acts, for instance, by failing to install a wheel-
chair-accessible ramp, without any discriminatory animus.
   The statutes’ use of the passive voice (“no qualified indi-
vidual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded . . . ”) only reinforces that conclusion. 

; see 

(a). As this Court has
recognized, “Congress’s use of the passive voice” often indi-
cates a “focu[s] on an event that occurs without respect to a
specific actor,” and therefore without respect to any actor’s
purpose. Dean v. United States, 

 (2009).
   If there were any remaining doubt, the history and pur-
pose of the statutes further confirm that Congress never in-
tended to impose an ulterior-purpose requirement. As this
Court recognized in Alexander v. Choate, 

(1985), when Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act, it
“perceived” “[d]iscrimination against the handicapped” as
“most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather
of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.”

; see also 

 (collecting statements by leg-
islators describing the Act as a response to “ ‘neglect’ ” of the
handicapped). As a result, “much of the conduct that Con-
gress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act
would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act
construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discrimina-
tory intent.” 

 at 296–297. That observation applies with
equal force to Title II of the ADA, which Congress modeled
on Section 504. Cf. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools,

, 159 (2017) (noting the two statutes impose
the “same prohibition” on covered entities).
   Consider one of the paradigmatic applications of these
two laws: ensuring the “elimination of architectural barri-
ers” to provide access for individuals with disabilities. See
Alexander, 

 (describing this as “one of the
central aims of the [Rehabilitation] Act”). Architectural
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             5

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

barriers like stairs are rarely (if ever) “erected with the aim
or intent of excluding the handicapped.” 

 Yet if re-
spondents’ novel rule were the law, ADA and Rehabilitation
Act claimants would have to show that a building’s archi-
tect acted with “animus” toward those with disabilities in
sketching out her designs. Brief for Respondents 16. It is
hard to imagine any architectural-barrier claim succeeding
under such a standard. Indeed, the total universe of viable
claims of that nature may well be a null set. Respondents’
proposed improper-purpose requirement would thus evis-
cerate the core of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act,
leaving millions of our fellow citizens without the protec-
tions Congress intended.
                         *     *     *
   In short, there is good reason no court of appeals has
adopted respondents’ eleventh-hour argument. Congress
was not naive to the insidious nature of disability discrimi-
nation when it enacted the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. It
understood full well that discrimination against those with
disabilities derives principally from “apathetic attitudes ra-
ther than affirmative animus.” Alexander, 

. The resulting laws reflect that understanding, and it
is not the Judiciary’s prerogative to override Congress’s pol-
icy judgments.