Com. v. Pisarchuk, I.

J-S36021-23

                                

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 IAN PISARCHUK                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 647 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 9, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0004977-2021,
                          CP-09-CR-0005002-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 IAN PISARCHUK                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1165 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 9, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0005002-2021


BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED DECEMBER 5, 2023

      Appellant Ian Pisarchuk appeals from the judgments of sentence

imposed following his open guilty pleas to sexual abuse of children and related

offenses. Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentences. We

affirm.
J-S36021-23



      We adopt the trial court’s summary of the facts underlying this matter.

See Trial Ct. Op., 4/18/23, at 3-7. Briefly, from 2016 through 2021, Appellant

used various pseudonyms on the social media application Snapchat to

blackmail adult women and minor girls into sending him sexually explicit

photographs and videos of themselves. Appellant threatened to post nude

photos of the victims online if they did not comply with his demands.

Additionally, Appellant also threatened to kill some victims and threatened to

rape the sister of one victim.   The ages of the minor victims ranged from

twelve to seventeen years old.     Police found Appellant’s messages to the

victims as well as photos and videos of the victims depicting them nude or

engaging in sexual activities.    One of Appellant’s adult victims, Lindsey

Piccone, disappeared on September 6, 2016, the day after receiving a

message from Appellant in which he threatened to ruin her life. Lindsey’s

body was found on November 1, 2016, and the cause of death was determined

to be suicide.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of sexual abuse

of children (photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming

sexual acts), two counts of unlawful contact with a minor, three counts of

sexual abuse of children (child pornography), two counts of corruption of

minors, ten counts of sexual extortion, eight counts of stalking, two counts of

terroristic threats, seven counts of harassment, and three counts of cyber




                                     -2-
J-S36021-23



harassment of a child1 at Docket No. 4977-2021. The Commonwealth also

charged     Appellant    with    two    counts   of   sexual   abuse   of   children—

photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming sexual acts, two

counts of unlawful contact with a minor, two counts of child pornography,

eight counts of sexual extortion, one count of disseminating explicit sexual

material to a minor,2 two counts of corruption of minors, one count of criminal

use of a communication facility,3 five counts of stalking, two counts of

terroristic threats, four counts of harassment, and three counts of cyber

harassment of a child at Docket No. 5002-2021.

       On March 1, 2020, the Commonwealth nolle prossed two counts of cyber

harassment of a child and one count each of corruption of minors and sexual

extortion at Docket No. 4977-2021. N.T. Plea Hr’g, 3/1/22, at 2. Appellant

entered open guilty pleas to all of the remaining offenses. Id. at 48; see also

Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 3/1/22, at 1-10.             The trial court deferred

sentencing for the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to determine

whether Appellant was a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the

Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act4 (SORNA). N.T. Plea Hr’g,

____________________________________________


1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(b)(1), 6318(a)(1), 6312(d), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3133(a)(1),

2709.1(a)(2), 2706(a)(1), 2709(a)(5), and 2709(a.1)(1)(ii), respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 5903(c)(1).


3 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a).


4 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.




                                           -3-
J-S36021-23



3/1/22, at 47-48.     Appellant waived the preparation of a presentence

investigation (PSI) report. Id. at 51.

     The trial court summarized the subsequent procedural history as follows:

      On docket number 5002-2021, this court sentenced Appellant to
      undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no
      less than two (2) years to no more than five (5) years on Count
      One, sexual abuse of children—photographing, videotaping,
      depicting on computer or filming sexual acts; to undergo
      imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no less than
      two (2) years to no more than five (5) years on Count 2, sexual
      abuse of children—photographing, videotaping, depicting on
      computer or filming sexual acts; to undergo imprisonment in [a]
      state correctional institution for no less than two (2) years to no
      more than five (5) years on Count 7, sexual extortion; to undergo
      imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no less than
      two (2) years to no more than five (5) years on Count 8, sexual
      extortion; and to undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional
      institution for no less than two (2) years to no more than five (5)
      years on Count 24, terroristic threats. . . . These sentences were
      ordered to run consecutively.

      On docket number 4977-2021, this court sentenced Appellant to
      undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no
      less than one (1) year to no more than five (5) years on Count 1,
      sexual abuse of children—photographing, videotaping, depicting
      on computer or filming sexual acts; to undergo imprisonment in
      [a] state correctional institution for no less than one (1) year to
      no more than five (5) years on Count 2, sexual abuse of children—
      photographing, videotaping, depicting on computer or filming
      sexual acts; to undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional
      institution for no less than one (1) year to no more than two (2)
      years on Count 5, child pornography; to undergo imprisonment in
      [a] state correctional institution for no less than one (1) year to
      no more than two (2) years on Count 10, sexual extortion; to
      undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no
      less than one (1) year to no more than two (2) years on Count
      14, sexual extortion; to undergo imprisonment in [a] state
      correctional institution for no less than one (1) year to no more
      than two (2) years on Count 16, sexual extortion; to undergo
      imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for no less than
      one (1) year to no more than two (2) years on Count 20, stalking;

                                     -4-
J-S36021-23


       to undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional institution for
       no less than one (1) year to no more than two (2) years on Count
       21, stalking; to undergo imprisonment in [a] state correctional
       institution for no less than one (1) year to no more than two (2)
       years on Count 22, stalking; and to undergo imprisonment in [a]
       state correctional institution for no less than one (1) year to no
       more than two (2) years on Count 28, terroristic threats. [The
       trial court also imposed ten years of probation on Count 3,
       unlawful contact with a minor, and Count 4, unlawful contact with
       a minor, concurrent to each other and consecutive to Appellant’s
       terms of imprisonment. The trial court did not impose any further
       penalty on the remaining counts.]

       Therefore, in the aggregate, Appellant was sentenced to undergo
       imprisonment in [a] state correctional [institution] for no less than
       twenty (20) years to no more than fifty-one (51) years followed
       by ten (10) years of probation. [The trial court also ordered
       Appellant to register as a Tier II offender under SORNA.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9 (some formatting altered).

       Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider sentence,

which the trial court denied on February 28, 2023. On March 6, 2023, the

trial court determined that Appellant was not an SVP.

       Appellant filed a notice of appeal.5 Both Appellant and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________


5 Appellant initially filed a single notice of appeal listing both trial court docket

numbers in violation of Commonwealth v. Walker, 

 (Pa. 2018)
and Pa.R.A.P. 341. However, on April 17, 2023, Appellant filed a “Motion to
Remand to File Amended Notices of Appeal.” This Court granted Appellant’s
motion and remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Appellant to file
two amened notices of appeal. See Order, 4/28/23 (per curiam) (citing
Commonwealth v. Young, 

, 1057 (Pa. Super. 2022)).
Appellant filed amended notices of appeal, one at each trial court docket
number, on May 10, 2023. This Court subsequently consolidated these
appeals sua sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. See Order, 5/16/23 (per
curiam).


                                           -5-
J-S36021-23



       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

       Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant by
       imposing a manifestly excessive sentence, relying on improper
       factors, and failing to consider all relevant factors?

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

       In his sole claim, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.     Id. at 14-23.      Appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing an aggregate sentence that is manifestly excessive,

unreasonable, and constitutes too severe a punishment. Id. at 22. Appellant

contends that the trial court’s statements that Appellant “was in need of

supervision for ‘nearly the balance of his life[,]’” was likely to reoffend after

his release from custody, and that Appellant’s “outlook for rehabilitation was

bleak” lacked any support in the record.           Id. at 15, 22 (quoting N.T.

Sentencing, 2/9/23, at 86-87). Appellant asserts that the expert report6 of

Don Seraydarian, Ph.D., who concluded that Appellant is at a low to moderate

risk to reoffend, contradicts the trial court’s conclusions. Id. at 15, 17-18,

22.    Appellant further argues that the trial court failed to consider the

____________________________________________


6 Appellant cites to a report written by Dr. Seraydarian dated January 25,
2023, which is attached to his brief as Exhibit C. That report is not included
in the certified record. The Commonwealth has also cited Dr. Seraydarian’s
January 25, 2023 report in its brief. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 22-23.
Because the accuracy of the January 25, 2023 report attached to Appellant’s
brief is not in dispute, we may consider it. See Commonwealth v. Brown,

, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012) (holding that an appellate court can
consider a document that only appears in the reproduced record when “the
accuracy of the reproduction has not been disputed” (citation omitted)).


                                           -6-
J-S36021-23



“extensive evidence” Appellant presented regarding his rehabilitative needs.

Id. at 16-18.

      Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court considered improper factors

to support its decision to impose sentences in excess of the guideline ranges

including the facts of the case, the suicide of Lindsey Piccone, and the victims’

states of mind. Id. at 18-22. Appellant contends that the seriousness of the

offenses was already factored into the sentencing guidelines, and the trial

court did not identify facts distinguishable from typical cases to justify its

departure from the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 20.

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 

,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 

, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

      “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised



                                      -7-
J-S36021-23



for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 

,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 

, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).         “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 

, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      Here, the record confirms that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims

in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the

issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement.        Appellant has also included a Rule

2119(f) statement in his brief. Additionally, we conclude that Appellant has

raised a substantial question for review. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 

, 535-36 (Pa. Super. 2023) (finding a substantial question for review

where the defendant “pair[ed] an excessive sentence claim with an assertion

that the [trial] court failed to consider mitigating evidence” (citation omitted));

see also Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 

, 376 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(holding that a claim that trial court considered impermissible factor raises a

substantial question). Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.




                                       -8-
J-S36021-23



     Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

     Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
     sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
     absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
     of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
     the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
     sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
     judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
     arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

     Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
     is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
     (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

        The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
        the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

           (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
           sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
           erroneously;

           (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
           guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
           application of the guidelines would be clearly
           unreasonable; or

           (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
           sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

        In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
        sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

     42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

     In reviewing the record, we consider:

        (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
        history and characteristics of the defendant.

        (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
        defendant, including any [PSI].

        (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

        (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.


                                     -9-
J-S36021-23


        42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 

, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. 2014) (some

citations omitted and some formatting altered).

        The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the

sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all

witnesses firsthand. See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. In conducting appellate

review, this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment

in place of sentencing court where lower court was fully aware of all mitigating

factors[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

        “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim[s] and

[the]    community,     and    [the]   rehabilitative   needs   of   the   defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 

, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider

the sentencing guidelines.” 

 (citation omitted).7

____________________________________________


7 The trial court must apply Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of the

offense when calculating the defendant’s guideline sentence(s). See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Maneval, 

, 1200 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Although not applicable to the instant case, we note that on July 11, 2022,
the General Assembly enacted Act No. 75 of 2022, also known as “Lindsey’s
Law.” Lindsey’s Law was introduced as a direct response to Lindsey Piccone’s
suicide. See House of Representatives, Co-Sponsorship Mem., H.B. 2271,
Oct. 26, 2021. Act 75 amended the sexual extortion statute by directing the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing to adopt a sentencing enhancement
in the sentencing guidelines when “the complainant attempts suicide resulting
(Footnote Continued Next Page)


                                          - 10 -
J-S36021-23



       When assessing the impact that the offense has had on the victim, the

trial court may consider the effects the offense has had on the victim’s mental

health, including attempts to commit suicide. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Conte, 

, 1175, 1177-78 (Pa. Super. 2018); Commonwealth

v. Ahmad, 

, 889-90 (Pa. Super. 2008).

       Additionally, this Court has explained that

       the sentencing court is required to consider the sentence ranges
       set forth in the sentencing guidelines, but it [is] not bound by the
       sentencing guidelines.      The court may deviate from the
       recommended guidelines; they are “merely one factor among
       many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” A
       court may depart from the guidelines “if necessary, to fashion a
       sentence which takes into account the protection of the public, the
       rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the gravity of the
       particular offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the
       victim and the community.” When a court chooses to depart from
       the guidelines[,] however, it must “demonstrate on the record, as
       a proper starting point, [its] awareness of the sentencing
       guidelines.” Further, the court must “provide a contemporaneous
       written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from
       the guidelines.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 

, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (some

citations omitted and formatting altered). “The requirement that the court

provide a contemporaneous written statement is satisfied when the judge

states his [or her] reasons for the sentence on the record and in the



____________________________________________


in serious bodily injury or dies by suicide, within 90 days of the commission of
the offense, as a proximate result of the trauma that the complainant
experienced during or following the commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
3133(e)(2) (eff. Sept. 9, 2002).

                                          - 11 -
J-S36021-23



defendant’s presence.” Commonwealth v. Durazo, 

, 321 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      “When reviewing a sentence outside of the guidelines, the essential

question is whether the sentence imposed was [un]reasonable.” 

 (citations

omitted).   “A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to properly

account for” the four statutory factors of Section 9781(d). Sheller, 

.

      “[I]t is well-established that the imposition of consecutive rather than

concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.”

Kurtz, 294     A.3d at 535      (citation   omitted and formatting altered).

“Defendants convicted of multiple offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume

discount’ on their aggregate sentence. Further, we will not disturb consecutive

sentences unless the aggregate sentence is grossly disparate to the

defendant’s conduct, or viscerally appears as patently unreasonable.”

Commonwealth v. Bankes, 

, 1310 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

      In the case at bar, when imposing sentence, this court considered
      all relevant factors and determined that a lengthy sentence of
      incarceration was warranted for several reasons.

      First, the facts of this case are horrific. Put simply, Appellant is a
      predator who hunted down at least fifteen young victims over the
      course of five years. Appellant preyed upon the victims’ youth,
      naivete, and self-consciousness to blackmail them into sending
      him explicit photos and videos for his own pleasure. He possessed
      hundreds of photographs and videos of about 200 different
      women, many of them young in age.

                                     - 12 -
J-S36021-23


     Appellant stopped at nothing to obtain these pictures and videos:
     he threatened their jobs, he threatened to rape their family
     members, and he even threatened to kill some of them. When
     one victim, Lindsey Piccone, committed suicide, Appellant not only
     continued with his egregious conduct, but he also used this
     information to threaten future victims. He even admitted that the
     extortion itself was sexually gratifying to him, not just the pictures
     and videos themselves. Appellant was only stopped because one
     victim came forward. While he personally stated he never
     intended to act on his threats, the victims had no way of knowing
     this and were therefore terrorized into compliance. The facts of
     the case not only shock the conscience of this court, but also
     plausibly shock the conscience of anyone who reads or knows
     about this case.

     Second, this court considered the impact upon the victims. At the
     hearing, one victim testified that the time Appellant spent in jail
     was the first time in many years she felt safe. She explained that
     Appellant would add her on social media and repeatedly tell her
     she was “worthless” and that she would “never have a job again.”
     When the victim would block that account, Appellant would just
     make another account to continue the harassment. For years, she
     suffered with anxiety and had to seek counseling to cope with the
     trauma Appellant inflicted; she testified that she does not believe
     she “will ever feel true peace again.” Another victim told this court
     that she was shocked, scared, and confused; that Appellant
     targeted her because he knew she was “weak, innocent and
     broken.” She explained that coming forward to report Appellant
     to police was terrifying, but she knew it was necessary to stop him
     from traumatizing more young girls.

     This court also noted from the recitation of the facts that
     Appellant’s youngest known victim was twelve years old. At a
     time when she should have been hanging out with friends,
     learning how to do her make up, and looking forward to turning
     the “big 13,” she was instead being tormented by Appellant and
     his threats. That victim, as well as all of his other victims, were
     robbed of their childhoods. Put simply, the impact upon the
     victims is immeasurable and, in many cases, permanent.

     Third, there is clearly a high need to protect both the community
     and Appellant’s victims from his predatory behavior. Appellant’s
     conduct spanned several years and included a large number of
     victims. Appellant did not stop when he learned of Lindsey
     Piccone’s suicide, i.e., when he learned of the dire consequences

                                    - 13 -
J-S36021-23


     of his actions. Appellant has shown that he will continue to prey
     upon the young as long as he is able and that he has a high
     likelihood of reoffending. At the hearing to determine whether
     Appellant should be classified as a sexually violent predator,
     Appellant’s own expert witness, as well as Appellant in his letters
     to his family, admitted that Appellant is in need of serious, intense
     treatment for the rest of his life. As Appellant had never
     attempted to receive help before, this court finds it hard to believe
     that Appellant would independently seek such treatment unless
     being forced to in a state correctional facility.

     Fourth, this court considered Appellant’s conduct.              While
     Appellant’s counsel insisted that Appellant understood the
     seriousness of his conduct and that was one reason he chose to
     admit guilt and accept responsibility by entering a plea, that
     assertion was bellied by Appellant’s statement to the victims. “I
     hope you can move on from here,” he said. Anyone who can even
     slightly appreciate the gravity of Appellant’s offenses would know
     these victims will never be able to move on. Frankly, one victim,
     an only child, is dead and the others still suffer from the effects of
     his trauma such as anxiety and depression. The fact that
     Appellant thought they could just “move on” is not only shocking,
     but down right appalling to this court. While Appellant has made
     some personal strides in prison by helping fellow inmates obtain
     GEDs, this court found that these acts could not possibly
     compensate for his past conduct.

     Finally, this court considered Appellant’s sentencing guidelines.
     While these guidelines are helpful in many cases, this court
     reasoned that the legislature could not have fathomed a factual
     basis such as the one in the case at bar in determining said
     guidelines. If they had, there is no doubt the standard range of
     Appellant’s sentencing guidelines would call for much more than
     a few months in county prison.

     Therefore, this court determined a consecutive, state sentence is
     imperative to protect the public and to ensure Appellant receives
     the treatment he so desperately needs.           While this court’s
     sentence is admittedly lengthy, it is also clearly necessary. When
     imposing sentence, this court set forth its reasoning on the record
     as outline[d] above. Therefore, this court believes it did not abuse
     its discretion in sentencing Appellant and avers that Appellant’s
     assertions to the contrary are wholly without merit.




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J-S36021-23



Trial Ct. Op. at 13-16 (citations omitted and some formatting altered); see

also N.T. Sentencing, 2/9/23, at 88 (the trial court stated that “I don’t believe

the guidelines in this case will meet the needs of the community and your

need for rehabilitation. I think your need for rehabilitation is extensive and

as Dr. Seraydari[a]n points out, there are several things you have to undergo”

as part of Dr. Seraydarian’s recommended treatment plan).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 

. Specifically, we disagree with

Appellant’s assertion that the trial court relied on an improper factor by

considering Lindsey Piccone’s suicide. The trial court was required to consider

the impact of Appellant’s offenses on the victims. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b);

Fullin, 

. This Court has recognized that victim impact includes

the effects that the offense has had on the victim’s mental health including

attempts to commit suicide. See, e.g., Conte, 

;

Ahmad, 

. Therefore, the trial court properly considered

Lindsey Piccone’s death by suicide when assessing the impact of Appellant’s

crimes on the victims. See Conte, 

; Ahmad, 

; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Further, the trial court considered the

expert report of Dr. Seraydarian regarding Appellant’s rehabilitative needs.

See N.T. Sentencing, 2/9/23, at 88. Appellant essentially invites this Court

to reweigh the evidence regarding his rehabilitative needs, which this Court

will not do. See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536.




                                     - 15 -
J-S36021-23



      Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

sentences outside the sentencing guidelines. We observe that the trial court

explained that it had considered the recommended guideline range, the

protection of the public, Appellant’s the rehabilitative needs, the gravity of the

offenses, and the impact on the life of the victims and the community when

departing from the sentencing guidelines. See Trial Ct. Op. at 13-15; see

also Sheller, 

. Further, we conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences, based on the

prior decisions of this Court which have consistently held that a defendant is

not entitled to a “volume discount” at sentencing for committing multiple

offenses.   See Bankes, 286 A.3d at 1310.          Most importantly, Appellant

entered an open guilty plea to sixty-seven criminal counts involving egregious

predatory behavior victimizing multiple young women and underaged girls,

the impact of which culminated in the tragic suicide of Lindsey Piccone.

Appellant was advised during the plea hearing that there was no negotiated

sentence and that based on the gravity of the offenses, he was facing a

potential statutory maximum aggregate sentence of 184½ to 369 years of

incarceration. See N.T. Plea Hr’g, 3/1/22, at 24.

      Accordingly, on this record, we have no basis to conclude that the trial

court’s sentence was unreasonable. See Durazo, 

; Sheller,

; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). For these reasons, Appellant

is not entitled to relief.

      Judgments of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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J-S36021-23




Date: 12/5/2023




                  - 17 -