Martin v. United States

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND
 OF G. W., A MINOR, ET AL. v. UNITED STATES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

       No. 24–362.      Argued April 29, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025


On October 18, 2017, the FBI raided the wrong house in suburban At-
 lanta. Officers meant to execute search and arrest warrants at a sus-
 pected gang hideout at 3741 Landau Lane but instead stormed 3756
 Denville Trace, a quiet family home occupied by petitioners Hilliard
 Toi Cliatt, his partner Curtrina Martin, and her 7-year-old son. A six-
 member SWAT team breached the front door, detonated a flash-bang
 grenade, and assaulted the innocent occupants before realizing their
 mistake. The cause of the error was Special Agent Guerra’s reliance
 on a personal GPS device, combined with the team’s failure to notice
 the street sign for “Denville Trace” and the house number visible on
 the mailbox. Left with personal injuries and property damage, peti-
 tioners sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
 (FTCA), 

 et seq., seeking damages resulting from the
 officers’ alleged negligent and intentional actions during the raid. The
 district court granted summary judgment to the government. The
 Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying a unique approach to FTCA
 claims.
    The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity
 from suit as to certain torts committed by federal employees acting
 within the scope of their employment. But that waiver is subject to
 statutory exceptions, including two relevant to a law enforcement mis-
 conduct case like this one. The first is the intentional-tort exception
 in §2680(h), which bars claims against the government for 11 enumer-
 ated intentional torts. The second is the discretionary-function excep-
 tion in §2680(a), which bars claims against the government that are
 based on an official’s exercise of discretionary functions. Section
2                      MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                                  Syllabus

    2680(h) also contains a “law enforcement proviso” which counter-
    mands the intentional-tort exception, allowing suits for six specified
    torts (including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and false arrest)
    to proceed against the United States when the torts are committed by
    “investigative or law enforcement officers.” While most courts hold
    that the law enforcement proviso applies only to the intentional-tort
    exception, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach is different in two key re-
    spects. First, the Eleventh Circuit alone holds that the proviso over-
    rides all exceptions in §2680, including the discretionary-function ex-
    ception, meaning that intentional-tort claims covered by the proviso
    automatically proceed to the merits without further analysis of other
    applicable §2680 exceptions. Second, to compensate for this plaintiff-
    friendly approach, the Eleventh Circuit permits the government to as-
    sert a restrictive Supremacy Clause defense at the liability stage, al-
    lowing the government to escape liability when an officer’s actions
    have “some nexus with furthering federal policy” and reasonably “com-
    ply[ ] with the full range of federal law.” Denson v. United States, 

.
       Applying its distinctive approach, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
    law enforcement proviso protected petitioners’ intentional-tort claims
    from both the intentional-tort and discretionary-function exceptions.
    The court dismissed petitioners’ negligence claims under the discre-
    tionary-function exception, reasoning that Special Agent Guerra en-
    joyed discretion in preparing for the warrant execution. On the merits
    of the remaining intentional-tort claims, the court found the govern-
    ment had a valid Supremacy Clause defense and granted summary
    judgment for the United States.
Held:
    1. The law enforcement proviso in §2680(h) overrides only the inten-
 tional-tort exception in that subsection, not the discretionary-function
 exception or other exceptions throughout §2680. Pp. 6–11.
       (a) The text and structure of §2680 demonstrate that the law en-
 forcement proviso applies only to the intentional-tort exception. The
 proviso appears within the same subsection and sentence as the inten-
 tional-tort exception, reflecting the established principle that statu-
 tory provisos generally modify only the provisions in which they ap-
 pear. Section 2680 contains 13 discrete exceptions. Coupled with the
 lead-in clause, each exception forms a separate sentence and operates
 as a structurally distinct provision. The proviso addresses the same
 subject matter as subsection (h)—intentional torts—while other excep-
 tions cover entirely different topics like lost mail, combat injuries, and
 quarantine impositions. Further, the proviso’s definitional sentence
 expressly limits the definition of “investigative or law enforcement of-
 ficer” to “this subsection,” (i.e., subsection (h)), even though the phrase
                    Cite as: 

 (2025)                      3

                               Syllabus

“law enforcement officer” appears elsewhere in §2680. Congress’s
choice to embed the proviso within subsection (h) rather than place it
at the end of the full list of exceptions, as it sometimes does with
broadly applicable provisos, further confirms the proviso’s limited ap-
plication to subsection (h) alone. Pp. 6–10.
      (b) Petitioners’ arguments for broader application of the proviso
are unpersuasive. While the proviso mirrors the language of §2680’s
lead-in clause by stating that §1346(b) “shall apply” rather than “shall
not apply,” this textual similarity does not demonstrate that the pro-
viso applies to all exceptions, which form discrete instructions that
may be understood completely without reference to other provisions.
The absence of limiting language in the proviso’s first sentence does
not expand its scope beyond subsection (h), as Congress accomplished
that limitation through the proviso’s placement within the same sen-
tence as the intentional-tort exception. Legislative history suggesting
Congress intended to address wrong-house raids broadly cannot dis-
place what the law’s terms clearly direct, as legislative history is not
the law and Members of Congress may have had multiple purposes in
mind when crafting the proviso. Pp. 10–11.
   2. The Supremacy Clause does not afford the United States a de-
fense in FTCA suits. The FTCA is the “supreme” federal law governing
the United States’ tort liability and serves as the exclusive remedy for
damages claims arising from federal employees’ official conduct. The
statute generally makes the government liable under state law on the
same terms as a private individual would be liable under the law of
the place where the tortious conduct occurred. Because the FTCA in-
corporates state law as the liability standard, there is typically no con-
flict between federal and state law for the Supremacy Clause to re-
solve. While federal law may sometimes displace state law in FTCA
suits where a constitutional text or federal statute supplies controlling
liability rules, the Eleventh Circuit identified no such federal statute
or constitutional provision displacing Georgia tort law in this case.
The court’s reliance on In re Neagle, 

, is misplaced, as that
19th-century decision involved a federal officer’s immunity from state
criminal prosecution for acts necessary and proper in discharging fed-
eral duties, not the federal government’s liability under a statute that
expressly subjects it to state tort law on the same terms as private
parties. Section 2674 specifies the defenses available to the govern-
ment, including judicial or legislative immunity and other defenses to
which the United States is entitled, but these do not include the Elev-
enth Circuit’s novel Supremacy Clause defense. Pp. 12–17.
   3. On remand, the Eleventh Circuit should consider whether subsec-
tion (a)’s discretionary-function exception bars either the plaintiffs’
negligent- or intentional-tort claims—undertaking that assessment
4                      MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                                  Syllabus

    without reference to the mistaken view that the law enforcement pro-
    viso applies to subsection (a). The court must then ask of any surviving
    claims whether, under Georgia state law, a “private individual under
    like circumstances” would be liable for the acts and omissions the
    plaintiffs allege, subject to the defenses discussed in §2674—not a Su-
    premacy Clause defense.
       Remaining questions surrounding whether and under what circum-
    stances the discretionary-function exception may ever foreclose a suit
    like this one lie well beyond the two questions the Court granted cer-
    tiorari to address, and their resolution would benefit from the Elev-
    enth Circuit’s careful reexamination of this case in the first instance.
    Pp. 17–18.
Vacated and remanded.

    GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.            SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which JACKSON, J., joined.
                        Cite as: 

 (2025)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 24–362
                                   _________________


CURTRINA MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND
 NEXT FRIEND OF G. W., A MINOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS
             v. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                 [June 12, 2025]

  JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
  If federal officers raid the wrong house, causing property
damage and assaulting innocent occupants, may the home-
owners sue the government for damages? The answer is
not as obvious as it might be. All agree that the Federal
Tort Claims Act permits some suits for wrong-house raids.
But the scope of the Act’s permission is much less clear.
This case poses two questions about the Act’s application:
one concerning the FTCA’s sovereign-immunity waiver,
and the other touching on the defenses the United States
may assert.
                             I
                             A
  In the predawn hours of October 18, 2017, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation raided the wrong house in subur-
ban Atlanta. Officers meant to execute search and arrest
warrants at a suspected gang hideout, 3741 Landau Lane.
Instead, they stormed a quiet family home, 3756 Denville
Trace, occupied by Hilliard Toi Cliatt, his partner Curtrina
Martin, and her 7-year-old son G. W. App. to Pet. for Cert.
2                MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

3a–4a.
   A six-member SWAT team, led by FBI Special Agent
Lawrence Guerra, breached the front door and detonated a
flash-bang grenade. 

 at 7a–8a. Fearing a home inva-
sion, Mr. Cliatt and Ms. Martin hid in a bedroom closet. 

at 8a. But the SWAT team soon found the couple’s hiding
spot, dragged Mr. Cliatt from the closet, “threw [him] down
on the floor,” handcuffed him, and began “bombarding [him]
with questions.” 

 at 79a. Meanwhile, another officer
trained his weapon on Ms. Martin, who was lying on the
floor half-naked, having fallen inside the closet. 

 at 8a,
89a. Only then did another officer stumble across some
mail with the home’s address on it and realize the team had
the wrong house. 

 at 8a.
   The cause of the officers’ mistake? In preparation for the
raid, Agent Guerra visited the correct house to document
its features and identify a staging area for the SWAT team.

 at 5a. But, he says, when he used his personal GPS to
navigate to 3741 Landau Lane on the day of the raid, it led
him to 3756 Denville Trace. 

, 1287
(ND Ga. 2022). No one could confirm as much later because
Agent Guerra “threw . . . away” his GPS device “not long
after” the raid. 

. And it seems the agents nei-
ther noticed the street sign for “Denville Trace,” nor the
house number, which was visible on the mailbox at the end
of the driveway. Ibid.; Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Apparently, too,
Agent Guerra failed to appreciate that a different car was
parked in the driveway, one “not present . . . during [his]
previous visit.” 631 F. Supp. 3d, at 1288.
   Left with personal injuries and property damage—but
few explanations and no compensation—Mr. Cliatt and Ms.
Martin sued the United States. They did so under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 

 et seq., alleging that
the officers had committed various negligent and inten-
tional torts, App. 8–14.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            3

                      Opinion of the Court

                               B
   After discovery and motions practice, the district court
rejected each of the plaintiffs’ claims and granted summary
judgment to the government. The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed and, in doing so, relied on an understanding of the
FTCA that no other circuit has adopted. To appreciate
what sets the Eleventh Circuit apart and how its approach
affected its analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims, it helps to
begin by outlining how this suit would have proceeded else-
where.
   The FTCA allows those injured by federal employees to
sue the United States for damages. The statute achieves
that end by waiving, in 

(b), the federal gov-
ernment’s sovereign immunity for “certain torts committed
by federal employees acting within the scope of their em-
ployment.” Brownback v. King, 

 (2021)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But the statute’s
waiver is subject to 13 exceptions that claw back the gov-
ernment’s immunity in certain circumstances. Set out in
§2680, most of these 13 exceptions are obviously inapplica-
ble to suits alleging police misconduct within the United
States. But two in particular—the discretionary-function
exception and the intentional-tort exception—sometimes
come into play.
   In a suit like this one, most courts begin by assessing the
intentional-tort exception. Located in subsection (h) of
§2680, it prohibits claims alleging any of 11 enumerated
torts. But the exception is itself subject to a “law enforce-
ment proviso.” Millbrook v. United States, 

(2013). That proviso countermands the exception with re-
spect to six intentional torts (including assault, battery,
false imprisonment, and false arrest) against “investigative
or law enforcement officers.” §2680(h). So if a plaintiff al-
leges that a federal law enforcement officer committed one
or more of those six torts, the proviso will ensure those
4                 MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

claims survive an encounter with the intentional-tort ex-
ception. Id., at 55–56.
    Next, most courts turn to the discretionary-function ex-
ception. Housed in subsection (a) of §2680, this exception
bars “[a]ny claim” based on the exercise of an official’s “dis-
cretionary function.” Faced with that instruction, most
courts ask whether the exception precludes any of the plain-
tiff ’s remaining tort claims. And here, the answer is often
less clear cut. The discretionary-function exception, this
Court has said, forbids suits challenging decisions that “in-
volv[e] an element of judgment or choice” of a “kind that the
. . . exception was designed to shield.” United States v.
Gaubert, 

, 322–323 (1991) (alteration in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted). But several of our
lower court colleagues report that they have “struggl[ed]” to
discern what this direction requires of them. See, e.g., Xi v.
Haugen, 

 (CA3 2023) (Bibas, J., concur-
ring). So, for example, some lower courts have held that the
discretionary-function exception does not shield “careless”
or “unconstitutional” police conduct from judicial scrutiny,
but others have taken a contrary view and read the excep-
tion much more broadly. 

; Pet. for Cert. 28–34.
    Finally, if any of the plaintiff ’s claims survive the
discretionary-function exception and thus fall within the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, courts turn to a third
question: Is the government liable to the plaintiff on the
merits? When it comes to that question, the FTCA provides
that the government will usually be liable to the plaintiff if
a “private individual under like circumstances,” §2674,
would be liable under “the law of the place” where the gov-
ernment employee’s wrongful “act or omission occurred,”
§1346(b)(1). Ordinarily, then, courts will find for the plain-
tiff if he can demonstrate that federal officials committed a
tort under applicable state law. See Brownback, 

.
    Now compare that approach to the Eleventh Circuit’s.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                      Opinion of the Court

That court begins much as others do, asking whether the
law enforcement proviso permits a plaintiff ’s intentional-
tort claims to advance past subsection (h)’s intentional-tort
exception. See Nguyen v. United States, 

 (2009).
   But from there, the Eleventh Circuit proceeds quite dif-
ferently. Rather than asking whether the discretionary-
function exception bars either the plaintiff ’s negligent-tort
claims or his intentional-tort claims, as most courts do, the
Eleventh Circuit applies that exception only to the plain-
tiff ’s negligence claims. The Eleventh Circuit does so be-
cause, in its view, the law enforcement proviso does not just
override the intentional-tort exception, it also overrides all
the other exceptions in §2680, the discretionary-function
exception included. Id., at 1257. Under that approach, any
intentional-tort claim covered by the proviso automatically
proceeds to the merits—no matter what any other exception
has to say.
   To compensate for its expansive and plaintiff-friendly
reading of the proviso, the Eleventh Circuit then takes a
restrictive and defendant-friendly view at the FTCA’s lia-
bility stage. In other courts, an FTCA plaintiff will usually
prevail if he can show a “private individual under like cir-
cumstances,” §2674, would be liable under “the law of the
place” where the government employee’s wrongful “act or
omission occurred,” §1346(b)(1). But in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the government may assert a particular affirmative
defense under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. See
Denson v. United States, 

 (2009). And
that defense, the Eleventh Circuit holds, defeats a claim
whenever a law enforcement officer’s contested actions bear
“some nexus with furthering federal policy and can reason-
ably be characterized as complying with the full range of
federal law.” 

; accord, Kordash v. United States,

 (CA11 2022).
   Applying its unique approach to this case, the Eleventh
6                MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

Circuit held that the law enforcement proviso spared the
plaintiffs’ intentional-tort claims from both the intentional-
tort and the discretionary-function exceptions. It dismissed
the plaintiffs’ negligence claims under the discretionary-
function exception because, in its view, Agent Guerra “en-
joyed discretion in how he prepared for the warrant execu-
tion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a–18a. And on the merits of
the plaintiffs’ (remaining) intentional-tort claims, the court
held that the government had a winning Supremacy Clause
defense. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, the
United States was entitled to summary judgment. 

 at
18a–19a.
   We agreed to take this case to examine the distinctive
features of the Eleventh Circuit’s approach—namely (1)
whether the law enforcement proviso overrides not just the
intentional-tort exception but also the discretionary-function
exception, and (2) whether the Supremacy Clause affords
the United States a defense in FTCA suits. Pet. for Cert.
16, 25. 

 (2025).
                              II
   Begin with the law enforcement proviso. Does it counter-
mand only §2680(h)’s intentional-tort exception, as most
circuits have concluded and the government argues? Brief
for Respondents 25; Xi, 

 (Bibas, J., concur-
ring) (collecting cases). Or does the proviso also override
the other exceptions in §2680, including the discretionary-
function exception in subsection (a), as the Eleventh Circuit
has held and the plaintiffs contend? Nguyen, 

; Brief for Petitioners 40.
                            A
  To answer that question, we turn to the relevant statu-
tory text. Recall that §1346(b) waives the federal govern-
ment’s sovereign immunity, subject to a list of 13 exceptions
housed in §2680. Those exceptions are lettered (a) through
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)                7

                       Opinion of the Court

(n), with one letter unused. Rather than setting the law
enforcement proviso apart as a discrete provision at the end
of that list, Congress folded it into subsection (h)’s intentional-
tort exception. Here’s a sense of how the proviso (under-
lined below) appears in context.
       “The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of
    this title shall not apply to—
       “(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an
    employee of the Government, exercising due care, in
    the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
    such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the
    exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or per-
    form a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
    federal agency or an employee of the Government,
    whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
         .            .           .           .            .
       “(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false
    imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
    abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, de-
    ceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That,
    with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law
    enforcement officers of the United States Government,
    the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this
    title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date
    of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery,
    false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or
    malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsec-
    tion, ‘investigative or law enforcement officer’ means
    any officer of the United States who is empowered by
    law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make
    arrests for violations of Federal law.
         .            .           .           .            .
       “(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Fed-
    eral land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or
    a bank for cooperatives.”
8                 MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

   The proviso’s placement supplies an immediate clue
about the scope of its application. It appears in the same
subsection (and the same sentence) as the intentional-tort
exception. Given that arrangement, an ordinary reader
would naturally presume that the proviso modifies only
subsection (h). An everyday example helps illustrate the
point. Suppose a wife leaves her husband a shopping list:
“Please buy—Apples. Carrots. Steak: If there is a sale.
Bread. Milk.” The wife, we think, would be understandably
frustrated if her husband returned home with only steak in
hand because he could find nothing else discounted. Re-
flecting that intuition about ordinary meaning, our cases
recognize that, absent reason to think otherwise, statutory
provisos generally modify only the provisions in which they
sit. See McDonald v. United States, 

, 20–21
(1929); Alaska v. United States, 

 (2005);
A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 154–155 (2012) (Scalia
& Garner).
   Nothing about §2680(h)’s proviso gives us reason to think
it works differently. To the contrary, one textual clue after
another confirms that it follows the general rule. Start with
the statute’s grammatical structure. Section 2680 contains
a lead-in clause (“The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to—”) followed by a list
of exceptions. In conjunction with the lead-in clause, each
exception forms a stand-alone sentence ending with a pe-
riod, operating as a “distinct,” “structurally discrete” provi-
sion. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 

, and n. 4 (2005). And, given that, it is hard
to see how the law enforcement proviso might apply beyond
subsection (h), modifying exceptions housed in separate
subsections (and separate sentences) elsewhere in §2680.
   Notice, too, that subsection (h) and its proviso work to-
gether to address the same category of claims: intentional
torts. Subsection (h)’s intentional-tort exception excludes
from the FTCA’s sovereign-immunity waiver claims for
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             9

                      Opinion of the Court

torts like “assault, battery, false imprisonment, [and] false
arrest.” The proviso then undoes that assertion of sover-
eign immunity for some of those same torts when commit-
ted by “investigative or law enforcement officers.” By con-
trast, the proviso does not so much as mention the issues
addressed by §2680’s other exceptions, like claims for lost
mail, combat injuries, or the imposition of quarantines.
§2680(b), (f ), (j). That the proviso is “confined” to the same
“subject-matter” as subsection (h)’s “principal clause”
stands as more evidence yet that it “refers only to the pro-
vision to which it is attached.” United States v. Morrow,

 (1925).
   The proviso’s second sentence is telling as well. It defines
the phrase “investigative or law enforcement officer.” In
doing so, the sentence tells us that the definition applies
only to “this subsection” (i.e., subsection (h)), even though
the phrase “law enforcement officer” also appears in subsec-
tion (c)’s exception for claims arising from tax and customs
collection. §2680(c), (h). If Congress had wished the proviso
to modify each of the exceptions in §2680, it might have pro-
vided a section-wide definition, rather than a limited defi-
nition just for subsection (h).
   If more evidence were needed, comparing this statute
with others would supply it. Often, Congress drafts statu-
tory lists followed by a proviso in a separate paragraph at
the end.      See, e.g., 

(a)(2)(F)(ii)(II),
6928(f )(2). Sometimes, that placement can suggest that a
proviso relates to all the preceding subparts, not just the
nearest one. Scalia & Garner 156. But here Congress chose
a different course, folding the proviso into a single excep-
tion, rather than appending it to the end of the full list of
exceptions. And that choice, too, suggests this proviso ap-
plies to subsection (h) alone. See Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v.
Texas, 

 (2022).
10               MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

                              B
   Seeking to defend the Eleventh Circuit’s view that the
proviso applies broadly across all of §2680’s exceptions, the
plaintiffs offer a number of thoughtful arguments. But, to
our eyes, none can overcome the textual evidence we have
just laid out.
   First, the plaintiffs ask us to focus on how the proviso
mirrors §2680’s lead-in clause. Brief for Petitioners 42. The
lead-in clause, they observe, preserves the government’s
sovereign immunity by instructing that §1346(b)’s waiver
“shall not apply to” claims covered by the exceptions. §2680
(emphasis added). Meanwhile, the proviso countermands
that direction by instructing that §1346(b)’s waiver “shall
apply” to certain claims. §2680(h) (emphasis added). Be-
cause the language of the proviso mirrors the language of
the lead-in clause, the plaintiffs submit, Congress must
have meant for the proviso to have the last word with re-
spect to each of the FTCA’s exceptions. Id., at 42. That
conclusion, however, does not follow from its premise. Yes,
the proviso and lead-in clause contain similar language.
And, yes, the proviso surely countermands the lead-in
clause for purposes of subsection (h). But none of that
means the proviso speaks to other exceptions that work to-
gether with the lead-in language to form discrete instruc-
tions that “may be understood completely without reading
any further.” Jama, 

.
   Second, the plaintiffs remind us that the proviso’s second,
definitional sentence applies to “this subsection,” but the
proviso’s first, substantive part contains no such limiting
language. Brief for Petitioners 42–43 (quoting §2680(h)).
And that difference, the plaintiffs say, suggests that the
first, substantive part applies throughout §2680. Id., at 42–
43. Again, however, we do not see it. Congress had no need
to include similar limiting language in the first part of the
proviso to confine its application to subsection (h). Con-
gress accomplished just that by placing the proviso’s first
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             11

                       Opinion of the Court

part in the same sentence as the intentional-tort exception.
Meanwhile, in the proviso’s second sentence, Congress ar-
guably needed to confine the definition of “investigative or
law enforcement officer” to “this subsection” to ensure that
the phrase “law enforcement officer” carries a different
meaning when it appears in subsection (c).
   Third, the plaintiffs resort to legislative history. They
point to a committee report discussing how Congress en-
acted the proviso in response to two wrong-house raids
much like their own. 

 at 8–10, 44; see S. Rep. No. 93–
588, p. 3 (1973). And, the plaintiffs argue, unless the pro-
viso is given broad effect across §2680, it will not fulfill Con-
gress’s purpose of ensuring that wrong-house-raid cases
may proceed. But this argument stumbles, too. Few pieces
of legislation pursue any single “purpos[e] at all costs.”
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 

 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And Members of Congress may well have had more than
one purpose in mind when adding the proviso to the FTCA.
Perhaps some thought amending subsection (h) alone and
leaving others untouched would strike a suitable balance
between immunity and liability. Perhaps others concluded
there was no need to apply the proviso more broadly be-
cause no other exception would shield the government from
liability for wrong-house raids. Whatever the reason, no
amount of guesswork about the purposes behind legislation
can displace what the law’s terms clearly direct. “[L]egisla-
tive history is not the law.” Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,

 (2018).
                             III
   That takes us to the Eleventh Circuit’s second outlier po-
sition and the second question presented. May the United
States defeat an FTCA suit by invoking the Supremacy
Clause and showing that a federal officer’s acts had “some
nexus with furthering federal policy” and “compli[ed] with
12               MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

the full range of federal law”? App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because the govern-
ment now concedes that it enjoys no such defense, the Court
appointed Christopher Mills as amicus to represent the
Eleventh Circuit’s views. 

 (2025). He has ably
discharged his responsibilities. But in the end, we find the
government’s concession commendable and correct: The
FTCA does not permit the Eleventh Circuit’s Supremacy
Clause defense.
   The Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of decision when
federal and state laws conflict. It provides that the “Con-
stitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. So,
for example, when a regulated party cannot comply with
both federal and state directives, the Supremacy Clause
tells us the state law must yield. See, e.g., Virginia Ura-
nium, Inc. v. Warren, 

 (2019) (opinion of
GORSUCH, J.).
   The FTCA is the “supreme” federal law addressing the
United States’ liability for torts committed by its agents. It
supplies the “exclusive remedy” for damages claims arising
out of federal employees’ official conduct. See Hui v. Cas-
taneda, 

, 806 (2010). And, as we have seen,
the government will usually be liable if a “private individ-
ual under like circumstances,” §2674, “would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred,” §1346(b)(1). Accordingly, a
plaintiff may generally prevail in an FTCA suit by demon-
strating that “the State in which the alleged misconduct oc-
curred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct
to go forward.” Carlson v. Green, 

 (1980).
   Because the FTCA’s liability rule incorporates state law,
in most cases there is no conflict for the Supremacy Clause
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            13

                      Opinion of the Court

to resolve. Take this case. Georgia law supplies the rele-
vant “law of the place” where the officers’ tortious conduct
occurred. §1346(b)(1). And Georgia law would permit a
homeowner to sue a private person for damages if that per-
son intentionally or negligently raided his house and as-
saulted him. See App. 10–13 (citing Hendricks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 

, 264–265, 

, 594–595 (1989), for assault and battery and Lyttle
v. United States, 

 (MD Ga. 2012),
for negligence). So when the FTCA, the relevant federal
law in this field, instructs courts to apply those same state
rules to decide whether the United States is liable to the
plaintiffs, there is no discord between the two.
   To be sure, it is possible (though rare) for federal and
state law to conflict in an FTCA suit. So, for example, in
Hess v. United States, this Court held that federal maritime
law supplied the “law of the place” governing an FTCA suit
involving an accident on the Columbia River. 

, and n. 7 (1960). Though the accident “occurred within
the State of Oregon,” it happened “on navigable waters . . .
within the reach of admiralty jurisdiction.” 

. As
a result, federal maritime law displaced state tort law, just
as it would in “an action between private parties.” 

 In
much the same way, federal law will control other FTCA
suits where “a litigant [can] point specifically to a constitu-
tional text or a federal statute” that supplies controlling li-
ability rules, displacing contrary state law. Virginia Ura-
nium, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 

 (2011).
   In this case, however, the Eleventh Circuit did not iden-
tify any federal statute or constitutional provision displac-
ing Georgia tort law. Instead, the court of appeals pointed
to a line of cases stemming from this Court’s decision in
In re Neagle, 

 (1890). App. to Pet. for Cert.
16a–17a (citing Denson, 574 F. 3d, at 1336–1337). Those
cases, the Eleventh Circuit has observed, hold that federal
14                   MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                          Opinion of the Court

officers may sometimes defeat state prosecutions against
them by demonstrating that their actions, though criminal
under state law, were “necessary and proper” in the dis-
charge of their federal responsibilities. 

 at 1346–1347
(discussing In re Neagle). In the Eleventh Circuit’s view,
that same logic works to foreclose FTCA suits like the plain-
tiffs’. 574 F. 3d, at 1346–1347; Kordash, 51 F. 4th, at 1293–
1294.
   To appreciate why that view is mistaken, a little history
helps. In re Neagle involved an affair, a homicide, and a
habeas petition. In 1883, Sarah Althea Hill claimed to be
the wife of U. S. Senator William Sharon and sought a
share of his fortune in acrimonious California divorce pro-
ceedings. Sharon admitted an affair but insisted that Hill
had forged the pair’s handwritten marriage contract. Hill
hired David Terry to represent her. A former Chief Justice
of the California Supreme Court, Terry had resigned that
post after killing (another) U. S. Senator in a duel. As the
litigation wore on, lawyer and client married.
   Eventually, the dispute between Hill and Sharon wound
up before U. S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field while
he was riding circuit. Terry and Justice Field were no
strangers, having served together on the California Su-
preme Court. Even so, Justice Field issued a devastating
ruling against Hill. As he announced his decision, Hill leapt
from her seat, denounced the Justice as “bought,” and had
to be carried from the courtroom. Joining the fracas, Terry
punched a marshal and brandished a bowie knife. Even af-
ter the couple spent time in jail for contempt, they contin-
ued to issue threats against Justice Field.1
   Those events found their way into the U. S. Reports this
way. Aware of the threat Hill and Terry posed, the U. S.

——————
   1 For a full account of the saga, see In re Neagle, 135 U. S., at 42–55;

W. Lewis, The Supreme Court and a Six-Gun: The Extraordinary Story
of In re Neagle, 43 A. B. A. J. 415 (1957) (Lewis).
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             15

                       Opinion of the Court

Attorney General ordered Deputy Marshal David Neagle, a
former chief of police in Tombstone, Arizona, to accompany
Justice Field when he next rode circuit in California. 

; In re Neagle, 135 U. S., at 51–52. That decision proved
prescient, for Terry soon cornered the Justice on a train and
attacked him. 

 at 52–54. Intervening to protect the Jus-
tice, Neagle shot and killed Terry. 

 After the shooting,
California authorities arrested Neagle and began prosecut-
ing him for murder. Neagle countered by filing a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court seeking his re-
lease. 

   When Neagle’s petition reached this Court, it agreed the
writ should issue, reasoning that the Supremacy Clause
shielded him from state criminal charges. Without some
such protection, the Court concluded, California could frus-
trate federal law by prosecuting a federal marshal “for an
act which he was authorized to do by the law of the United
States,” an act “which it was his duty to do,” and in circum-
stances where he “did no more than what was necessary
and proper.” 

 at 75–76.
   Memorable as In re Neagle may be, we do not see how it
informs the prosaic task of applying the FTCA. The Court’s
decision may stand for the proposition that federal law will
sometimes preempt a state criminal law when it conflicts
with a federal officer’s duties—and do so even in the ab-
sence of express federal legislation overriding the state law
in question. But In re Neagle does not speak to a situation
where, as here, Congress has entered the field and ex-
pressly bound the federal government to accept liability un-
der state tort law on the same terms as a “private individ-
ual.” §2674. After all, no private individual could deploy
In re Neagle to his advantage. It has only ever worked to
shield “[f]ederal officers who are discharging their duties.”
Ohio v. Thomas, 

 (1898); see also In re
Neagle, 

 (“officers and agents . . . acting . . .
within the scope of their authority”); Davis v. Burke, 179
16                    MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                           Opinion of the Court

U. S. 399, 402 (1900) (“an officer of the United States [who]
has been arrested under state process for acts done under
the authority of the Federal government”).2
   To be sure, the government may raise other defenses
against tort liability, and some may be uniquely federal in
nature. After setting forth the general rule that the gov-
ernment can be held liable under state tort law on the same
terms as a “private individual,” §2674 adds that the govern-
ment may “assert any defense based upon judicial or legis-
lative immunity which otherwise would have been availa-
ble to the employee of the United States whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other de-
fenses to which the United States is entitled.” But none of
these defenses include In re Neagle. That decision did not
recognize a “judicial or legislative immunity.” Nor has it
been understood as a “defens[e] to which the United States
is entitled,” but instead (and again) as a shield “[f]ederal
officers” may assert. Thomas, 

. Had Con-
gress wanted to refashion In re Neagle into a new defense
the government itself can assert under the FTCA, it might
have said so. Yet it did not.
                            IV
  Where does all that leave the case before us? We can say
this much: The plaintiffs’ intentional-tort claims survive
their encounter with subsection (h) thanks to the law en-
forcement proviso, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized. But
——————
   2 To date at least, this Court has also generally understood In re Neagle

as providing federal officers a shield against only state criminal prosecu-
tion, not (as here) state tort liability. See, e.g., Ohio v. Thomas, 

, 283–285 (1899) (favorably citing In re Waite, a case holding that the
defense would permit “a civil action for damages,” even where it barred
“a criminal prosecution,” because a damages action, unlike a prosecution,
would not bring the “federal and state governments into conflict,” 

, 363–364 (ND Iowa 1897)); Johnson v. Maryland, 

(1920) (suggesting that the defense would not foreclose “liability under
the common law of a State” for “negligence”).
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             17

                      Opinion of the Court

it remains for that court on remand to consider whether
subsection (a)’s discretionary-function exception bars either
the plaintiffs’ negligent- or intentional-tort claims. As we
have explained, the Eleventh Circuit must undertake that
assessment without reference to its mistaken view that the
law enforcement proviso applies to subsection (a). Should
some or all of the plaintiffs’ claims survive the discretionary-
function exception, the Eleventh Circuit must then ask
whether, under Georgia state law, a “private individual un-
der like circumstances” would be liable for the acts and
omissions the plaintiffs allege, subject to the defenses dis-
cussed in §2674—not a Supremacy Clause defense nowhere
mentioned there.
   Having resolved that much, the plaintiffs ask us to decide
more still. See Brief for Petitioners 19–40. In particular,
they call on us to determine whether and under what cir-
cumstances the discretionary-function exception bars suits
for wrong-house raids and similar misconduct. Unless we
take up that further question, they worry, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit on remand may take too broad a view of the exception
and dismiss their claims again. After all, the plaintiffs
observe, in the past that court has suggested that the
discretionary-function exception bars any claim “unless a
source of federal law ‘specifically prescribes’ a course of con-
duct” and thus deprives an official of all discretion. Id., at
36 (quoting Shivers v. United States, 

(CA11 2021)). And that approach, the plaintiffs insist, is
both seriously mistaken and at odds with how other circuits
understand the exception. Brief for Petitioners 36. Some
courts, for instance, have held that the discretionary-function
exception does not protect conduct “marked by individual
carelessness or laziness,” rather than “policy considera-
tions.” Rich v. United States, 

 (CA4
2015). Some courts do not apply the exception when law
enforcement officers violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights. Xi, 

 (“government officials never
18                MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

have discretion to violate the Constitution”). And some
have indicated that the exception does not protect “ministe-
rial” tasks. See 

 (Bibas, J., concurring). The
plaintiffs ask us to endorse decisions like these, apply their
reasoning to this case, and hold it survives the discretionary-
function exception. Brief for Petitioners 39–40
   We readily acknowledge that different lower courts have
taken different views of the discretionary-function excep-
tion. We acknowledge, too, that important questions sur-
round whether and under what circumstances that excep-
tion may ever foreclose a suit like this one. But those
questions lie well beyond the two we granted certiorari to
address. And before addressing them, we would benefit
from the Eleventh Circuit’s careful reexamination of this
case in the first instance. It is work enough for the day to
answer the questions we took this case to resolve, clear
away the two faulty assumptions on which that court has
relied in the past, and redirect it to the proper inquiry.
   The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
                                               It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 24–362
                          _________________


CURTRINA MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT AND
 NEXT FRIEND OF G. W., A MINOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS
             v. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                         [June 12, 2025]

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins,
concurring.
  I join in full the Court’s opinion, which holds that the
Eleventh Circuit’s distinctive approach to suits under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is wrong in two respects.
See ante, at 6, 16–17. The law enforcement proviso modifies
only the subsection in which it is located: Section 2680(h)’s
intentional-tort exception. Ante, at 6–11. The United
States, moreover, may not defeat an FTCA suit simply by
“showing that a federal officer’s acts had ‘some nexus with
furthering federal policy’ and ‘compli[ed] with the full range
of federal law.’ ” Ante, at 11–12 (alteration in original).
With those two principles clarified, I also agree that the
Eleventh Circuit must now consider on remand whether the
FTCA’s discretionary-function exception bars plaintiffs’
negligent- and intentional-tort claims. Ante, at 17–18. I
write separately to underscore that there is reason to think
the discretionary-function exception may not apply to these
claims.
                            I
  The FTCA shields the United States from liability for
claims “based upon” a federal employee’s “exercise or per-
2                 MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

formance” (or failure to exercise or perform) “a discretion-
ary function or duty,” “whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.” 

(a). This Court has set
forth a two-part test that governs the application of
§2680(a), known as the discretionary-function exception.
First, courts must consider the nature of the official’s con-
duct and decide whether it “ ‘involv[es] an element of judg-
ment or choice.’ ” United States v. Gaubert, 

 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 

 (1988)). “The requirement of judgment or choice,”
this Court has explained, “is not satisfied if a ‘federal stat-
ute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for an employee to follow.’ ” 

. In
such circumstances, “ ‘the employee has no rightful option
but to adhere to the directive.’ ” 

  Even where a federal employee retains an element of
choice, however, the exception does not apply reflexively.
After all, it is rare for statutes or regulations to prescribe
an official’s required course of conduct down to the very last
detail, so some degree of choice will almost invariably re-
main. Thus, this Court has required lower courts to deter-
mine, at the second step, whether “th[e] judgment is of the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed
to shield.” Berkovitz, 

. Because “[t]he basis
for the discretionary function exception was Congress’ de-
sire to ‘prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and
political policy through the medium of an action in tort,’ ”
this Court has clarified that the exception protects only
those governmental actions and decisions that are them-
selves “based on considerations of public policy.” 

 at
536–537 (quoting United States v. S. A. Empresa De Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense, 

 (1984)); see
Gaubert, 

.
  To that end, this Court has said, it is “obviou[s]” that
some discretionary acts performed by Government agents
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

“are within the scope of [their] employment but not within
the discretionary function exception.” 

. If a
federal banking regulator “drove an automobile on a mis-
sion connected with his official duties and negligently col-
lided with another car,” for example, the Court has made
clear that “the exception would not apply.” 

 That is
because, while “driving requires the constant exercise of
discretion, the official’s decisions in exercising that discre-
tion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory policy.”

   It has been 34 years since this Court last weighed in on
the discretionary-function exception, see Gaubert, 

, and despite substantial percolation in the courts of ap-
peals, the “exact boundaries of the exception remain un-
clear,” 14 C. Wright, A. Miller, & H. Hershkoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure §3658.1 (4th ed. Supp. 2025). The
Court today resolves one of the Circuit splits regarding the
exception’s application: whether claims that fall within the
FTCA’s law enforcement proviso must necessarily fall out-
side of the discretionary-function exception. Yet, as the
Court recognizes, ante, at 17–18, several additional points
of disagreement remain, including whether allegedly “un-
constitutional conduct necessarily falls outside the excep-
tion” because officials lack discretion to violate the Consti-
tution, and “whether the exception applies when the
challenged act was careless rather than a considered exer-
cise of discretion.” Xi v. Haugen, 

 (CA3
2023) (Bibas, J., concurring) (describing these Circuit
splits). Given the enduring questions about how to apply
the discretionary-function exception, and the divergent ap-
proaches taken by the Circuits, it is long past time for this
Court to weigh in on the exception’s scope.
   Even without further intervention by this Court, how-
ever, there is reason to question the Eleventh Circuit’s sug-
gestion in the decision below that the discretionary-func-
tion exception might apply “ ‘unless a source of federal law
4                 MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

“specifically prescribes” a [federal employee’s] course of con-
duct.’ ” 

, *6 (2024) (quoting Shivers v.
United States, 

 (CA11 2021); emphasis in
original). That approach, which even the Government does
not defend before this Court, would run headlong into
this Court’s precedents. Gaubert, after all, applies the
discretionary-function exception only where an official’s ac-
tions both involve an element of judgment and rely on pub-
lic policy considerations. See 499 U. S., at 322–323; see also
Berkovitz, 486 U. S., at 536–537. Whether federal law pre-
scribes a particular course of action resolves only the first
of Gaubert’s two questions. The second question (whether
an officer’s decisions were “ ‘based on considerations of pub-
lic policy,’ ” 

) remains live. Were it other-
wise, a federal official’s negligent driving decisions would
fall beyond the reach of the discretionary-function excep-
tion only if federal law or policy specifically prescribed an
officer’s permissible maneuvers on the road. Cf. 

.
                              II
  Agent Guerra’s preparation to execute search and arrest
warrants at 3741 Landau Lane, and his subsequent deci-
sion to raid Martin and Cliatt’s home at 3756 Denville
Trace, bear some resemblance to Gaubert’s negligent driv-
ing hypothetical. Like driving, executing a warrant always
involves some measure of discretion. Yet it is hard to see
how Guerra’s conduct in this case, including his allegedly
negligent choice to use his personal GPS and his failure to
check the street sign or house number on the mailbox before
breaking down Martin’s door and terrorizing the home’s
occupants, involved the kind of policy judgments that the
discretionary-function exception was designed to protect.
  The FTCA’s history, too, confirms Congress’s intention to
subject the United States to liability for intentional torts
committed by law enforcement officers like Agent Guerra.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                   SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

The relevant context is as follows: For several decades after
the FTCA’s enactment, Congress retained the United
States’ sovereign immunity for myriad intentional torts
committed by federal employees, including assault, battery,
and false arrest. See 

(h). That changed,
however, in response to an episode that will sound familiar
to readers of the majority opinion. See ante, at 2.
    In April 1973, Herbert and Evelyn Giglotto awoke in
their Collinsville, Illinois, townhouse “to the sound of some-
one smashing down their door and bursting into their
house.” J. Boger, M. Gitenstein, & P. Verkuil, The Federal
Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Inter-
pretative Analysis, 54 N. C. L. Rev. 497, 500 (1976). After
15 state and federal officers ransacked the Giglottos’ home,
tied them up at gunpoint, and threatened to shoot Mr. Gi-
glotto if he moved, the officers realized they “ ‘ha[d] the
wrong people.’ ” 

 The officers eventually moved on to
the home of Donald Askew, where they terrorized yet an-
other innocent couple before confessing they had acted on a
“ ‘bad tip.’ ” 

.
    The Collinsville raids garnered national attention, in-
cluding from the United States Senate. See S. Rep. No. 93–
588, pp. 2–3 (1973); see also Brief for Members of Congress
as Amici Curiae 8–12. Noting that “[t]here [was] no effec-
tive legal remedy against the Federal Government for the
actual physical damage, much less the pain, suffering and
humiliation to which the Collinsville families ha[d] been
subjected,” the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions proposed an amendment to the FTCA. See S. Rep.
No. 93–588, at 2. The solution was to add a proviso to the
end of the intentional-tort exception that “deprive[s] the
Federal Government of the defense of sovereign immunity”
for FTCA suits arising out of the state-law torts of “assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, or abuse of process” by federal law enforcement of-
ficers. 

; see §2680(h). The Committee designed the
6                 MARTIN v. UNITED STATES

                    SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

proviso to ensure “innocent individuals who are subjected
to raids of the type conducted in Collinsville, Illinois, will
have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents
[via suits under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 

 (1971)] and the Federal Government
[through the FTCA].” Id., at 3 (emphasis added).
   Of course, the majority correctly holds that the proviso
does not altogether trump the discretionary-function excep-
tion: Even if an intentional-tort claim “survive[s its] en-
counter with subsection (h) thanks to the law enforcement
proviso,” courts must nevertheless consider whether “sub-
section (a)’s discretionary-function exception bars . . . the
plaintiffs’ negligent- or intentional-tort claims.” Ante, at 17.
Courts, however, should not ignore the existence of the law
enforcement proviso, or the factual context that inspired its
passage, when construing the discretionary-function excep-
tion. Whatever else is true of that exception, any interpre-
tation should allow for liability in the very cases Congress
amended the FTCA to remedy. See Van Buren v. United
States, 

 (2021) (“ ‘When Congress amends
legislation, courts must presume it intends the change to
have real and substantial effect’ ”); see also Hungary v. Si-
mon, 

, ___–___ (2025) (slip op., at 15–16) (rely-
ing on a statute’s “ ‘historical backdrop’ ” to “ ‘permit adjudi-
cation of claims’ ” that an earlier decision of this Court had
avoided).
                        *     *    *
  On remand, the court should approach the discretionary-
function exception with an eye to both steps of the Gaubert
analysis and to the existence and context of the intentional-
tort exception’s law enforcement proviso.