In the Int. of: K.T., Appeal of: K.T.

J-A18016-24

                             

 IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T., A MINOR :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :              PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: K.T., MOTHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :         No. 324 WDA 2024

            Appeal from the Order Entered February 14, 2024
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                     No(s): CP-02-AP-0000197-2019


BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                    FILED: September 16, 2024

      K.T. (Mother) appeals from the order granting the petition filed by the

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (the Agency or CYF),

and involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to K.T. (a daughter born

in June 2016) (Child). Upon careful review, we affirm.

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously remanded this case to the

orphans’ court for reconsideration of the factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(b), which we discuss infra. Our Supreme Court adeptly summarized the

factual background of this case:

             [CYF] first became involved with [Child] when she tested
      positive for cocaine at birth; CYF had been involved with Mother
      since 2009 regarding an older child. During CYF’s investigation,
      Mother admitted use of marijuana and alcohol[,] and CYF deemed
      her housing unstable. CYF referred Mother for a drug and alcohol
      abuse assessment with Pennsylvania Organization for Women in
      Early Recovery (POWER), as well as housing assistance and in-
J-A18016-24


     home services with Family Resource. CYF also required Mother to
     begin regular urine drug screenings.

           Prompted by continued housing instability, a report of
     intimate partner violence between Mother and Child’s biological
     father,[FN1] and Mother’s failure to follow through with service
     referrals, CYF sought a finding of dependency on January 26,
     2017. Prior to the dependency hearing, CYF removed Child under
     an Emergency Custody Authorization (ECA) on March 7, 2017, due
     to a report Mother “allegedly became physical” with one of her
     older children who dropped Child.[FN2] N.T. Termination Hearing,
     3/22/21 at 15. On March 27, 2017, the dependency court found
     Child dependent and ordered all contact between Mother and Child
     to be supervised. Child was placed with a foster parent and
     adoptive resource, her godmother[ (Foster Mother)], in June
     2017. The court also ordered Mother to complete a drug and
     alcohol assessment, related treatment, and urine drug screenings.


     [FN1]Father’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated in
     October 2021.

     [FN2] Mother has two older children, daughter A. and son L.W.




            For more than two years, while Child remained in her foster
     home, and prior to CYF filing for termination, Mother was
     inconsistent    with    participation   in   CYF’s    recommended
     services. [FN3] During this time, she continued to struggle with her
     sobriety, mental health, and behavior, relapsing after treatment
     programs, testing positive on five occasions for [controlled]
     substances, and gaining a criminal record of five summary
     citations, some involving her children, as well as aggressive
     behavior.[FN4]


     [FN3] Mother attended some teaming and conferencing meetings
     with CYF.     See N.T. 3/22/21 at 30.     She attended most
     permanency review hearings. See id. at 31. Mother attended
     thirty-four of the fifty-seven mandated substance screenings.
     See id. at 84. In August 2017, Mother completed POWER’s drug
     and alcohol assessment, after failing to comply on two other
     occasions, and she was “recommended for inpatient treatment.”
     See id. at 62-63. Mother then checked herself into Gateway

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     [Rehabilitation] on September 27, 2017[,] for treatment and
     later[, Mother] transferred to Sojourner House. See id. at 63.
     She left Sojourner House without completing the program. See
     id. at 65. In December 2017, Mother completed an intake at
     Family Links after CYF referred her for mental health concerns.
     See id. at 85. Mother later began SHORES, a drug and alcohol
     treatment program, following a referral from CYF and a positive
     drug test, but SHORES discharged Mother for missing sessions.
     See id. at 65-66. On June 21, 2018, Mother completed another
     assessment with SHORES in which they recommended intensive
     outpatient services. See id. at 67. Instead, Mother agreed to
     twice a week, in-home counseling. See id. Mother successfully
     completed the SHORES program in January 2019. See id. at 72.
     In April 2019, Mother completed another drug and alcohol
     assessment and was given no further recommendations. See id.
     at 73-74. But, after another positive drug test result, CYF referred
     Mother for a POWER assessment in May of 2019. See id. Mother
     did not complete the assessment. See id.

     [FN4] While Mother was pregnant with Child, she pled guilty to two

     summary citations of disorderly conduct. See Int. of K.T., No.
     DP-091-2017, slip op. at 7 (C.P. Allegheny, Nov. 22, 2021). After
     Child’s removal from her care, Mother pled guilty in 2018 to four
     summary citations: retail theft, harassment …, defiant
     trespassing, and disorderly conduct. See id. In August of 2019,
     Mother pled guilty to another summary citation of disorderly
     conduct[. Mother] was also involved in an incident leading to a
     summary citation of disorderly conduct, engaging in fighting, in
     November of 2019. See id. at 7-8. Following CYF’s filing for
     termination in October 2019, Mother pled guilty in 2020 to
     summary citations for harassment and criminal mischief. See id.
     at 8. Testimony at the termination proceeding showed three
     incidents, those leading to Mother’s August and November 2019
     citations and 2020 citations, involved her older children. …


            Prior to CYF’s filing for termination, Mother attended most
     visits with Child[,] which were typically scheduled for three times
     a week. Visits were both supervised and unsupervised. In
     October 2018, the court permitted Mother to have unsupervised,
     overnight visits with Child, but by February 2019, Mother’s visits
     were moved back to supervised due to concerns about her
     sobriety. In April 2019, the court gave permission to move back
     to unsupervised visits, but before these could begin, Mother tested

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J-A18016-24


     positive for [controlled] substances and the court granted CYF’s
     request [that] visits remain supervised. Mother also failed to
     return Child timely on two occasions, and once required CYF to
     seek a court order returning Child to its custody. See Order to
     Take Child into Custody, 6/19/19. Although Mother stabilized her
     housing by May 2019, CYF had ongoing concerns with Mother’s
     continued substance abuse, recent criminal offenses, and failure
     to return Child in a timely fashion, and by August 2019, Child’s
     permanency goal was changed to adoption. See N.T. 3/22/21 at
     29-30.[FN5] By this time, Child was three years old and had not
     lived with Mother since June 2017.[FN6]


     [FN5] … Mother did not file an appeal from this decision.   …

     [FN6] Even  during the period Child lived with Mother, Child was
     actually in maternal grandmother’s care (with whom Mother lived)
     and Mother’s contact was ordered to be supervised.

Interest of K.T., 

, 1090-92 (Pa. 2023) (footnotes in original).

     On October 28, 2019, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights to Child, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court scheduled a hearing, which occurred on

March 22, 2021, and May 13, 2021 (the termination hearing).

            CYF presented seven witnesses[ at the termination
     hearing]: Amanda McCloy[ (Ms. McCloy)], a CYF caseworker;
     William Pipkins, family transportation supervisor with Second
     Chance, the organization that scheduled, supervised, and
     provided transportation for a portion of Mother’s visits with Child;
     Myelodie Turner, Mother’s caseworker with Second Chance; Brett
     Basic, police detective dispatched for the incident resulting in
     Mother’s August 2019 disorderly conduct offense; Ronald Bobick,
     police officer dispatched to assist in the enforcement of an ECA for
     Mother’s older child[,] L.W.; Ryan Miller, police sergeant
     dispatched for the incident resulting in Mother’s October 2020
     guilty pleas on [the] criminal mischief and harassment citations;
     and Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D.[ (Dr. Rosenblum)], court-appointed
     clinical psychologist who performed three individual and
     interactional evaluations of Mother, Child, and Foster Mother.

                                    -4-
J-A18016-24


     Mother presented three witnesses: Daniel Garrighan, facility
     director of Jade Wellness Center[,] where Mother received drug
     and alcohol outpatient services starting in August 2020; Jawana
     Warren, site director at the Clairton Family Center[,] where
     Mother completed parenting classes in October 2020; and Lisa
     Penn, program manager with POWER.

Id. at 1091-92.

     Pertinent to the Supreme Court’s remand, Dr. Rosenblum testified

regarding the bond between Child and Mother, and Child and Foster Mother.

As summarized by the Supreme Court:

     Child is “always glad to see Mother,” “loves her,” and enjoys
     spending time with her, but Child’s relationship with her is “more
     ancillary” and “playful” like a “big sister” or “aunt.”       [N.T.
     Termination Hearing, 5/13/21,] at 84, 90, 93. [Dr. Rosenblum]
     said Mother is “nurturing” and “affectionate,” but “tends to be
     comfortable with creating an emotional dependency.” Id. at 85,
     87. She is not “as focused on helping Child to expand her
     developmental competencies and to build her self-esteem.” Id.
     at 87. Specifically, [Dr. Rosenblum] noted, in the last two
     evaluations, Mother “spent more time focused” on “Child’s
     appearance,” suggesting “she’s not getting adequate physical
     care” with Foster Mother, than “engaging Child in positive
     activities.” Id. at 85-86. [Dr. Rosenblum] further testified[,] “I
     think it makes Child uncomfortable.” Id. at 86. He went on to
     explain “it is pretty well-known that Mother and Foster Mother do
     not get along” and “Foster Mother indicates that Mother has
     harassed her.” Id. at 85.

           Dr. Rosenblum further testified that Child “receives
     excellent, outstanding care from her Foster Mother” and “her
     primary attachment is definitely to her Foster Mother.” Id. at 88,
     90. He testified “Foster Mother does a particularly good job of
     building Child’s confidence and encouraging her.” Id. at 87. He
     explained    “Child    has   developed    attachments,     healthy
     attachments, to her Foster Mother and her foster siblings.” Id. at
     89. [Dr. Rosenblum] explained her foster home “is the foundation
     of her emotional well-being.” Id. at 121.

Id. at 1092-93 (internal brackets omitted).

                                    -5-
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      On October 13, 2021, the orphans’ court denied CYF’s petition to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights.   The orphans’ court found

that although CYF met its burden of establishing grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), CYF failed to prove that termination of

Mother’s parental rights would “serve the needs and welfare of [C]hild[,]”

pursuant to Section 2511(b). Order, 10/13/21. CYF and Child, through her

guardian ad litem, timely appealed. CYF and Child asserted the orphans’ court

erred in concluding CYF failed to establish that termination of Mother’s

parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of Child. See Rule 1925(b)

Statement (Child), 10/20/21; Rule 1925(b) Statement (CYF), 10/22/21.

      A divided panel of this Court affirmed the orphans’ court’s order finding

grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), but denying CYF’s petition

based upon its failure to establish termination was warranted under Section

2511(b).    See Interest of K.T., 

 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(unpublished memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently

granted allowance of appeal on August 18, 2022. See Interest of K.T., 

 (Pa. 2022). The Supreme Court limited the appeal to clarify the

appropriate bond analysis required by Section 2511(b). Id. at 1250.

      The Supreme Court subsequently reversed this Court’s order affirming

the denial of the termination petition.    The Supreme Court concluded the

orphans’ court and this Court employed the incorrect standard in applying

Section 2511(b):


                                     -6-
J-A18016-24


       [T]he lower tribunals focused their Section 2511(b) analysis only
       on whether severing the parental bond would have an “adverse”
       or “detrimental” impact on Child and, finding such impact was
       supported by the record, concluded this one factor precluded
       termination of Mother’s parental rights, above all other elements
       that should comprise a complete subsection (b) needs and welfare
       analysis. But a court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and
       welfare analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or
       detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond. We
       emphasize analysis of the parental bond is but one part of the
       overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a determination of
       whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e.,
       whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental,
       physical, and emotional needs and welfare.

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1112-13.           Accordingly, the Supreme Court

remanded the case to the orphans’ court “to review the record or further

develop it with the foregoing clarification of the 2511(b) analysis in hand.”

Id. at 1117.1

       Upon remand, and with the benefit of the Supreme Court’s clarification

of Section 2511(b)’s dictates, the orphans’ court determined that CYF met its

burden of establishing that termination of Mother’s parental rights best served

the needs and welfare of Child.           Accordingly, on February 14, 2024, the

orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child. Mother timely



____________________________________________


1 The Supreme Court rejected CYF and Child’s argument that the Court should

“order termination of Mother’s parental rights on this record.” Interest of
K.T., 296 A.3d at 1117. The Court explained that “[a]ppellate courts
reviewing such fact-bound claims arising in termination matters should defer
to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and can determine the
credibility to be placed on each witness ….” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).


                                           -7-
J-A18016-24


appealed2 and filed a contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise

statement.

       Mother presents the following issues:

       I.    Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
       matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate
       Mother’s parental rights pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(2), (5),
       and (8)?

       II.   Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
       matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by
       clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s
       parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child
       pursuant to [Section] 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 3.

       We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion.

See Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1104. This standard of review requires

appellate courts to

       accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
       trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual
       findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the
       trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has
       been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
       because the reviewing court might have reached a different
       conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of


____________________________________________


2 On March 22, 2024, CYF and Child filed a joint motion to quash Mother’s
appeal as untimely. See Motion to Quash, 3/22/2024; see also Pa.R.A.P.
903(a) (a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the
order on appeal). Upon review, we denied the motion, observing that
although the orphans’ court’s termination order was dated February 9, 2024,
it was not entered on the trial court docket until February 14, 2024. See
Superior Court Order, 4/5/24. Accordingly, Mother timely filed her notice of
appeal within thirty days of February 14, 2024. See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P.
903(a).

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     discretion  only     upon       demonstration         of    manifest
     unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

            As [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] discussed in [In re:]
     R.J.T., [

 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons
     for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review…. [U]nlike
     trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make fact-
     specific determinations on a cold record, where trial judges are
     observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often
     presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and
     parents. R.J.T., 

. Therefore, even where the facts
     could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
     dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist
     the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own
     credibility determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer
     to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by
     the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of
     an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 

, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations

omitted).

     Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

     Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
     seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
     that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
     termination delineated in [Section] 2511(a). Only if the court
     determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
     or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
     the analysis pursuant to [Section] 2511(b): determination of the
     needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
     of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
     concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
     parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
     of permanently severing any such bond.

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 

 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted).   “The standard of ‘clear and convincing’ evidence is defined as


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J-A18016-24


testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). Finally, this Court need only

agree with the orphans’ court as to “any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a),

in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental

rights.”    Interest of M.E., 

, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      On prior appeal, CYF and Child solely challenged termination under

Section 2511(b). See Rule 1925(b) Statement (Child), 10/20/21, ¶ 1; Rule

1925(b) Statement (CYF), 10/22/21, ¶ 1. This Court likewise observed that

the orphans’ court’s finding that termination is appropriate under Section

2511(a) was “uncontested.” See Interest of K.T., 

 (Pa. Super.

2022) (unpublished memorandum at 5). Our Supreme Court remanded solely

for consideration of whether termination is appropriate under Section 2511(b).

See Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1117 (“[C]onsidering termination’s

irreversible effect on a child’s relationship with a parent, we allow the

[orphans’] court an opportunity to review the record or further develop it with

the foregoing clarification of the 2511(b) analysis in hand.”). Accordingly, the

orphans’ court, and this Court, are limited to the scope of the remand order,




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J-A18016-24


and we address only that issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 2591(a) (“the court … shall

proceed in accordance with the judgment or order of the appellate court.”). 3

       Even if Mother had preserved her present challenge to termination under

Section 2511(a), we would conclude such challenge lacks merit. Instantly, we

examine Mother’s challenge pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:

       (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
       be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

                                          ***

          (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
          or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
          essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
          his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
          causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
          will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). The petitioner must prove

       (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
       (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child
       to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and
       (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
       cannot or will not be remedied.
____________________________________________


3 We have further acknowledged:



       “[I]t has long been the law in Pennsylvania that following remand,
       a lower court is permitted to proceed only in accordance with the
       remand order.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, … 

, 1280 n.19 (Pa. 2014). Further, “where a case is remanded
       for a specific and limited purpose, issues not encompassed within
       the remand order may not be decided on remand.” 

 (citation
       omitted).

Ratner v. Iron Stone Real Estate Fund, I, L.P., 

 (Pa.
Super. 2021).

                                          - 11 -
J-A18016-24



In re A.H., 

 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Grounds

for termination “are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.” 

 Further, “[p]arents are

required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption

of full parental duties.” 

 (emphasis added).

      Here, regarding Section 2511(a)(2), Mother asserts CYF “failed to prove

that Mother has not or cannot remedy the conditions that caused the Child to

be without essential parental care.”         Mother’s Brief at 23.     Mother

acknowledges Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony that “he is doubtful that Mother

could mature to the point where she could provide a safe and secure

environment for Child.” 

 (citing N.T., 5/13/21, at 107). Mother points out,

however, that Dr. Rosenblum “also testified that there is a guarded prognosis

that Mother could make a strong effort in therapy such that [she] could make

significant improvements toward maturity.” 

 (citing N.T., 5/13/21, at 126).

Based upon this “guarded prognosis,” Mother argues, “[i]t is premature to

terminate Mother’s parental rights without providing her additional time to

remedy the causes of her incapacity.” Id. at 24.

      CYF responds that “Mother has not demonstrated that she could remedy

the conditions that have prevented her from parenting any child since 2009[,]

and she specifically has not demonstrated the capacity to do so since Child’s

birth in 2016.” CYF’s Brief at 24-25. CYF further maintains:




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     Although Dr. Rosenblum [testified] that the verdict may be out
     regarding Mother’s ability to parent any child successfully in the
     future, he was unequivocal that the prognosis was not favorable[,]
     and that “for this child the train has left the station.”

Id. at 25 (emphasis in original) (quoting N.T., 5/13/21, at 127).

     The orphans’ court addressed Mother’s first issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925

opinion:

           Mother has had continuing issues with substance abuse,
     having attempted several times to abstain, with the help of CYF,
     which started at a young age. See Exhibit #3[,] Dr. Rosenblum
     Evaluation Reports[,] pg. 3, 4, and 5. In her youth, Mother
     attended Woodland Hills school district, but dropped out after 9th
     grade. Id. at 3. While she has not earned her GED, she took
     classes while incarcerated after the birth of her first child. Id.
     She started hanging out at bars and started using marijuana at
     the age of 14 or 15. Id. This became a daily habit and she
     eventually started using cocaine, which was sometimes offered to
     her by patrons at the adult entertainment club where she worked.
     Id. Her early life has resulted in the diagnosis of several mood
     and personality disorders. Id. As a result, she has experienced
     issues focusing, as well as regulating her responses to stress. (Tr.
     2 at 75). This had led to a history of summary citations and
     criminal charge(s). See CYF Exhibit #5 Criminal Docket. Mother
     has made progress in dealing with her mental health concerns, as
     well as substance use concerns, but has had trouble improving her
     judgment and achieving and maintaining a stable pattern of
     adjustment.     See Exhibit #3[,] Dr. Rosenblum Evaluation
     Reports[,] at 26.       Mother continues to be unable to
     understand the role of drugs in her life and how they affect
     behavior otherwise and, in combination with the other concerns
     regarding her mental health, this results in a guarded prognosis
     for improvement. (Tr. 2 at 80 and 83). Due to this evidence, CYF
     has established the statutory grounds for the termination of
     parental rights through the conduct of the parent pursuant to
     [Section] 2511(a)(2)[].

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/16/24, Attach. A, at 14-15 (emphasis added).




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          Our review confirms the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by the

record, and free of legal error. The record discloses that in the two-and-one-

half years Child was in placement prior to CYF filing its termination petition,

Mother’s compliance with recommended treatment was inconsistent.             See

N.T., 3/22/21, at 55-69, 72-76 (Ms. McCloy testifying to Mother’s treatment

history).      Despite CYF recommending drug and alcohol services, Mother

continued to test positive for controlled substances, with a positive drug

screen for “opiates” as recently as August 2019. See id. at 55-57; see also

N.T., 5/13/21, at 78 (Dr. Rosenblum testifying that Mother admitted taking a

“pain pill”). Significantly, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother had

failed to complete 23 of 57 total drug screens. See id. at 84. Therefore, we

discern no error in the orphans’ court’s determination that CYF proved, by

clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights

was warranted under Section 2511(a)(2).          See S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (“an

appellate court must … defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings

are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result

of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”). Mother’s first issue merits no

relief.

          In her second issue, Mother claims termination of her parental rights is

inappropriate under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).         Mother argues “[t]he record

does not include sufficient evidence to support a determination that

termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves the needs and welfare of


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[] Child.” Mother’s Brief at 26. Mother asserts the orphans’ court “relied only

on general assumptions rather than a full evaluation of Child’s needs and

welfare.” Id. at 27. Mother concedes that “it may be true that Mother cannot

serve in a full-time caretaking role,” but maintains that “she is still able to

contribute positively to Child’s life by meeting developmental and emotional

needs of Child.” Id. at 28.

      When the orphans’ court finds grounds for termination under Section

2511(a), it must separately consider a child’s needs and welfare:

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. ….

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      “Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

above concerns for the parent.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. Courts

must also “discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id.

(citation omitted). However, “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” Id. at 1113.

            The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration
      of other important factors such as: the child’s need for
      permanency and length of time in foster care …; whether the child
      is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and

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      whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental,
      physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love,
      comfort, security, safety, and stability.

Id. (footnote and citations omitted).

      Pertinently, in the previous appeal, our Supreme Court faulted the

orphans’ court’s initial analysis for failing to “explain the subsection (b)

considerations of foster parent bond, preadoptive home, and need for

permanency ….” Id. at 1114. The Supreme Court explained:

      “[A]n emotional bond” with a parent is legally insufficient to
      preclude termination of parental rights without determining
      whether such bond is necessary and beneficial to the child and
      weighing the other factors present in the record. Likewise, an
      “adverse effect” or “detrimental impact” of severance alone
      cannot demonstrate a necessary and beneficial bond. In this case,
      we cannot discern whether the court considered the other factors
      present in this record[,] but we can conclude it conducted a legally
      erroneous parental bond analysis.

Id. at 1114-15 (footnote omitted).

      Instantly, the orphans’ court complied with the Supreme Court’s remand

order, and conducted a thorough Section 2511(b) analysis in its Rule 1925

opinion:

            Following additional review of the record, as difficult as it
      may be for this court to decide, the damage of granting []
      termination [of Mother’s parental rights] would not outweigh the
      damage of [C]hild not receiving the care and stability necessary
      for her “needs and welfare.”

      ….

            In the case at hand, there is no doubt in this court’s mind
      that Mother loves her child and that there is a bond between
      Mother and [C]hild. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/13/21, 84-
      88, 128. However, upon further review of Dr. Rosenblum’s

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      testimony, in relying upon the mere existence of that bond, this
      court failed to recognize the damage being done by the prolonged,
      unhealthy aspects of the bond[,] as well as its adverse effect on
      [C]hild’s ability to form attachments to [F]oster Mother[,] who can
      provide care and stability for [C]hild. Id. at 85-90, 93, 121, 126-
      30. As painful as it may be to break [C]hild’s bond to her biological
      parent, even when there are aspects of that bond that are
      unhealthy, this court must weigh that injury against the damage
      that may cause if left intact. And in the case herein, it is likely
      that [Child will be] damage[d by] not receiving the care and
      stability necessary for her “needs and welfare.”

      ….

             Dr. Rosenblum testified that [C]hild receives “excellent,
      outstanding” care from [] Foster Mother and [Child’s] primary
      attachment is [to] Foster Mother. N.T. Termination Hearing,
      5/13/21, at 88, 90. [C]hild has developed healthy attachments
      to [] Foster Mother and foster siblings. Id. at 89. [] Foster Mother
      does a good job of building [C]hild’s confidence and encouraging
      [C]hild. Id. at 87. Furthermore, the foster home “is the
      foundation of her emotional well-being.” Id. at 13-14, 121.

      ….

            Upon further review of the record, [C]hild is in a pre-
      adoptive home. See 3/22/2021, at 28. Furthermore, relying
      upon the mere existence of the bond between Mother and [C]hild,
      this court failed to recognize Mother’s inability to correct her
      parenting[, which] is impeding [C]hild’s permanent placement in
      the pre-adoptive home. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/13/21,
      at 10, 12, 20-21, 31-33, 85, 127-128.

            ….   The need for permanency is important, and the
      detrimental impact of the termination is nevertheless outweighed
      by the benefit of moving [C]hild to a permanent home.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/16/24, at 3-8.

      The orphans’ court’s properly analyzed Child’s best interest in

accordance with the Supreme Court’s directive. We agree with the reasoning

and conclusion of the orphans’ court, as it is supported by the record and free

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J-A18016-24


of legal error. S.P., 

, 826-27. Dr. Rosenblum testified that Child

has developed “healthy attachments” to Foster Mother and two foster siblings,

who she “considers [] her brother and sister.” N.T., 5/13/21, at 89. Although

Child “has an attachment to” Mother, “it is not her primary attachment. The

person [Child] has lived with virtually her entire life[ ]is [F]oster [M]other[.]”

Id. at 90.   Dr. Rosenblum further opined that Mother is not

      in a position to assume a safe, secure … family environment for
      [Child] that would allow her to grow and develop in a healthy
      manner without risk of some form of psychological harm or
      concern to her well-being. The person who has guided [Child] in
      a very positive direction throughout her life has been [F]oster
      [M]other. [M]other’s relationship, while [Child] loves [M]other, it
      is more like [] a big sister, an aunt. [Child] does not have a sense
      of connecting to [Mother] as a caregiver. And there is only one
      person who has served in that role or function, and that is [Foster
      Mother].

Id. at 93.

      Although Mother has made some progress toward her parenting goals,

as we have previously observed, a “court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to the parent’s claim

to progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 

 (Pa. Super. 2006). The record amply supports the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights best suits the needs

and welfare of Child. The record confirms the orphans’ court acted within its

discretion when it credited Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony regarding Child’s bond

with Foster Mother, and absence of a “caregiver” bond with Mother.           See

L.C.J.W., 

 (“It is the province of the orphans’ court to assess

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J-A18016-24


credibility and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and in doing so it is free

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Accordingly, Mother is entitled no relief, and we affirm the

order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      Order affirmed.




DATE: 09/16/2024




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