Bouarfa v. Mayorkas

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2024                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 

.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

          BOUARFA v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF
              HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

  No. 23–583.      Argued October 15, 2024—Decided December 10, 2024
Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, began the process of obtaining perma-
 nent legal residence for Ala’a Hamayel, her noncitizen spouse, by filing
 a visa petition with the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
 (USCIS). Relevant here, USCIS “shall . . . approve” a visa petition if
 it “determines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that
 the noncitizen is the petitioner’s spouse. 

(b) (emphasis
 added). But if the noncitizen has previously sought or received an im-
 migration benefit “by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney
 General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the im-
 migration laws”—known as the sham-marriage bar—the agency must
 deny the petition. §1154(c). USCIS initially approved Bouarfa’s visa
 petition. Two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent
 to Revoke its approval based on evidence suggesting that her husband
 had previously entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading im-
 migration laws. Although Bouarfa vigorously denied the evidence, the
 agency revoked its prior approval based on the Secretary of Homeland
 Security’s statutory authority under §1155 to “revoke the approval of
 any petition” “for good and sufficient cause.” The Board of Immigra-
 tion Appeals affirmed the revocation, finding that USCIS’s determina-
 tion that Hamayel had entered into a prior sham marriage that would
 have prevented initial approval of the petition under §1154(c) consti-
 tuted “good and sufficient cause” for revocation under §1155.
    Bouarfa challenged the agency’s revocation in federal court. The
 District Court dismissed the suit, holding that §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a
 provision that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain dis-
 cretionary agency decisions—barred judicial review of the agency’s
 revocation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
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                                  Syllabus

Held: Revocation of an approved visa petition under §1155 based on a
 sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discre-
 tionary decision that falls within the purview of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),
 which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in
 the discretion of ” the agency. Pp. 6–12.
    (a) Section 1155 is a quintessential grant of discretion: The Secre-
 tary “may” revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any time” for
 what the Secretary deems “good and sufficient cause.” Such a broad
 grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is
 similar to other statutes held to “ ‘commi[t]’ ” a decision “ ‘to agency dis-
 cretion.’ ” Webster v. Doe, 

. Congress did not impose
 specific criteria or conditions limiting this authority, nor did it pre-
 scribe how or when the Secretary must act. Context reinforces the
 discretionary nature of §1155. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s neighboring
 provision, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), bars judicial review under specific provi-
 sions, each of which contains language indicating that the decisions
 involved are entrusted to the discretion of the Attorney General. Sec-
 tion 1155 contains similar language. Pp. 6–8.
    (b) Bouarfa argues that although some revocations are discretion-
 ary, the revocation here was not, so §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not apply to
 preclude judicial review. Bouarfa contends that once the Secretary
 approves a petition and later determines that the beneficiary had pre-
 viously entered into a sham marriage, the Secretary has no choice but
 to revoke the agency’s approval. Neither the statutory text nor its con-
 text limits the Secretary’s discretion in this way. Pp. 8–12.
       (1) Contrary to Bouarfa’s argument, §1154(c)’s text nowhere cre-
 ates an ongoing duty for the agency to continually confirm that its in-
 itial approval was sound. Instead, §1154(c)’s command to the agency
 extends only to the point of approval. Turning to §1154(c)’s context,
 Bouarfa argues that because a noncitizen may use an approved visa
 petition to continue along the path toward permanent residency, Con-
 gress implicitly required the agency to continually reassess its prior
 approval. But nothing in the statutory scheme requires revisiting past
 decisions of approval; rather, each stage of the process comes with its
 own criteria. Indeed, the specific grant of discretion in §1155 to revoke
 prior approval of a visa petition forecloses the argument that Congress
 silently mandated revocation in certain situations. Pp. 8–9.
       (2) Bouarfa’s assertion that the Secretary always revokes the
 agency’s approval of a visa petition if the agency later makes a sham-
 marriage determination makes no difference because Congress did not
 make the availability of judicial review dependent on agency practice.
 Rather, §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made dis-
 cretionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 

, 246–247
 (emphasis added). Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that Congress
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                                Syllabus

  created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is subject
  to judicial review when an agency denies a visa petition but not when
  the agency revokes a prior approval. That distinction “reflects Con-
  gress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary
  relief.” Patel v. Garland, 

. Pp. 9–11.
       (3) Precedent, likewise, does not mandate Bouarfa’s interpreta-
  tion. Unlike the discretionary determination at issue in Patel v. Gar-
  land, §1155’s revocation authorization has no “threshold require-
  ments” to access the relevant discretion, id., at 332, 347, so Patel does
  not help Bouarfa. Finally, because the presumption that administra-
  tive action is subject to judicial review may be overcome by “ ‘clear and
  convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to preclude judicial re-
  view,” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

, there is no need
  to resort to the presumption of reviewability where, as here, “the stat-
  ute is clear,” Patel, 

. Pp. 11–12.

, affirmed.

  JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 23–583
                                   _________________


   AMINA BOUARFA, PETITIONER v. ALEJANDRO
     MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
              SECURITY, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
          APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                              [December 10, 2024]

   JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
   A common feature of our Nation’s complex system of law-
ful immigration is mandatory statutory rules paired with
discretionary exceptions. Executive Branch agencies im-
plement both. Whether any given agency decision is man-
datory or discretionary matters, because Congress has lim-
ited judicial review of many discretionary determinations.
See 

, as amended, 

(a)(2)(B).
This case involves the Secretary of Homeland Security’s de-
cision to revoke initial approval of a visa petition that
Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, filed on behalf of her noncit-
izen spouse.
   The Secretary points to 

 as the source of
the agency’s revocation authority; that provision states that
the Secretary “may, at any time,” revoke approval of a visa
petition “for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.”
The issue we address today is whether revocation under
§1155 qualifies as a decision “in the discretion of ” the Sec-
retary such that it falls within the purview of a separate
statute—§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—that strips federal courts of ju-
risdiction to review certain discretionary actions. We hold
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                      Opinion of the Court

that it does.
                               I
                               A
   The agency decision at issue in this case occurs along the
pathway to permanent legal status for a noncitizen spouse
of a U. S. citizen. There is no dispute about the steps in-
volved. A U. S. citizen kicks off the process by filing an im-
migrant visa petition on behalf of her spouse with the U. S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which ex-
ercises authority delegated by the Attorney General and
Secretary of Homeland Security. §1154(a). If USCIS ap-
proves the petition, the noncitizen may then apply for an
immigrant visa to enter the country as a lawful permanent
resident, §§1201(a), 1202(a), or, if he is already in the coun-
try, for adjustment of status, §1255.
   USCIS’s decision to approve or deny a visa petition filed
on behalf of a noncitizen spouse involves a number of man-
datory determinations. For instance, if the agency “deter-
mines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that
the noncitizen is the petitioner’s spouse, it “shall . . . ap-
prove the petition.” §1154(b) (emphasis added). However,
as relevant here, there is also a mandatory exception: If the
noncitizen “has previously been accorded” or “sought to be
accorded” an immigration benefit “by reason of a marriage
determined by the Attorney General to have been entered
into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws,” the
agency must deny the petition. §1154(c). This is known as
the sham-marriage bar, and, although we have never held
as much, the parties agree that judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 

 et seq.,
is available to challenge the agency’s invocation of it. See,
e.g., Mendoza v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, 

, 1354–1356 (CA11 2017) (per curiam);
Ruiz v. Mukasey, 

, 275–276 (CA2 2009).
   The visa-petition-approval process for noncitizen spouses
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                          Opinion of the Court

of U. S. citizens can also involve certain non-mandatory de-
terminations that Congress has authorized agency officials
to make. One such statutory provision is at issue here: It
broadly states that the Secretary “may, at any time, for
what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the
approval of any petition.” §1155.1
   We took this case to determine whether the Secretary’s
decision under §1155 to revoke the agency’s approval of a
visa petition based on a sham-marriage determination is
the kind of discretionary decision that falls within
§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a jurisdiction-stripping provision. As
noted above, in the immigration realm, properly identifying
the mandatory or discretionary nature of a particular
agency decision can be critical, precisely because that sta-
tus has implications for whether the agency’s decision can
be challenged in court. Through §1252(a)(2)(B), Congress
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review two catego-
ries of discretionary agency decisions. First, Congress pre-
cluded review of “any judgment regarding the granting of
relief under” five listed statutory provisions that empower
the Attorney General to grant certain relief to noncitizens.
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, in the provision at issue here,
Congress barred review of “any other decision or action of
the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity the authority for which is specified under this subchap-
ter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the
Secretary.”2 §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).


——————
  1 In a separate provision, Congress has limited the reasons why the

Secretary may revoke the approval of a visa petition for some petitioners.
See 

(h). That provision does not limit the Secretary’s
discretion to revoke based on a sham-marriage determination and is
therefore not relevant here.
  2 In certain contexts, Congress has restored judicial review over “con-

stitutional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D). The parties agree
that this case does not implicate that provision.
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                      Opinion of the Court

                               B
    Amina Bouarfa is a U. S. citizen who married Ala’a Ha-
mayel, a noncitizen and Palestinian national. They have
three young children, all of whom are U. S. citizens. A few
years after they married, Bouarfa filed a visa petition on
Hamayel’s behalf.
    USCIS initially approved the petition. But two years
later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke
its approval. The agency informed Bouarfa that it had un-
covered evidence suggesting that, nearly a decade earlier,
her husband had entered into a marriage for the purpose of
evading immigration laws. According to the agency, during
an interrogation, Hamayel’s ex-wife had stated that her
marriage with Hamayel had been “ fraudulent ” and that
she had asked him for $5,000 before filing a visa petition on
his behalf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The agency told
Bouarfa that, had it been aware of this evidence at the time
it reviewed her visa petition, it never would have approved
it.
    Bouarfa vigorously denied these characterizations. She
pointed out that her husband’s ex-wife had later recanted
her statements, claiming that she had made them under
duress. Nonetheless, USCIS concluded that there was
“substantial and probative evidence to support a finding
that” Hamayel’s prior marriage “was for the purpose of con-
veying immigration benefits.” Addendum to Brief for Peti-
tioner 12a. Recognizing that the Secretary was permitted
to “revoke the approval of any petition” “for good and suffi-
cient cause,” id., at 9a, the agency decided to revoke ap-
proval of the visa petition that Bouarfa had filed on her hus-
band’s behalf.
    Bouarfa appealed that revocation to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, which affirmed. The Board explained that
USCIS had revoked its approval because it determined that
the “visa petition was approved in error” in light of
§1154(c)’s sham-marriage bar. App. 12. On de novo review,
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                          Opinion of the Court

the Board concluded that the evidence supported USCIS’s
determination that Hamayel had entered into a sham mar-
riage. The fact that such a determination would have pre-
vented the agency from approving the petition in the first
instance, the Board found, constituted “good and sufficient
cause” for revocation. 

.
   Having struck out before the agency, Bouarfa turned to
the courts. She filed an APA action in Federal District
Court, arguing that the agency’s revocation was “ ‘arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance
with law’ ” because the agency lacked sufficient evidence to
support its sham-marriage determination. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 25a. The District Court granted the Government’s
motion to dismiss, holding that §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), a juris-
diction-stripping provision, barred judicial review of the
agency’s revocation.
   In Bouarfa v. Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Security, 

 (2023), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It con-
cluded that the text of §1155 “makes clear that the Secre-
tary’s authority to revoke the approval of a petition is dis-
cretionary.” Id., at 1162. In the court’s view, it made no
difference that the agency rested its revocation on a deter-
mination that would have required the agency to deny the
petition in the first instance. “[N]othing in the statute,” the
court reasoned, “requires the Secretary to revoke the ap-
proval of a petition in any circumstance, even when the De-
partment later determines that the approval was in error.”
Ibid.
   We granted certiorari to resolve a question that has split
the courts of appeals: Whether federal courts have jurisdic-
tion to review the Secretary’s revocation of the agency’s
prior approval of a visa petition. 

 (2024).3
——————
  3 Two Circuits have held that federal courts may review challenges to

the Secretary’s revocations, at least in some situations. See Jomaa v.
United States, 

, 294–296 (CA6 2019); ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way,

, 894 (CA9 2004). A number of other Circuits have come
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                          Opinion of the Court

Bouarfa challenges the Secretary’s revocation on the as-
sumption that the fact that her husband is not in removal
proceedings does not affect the jurisdictional analysis.4
                                II
                                A
   It is clear on the face of §1155 that the revocation provi-
sion is a quintessential grant of discretion to the Secretary.
Once again, that provision provides that the Secretary
“may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and suffi-
cient cause, revoke the approval of any [visa] petition.”
§1155. As “[t]his Court has ‘repeatedly observed,’ ” “ ‘the
word “may” clearly connotes discretion.’ ” Biden v. Texas,

 (2022) (quoting Opati v. Republic of Su-
dan, 

 (2020)). Moreover, here, Congress
has in no way prescribed how that discretion must be exer-
cised. There are no conditions that the Secretary must sat-
isfy before he can revoke the agency’s approval; he may do
so “at any time,” for whatever reason “he deems to be good
and sufficient cause.” That broad grant of authority “fairly
exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other
statutes that we have held “ ‘commi[t]’ ” a decision “ ‘to
agency discretion.’ ” Webster v. Doe, 

(1988) (holding that a statute permitting the agency to ter-
minate an employee whenever it “ ‘deem[s] such termina-
tion necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States’ ” was discretionary).
   Context reinforces what the text makes plain. Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s neighboring provision, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i),
bars judicial review of determinations under five statutory

——————
out the other way. See Nouritajer v. Jaddou, 

 (CA2 2021);
Jilin Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 

 (CA3
2006); El-Khader v. Monica, 

 (CA7 2004).
  4 We therefore assume—without deciding—that §1252(a)(2)(B) applies

when, as here, a noncitizen is neither in removal proceedings nor seeking
review of a final order of removal.
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                      Opinion of the Court

provisions that address “different form[s] of discretionary
relief from removal.” Kucana v. Holder, 

(2010). Each of those provisions “contains language indi-
cating that the decision is entrusted to the Attorney Gen-
eral’s discretion.” Ibid.; see, e.g., §1229b(a) (“The Attorney
General may cancel removal . . . ”); §1229c(a)(1) (“The At-
torney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart
the United States . . . ”). Section 1155 contains similar lan-
guage.
   Indeed, many of the undoubtedly discretionary provisions
listed in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) vest less discretion in the Attor-
ney General than §1155 vests in the Secretary. The Attor-
ney General may, for instance, cancel removal for a perma-
nent resident only if he determines that the noncitizen has
been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years, has
continually resided in the United States for at least seven
years, and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
§1229b(a). He may exercise his discretion to waive the con-
sequences of a fraud determination that would otherwise
bar relief only if failing to do so “would result in extreme
hardship” to the noncitizen’s family members or, in certain
situations, the noncitizen. §1182(i)(1). And he has discre-
tion to adjust a noncitizen’s status only if he first confirms
that certain preconditions have been satisfied. §1255(a).
When it comes to the Secretary’s discretion to revoke the
agency’s approval of a visa petition, though, Congress im-
posed no such threshold requirements. If the provisions
listed in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) pertain to discretionary agency
determinations, surely §1155 does too.
   That discretion is a two-way street. By granting the Sec-
retary discretion to revoke the agency’s approval of visa pe-
titions, Congress has also vested the Secretary with discre-
tion to decline to revoke an approval the agency previously
gave. So, if the Secretary determines that the agency’s ap-
proval of a visa petition was erroneous, he can revoke that
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                      Opinion of the Court

approval—or he can let the error stand. As a general mat-
ter, then, this discretion may work to the benefit of visa-
petition beneficiaries, since rather than tying the agency’s
hands by forcing revocation, Congress created “room for
mercy.” Patel v. Garland, 

 (2022).
   In any event, when the Secretary opts to revoke a petition
that he determines should not have been approved in the
first place, the petitioner is not out of options. As the Gov-
ernment concedes, nothing prohibits a citizen from filing
another petition on behalf of the same relative. Brief for
Respondents 3. Indeed, Bouarfa has already taken ad-
vantage of that alternative here. After the Secretary re-
voked the agency’s approval of her petition, Bouarfa filed
another one. That petition is still pending, and if it is de-
nied due to the agency’s sham-marriage determination,
Bouarfa can seek judicial review of that determination.
                              B
  Bouarfa disputes hardly any of this. She concedes that
some revocations are discretionary for purposes of
§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). But she argues that this particular rev-
ocation was not. In Bouarfa’s view, if the Secretary ap-
proves a visa petition and later determines that the benefi-
ciary had previously entered into a sham marriage, the
Secretary has no choice but to revoke the agency’s approval.
We cannot agree. Nothing in the statute’s text or context
limits the Secretary’s discretion in this way.
                             1
   Bouarfa’s textual argument rests on §1154(c), which she
argues creates an ongoing duty for the agency to continu-
ally confirm that its prior approval was sound. Section
1154(c) commands that “no petition shall be approved” if
the Attorney General makes a sham-marriage determina-
tion. According to Bouarfa, we should interpret this provi-
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                     Opinion of the Court

sion as directing that “no petition shall be approved or re-
main approved” if a sham-marriage determination is made.
   The problem for Bouarfa’s argument is that §1154(c) no-
where suggests that its command extends beyond the point
of approval. Nothing in the provision mentions revocation.
And we need not guess in what situations Congress wanted
the Secretary to revoke the agency’s approval, because Con-
gress answered that question directly: The Secretary “may”
do so whenever he “deems” there to be “good and sufficient
cause.” §1155. This specific grant of discretion to revoke
forecloses the argument that Congress silently mandated
revocation in certain situations.
   Turning to context, Bouarfa argues that, because a
noncitizen may use an approved visa petition to continue
along the path toward lawful permanent residency, Con-
gress implicitly required the agency to continually reassess
whether its prior approval was in error. But nothing about
the statutory scheme requires the agency to revisit its past
decisions. Instead, each stage of the process comes with its
own criteria. See, e.g., §1255 (adjustment of status); §1182
(visa eligibility). Of course, if the Secretary determines at
any point along the way that the agency’s prior approval of
a visa petition was erroneous, he can exercise his discretion
to revoke it. Under Bouarfa’s interpretation, the Secretary
would be required to do so any time he determined that the
agency made a mistake—no matter the circumstance. Con-
gress, however, left that decision to the Secretary. The
agency’s mea culpa may—but need not—result in the
noncitizen losing his ability to gain permanent residency.
                               2
  With text and context against her, Bouarfa turns to
agency practice. She contends that, as a practical matter,
the Secretary always revokes the agency’s approval of a
visa petition if the agency later makes a sham-marriage de-
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                       Opinion of the Court

termination. That may be true. At oral argument, the Gov-
ernment was unable to identify a single instance in which
the agency declined to revoke its approval after determin-
ing that the beneficiary had entered into a sham marriage.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. But Congress did not make the availa-
bility of judicial review dependent on agency practice. Ra-
ther, §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions
“made discretionary by legislation.” Kucana, 558 U. S., at
246–247 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the fact that the
agency appears to be exercising its revocation discretion
consistently is a virtue, not a vice. Bouarfa’s use-it-or-lose-
it theory of agency discretion creates perverse incentives,
encouraging an agency to act arbitrarily (by revoking some
approvals after a sham-marriage finding while maintaining
others) or risk losing congressionally granted insulation
from judicial review.
   Nor is it unreasonable, as Bouarfa protests, to suppose
that Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage
determination is reviewable if it is the reason for the
agency’s denial of a petition, but not if it is the reason for
the agency’s revocation. That distinction “reflects Con-
gress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for
discretionary relief.” Patel, 

. In the inter-
est of finality, Congress vested the Secretary with the dis-
cretion to allow the agency’s mistakes to inure to the benefit
of the noncitizen. At the same time, Congress did not want
this discretion to open up a new source of litigation. Cf.
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 

 (2020) (ob-
serving Congress’s goal of “ ‘consolidat[ing] judicial review
of immigration proceedings into one action’ ” (quoting INS
v. St. Cyr, 

 (2001)). “[T]he context in
which” the agency makes the sham-marriage determina-
tion thus “explains the difference in protection afforded.”
Patel, 

.5
——————
 5 Bouarfa protests that this creates a loophole through which the
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                          Opinion of the Court

                               3
   Finally, our precedent does not mandate Bouarfa’s inter-
pretation. In Patel, we held that §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes
judicial review of factual findings that underlie a denial of
discretionary relief—including when those findings are
“threshold requirements established by Congress” to access
the relevant discretion. Id., at 332, 347. In concluding that
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i) reaches those threshold determinations,
we relied on the fact that the provision prohibits judicial
review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief ”
under the enumerated provisions. Id., at 338. Bouarfa ar-
gues that, because the jurisdiction-stripping provision at is-
sue here lacks similar language, its scope must be nar-
rower. But even assuming that is true, that does not help
Bouarfa here, because unlike the discretionary determina-
tion at issue in Patel, §1155’s revocation authorization has
no threshold requirements. We therefore need not resolve
whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdiction to re-
view threshold determinations that the agency must make
before exercising discretion.
   Bouarfa also leans on the general “presumption” that ad-
ministrative action is subject to judicial review. See Guer-
rero-Lasprilla, 

. But that presumption
may be overcome by “ ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of con-
gressional intent to preclude judicial review.” 

 (quot-
ing Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 

(1993)). Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—“which is, after all, a ju-
risdiction-stripping statute,” Patel, 596 U. S., at 347—
clearly expresses Congress’s desire to preclude judicial re-

——————
agency can insulate itself from judicial review by granting petitions it is
supposed to deny and then subsequently revoking its approval. But she
points to no evidence suggesting that the agency has done so in this case
or any other. Nor has she alleged that the agency violated constitutional
or procedural requirements when it revoked her petition. We express no
view as to whether a lawsuit with such allegations would be reviewable.
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                      Opinion of the Court

view of the Secretary’s discretionary revocation of an ap-
proved visa petition. “Because the statute is clear, we have
no reason to resort to the presumption of reviewability.”

                       *     *    *
   In §1155, Congress granted the Secretary broad author-
ity to revoke an approved visa petition “at any time, for
what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” Such a rev-
ocation is thus “in the discretion of ” the agency.
§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Where §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, then, it
bars judicial review of the Secretary’s revocation under
§1155. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
                                             It is so ordered.