Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

         AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVICES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                  THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

    No. 23–1039. Argued February 26, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025
Petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the
  Ohio Department of Youth Services in various roles since 2004. In
  2019, the agency interviewed Ames for a new management position
  but ultimately hired another candidate—a lesbian woman. The agency
  subsequently demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator
  and later hired a gay man to fill that role. Ames then filed this lawsuit
  against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the
  management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orienta-
  tion. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency,
  and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The courts below analyzed Ames’s
  claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

, which
  sets forth the traditional framework for evaluating disparate-
  treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the first step
  of that framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that
  the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Like the District
  Court, the Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her prima
  facie burden because she had not shown “ ‘background circumstances
  to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer
  who discriminates against the majority.’ ” 

. The
  court reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make
  this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-
  facie case.” 

Held: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which re-
 quires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary
 standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the
 text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents. Pp. 4–9.
    (a) Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from in-
 tentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race,
2               AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                                   Syllabus

    color, religion, sex, or national origin. 

, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
    2(a)(1). For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Douglas
    framework—stating a prima facie case of discrimination—is “not on-
    erous.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

. The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule requires
    plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional
    burden at step one. But the text of Title VII’s disparate-treatment
    provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and
    minority-group plaintiffs. The provision focuses on individuals rather
    than groups, barring discrimination against “any individual” because
    of protected characteristics. Congress left no room for courts to impose
    special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
       This Court’s precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute,
    and make clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment un-
    der Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a
    member of a majority group. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 

 (“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or
    majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” in Title
    VII). Moreover, the “background circumstances” rule—which subjects
    all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary
    standard in every case—ignores the Court’s instruction to avoid inflex-
    ible applications of the prima facie standard. Teamsters v. United
    States, 

. Pp. 4–7.
       (b) Ohio argues that the “background circumstances” rule does not
    subject majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened evidentiary standard
    but rather is “just another way of asking whether the circumstances
    surrounding an employment decision, if otherwise unexplained, sug-
    gest that the decision was because of a protected characteristic.” Brief
    for Respondent 10. Ohio’s recasting is directly at odds with the Sixth
    Circuit’s description of the “background circumstances” rule and its
    application of that rule in this case. Ohio’s alternative argument that
    Ames’s Title VII claims would fail even absent the “background cir-
    cumstances” rule is for the courts below to consider in the first instance
    on remand. Pp. 7–9.

, vacated and remanded.

   JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
                        Cite as: 

 (2025)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 23–1039
                                   _________________


       MARLEAN A. AMES, PETITIONER v. OHIO
        DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                  [June 5, 2025]

   JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Under our Title VII precedents, a plain-
tiff may make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment
by showing “that she applied for an available position for
which she was qualified, but was rejected under circum-
stances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrim-
ination.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

 (1981).
   The question in this case is whether, to satisfy that prima
facie burden, a plaintiff who is a member of a majority
group must also show “ ‘background circumstances to sup-
port the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual em-
ployer who discriminates against the majority.’ ” 

 (CA6 2023) (per curiam). We hold that this addi-
tional “background circumstances” requirement is not con-
sistent with Title VII’s text or our case law construing the
statute. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and re-
mand for application of the proper prima facie standard.
2          AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     Opinion of the Court

                              I
   The Ohio Department of Youth Services operates the
State’s juvenile correctional system. In 2004, the agency
hired petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to
serve as an executive secretary. Ames was eventually pro-
moted to program administrator and, in 2019, applied for a
newly created management position in the agency’s Office
of Quality and Improvement. Although the agency inter-
viewed her for the position, it ultimately hired a different
candidate—a lesbian woman—to fill the role.
   A few days after Ames interviewed for the management
position, her supervisors removed her from her role as pro-
gram administrator. She accepted a demotion to the secre-
tarial role she had held when she first joined the agency—
a move that resulted in a significant pay cut. The agency
then hired a gay man to fill the vacant program-adminis-
trator position. Ames subsequently filed this lawsuit
against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was
denied the management promotion and demoted because of
her sexual orientation.
   The District Court granted summary judgment to the
agency. 

, *12 (SD Ohio, Mar. 16, 2023).
The court analyzed Ames’s claims under McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973), which establishes
the traditional framework for evaluating disparate-treat-
ment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the
first step of that framework, the plaintiff must make a
prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a dis-
criminatory motive. Relying on Circuit precedent, the Dis-
trict Court concluded that Ames had failed to make that
showing because she had not presented evidence of “ ‘back-
ground circumstances’ ” suggesting that the agency was the
rare employer who discriminates against members of a ma-
jority group. 

, *7. Without that evidence,
the court held, plaintiffs who are members of majority
groups—including heterosexual plaintiffs, like Ames—
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                     3

                          Opinion of the Court

could not discharge their evidentiary burden at the first
step of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. 

,
*8–*9.
  The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Like the District Court, the
Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her prima
facie burden because she had not shown “ ‘background cir-
cumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is
that unusual employer who discriminates against the ma-
jority.’ ” 

. The court reasoned that Ames,
as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in
addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie
case.” 

 And it explained that plaintiffs can typically
satisfy this burden, where applicable, by presenting “evi-
dence that a member of the relevant minority group (here,
gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with
statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . .
against members of the majority group.” 

 The panel
concluded that the agency was entitled to summary judg-
ment because Ames had failed to present either type of ev-
idence. 

  Judge Kethledge concurred in the court’s decision but
wrote separately to express his disagreement with the
“background circumstances” rule. In his view, the require-
ment was not only unworkable—in that it required an as-
sessment of evidence presented by different plaintiffs under
different standards—but also diverged substantially from
Title VII’s text. 

 at 827–828.
  The Sixth Circuit’s decision reinforced a Circuit split as
to whether majority-group plaintiffs are subject to a differ-
ent evidentiary burden than minority-group plaintiffs at
McDonnell Douglas’s first step.1 We granted certiorari to

——————
  1 In addition to the Sixth Circuit, four other Circuits have held or sug-

gested that majority-group plaintiffs must satisfy a heightened burden
to make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII.
See Hammer v. Ashcroft, 

 (CA8 2004); Mills v. Health
4             AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                          Opinion of the Court

resolve that split. See 

 (2024).
                               II
   Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers
from intentionally discriminating against their employees
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). In McDonnell Douglas, this
Court laid out a three-step burden-shifting framework for
evaluating claims arising under that provision. 411 U. S.,
at 802–804. The McDonnell Douglas framework aims to
“bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
th[e] ultimate question” in a disparate-treatment case—
namely, whether “the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff.” Burdine, 

.2
   At the first step of the familiar three-step inquiry, the
plaintiff bears the “initial burden” of “establishing a prima
facie case” by producing enough evidence to support an in-
ference of discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas, 

. If the plaintiff clears that hurdle, the burden
then “shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”

 Finally, if the employer articulates such a justifica-
tion, the plaintiff must then have a “fair opportunity” to
show that the stated justification “was in fact pretext” for
——————
Care Serv. Corp., 

 (CA7 1999); Harding v. Gray, 

 (CADC 1993); Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 

(CA10 1992). Other Circuits do not impose any heightened burden on
majority-group plaintiffs.
  2 Although our cases have sometimes described the McDonnell Douglas

inquiry as a “burden-shifting” framework, the “ultimate burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine,

. McDonnell Douglas merely aims to provide “ ‘a sensi-
ble, orderly way to evaluate the evidence’ ” that “ ‘bears on the critical
question of discrimination.’ ” Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

 (1983). For purposes of this case, we assume without
deciding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies at the sum-
mary-judgment stage of litigation.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                      Opinion of the Court

discrimination. Id., at 804. A plaintiff “may succeed [under
the McDonnell Douglas framework] either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”
Burdine, 

.
    For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Doug-
las framework—the prima facie burden—is “not onerous.”
Burdine, 

. A plaintiff may satisfy it simply
by presenting evidence “that she applied for an available
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” 

 But, under Sixth Circuit precedent,
plaintiffs who are members of a majority group bear an ad-
ditional burden at step one: They must also establish
“ ‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that
the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority.’ ” 

.
    As outlined below, the Sixth Circuit’s “background cir-
cumstances” rule cannot be squared with the text of Title
VII or our longstanding precedents. And nothing Ohio has
said, in its brief or at oral argument, persuades us other-
wise.
                              A
   As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment pro-
vision draws no distinctions between majority-group plain-
tiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision
makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The “law’s focus
on individuals rather than groups [is] anything but aca-
demic.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 

, 659
6          AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     Opinion of the Court

(2020). By establishing the same protections for every “in-
dividual”—without regard to that individual’s membership
in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for
courts to impose special requirements on majority-group
plaintiffs alone.
   Our precedents reinforce that understanding of the stat-
ute. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 

 (1971), for
instance, we said that “[d]iscriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Con-
gress has proscribed” in Title VII. 

 (emphasis
added). We made the same point even more explicitly in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 

 (1976), a few years later. The employer in that case had
argued that certain forms of discrimination against White
employees fell outside the reach of Title VII. 

. But we rejected that argument, holding that “Title VII
prohibit[ed] racial discrimination against the white peti-
tioners in th[at] case upon the same standards as would be
applicable were they Negroes.” 

 (emphasis
added); see also 

 at 279 (citing favorably the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission’s view that Title VII
bars discrimination “against whites on the same terms as
racial discrimination against nonwhites”).
   Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for prov-
ing disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based
on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority
group. Accord, Bostock, 

 (“This statute
works to protect individuals of both sexes from discrimina-
tion, and does so equally”). The “background circum-
stances” rule flouts that basic principle.
   The “background circumstances” rule also ignores our in-
struction to avoid inflexible applications of McDonnell
Douglas’s first prong. This Court has repeatedly explained
that the “precise requirements of a prima facie case can
vary depending on the context and were ‘never intended to
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’ ” Swierkiewicz v.
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                      7

                           Opinion of the Court

Sorema N. A., 

 (2002) (quoting Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 

 (1978)). In
McDonnell Douglas itself, we observed that the “facts nec-
essarily will vary in Title VII cases,” and that “the prima
facie proof required” can therefore differ from case to case.

.
   The “background circumstances” rule disregards this ad-
monition by uniformly subjecting all majority-group plain-
tiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in
every case. As the Sixth Circuit observed, the rule effec-
tively requires majority-group plaintiffs (and only majority-
group plaintiffs) to produce certain types of evidence—such
as statistical proof or information about the relevant deci-
sionmaker’s protected traits—that would not otherwise be
required to make out a prima facie case. 

.
   This Court has long rejected such “inflexible formula-
tion[s]” of the prima facie standard in disparate-treatment
cases. Teamsters v. United States, 

(1977). We do so again today.
                                B
   Ohio barely contests any of the above. At oral argument,
the State repeatedly acknowledged that Title VII’s dispar-
ate-treatment provision imposes the same prima facie bur-
den on majority-group plaintiffs that it imposes on minor-
ity-group plaintiffs.3 Its brief likewise offers no justification
for imposing a heightened evidentiary standard on major-
ity-group plaintiffs. Instead, Ohio tries to attack the prem-
ise of the question presented by arguing that the “back-
ground circumstances” rule does not operate to subject

——————
  3 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39 (“Ohio agrees it is wrong to hold some litigants

to a higher standard because of their protected characteristics”); id., at
44 (endorsing the Solicitor General’s position that Title VII imposes the
same standards on majority-group and minority-group plaintiffs); id., at
49–51 (confirming that Ames “should have the same burden” as other
plaintiffs).
8           AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                      Opinion of the Court

majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened evidentiary stand-
ard at all. Under Ohio’s view, the “background circum-
stances” requirement “is not an additional prima facie ele-
ment” but, rather, “just another way of asking whether the
circumstances surrounding an employment decision, if oth-
erwise unexplained, suggest that the decision was because
of a protected characteristic.” Brief for Respondent 10.
    This contention is directly at odds with the Court of Ap-
peals’ description of the “background circumstances” rule
and its application of that requirement in this case. The
Court of Appeals explicitly held that “Ames is heterosexual
. . . which means she must make a showing in addition to
the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” 

 (emphasis added). And the ensuing passage
of the court’s opinion confirmed that a higher evidentiary
standard was being imposed on Ames because of her sexual
orientation. The court stated: “Whether Ames made the
necessary showing of ‘background circumstances’ is the
principal issue here” because “otherwise Ames’s prima-facie
case was easy to make.” 

 The court then recounted
how Ames was qualified, had been denied a promotion in
favor of a gay candidate, and was later demoted in favor of
another gay candidate—evidence that would ordinarily sat-
isfy her prima facie burden—before it specifically faulted
Ames for failing to make the “requisite showing of ‘back-
ground circumstances.’ ” 

    In short, the Sixth Circuit expressly based its holding af-
firming summary judgment in favor of the agency on
Ames’s failure to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard.
Ohio’s attempt to recast the “background circumstances”
rule as an application of the ordinary prima facie standard
thus misses the mark by a mile.
    Ohio also urges this Court to affirm the judgment below
on alternative grounds, arguing that Ames’s Title VII
claims would fail even absent the “background circum-
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            9

                     Opinion of the Court

stances” rule. But those alternative arguments would re-
quire us to resolve issues that the Court of Appeals did not
address in the first instance and that fall beyond the scope
of the question presented. We granted review to consider
the validity of the “background circumstances” rule, and we
reject that rule for the reasons set forth above. We leave it
to the courts below to address any of Ohio’s remaining ar-
guments on remand.
                         *    *    *
  The Sixth Circuit has implemented a rule that requires
certain Title VII plaintiffs—those who are members of ma-
jority groups—to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard
in order to carry their burden under the first step of the
McDonnell Douglas framework. We conclude that Title VII
does not impose such a heightened standard on majority-
group plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment below is vacated,
and the case is remanded for application of the proper
prima facie standard.
                                           It is so ordered.
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            1

                    THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                         No. 23–1039
                         _________________


      MARLEAN A. AMES, PETITIONER v. OHIO
       DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
            APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                        [June 5, 2025]

  JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins,
concurring.
  I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to
highlight the problems that arise when judges create atex-
tual legal rules and frameworks. Judge-made doctrines
have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text,
impose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confu-
sion for courts. The “background circumstances” rule—cor-
rectly rejected by the Court today—is one example of this
phenomenon. And, the decision below involves another ex-
ample: The Sixth Circuit analyzed Ames’s Title VII claim
under the three-step framework developed by this Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 

 (1973). As
with the “background circumstances” rule, the McDonnell
Douglas framework lacks any basis in the text of Title VII
and has proved difficult for courts to apply. In a case where
the parties ask us to do so, I would be willing to consider
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework is a workable
and useful evidentiary tool.
                              I
  The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule im-
poses a heightened burden on Title VII plaintiffs who be-
long to so-called “majority groups.” See 

(2023). The rule requires a majority-group plaintiff to
2             AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                        THOMAS, J., concurring

prove, in addition to the standard elements of a Title VII
claim, that background circumstances “ ‘support the suspi-
cion that the defendant is that unusual employer who dis-
criminates against the majority.’ ” 

 This additional re-
quirement is a paradigmatic example of how judge-made
doctrines can distort the underlying statutory text.
  As the Court’s opinion explains, the “background circum-
stances” rule lacks any basis in the text of Title VII. Ante,
at 6. Title VII bars employment discrimination against
“any individual” “because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1).
“Thus, to state the obvious, the statute bars discrimination
against ‘any individual’ on the grounds specified therein.”

 (Kethledge, J., concurring). The “back-
ground circumstances” rule plainly contravenes that statu-
tory command by imposing a higher burden on some indi-
viduals based solely on their membership in a particular
demographic group.1
  This rule is a product of improper judicial lawmaking.
See Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 

 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile interpreting and
applying substantive law is the essence of the ‘judicial
Power’ created under Article III of the Constitution, that
power does not encompass the making of substantive law”).
The rule was created by D. C. Circuit judges in Parker v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 

 (1981). Applying
their own “common sense,” these judges determined that
extra evidence is required to prove discrimination when a
Title VII plaintiff is white. 

. In support of this
proposition, the court cited only its mistaken understand-
ing of the McDonnell Douglas framework, another judge-
——————
  1 The “background circumstances” rule is also plainly at odds with the

Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. That guarantee “ ‘cannot
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to [another].’ ” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President
and Fellows of Harvard College, 

 (2023).
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             3

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

made construct, see Part II, infra. 

. At
no point in its development of this new rule did the court
refer to the text of Title VII.
   The “background circumstances” rule also highlights how
judge-made doctrines can be difficult for courts to apply.
Because courts lack an underlying legal authority on which
to ground their analysis, there is no principled way to re-
solve doctrinal ambiguities. The “background circum-
stances” rule suffers from this flaw. A number of courts
have described the rule as “vague and ill-defined.” E.g.,
Iadimarco v. Runyon, 

 (CA3 1999); see
also Stock v. Universal Foods Corp., 

 (Md 1993) (describing the rule as “vague and difficult
to apply”). Most notably, the “background circumstances”
rule requires courts to perform the difficult—if not impossi-
ble—task of deciding whether a particular plaintiff quali-
fies as a member of the so-called “majority.” See Smyer v.
Kroger Ltd. Partnership 1, 

, *7 (CA6, Mar.
8, 2024) (Boggs, J., concurring) (explaining that we live “[i]n
a world where it has become increasingly difficult to deter-
mine who belongs in the majority”).
   How a court defines the boundaries of a population can
affect whether a particular person falls into a majority or
minority group. Women, for example, make up the majority
in the United States as a whole, but not in some States and
counties. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, L.
Blakeslee, Z. Caplan, J. Meyer, M. Rabe, & A. Roberts, Age
and Sex Composition: 2020, pp. 2, 8, 14–15 (C2020BR–06,
2023) (Census Bureau). Similarly, women make up the ma-
jority of employees in certain industries, such as teaching
and nursing, but the minority in other industries, such as
construction. Brief for America First Legal Foundation as
Amicus Curiae 13 (citing Dept. of Labor, Occupations With
the Largest Share of Women Workers (Apr. 2025), https://
www.dol.gov/agencies/wb/data/occupations/largest-share-
women-workers; Dept. of Labor, Occupations With the
4             AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                         THOMAS, J., concurring

Smallest Share of Women Workers (Apr. 2025), https://www
.dol.gov/agencies/wb/data/occupations/occupations-smallest-
share-women-workers).
  Defining the “majority” is even more difficult in the con-
text of race, as racial categories tend to be “overbroad” and
“imprecise in many ways.” Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 

 (2023).2 “American families have become increas-
ingly multicultural,” and “attempts to divide us all up into
a handful of groups have become only more incoherent
with time.” 

 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). And,
even if courts could identify all the relevant racial groups
and their boundaries, courts would still struggle to deter-
mine which racial groups make up a majority. Black em-
ployees in Detroit, for example, make up a majority in
their city, but not in Michigan or the United States at
large. See Census Bureau, Quick Facts: Detroit City,
Michigan (July 2024), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/detroitcitymichigan/PST045224; Census Bureau,
Quick Facts: Michigan (July 2024), https://www.census
.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/MI/PST045224.
  Similar problems arise with religion. As with sex and
race, a particular religion could make up the majority or the
minority, depending on how the population is defined. And,
in the context of religion, the “background circumstances”
——————
   2 “The term ‘Asian,’ ” for example, “is extremely broad and masks im-

portant variations by country of origin.” R. Bhopal, Migration, Ethnicity,
Race, and Health in Multicultural Societies 18 (2d ed. 2014). Courts
have also struggled to determine what it means to be “Hispanic.” See,
e.g., Major Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Erie Cty., 134 App. Div. 2d 872, 873–
874, 521 N. Y. S. 2d 959, 960 (1987) (upholding an administrative deter-
mination that a person with one Mexican grandparent did not qualify as
Hispanic); see also M. Lopez, J. Krogstad, & J. Passel, Pew Research
Center, Who Is Hispanic? (Sept. 15, 2022), https://web.archive.org/web/
20220930084123/https:/www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/09/15/who
-is-hispanic/ (describing “evolving cultural norms about what it means to
be Hispanic or Latino in the U. S. today”).
                 Cite as: 

 (2025)            5

                    THOMAS, J., concurring

rule requires courts to decide both the plaintiff ’s religion
and how the plaintiff ’s religion compares with the religion
of everyone else in the relevant population. Those tasks are
formidable, as Americans hold a wide range of religious be-
liefs, as well as a wide range of views about the proper way
to categorize other religions. Americans have different
views, for example, on whether Catholics are Christians.
The “judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve”
these kinds of faith-based “differences.” Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 

(1981); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-
Berru, 

, 761 (2020) (“[D]etermining whether a
person is a ‘co-religionist’ will not always be easy”).
   Courts that have adopted the “background circum-
stances” rule have offered no guidance on how to decide
whether a particular person is a member of the “majority.”
See Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 

(CADC 1986) (“[N]either this court nor the Supreme Court
has squarely addressed the issue whether minority status
for purposes of a prima facie case could have a regional or
local meaning”). Instead, judges have been left to their own
devices to make these challenging determinations.
   Most courts appear to have sidestepped these difficulties
by abandoning the search for neutral principles and instead
assuming that the “background circumstances” rule applies
only to white and male plaintiffs. The Tenth Circuit, for
example, assumed that the rule applies to “white plain-
tiff[s]” on the ground that white individuals are “members
of a historically favored group.” Taken v. Oklahoma Corp.
Comm’n, 

 (1997). Similarly, the D. C.
Circuit applied the rule to a white plaintiff while acknowl-
edging that “[o]f course whites are in the minority in the
District of Columbia.” Bishopp, 

, and n. 5.
In other words, courts with this rule have enshrined into
Title VII’s antidiscrimination law an explicitly race-based
preference: White plaintiffs must prove the existence of
6             AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                         THOMAS, J., concurring

background circumstances, while nonwhite plaintiffs need
not do so. Such a rule is undoubtedly contrary to Title VII,
and likely violates the Constitution, under which “there can
be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 

(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment); see n. 1, supra.
   Thankfully, today’s decision obviates the need for courts
to engage in the “sordid business” of “divvying us up by
race” or any other protected trait. League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, 

 (2006)
(ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). I simply observe that the
“background circumstances” rule is emblematic of the seri-
ous challenges that can arise when judges invent atextual
requirements.3 For too long, that rule put “a deep scratch
across [the] surface” of Title VII. 

 (Keth-
ledge, J., concurring). I am pleased that the Court rejects
it in full today.
                            II
  This case involves a second judge-made rule. Relying on
Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit applied the three-step
framework developed by this Court in McDonnell Douglas
——————
   3 The “ ‘background circumstances’ ” rule is nonsensical for an addi-

tional reason: It requires courts to assume that only an “ ‘unusual em-
ployer’ ” would discriminate against those it perceives to be in the major-
ity. 

 (CA6 2023). But, a number of this Nation’s largest
and most prestigious employers have overtly discriminated against those
they deem members of so-called majority groups. American employers
have long been “obsessed” with “diversity, equity, and inclusion” initia-
tives and affirmative action plans. Brief for America First Legal Foun-
dation as Amicus Curiae 8. Initiatives of this kind have often led to overt
discrimination against those perceived to be in the majority. Harvard
College, 

 (THOMAS, J., concurring); Preston v. Wisconsin
Health Fund, 

 (CA7 2005) (Posner, J., for the court)
(explaining that companies are “under pressure from affirmative action
plans” to discriminate in favor of members of so-called minority groups).
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)              7

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

to determine whether Ames’s Title VII claim should survive
summary judgment. The Court today assumes without de-
ciding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is an appro-
priate tool for making that determination. Ante, at 4, n. 2.
But, the judge-made McDonnell Douglas framework has no
basis in the text of Title VII. And, as I have previously ex-
plained, lower courts’ extension of this doctrine into the
summary-judgment context has caused “significant confu-
sion” and “troubling outcomes on the ground.” Hittle v. City
of Stockton, 

, ___–___ (2025) (opinion dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 3–4). In an appro-
priate case, this Court should consider whether the McDon-
nell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool to evaluate
Title VII claims at summary judgment.
                               A
   The McDonnell Douglas framework is a judge-made evi-
dentiary “tool.” Comcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African
American-Owned Media, 

 (2020). It was
originally developed for courts to use in a bench trial. Hit-
tle, 604 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3).
Its intended purpose was to help “bring the litigants and
the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate ques-
tion” in a Title VII case—that is, whether “the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 

(1981).
   The framework has three steps, which this Court has
summarized as follows: “First, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima fa-
cie case of discrimination.” 

 at 252–253. “Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the bur-
den shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’ ”

 at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 

).
“Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff
8           AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” 450 U. S., at 253.
   The McDonnell Douglas framework was made “out of
whole cloth.” Hittle, 604 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS,
J.) (slip op., at 3). Its contours have no basis in the text of
Title VII or any other source of law. And, as far as I can
tell, this Court has never attempted to justify it on textual
grounds. Ibid.; see Tynes v. Florida Dept. of Juvenile Jus-
tice, 

 (CA11 2023) (Newsom, J., concur-
ring) (“There’s certainly no textual warrant in Title VII or
the Federal Rules for so elaborate a scheme, and so far as I
know, no one has ever even sought to justify it as rooted in
either”); Griffith v. Des Moines, 

 (CA8
2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially) (“Absent from
th[e] opinion was any justification or authority for this
scheme”).
                              B
  The McDonnell Douglas framework exemplifies how
judge-made doctrines can have amorphous bounds. Alt-
hough originally designed for the bench-trial context, the
McDonnell Douglas framework has over the years “taken
on a life of its own.” Tynes, 

 (Newsom, J.,
concurring). It is today “the presumptive means of resolv-
ing Title VII cases at summary judgment.” 

 And, that
development has come without this Court ever consider-
ing—much less holding—that the framework is an appro-
priate tool for the summary-judgment task.
  Far from extending the framework to new contexts, this
Court has taken steps to “limi[t] the relevancy and applica-
bility of the McDonnell Douglas framework.” T. Tymkovich,
The Problem With Pretext, 85 Denver U. L. Rev. 503, 507
(2008) (Tymkovich). For example, this Court has held that
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                     9

                         THOMAS, J., concurring

McDonnell Douglas is “inapplicable” when the plaintiff re-
lies on direct evidence to prove his claim. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Thurston, 

 (1985). The Court
has also held that the framework does not apply in Title VII
mixed-motive cases. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 

 (1989) (plurality opinion). We have said that the
framework is inapplicable at the pleading stage,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 

 (2002),
and in deciding post-trial motions, Postal Service Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 

 (1983). This Court
has further explained that a plaintiff need not satisfy the
first step of the framework at trial. 

 And, we have
strongly suggested that the framework should not be refer-
enced in jury instructions because it is too confusing. Vance
v. Ball State Univ., 

, 444–445, and n. 13
(2013).
   Notwithstanding this Court’s steps to limit McDonnell
Douglas, it is now the framework that “courts typically ap-
ply” “to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered suffi-
cient evidence to survive summary judgment.” Jackson v.
VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital, Inc., 

(CA6 2016). The reason for this expansion is unclear. This
Court has only once addressed the application of McDonnell
Douglas to Title VII cases at summary judgment, and it
held that the framework did not apply. See Trans World
Airlines, 

.4 But, however we got here,
McDonnell Douglas now undeniably plays a prominent role
in Title VII cases at summary judgment.


——————
  4 To be sure, this Court has assumed without deciding that the McDon-

nell Douglas framework applies at summary judgment in contexts out-
side of Title VII. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,

 (1996) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). But,
as far as I can tell, this Court has never had occasion to decide whether
the McDonnell Douglas framework is a useful or appropriate tool for
evaluating any kind of claim at summary judgment.
10          AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

                                C
   I seriously doubt that the McDonnell Douglas framework
is a suitable tool for evaluating Title VII claims at summary
judgment. In my view, the framework is incompatible with
the summary-judgment standard; it fails to encompass the
various ways in which a plaintiff could prove his claim; it
requires courts to maintain artificial distinctions between
direct and circumstantial evidence; and it has created out-
sized judicial confusion.
                              1
  My first concern is that the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is incompatible with the summary-judgment standard
set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
  Rule 56(a) requires a court to grant summary judgment
when the movant establishes that there is “no genuine dis-
pute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” But, “the language this Court
has used to describe the [McDonnell Douglas] framework
does not neatly track” that rule. Hittle, 604 U. S., at ___
(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4). Namely, the frame-
work does not speak in terms of “genuine dispute[s]” re-
garding the facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). Instead, it
speaks in terms of “proving” facts “by the preponderance of
the evidence.” Burdine, 450 U. S., at 252–253. That differ-
ence is significant because “a plaintiff need not establish or
prove any elements—by a preponderance or otherwise—to
survive summary judgment.” Hittle, 604 U. S., at ___ (opin-
ion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 4). In my view, requiring a
plaintiff to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework—as
this Court has described it—requires a plaintiff to prove too
much at summary judgment.
  If courts are to apply McDonnell Douglas at summary
judgment, they must modify the framework to match the
applicable legal standard. For example, at the third step,
the question for the court cannot be whether the plaintiff
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)              11

                      THOMAS, J., concurring

has “prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant . . . were a pre-
text for discrimination.” Burdine, 

. In-
stead, the plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence to
create a “genuine dispute as to” whether the employer’s
stated reason was pretextual. Rule 56(a).
                                 2
   A second problem with the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is that it fails to capture all the ways in which a plain-
tiff can prove a Title VII claim. See Hittle, 604 U. S., at ___
(opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 5). McDonnell Douglas
“sets forth criteria that, if satisfied, will allow a plaintiff to
prove a Title VII violation.” 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).
But, satisfying McDonnell Douglas is “not the only way” to
prevail under Title VII. 604 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).
   For example, the text of Title VII provides that “an un-
lawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employ-
ment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(m) (emphasis added). In
other words, a plaintiff may establish a Title VII violation
by proving that an employer took an employment action in
part because of an unlawful motive.
   Yet, the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a plain-
tiff to prove that “the legitimate reasons offered by the de-
fendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Burdine, 

. That require-
ment demands more than the text of Title VII: Under the
statute, a plaintiff need not establish that the employer’s
stated reason for its action was wholly pretextual. A plain-
tiff could prevail even if the employer’s stated reason was
part of the reason for the employer’s action. It follows that
a plaintiff ’s inability to satisfy McDonnell Douglas’s third
step does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff ’s claim
12          AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

should fail. In view of that problem, this Court has held
that the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be used
in cases where the plaintiff argues that the employer oper-
ated with mixed motives. Price Waterhouse, 

 (plurality opinion). Instead, the framework appears to
be limited to cases where the plaintiff argues that discrim-
ination was the sole factor influencing the employer’s deci-
sion. But, “[n]othing in the text of [Title VII] indicates that
Congress intended courts to maintain this dichotomy.”
Tymkovich 522.
  And, even in so-called single-motive cases, McDonnell
Douglas fails to capture all the ways in which a plaintiff
could prevail. See Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 

, 1310 (CA11 2023) (observing that a plaintiff
can prove a Title VII claim without satisfying McDonnell
Douglas’s three steps). A plaintiff who cannot establish a
prima facie case at the first step or pretext at the third step
can still prevail under Title VII so long as his evidence
raises a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.
The “ultimate question” is simply whether “the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” Burdine,

.
                               3
   Another problem with the McDonnell Douglas framework
is that it requires courts to draw and maintain an artificial
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.
   This Court has held that “the McDonnell Douglas test is
inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.” Trans World Airlines, 

.
Our precedent therefore requires courts to “make the often
subtle and difficult distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indi-
rect’ or ‘circumstantial’ evidence.” Price Waterhouse, 

 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
   In most civil litigation contexts, courts have no occasion
to distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence.
                  Cite as: 

 (2025)             13

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

“[I]n any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct
or circumstantial evidence,” or some combination thereof.
Aikens, 

. And, the law makes no dis-
tinction regarding the weight or value assigned to either
kind of evidence. “The reason for treating circumstantial
and direct evidence alike,” we have explained, “is both clear
and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only suffi-
cient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persua-
sive than direct evidence.’ ” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 

 (2003).
   That “ ‘[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation’ ”—that a
plaintiff can proceed with direct or circumstantial evi-
dence—applies with full force to Title VII cases. 

.
Yet, McDonnell Douglas requires courts to determine at the
outset the nature of the evidence before it, which often pro-
longs litigation instead of streamlining it. See, e.g., Oth-
man v. Country Club Hills, 

 (CA8 2012).
Because a Title VII plaintiff can prove his claim with either
direct or circumstantial evidence, I am skeptical of a frame-
work that requires courts to perform the “difficult” task of
characterizing each piece of evidence. Price Waterhouse,

 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
                                 4
   That the McDonnell Douglas framework “has befuddled”
courts “[s]ince its inception” is yet another reason to ques-
tion it. Griffith, 

 (Magnuson, J., concurring
specially). Six years after this Court created the frame-
work, the First Circuit observed that “the subtleties of
McDonnell Douglas are confusing” and “have caused con-
siderable difficulty for judges of all levels.” Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 

 (CA1 1979). That early confusion
never dissipated. A decade later, Justice Kennedy made
the same observation, explaining that “[l]ower courts long
have had difficulty applying McDonnell Douglas.” Price
Waterhouse, 

 (dissenting opinion). About
14          AMES v. OHIO DEPT. OF YOUTH SERVS.

                     THOMAS, J., concurring

20 years after that, Judge Tymkovich too observed that
“[l]ower courts have struggled to implement the burden-
shifting framework for over thirty years.” Tymkovich 529.
The McDonnell Douglas framework has been on the books
for over 50 years now, and courts still report “continuing
confusion.” Tynes, 

; see also Hittle, 604
U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 6) (collect-
ing examples). That those who have carefully grappled
with the framework for decades cannot make sense of it
suggests that the framework is unworkable.
                             D
   This case did not present the question whether the
McDonnell Douglas framework is an appropriate tool for
evaluating Title VII claims at summary judgment. In a
case where that issue is squarely before us, I would consider
whether the framework should be used for that purpose.
   In the meantime, litigants and lower courts are free to
proceed without the McDonnell Douglas framework. This
Court has never required anyone to use it. And, district
courts are well equipped to resolve summary judgment mo-
tions without it. Every day—and in almost every context
except the Title VII context—district courts across the
country resolve summary judgment motions by applying
the straightforward text of Rule 56. In my view, it might
behoove courts and litigants to take that same approach in
Title VII cases.
                       *    *    *
  Atextual, judge-created legal rules have a tendency to
generate complexity, confusion, and erroneous results. I
am pleased that the Court correctly rejects the atextual
“background circumstances” rule today.