Full Opinion (html_with_citations)

J-S23015-23
2023 PA Super 193


 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 VAUGHN JOHN FELIX                         :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 3104 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 8, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001408-2018


BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED OCTOBER 2, 2023

      Vaughn John Felix appeals from the order denying his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9545. Felix argues that his plea counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him

to enter an involuntary guilty plea to first-degree murder, because counsel

failed to inform him of the nature of the charges, the factual basis of the plea,

and the nature of the death penalty proceedings. We affirm.

      In 2016 and 2017, Felix and co-conspirator, Gregory Lewis, Jr., robbed

numerous businesses in Northampton County. Relevant to this case, during

one robbery attempt, Felix shot and killed an employee of a cell phone store.

The police arrested Felix and charged him in several different cases with

numerous crimes.
J-S23015-23


      Ultimately, on June 20, 2019, Felix entered guilty pleas in seven cases,

including first-degree murder in one of the cases. That same day, in

accordance with the terms of the plea, the trial court sentenced Feliz to an

aggregate sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Felix did

not file a direct appeal.

      Subsequently, Felix filed numerous pro se filings, including one on April

1, 2020, under co-conspirator Lewis’s docket numbers. In that petition, Felix

essentially argued that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance which

caused his plea to be unknowingly entered. Thereafter, on June 28, 2021,

Felix filed an untimely PCRA petition under the instant docket number. The

PCRA court appointed counsel, who requested that the PCRA court treat his

previously filed pro se documents as a timely filed PCRA petition. The PCRA

court ruled that Felix’s April 1, 2020 petition, filed in Lewis’s case, would be

treated as timely filed PCRA petition. Felix’s counsel then filed an amended

petition, arguing, inter alia, that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

advise him that a jury rather than a judge would determine whether he would

be sentenced to death if he were convicted of first-degree murder, and

furthermore by failing to advise him of the nature of the charges and factual

basis of the guilty plea related to the first-degree murder charge. The PCRA

court held evidentiary hearings, after which the PCRA court denied Felix’s

petition. This timely appeal followed.

      Felix raises the following questions for our review:


                                      -2-
J-S23015-23


      A. Was [plea counsel] ineffective for failing to ensure that [Felix]
         was advised of the nature of the charge of first-degree murder
         to which he pleaded guilty and such failure caused [Felix] to
         plead guilty?

      B. Was [plea counsel] ineffective for failing to advise [Felix] of the
         factual basis of the plea which caused [Felix] to plead guilty?

      C. Was [plea counsel] ineffective for failing to advise [Felix] about
         the nature of the death penalty process and such failure caused
         [Felix] to plead guilty?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      This Court’s standard of review regarding a PCRA court’s denial of a

PCRA petition is whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the

evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Garcia,
23 A.3d 1059, 1061
 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      We will address Felix’s first two claims together. Felix contends plea

counsel was ineffective for inducing him to enter an unknowing and

involuntary guilty plea. See Appellant’s Brief at 14, 22. Felix asserts he was

unaware of the nature of the first-degree murder charge, thereby causing him

to enter an involuntary guilty plea. See id. at 14, 15-16, 21-22. Specifically,

Felix argues he was not afforded an explanation of the elements of first-degree

murder, including malice and specific intent to kill. See id. at 19-20. Felix

argues that plea counsel, at the PCRA hearing, failed to specifically state that

he had informed Felix of these elements, testifying instead that he “would

have” or was “sure (he) did” mention the elements to Felix. Felix points to




                                      -3-
J-S23015-23


his own testimony at the PCRA hearing which he contends established that he

did not understand the nature of the charges. See id. at 20-21.

      Felix concludes that his underlying claim has arguable merit as plea

counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to provide him with the proper

information, and he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. See id. at 21.

      Additionally, Felix argues that plea counsel failed to provide him with

the factual basis of the crime related to the first-degree murder charge prior

to his entry of the guilty plea. See id. at 16, 22, 23, 24. Felix asserts that the

PCRA court, in its opinion denying PCRA relief, erroneously cited to his

testimony at Lewis’s trial to establish the factual basis was presented to Felix.

See id. at 24. Again, Felix maintains that his underlying claim has arguable

merit, counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to provide this information,

and he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. See id. at 23.

      To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, Felix must demonstrate by a

preponderance of evidence that “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit;

(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)

the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction.”

Commonwealth v. Brown,
196 A.3d 130, 150
 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the burden is on the appellant to

prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Simpson,
66 A.3d 253, 260
 (Pa.

2013). A failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will require




                                      -4-
J-S23015-23


rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo,
244 A.3d 359
, 368

(Pa. 2021).

      A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a
      plea process as well as during trial. The law does not require that
      appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a
      plea of guilty. Instead, the defendant must show that counsel’s
      deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example,
      by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent
      plea. The voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s
      advice was within the range of competence demanded of
      attorneys in criminal cases. Therefore, allegations of
      ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will
      serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused
      appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.

      Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly,
      voluntarily[,] and intelligently entered. There is no absolute right
      to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow
      a defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the
      trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing, a defendant must
      make a showing of prejudice amounting to “manifest injustice.” A
      plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered
      into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently. A defendant’s
      disappointment in the sentence imposed does not constitute
      “manifest injustice.”

Commonwealth v. Bedell,
954 A.2d 1209, 1212
 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(citations, brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).

      To ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea, trial courts are

required to ask the following questions in the guilty plea colloquy:

      1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
         which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

      2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

      3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to
         a trial by jury?


                                     -5-
J-S23015-23


       4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
          innocent until found guilty?

       5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible ranges of sentences
          and/or fines for the offenses charged?

       6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
          terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge
          accepts such agreement?
Id.
 (citation omitted); accord Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt.

       The guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively demonstrate that the
       defendant understood what the plea connoted and its
       consequences. Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is
       presumed that he was aware of what he was doing, and the
       burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. In determining
       whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, a
       court is free to consider the totality of the circumstances
       surrounding the plea. Furthermore, nothing in the rule precludes
       the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that
       is read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part
       of the plea proceedings.

Bedell,
954 A.2d at 1212-13
 (citations, quotation marks, and ellipses

omitted).

       During his extensive oral and written guilty plea colloquies, Felix stated

that he understood English, did not have any mental health issues, was not

under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and was entering the plea of his own

free will. See N.T., 6/20/19, at 13-14, 23-24; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy,

6/19/19, at 2, 6, 7.1 Felix stated that he understood the nature of the charges,


____________________________________________


1 We note that Felix completed a written guilty plea colloquy, which detailed

the guilty plea he was entering, and a written plea agreement colloquy, which
detailed, inter alia, that Felix was waiving various rights, including the right to
file post-sentence motions, direct appeal, and petition for allowance of appeal.

                                           -6-
J-S23015-23


and the elements of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty. See N.T.,

6/20/19, at 19; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 2. Felix also admitted

to committing the legal elements making up all of charged crimes,

acknowledging that he and Lewis plotted to rob a cell phone store and that he

ended up shooting the victim in the face, causing the victim’s death. See N.T.,

6/20/19, at 36; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 2; see also Written

Plea Agreement Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 5 (wherein Felix admits that he is guilty

of first-degree murder).

      Moreover, Felix stated that he understood the permissible range of

sentences and fines, and consequently agreed to enter the guilty plea to first-

degree murder in exchange for a sentence of life in prison without parole; in

return the Commonwealth agreed to not seek the death penalty. See N.T.,

6/20/19, at 10-11, 31-35; Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 3. Felix

also confirmed that he understood the rights he was foregoing by pleading

guilty, including the presumption of innocence, the right to a jury trial, and

the right to file pretrial motions, and that had he gone to trial, the

Commonwealth had to prove each and every element of the charges beyond

a reasonable doubt. See N.T., 6/20/19, at 16-18, 19. Written Guilty Plea

Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 3-5.

      Additionally, Felix indicated that no one had forced or threatened him to

plead guilty and that he willingly entered the plea. See N.T., 6/20/19, at 19.

Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 7. Finally, Felix expressed


                                     -7-
J-S23015-23


satisfaction with his plea counsel. See N.T., 6/20/19, at 21-22, 29; Written

Guilty Plea Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 7. Thereafter, the trial court accepted Felix’s

guilty plea. See N.T., 6/20/19, at 42.

      Considering the totality of the circumstances, the record reflects that

Felix voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently tendered his guilty plea. See

Commonwealth v. Jabbie,
200 A.3d 500, 506
 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating

that a defendant is bound by his statements at his plea colloquy and may not

assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made

when he entered the plea). In fact, Felix stated that he understood the nature

of the charges he was facing, including first-degree murder. See Written Plea

Colloquy, 6/19/19, at 2. Furthermore, plea counsel explicitly stated that he

explained the elements of first-degree murder to Felix. See N.T., 3/22/22, at

16-19. Notably, the PCRA court found Felix’s testimony to the contrary to lack

credibility.   See   PCRA    Court     Opinion,    11/8/22,    at   10;     see   also

Commonwealth v. Johnson,
966 A.2d 523, 539
 (Pa. 2009) (“A PCRA court

passes    on   witness   credibility   at   PCRA   hearings,   and    its   credibility

determinations should be provided great deference by reviewing courts.”);

Commonwealth v. Pier,
182 A.3d 476, 480
 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that

appellant could not obtain PCRA relief based upon claims he lied during the

plea colloquy).

      Moreover, Felix acknowledged the factual basis of the first-degree

murder charge, admitting that he shot the victim in the face with a gun. See


                                        -8-
J-S23015-23


N.T., 6/20/19, at 36.2 Therefore, Felix tendered his guilty plea under his own

volition, and has not demonstrated prejudice amounting to manifest injustice

to justify withdrawing his guilty plea. See Bedell,
954 A.2d at 1212
; see also

Brown,
196 A.3d at 150
. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Felix’s

ineffectiveness claims are without arguable merit.

       In his final claim, Felix contends that his plea counsel was ineffective for

failing to inform him of the nature of the death penalty proceedings, including

that a jury, not a judge, decides whether a defendant would be sentenced to

death. See Appellant’s Brief at 24, 25-26. Felix argues that counsel’s failure

to educate him on this process established that he entered an involuntary

plea. See id. at 25, 26. Felix asserts that plea counsel had no reasonable basis

for failing to review this process and that he was prejudiced because he would

not have pleaded guilty had he known about this process. See id. at 26.

       Here, Felix testified that plea counsel advised him that under the death

penalty procedure, the judge would give him the death sentence, and never

said anything about a jury making this decision. See N.T., 6/6/22, at 30, 32,

38-39, 58. Felix also stated that plea counsel said that the death penalty was

automatic after a finding of guilt of first-degree murder. See id. at 58-59.



____________________________________________


2 Although Felix correctly notes that the PCRA court cited to his testimony at

Lewis’s trial to show he was aware of the factual basis of the guilty plea, see
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/8/22, at 6-7 (noting that Felix testified at Lewis’s trial
and admitted to shooting the victim in the face), we do not find error because
Felix admitted to these facts at the guilty plea colloquy.

                                           -9-
J-S23015-23


      On the other hand, plea counsel testified that he discussed the death

penalty procedure with Felix and his mother. See N.T., 3/22/22, at 20-21.

Plea counsel stated that he informed Felix that if he were convicted of first-

degree murder, a second proceeding would take place before a jury. See id.

at 20, 21, 23. Plea counsel also apprised Felix that a unanimous jury would

have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty was warranted.

See id. at 21, 23.

      The PCRA court found Felix’s testimony to be not credible, and plea

counsel’s testimony to be credible. See PCRA Court Opinion, 11/8/22, at 16.

Felix’s argument merely asks this Court to reweigh the testimony in his favor;

we cannot do so. See Johnson,
966 A.2d at 539
. Based upon the PCRA court’s

finding crediting plea counsel’s testimony, Felix fails to establish counsel was

ineffective in this regard. See Commonwealth v. Reid,
259 A.3d 395
, 411

(Pa. 2021) (concluding that appellant’s ineffectiveness claim did not have

arguable merit where the PCRA court found counsel’s testimony to be credible,

which undermined appellant’s claim).

      In summary, we have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant

law, the certified record, and the well-written decisions of the learned trial

judge, the Honorable Paula A. Roscioli, dated November 8, 2022, and

December 21, 2022. We conclude that there has been no error in this case

and affirm the actions of the PCRA court.

      Order affirmed.


                                     - 10 -
J-S23015-23




Date: 10/2/2023




                  - 11 -