In Re: C.P.D., Appeal of: T.P.D.
Citation2024 Pa. Super. 201, 324 A.3d 11
Date Filed2024-09-06
Docket719 EDA 2024
JudgeKing
Cited17 times
StatusPublished
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
J-S23016-24
2024 PA Super 201
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.P.D., FATHER : No. 719 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-A0015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.J.D. AND G.O. : No. 720 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-A0015
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.P.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: ADOPTIONS FROM THE :
HEART : No. 792 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2021-A0015
J-S23016-24
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2024
In these consolidated cross-appeals, Appellant, T.P.D. (âFatherâ),
appeals at docket No. 719 EDA 2024 from the decree involuntarily terminating
his parental rights to his son, C.P.D. (âChildâ) (born in September 2020),
based on the respective termination petitions filed by Adoptions from the
Heart (âAFTHâ) and Childâs court-appointed legal counsel/guardian ad litem
(âGALâ), and joined by the pre-adoptive parents, A.J.D. and G.O. (âPre-
Adoptive Parentsâ). Additionally, at dockets Nos. 720 EDA 2024 and 792 EDA
2024, Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH filed cross-appeals from the courtâs
earlier orders that denied confirmation of J.S. (âMotherâ) 1 and Fatherâs
consents to adoption and denied reconsideration of same. For the following
reasons, we affirm the involuntary termination of Fatherâs parental rights, but
we vacate the orders denying confirmation of Mother and Fatherâs consents to
adoption.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Child was born in September 2020. Mother and Father had prior negative
experiences with Children and Youth Services (âCYSâ). Fearful of CYS
involvement concerning Child, Mother and Father placed Child with relatives
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child on February 28,
2023, and she is not a party to this appeal.
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who had custody of their two older daughters, A.A.D. and A.J.D. 2 On October
11, 2020, Mother contacted AFTH regarding placement for Child, as Mother
and Father were having disagreements with the relatives caring for their
daughters because they had been denying Mother and Father contact with the
children. In late October 2020, Mother and Father conferred with two
caseworkers from AFTH, Jackie Lovell and Michaelina Bendig. On October 23,
2020, Ms. Lovell had a phone conversation with Mother, during which they
discussed the open adoption process and the availability of a Post Adoption
Contact Agreement (âPACAâ).
The next day, Mother and Father met with Ms. Bendig. Ms. Bendig
indicated that AFTH would support them in seeking a PACA with respect to
their younger daughter, whose adoption had not yet been finalized.
Additionally, in response to their concerns, and to extinguish any potential for
CYS involvement, Ms. Bendig suggested Mother and Father consider
transferring custody of Child to AFTH. Mother and Father signed the forms
transferring custody to AFTH that same day. After Mother and Father
executed the transfer documents, they made an appointment to meet with
Ms. Bendig and Pre-Adoptive Parents, whom they had selected, at the offices
of AFTH on October 27, 2020.
On October 27, 2020, Mother and Father went to the AFTH office in
Wynnewood, Pennsylvania. Mother and Father met Pre-Adoptive Parents at
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2 This family had already adopted Mother and Fatherâs oldest daughter and
were in the process of adopting their younger daughter.
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that time. Additionally, Mother and Father signed consents to adoption, as
well as a PACA concerning Child, which Pre-Adoptive Parents also signed.
During this meeting, Ms. Bendig reiterated that she would help Mother and
Father obtain a PACA concerning their younger daughter. Additionally, Ms.
Bendig offered assistance to Mother and Father regarding a needed car battery
and cell phone minutes.
On October 28, 2020, Mother and Father again returned to the AFTH
office, where they spent some time with Child, who had been brought there
by a temporary guardian. On this day, Pre-Adoptive Parents took physical
custody of Child, and Child has remained with them ever since.
On Saturday, November 21, 2020, Father called AFTHâs evening
answering service, and left a message that he wished to revoke his consent
to adoption. Father left his cell phone number for a return call. The next day,
Ms. Bendig called and texted Father, offering to discuss his desire to revoke
his consent. Nevertheless, Father did not return Ms. Bendigâs call that day.
In response to her text, Father stated that he could not talk at the moment
but Mother or Father would call her back. Ms. Bendig texted Father that he
needed to call her and not the on-call answering service. However, Father did
not return Ms. Bendigâs phone call. Ms. Bendig did not write a letter formally
advising Father that a revocation of his consent must be in writing. Ms. Bendig
also did not remind Father of this requirement in her text messages.
On November 22 and 23, 2020, Ms. Bendig e-mailed Mother and Father
at an e-mail address they both used regarding whether they wanted to revoke
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their consents to adoption. Father did not respond to the e-mail. Mother
replied that she did not want to revoke her consent. Ms. Bendig did not receive
any communication from Father between November 22, 2020 and December
30, 2020 indicating that Father still wanted to revoke his consent.
AFTH filed petitions to confirm the consents of adoption by Mother and
Father on February 18, 2021.
[The c]ourt scheduled a hearing on the Petitions to Confirm
the Consents to Adoption on May 4, 2021, at which [Mother
and Father] appeared, but were not represented by counsel.
[Mother and Father] alleged that they were under duress
while signing their consents and expressed a desire to
revoke their consents. Following [Mother and Fatherâs]
request for the appointment of counsel, this [c]ourt
adjourned the hearing on the Petitions to Confirm Consents,
[and appointed counsel for Mother and Father.]
On June 22, 2021, this [c]ourt held a hearing at which âŚ
Father and ⌠Mother, now both represented by counsel,
indicated that they had consented to the adoption.
However, ⌠Father maintained that he had validly and
timely revoked his consent. He also maintained that,
although he had agreed to a voluntary [PACA] with [Pre-
Adoptive Parents] that provided for an exchange of
photographs and letters and also three visits per year
between [Mother and Father], [Pre-Adoptive Parents], and
[Child], he also wanted to negotiate a PACA pursuant to
which [Child] would continue to have visits with his
daughters, A.A.D. and A.J.D. ⌠Father testified that a PACA
fostering visits between [Child] and his birth sisters had
never been meaningfully explored. To permit consideration
of whether a PACA was in the interests of each of the
children, this [c]ourt appointed a GAL for Child and for
[Childâs birth sisters]. In light of Fatherâs revocation claim,
and despite his articulated desire to proceed with the
hearing âŚ, the [c]ourt was constrained to schedule two
additional hearings on the, now contested, Petitions to
Confirm Consent for October 18, 2021 and October 25,
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2021.
A third hearing was scheduled, as expediently as feasible,
for January 6, 2022. At the conclusion of testimony, counsel
asserted the following legal issues: 1) whether the consents
were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing where [Mother and
Father] alleged that they were conditioned on execution of
a PACA (and a promise of a second PACA related to one of
their daughters), 2) whether [Mother and Father] attempted
to and, in fact, did revoke their consents in writing; 3)
whether AFTHâs advice and documents were confusing and
misleading as to the sufficiency of a verbal telephone call to
revoke consent; and 4) whether AFTH compounded the
confusion surrounding revocation of consents by failing to
remind [Mother and Father] that revocation must be in
writing, and exacerbated [Mother and Fatherâs] sense of
duress and intimidation by advising them that AFTH would
make a report to the office of [CYS] if they revoked their
consents.
(Orphansâ Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 2-3) (internal footnotes omitted).
On May 13, 2022, the Orphansâ Court decided that Mother and Fatherâs
consents to adoption were invalid. Regarding the attempted revocation of
Mother and Fatherâs consents, the court explained that they failed to deliver a
written revocation of consent within 30 days following the execution of their
consents, and they failed to challenge the validity of the consents within 60
days, as required under the statute. (Id. at 22). The court expressly found
Fatherâs testimony concerning a purported written revocation incredible. (See
id. at 22-24).3 Nevertheless, the court found their consents to adoption were
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3 Notwithstanding these findings, the court was âtroubledâ by certain actions
of AFTH where AFTH provided Mother and Father a document describing
procedures for revocation which did not specify that revocation must be
written. Rather, the document stated that a birth parent who wished to revoke
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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conditioned on an agreement for a PACA, and that a consent to adoption
conditioned on a PACA is not a voluntary, intelligent, and unconditional
consent, rendering the consents invalid. (Id. at 19).
On May 21, 2022, AFTH filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
court granted. Following additional briefing, the court entered an order on
September 23, 2022 denying the motion for reconsideration on the merits and
resting on the courtâs May 13, 2022 decision.
While the petitions to confirm consents were pending, AFTH filed a
petition to involuntarily terminate Fatherâs parental rights on September 2,
2021, and a petition to involuntarily terminate Motherâs parental rights on
September 23, 2021. Childâs GAL also filed a petition for involuntarily
termination of Mother and Fatherâs parental rights on September 21, 2021.
The court had deferred scheduling an involuntary termination hearing pending
disposition of the petitions to confirm consents.
On October 11, 2022, Pre-Adoptive Parents filed a notice of appeal from
the courtâs May 13, 2022 decision. AFTH also appealed this decision on
October 12, 2022. Nevertheless, this Court quashed those appeals on
December 9, 2022, based on the pendency of the petitions for involuntary
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a consent must call the caseworker. Additionally, the record indicated that
Ms. Bendig advised Mother and Father to call her, but she did not communicate
to them that a revocation must be in writing. Ms. Bendig also informed Mother
that if they wanted to revoke consent, she would have to notify CYS that they
reclaimed custody of Child. Given Mother and Fatherâs expressed fear that
CYS would become involved, the court found that this statement had the effect
of intimidating Mother from expressing her honest views about whether she
wanted to revoke consent. (Id. at 24-25).
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termination of Mother and Fatherâs parental rights.
As previously stated, Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights
to Child on February 27, 2023. On May 18, 2023 and May 22, 2023, the
Orphansâ Court conducted hearings regarding the petitions for involuntary
termination of Fatherâs parental rights. The court summarized the testimony
at the termination hearings as follows:
At the outset of the hearing on the contested Petitions for
Involuntary Termination of ⌠Fatherâs parental rights, all
counsel stipulated that the [c]ourt may consider all of the
testimony and evidence, including the testimony and
evidence taken in the prior proceedings with respect to the
Petitions to Confirm Consents to adoption.
On May 22, 2023, this [c]ourt heard testimony of Dr. Erica
Williams, and admitted in evidence her evaluations of âŚ
Father and her Supplemental Report as Exhibits P-7 and P-
11. Dr. Williams was qualified as an expert in psychology,
forensic psychology, and bonding and attachment
assessments and capacity evaluations.
Dr. Williams performed a parenting capacity evaluation of âŚ
Father on March 31, 2023, which was admitted in evidence
as Exhibit P-7. Dr. Williams testified that it was difficult to
obtain a chronological timeline or history from ⌠Father, as
he âhad an inability or unwillingness to provide the
information as needed and to provide it in a structured,
consistent way.â Dr. Williams identified several areas of
concern, including a longstanding history of criminal legal
issues, as well as substance abuse issues, and ⌠Fatherâs
inability to accept responsibility for this criminal record
history. According to Dr. Williams, ⌠Father, rather than
being accountable for his own actions, tends to indicate that
these things happened to him and see himself as the victim.
Dr. Williams also identified chronic instability in ⌠Fatherâs
housing, issues of domestic violence, and significant
employment instability. He described to Dr. Williams that
he was currently employed, but moving to a new job, but
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âcouldnât really explain what the new job was.â His
testimony in [c]ourt was similar, in that he would mention
having expectations of a new and better job, and at first
indicate it was a certainty, but when pressed[, he would]
mention two or three job possibilities that were uncertain,
or for which he had had an interview. Dr. Williams explained
that in trying to evaluate ⌠Fatherâs circumstances and
identify solutions, he presents with âpervasive minimization,
⌠denial, [and] defensiveness.â These traits were confirmed
by administration of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory, according to Dr. Williams.
When Dr. Williams asked ⌠Father whether he anticipated
any concerns about parenting [Child], or about removing
him from the home that he has known for more than two
years, ⌠Father stated that he did not have any concerns
about parenting and that he did not foresee any issues. She
concluded that this attitude was further evidence of âŚ
Fatherâs pattern of âdenial, minimization, the inability to see
the actual reality of what may or may not happen.â Dr.
Williams testified that, when asked about removing [Child]
from the home where he has been residing for more than
two years, initially ⌠Father âdenied that there would be any
impact on [Child]. Then he thought about it and thought
perhaps there would be impact, but it will only take a matter
of days for [Child] to get over it and then it would be a
nonissue.... Again, itâs the denial and the minimization and
not understanding of the impact of real life events on others,
and itâs concerning that he couldnât predict and then plan for
the support that [Child] would need given that severe
disruption of attachment.â Dr. Williams also testified, based
upon her expertise, that when a child has a secure
attachment for a period of years, if you abruptly change
that, it is going to be a severe disruption.
Dr. Williams also testified that ⌠Father expressed that his
goal with respect to this case involving his son, [Child], was
initially to obtain custody of [Child], but then to turn over
the child to his family members who have adopted his two
older daughters.
Dr. Williams also observed patterns in ⌠Fatherâs criminal
history and his decades-long substance abuse history of
placing himself and others at risk of harm, including by his
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substance abuse, and when he became violent with a police
officer, and incidents of domestic violence. Ultimately, Dr.
Williams testified that it was her opinion, to a reasonable
degree of psychological certainty, based upon her
evaluation, that ⌠Father lacked the capacity to parent, and
also that he has not begun the process of remedying these
incapacities.
Dr. Williams also testified that she performed an assessment
of whether there was a parental bond between ⌠Father and
[Child], which included observing them together, and
expressed her opinion that there is no parent-caregiver
bond between the two.
On examination by his own counsel, ⌠Father acknowledged
that he had changed his mind multiple times about his goal
for these proceedings. Initially, when counsel was first
appointed for him, he supported the Petition to Confirm his
consent to the adoption, but desired to negotiate for more
visits under a [PACA]. At the hearing on the Petitions to
Confirm Consent, he took the position that he had revoked
his consent. At one time he advised Dr. Williams and others
that he intended to obtain custody of [Child] but then to
turn custody over to the family members who have adopted
[Childâs siblings]. Still later, at trial on these petitions, he
changed his position again, asserting that he wished to
obtain custody of [Child] and raise him himself.
⌠Father acknowledged that he had received from his
counsel the requests for discovery, as well as this [c]ourtâs
Order for him to provide discovery, but that although he
wished to comply, he had never dropped off any pay stubs,
tax returns, lease, documentation regarding his substance
use treatment or any other documentation to his counsel to
be delivered to opposing counsel before trial. Having not
produced these exhibits before trial as required, ⌠Father
did bring with him to [c]ourt a tax return for 2022, some
pay stubs, and a lease, as well as, a document
demonstrating the support he is receiving towards his
housing through a program called HUD-VASH in Chester
County, Pennsylvania. These documents were admitted in
evidence as Exhibits F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4, and F-5.
Questions were raised about whether ⌠Father had ever filed
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a custody petition in the Family Division of this Court, during
the pendency of these proceedings. Although his [c]ourt-
appointed counsel helped to draft a petition for him to file
to seek custody, he testified that he took it to the
Prothonotary intending to file it, but that he neither paid the
filing fee, nor filed a petition for leave to file without paying
the fee (I.F.P.). As a result, no petition for custody was ever
filed.
Regarding ⌠Fatherâs housing, counsel for the child
established through cross-examination that ⌠Father lived
in an apartment ⌠in Paoli, Pennsylvania, at the time of
[Childâs] birth, and from approximately 2018 to 2021. He
acknowledged that he received several eviction notices
while living at that address but protested that he was not
evicted. After leaving that apartment in 2021, he lived for
a time in a Holiday Inn Express hotel, and then ⌠in Paoli,
at a home owned by someone he worked for. Sometime
around July of 2022, he testified that he entered a program
through the VA for Homeless Veterans, called Fresh Start,
and moved into housing at the VA in Coatesville,
Pennsylvania. Although he acknowledged being admitted to
this program he was argumentative and evasive with
counsel and appeared to resist acknowledging that this was
a program for homeless veterans. [The GAL] offered in
evidence as Exhibit P-12, a letter from the VA dated April
24, 2023, confirming that ⌠Father participated in a
program of supportive housing for homeless veterans called
Fresh Start, and lived there from July of 2022 through
November 28, of 2022. At the end of November 2022, he
moved to a two-bedroom cottage ⌠in West Chester,
Pennsylvania, with support from the HUD-VASH program.
On cross-examination of ⌠Father, counsel for the child
established that ⌠Father had a criminal record stretching
back at least to 2006 in Pennsylvania. Criminal records of
⌠Father were admitted in evidence as Exhibits P-3(a), P-
3(b), P-3-(c), P-3(d), P-3(e) and P-3(f).
Asked about his substance abuse history, ⌠Father
acknowledged a history of being addicted to Percocet. At
first he testified that his addiction began in 2011 or 2012,
but then he acknowledged that he was in a drug rehab in
2005 or 2006. Although his ability to clearly testify to the
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dates was limited, he acknowledged being released from jail
to a program called âMinsecâ in 2005 or 2006, being
released from jail to a program in Valley Forge,
Pennsylvania, in 2009, and attending a third rehab called
Mirmont in 2019, after his release from incarceration. He
also acknowledged that after the first rehab stay in 2005, or
2006, he was prescribed Suboxone.
⌠Fatherâs testimony in [c]ourt on May 18, and May 22,
2023, consistent with the description by Dr. Erica Williams,
evidenced a pattern of minimization, denial and
defensiveness, particularly with respect to his criminal
record, his substance abuse history, and his housing
instability. His failure to provide documents, in response to
a discovery request and in response to a [c]ourt Order, prior
to trial on these subjects exacerbated the problem with
corroborating his claims to have achieved employment and
housing stability and sobriety.
⌠Father acknowledged that he has not provided any
financial support for [Child], nor sent him any cards or gifts,
except when having a visit with him, during the entire period
from October of 2020 until the hearing in May 2023.
⌠Father has had approximately 5 visits with the child âŚ
between October 2020 and through the date of the hearings
in May 2023. According to the testimony of [the pre-
adoptive father G.O.], he attempted to but could not reach
⌠Father for much of 2022. Indeed, a visit was scheduled
for ⌠Father with [Child] in the summer of 2022, but âŚ
Father did not show. Although ⌠Father stated that he
wished to have visits and contact with [Child], he typically
did not make a request to set up a visit on a specific date.
His attorney on some occasions was involved in assisting
him to set up visits. The most recent visit between ⌠Father
and [Child] occurred [in] January of 2023, and was set up
on the initiative of the [P]re-[A]doptive [P]arents, although
⌠Fatherâs attorney had initially made a request for a visit
in December near Christmas.
(Orphansâ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 3-8) (internal citations omitted).
At the conclusion of the termination hearing on May 22, 2023, the
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Orphansâ Court granted the petitions for involuntary termination of Fatherâs
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b).
Father timely appealed the termination decree, and AFTH and Pre-
Adoptive Parents subsequently filed cross-appeals challenging the earlier
orders denying confirmation of the adoption consents and reconsideration of
same. On January 4, 2024, however, this Court vacated the May 22, 2023
order terminating Fatherâs parental rights, and remanded with instructions for
the Orphansâ Court to expressly determine whether Childâs GAL had a conflict
of interest that prevented her from also serving as Childâs legal counsel in the
termination proceedings. This Court dismissed the cross-appeals without
prejudice. See In re Adoption of C.P.D., 1586 EDA 2023 (Pa.Super. filed
Jan. 4, 2024) (unpublished memorandum).
On February 21, 2024, the Orphansâ Court expressly determined that no
conflict of interest existed that prevented Childâs GAL from also serving as
Childâs legal counsel in the termination proceedings. Consequently, the
Orphansâ Court re-entered the decree involuntarily terminating Fatherâs
parental rights to Child. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on February 29,
2024, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH also timely filed
cross-appeals and respective Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statements.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings
of this Honorable Court that Petitioners proved by clear and
convincing evidence the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. [§]
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2511(a)(1) for the involuntary termination of Birth Fatherâs
parental rights?
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings
of this Honorable Court that Petitioners proved by clear and
convincing evidence the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. [§]
2511(a)(2) for the involuntary termination of Birth Fatherâs
parental rights?
Whether this Honorable Court abused its discretion in
finding that the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of [Child] will be best served by the
termination of Birth Fatherâs parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. [§] 2511(b), when there is a strong and loving bond
between Birth Father and the child, and severance of that
bond will cause irreparable harm to the child?
(Fatherâs Brief at 4).
Pre-Adoptive Parents raise the following issue for our review:
Whether the [Orphansâ C]ourt committed an error of law by
denying to confirm the consent to adoption of [Father], after
deciding that the consent was in compliance with 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2711(a) and (d), and that he did not timely revoke his
consent or file a petition alleging fraud or duress in
accordance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2711(c)?
(Pre-Adoptive Parentsâ Brief at 11).
AFTH raises the following issues for our review:
Whether the [Orphansâ C]ourt committed an error of law by
denying confirmation [of] Fatherâs consent to adoption, after
finding that: (a) the consent complied with 23 Pa.C.S. §
2711(a) and (d); (b) Father did not timely revoke his
consent in accordance with § 2711(c)(1)(i); and (c) Father
did not timely challenge the validity of the consent on the
basis of fraud or duress in accordance with ⌠23 Pa.C.S. [§]
2711(c)(3).
Whether the [Orphansâ C]ourtâs decision to invalidate
consents signed by the Birthparents many months earlier
was manifestly unreasonable because it was contrary to the
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weight of [the] evidence.
(AFTHâs Brief at 13).
In his issues combined, Father disputes the Orphansâ Courtâs finding that
he refused or failed to perform parental duties concerning Child. Father
emphasizes that at the outset of this case, he brought Child into the care of
AFTH for placement for an open adoption. Father argues that there was no
indication of abuse or neglect, nor was there a question of Fatherâs capacity
to care for Child. At the time of Childâs placement, AFTH had Mother and
Father sign consents to adoption and a PACA and made other promises to
Mother and Father. Father insists that Mother and Father revoked their
consent for adoption within 30 days. Father asserts that AFTH took no action
to return Child to Mother and Father, effectively ignoring their revocation.
Father submits that he had no counsel, had revoked his consent, and had no
idea how to secure Childâs return.
Father maintains that once AFTH filed for the adoption and confirmation
of consents, that opened the door for Father to assert his revocation. Father
contends that AFTH took no steps to set up visits between Father and Child
while the matter concerning the validity of the adoption consents was pending.
Father highlights that the court deemed his consent to adoption invalid on May
13, 2022. Father avers that he has never refused to perform parental duties.
Father stresses that he has acted appropriately with Child during visits and
attended to Childâs needs when he had the opportunity. Under these
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circumstances, Father submits that termination of his parental rights was
improper under Section 2511(a)(1).
Additionally, Father argues that no incapacity existed when Child was
placed with AFTH. Father asserts that he initially planned for an open
adoption, and there was no removal of Child from the home due to any
incapacity, abuse, or neglect by Father. To the contrary, Father emphasizes
that he was trying to assure Child would have the proper care and control by
meeting with and selecting Pre-Adoptive Parents. Father claims that he has
been employed and maintained housing throughout this litigation. Thus,
Father challenges any âclaims and innuendos that Father was incapable of
caring for his son both physically and financially.â (Fatherâs Brief at 15).
Father insists that he has shown during visits that he can attend to Childâs
needs appropriately. Father avers that the lack of his âfuture planâ should not
be held against him, as a parent does not have to have a future plan to have
children. (Id. at 16). Under these circumstances, Father submits that
termination of his parental rights was also improper under Section 2511(a)(2).
With respect to Section 2511(b), Father reiterates that he revoked his
consent to adoption within 30 days. Father argues that AFTH and Pre-
Adoptive Parents should have returned Child to Father at that time. âInstead
they have held this child, requiring Father to go through extended court
hearings and the passing of valuable time in the life of a child so young.â (Id.
at 17). Father maintains that the court did not invalidate Fatherâs consent to
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adoption until May 2022; at that point, Child had been with Pre-Adoptive
Parents for 18 of his 20 months of life. Father complains that he did not have
a chance to develop a significant bond with Child during this time. Father
stresses that the âdelay in time from the revocation [of the consent to
adoption] to present was caused by [AFTHâs] failure to properly address the
revocation of the consent in this case and created a situation whereby the
child, rather than be returned to the parents in less than 30 days, has now
been in the custody of the [Pre-Adoptive Parents] for in excess of 20 months.â
(Id. at 18). Father proclaims that neither he nor Child should be penalized in
such a harsh fashion due to AFTHâs inaction. Father concludes the court erred
by involuntarily terminating his parental rights, and this Court must grant
relief. We disagree.
Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: âour
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.â
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115(Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J.,972 A.2d 5, 8
(Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial courtâs
decision, the decree must stand. ⌠We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial courtâs decision is
supported by competent evidence.
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In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668,863 A.2d 1141
(2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
is on the party seeking termination to establish by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the courtâs findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
courtâs decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191[-92] (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supraat 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J.,936 A.2d 1128, 1131-32
(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied,597 Pa. 718
,951 A.2d 1165
(2008)).
The court granted involuntary termination of Fatherâs parental rights to
Child on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.âThe rights of a parent in regard to
a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.âThe court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). âParental rights may be involuntarily
terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along
with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.â In re Z.P., supra
at 1117. When conducting a termination analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parentâs conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parentâs conduct warrants
termination ofâŚhis parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
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the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parentâs explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re Z.P.,
supra at 1117. âParents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
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reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.â Id.at 1117- 18. Under Section 2511(a)(2), âthe petitioner for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.â In Interest of Lilley,719 A.2d 327, 330
(Pa.Super. 1998).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the childâs needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520(Pa.Super. 2006). âIntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.âId.
Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Further, our Supreme Court has recently clarified that, in making a
Section 2511(b) determination, a trial court must analyze: (1) whether the
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parental bond is ânecessary and beneficial to the child;â (2) âthe childâs need
for permanency and length of time in foster care;â (3) âwhether the child is in
a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents;â and (4) âwhether the
foster home meets the childâs developmental, physical, and emotional needs,
including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety and stability.â
Interest of K.T., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023). Moreover, the Court explained that, when reviewing the nature of the parental bond, a court must consider âwhether maintaining the bond serves the childâs developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.âId.
Importantly, the K.T. Courtâs decision is particularly relevant to an analysis of an existing parental-bond. âIn cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.â In re K.Z.S.,946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa.Super. 2008)
(citation omitted).
Instantly, at the conclusion of the termination hearings, the court
discussed Fatherâs history of unstable employment, unstable housing,
unstable relationships, criminal conduct, substance abuse, and âinadequate
self-knowledge about each of these things that would enable him to prevent
continuation of these unfortunate interactions, inadequate recognition of his
own responsibility for the criminal activities, excessive focus on himself as a
victim of [CYS]âŚâ (N.T. Termination Hearing, 5/22/23, at 113-14). Based
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upon this history, Dr. Williams opined to a reasonable degree of psychological
certainty that at the present time, Father lacks the capacity to parent Child.
(Id. at 113).
Further, the court noted that Father minimized any concern for Child
that would arise from removing him from Pre-Adoptive Parentsâ home,
indicating a lack of ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable
consequences to Child. (Id. at 116). The court also highlighted that Father
did not ever send Child cards, gifts, letters, or provide financial support for
Child. (Id. at 117). Although Father stated that he opened a bank account
for Child, the account was in Fatherâs name and was not restricted in any form
or designated for the benefit of Child. (Id.) The court emphasized that Father
sought visits with Child and negotiated a voluntary PACA that provided for
visits, as well as letters and e-mails. Nevertheless, Father did not consistently
seek visitation with Child and visited with him only five times in total. (Id. at
117). Although Pre-Adoptive Parents set up an e-mail account to share
pictures and updates about Child, Father did not make use of that account or
communicate via that account to receive updates. (Id. at 118).
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that Father failed to
perform any parental duties for a period of more than six months prior to the
filing of the termination petitions, and Father is not capable of performing
parental duties and taking care of Child. (Id. at 121-22). Thus, the court
found termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(1) and (2). (Id. at 122).
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(See also Orphansâ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 8-9) (finding that âFather has
failed and refused to perform parenting responsibilities, and has an incapacity
to parent. These findings are supported by the lengthy record and the expert
testimony of Dr. Erica Williamsâ).
Our review of the record supports the courtâs analysis under Section
2511(a)(1).4 As the Orphansâ Court noted, Father has not provided for Child
financially, sent Child cards or gifts, kept apprised of updates concerning Child
via the e-mail account specifically set up for that purpose, or consistently
visited with Child. Rather, the record confirms that Pre-Adoptive Parents
perform all parental duties. Although Father claims AFTH did not set up visits
for Father and that litigation concerning the validity of the adoption consents
delayed Fatherâs reunification with Child, Father fails to articulate what steps
he took to care for Child during the pendency of litigation. Indeed, the
evidence shows that Father did not file a custody petition following his
purported revocation of his adoption consent even though his counsel had
drafted one, did not request visits, and did not seek updates on Childâs well-
being during this time. Additionally, Dr. Williams made clear that terminating
Fatherâs parental rights would not cause irreparable harm to Child. Thus, the
record supports the courtâs decision that for at least six months prior to the
filing of the termination petitions, Father failed to perform parental duties for
____________________________________________
4 We need only discuss one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section
2511(b). See In re Z.P., supra.
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Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1); In re Z.S.W., supra.
Regarding Section 2511(b), the court explained:
In this case the [c]ourt finds that there is no parental bond
between the child, ⌠and ⌠Father. ⌠Father has not
provided for the child emotionally or financially, has not
acted in a parental role with the child, and has attended only
approximately 5 visits with the child in over two-and-a-half
years. Based upon his own testimony, and the extensive
record, as well as the expert testimony of Dr. Erica Williams,
this [c]ourt concludes that there is no parental bond
between [Child] and ⌠Father and that termination of âŚ
Fatherâs parental rights will not cause irreparable harm to
the child.
The child is placed in a loving and nurturing home where all
of his needs are being met, and he is bonded to [Pre-
Adoptive Parents]. In addition to their own testimony, this
is supported in the expert testimony of Dr. Erica Williams.
Indeed, ⌠Fatherâs inability to appreciate the profound
disruption and harm that would occur for [Child] were he to
be removed from this loving home is one of many indicators
of ⌠Fatherâs incapacity to appreciate and anticipate the
needs and welfare of the child, and to place the childâs
welfare ahead of his own desires, demonstrates his
incapacity to parent.
(Orphansâ Court Opinion, 7/14/23, at 9). The record supports the courtâs
analysis concerning Section 2511(b). See In re Z.P., supra.Further, the courtâs analysis confirms the court considered all relevant factors regarding whether a bond exists between Father and Child. See Interest of K.T., supra. On this record, we see no error of law or abuse of discretion concerning the courtâs termination of Fatherâs parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). See In reZ.P., supra.
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Thus, we turn to the cross-appeals. 5 For purposes of disposition, we
consider the arguments of Pre-Adoptive Parents and AFTH together. Pre-
Adoptive Parents argue that both Mother and Father executed consents to
Childâs adoption on October 27, 2020 that complied with 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2711(a) and (d). Pre-Adoptive Parents assert that neither Mother nor Father
delivered to AFTH a written revocation of those consents at any time. Pre-
Adoptive Parents contend that neither parent filed a petition to revoke the
____________________________________________
5 We observe that by affirming the trial courtâs decision to involuntarily
terminate Fatherâs parental rights, and in light of Motherâs voluntary
relinquishment of her parental rights, the issues raised by Pre-Adoptive
Parents and AFTH appear to be moot. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616(Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc) (explaining general rule that actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of judicial process or case will be dismissed as moot; issue before court is moot if in ruling upon issue, court cannot enter order that has any legal force or effect). Although no party expressly raises an exception to the mootness doctrine, AFTH notes that the Orphansâ Courtâs decision to invalidate Fatherâs adoption consent has the potential to impact permanency for other children. Specifically, AFTH maintains that â[i]f the [Orphansâ C]ourtâs reasoning in this case remains on the docket undisturbed, it will endure as a viable roadmap for other birthparents to use to challenge their consents, long after statutory deadlines have passed and bonds have attached between the child and their adopting parent.â (AFTHâs Brief at 16-17). AFTH acknowledges that although the record in this case is not available for public view, any of the lawyers involved in this case are familiar with the decision and could use it when representing clients in other adoption cases. (Id. at 17 n.5). AFTH insists that the courtâs ruling âwould turn Pennsylvania adoption practice on its head, undermining the legislatureâs clear and unequivocal intent to provide certainty and permanency for children.â (Id. at 17). Thus, even if the issues raised in the cross-appeals are moot, we decline to dismiss the cross-appeals and proceed to address the merits of those issues. See In reD.A., supra
(explaining that
we will decide questions otherwise rendered moot when case involves question
of great public importance; question presented is capable of repetition and apt
to elude appellate review; or party to controversy will suffer some detriment
due to decision of trial court).
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consents based upon fraud or duress during the 60-day period required under
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). Pre-Adoptive Parents emphasize the Orphansâ Courtâs
finding that the testimony of Mother and Father was not entirely credible
concerning the circumstances surrounding their consents. Nevertheless, the
Orphansâ Court found the consents to adoption invalid because they were not
voluntary and unconditional in light of AFTHâs promises of a PACA with respect
to Child. Because Mother and Father did not revoke their consents to adoption
in a timely manner, however, Pre-Adoptive Parents contend that the Orphansâ
Court was precluded from addressing the issue of the validity of their
consents. Pre-Adoptive Parents submit that the Orphansâ Court relied on
cases involving voluntary relinquishment of parental rights rather than cases
concerning consents to adoption under Section 2711.
In AFTHâs issues combined, AFTH echoes the same arguments advanced
by Pre-Adoptive Parents. Additionally, AFTH argues that by ruling that the
signing of a PACA was a basis to invalidate the adoption consents, the court
effectively nullified another Pennsylvania statute, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2731-2742
(âAct 101â).6 AFTH asserts that the Orphansâ Court essentially ruled that using
____________________________________________
6 Chapter 27, Subchapter D of the Adoption Act, commonly referred to as âAct
101â sets forth the procedures related to PACAs at Sections 2731-2742:
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an option for
adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into a voluntary
agreement for ongoing communication or contact that:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 27 -
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the statutory tool created for court-enforceable future contact canceled out
the adoption consent, which is the opposite of Act 101âs purpose. AFTH
maintains that the purpose of Act 101 is to give birthparents the assurance of
knowing if, when, and how often they will see their child in the future if they
choose voluntary adoption. Thus, AFTH maintains that Act 101 was intended
to be used in conjunction with the adoption consent and not as a separate
âtransactionâ as the Orphansâ Court suggested. AFTH insists that the courtâs
âreliance on the absence of an express statement in Act 101 that a consent
cannot be conditional upon a PACA is misplaced where the legislative history
shows that PACA and voluntary consent are fundamentally connected.â
____________________________________________
(1) is in the best interest of the child;
(2) recognizes the partiesâ interests and desires for ongoing
communication or contact;
(3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the childâs
life; and
(4) is subject to approval by the courts.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. Section 2732 defines a PACA (called an âAgreementâ
under the statute) as a âvoluntary written agreement between an adoptive
parent and a birth relative that is approved by a court and provides for
continuing contact or communication between the child and the birth relative
or between the adoptive parent and the birth relative as provided under this
subchapter.â 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2732. The PACA must be filed with the court
that finalizes the adoption of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(a). Further,
the court shall approve the PACA if it has been entered into knowingly and
voluntarily by all parties, and is in the best interest of the child. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(b). The PACA shall not be legally enforceable unless
approved by the court, which the court shall approve when the statutory
conditions are satisfied. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(b), (c).
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(AFTHâs Brief at 49). AFTH submits that the Orphansâ Courtâs decision creates
an impossible dilemma for adoption agencies who must counsel clients about
the opportunity to sign a PACA as part of their adoption options. Under the
courtâs rationale, AFTH posits that professionals will need to advise
birthparents of Act 101 and then ask them to forsake the opportunity to sign
a PACA at the time of signing consent and only later try to get the parties to
sign one.
Further, AFTH avers that any suggestion that it misled or induced Father
to signing the adoption consent is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence. AFTH emphasizes testimony from Ms. Bendig, who affirmed that
she did not make promises to deliver benefits unrelated to Childâs adoption or
that Father could have believed his consent was conditioned on any such
promises. Although AFTH acknowledges that it tried to help Father with some
problems such as securing funds to help Father replace his car battery, AFTH
insists that its offer to help could not have reasonably been perceived as an
inducement to encourage Father to sign the adoption consent. AFTH also
contends that it did not promise to get a PACA for Fatherâs daughter if Father
signed the adoption consent for Child. AFTH highlights that Father was
familiar with the adoption and revocation process because he went through it
a year before these proceedings for his daughter. As well, AFTH points to
Motherâs testimony confirming that she signed her adoption consent because
she did not want Child to be placed in the foster care system, and not in
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reliance on having a PACA or any promise from AFTH. Pre-Adoptive Parents
and AFTH conclude that the court erred in refusing to confirm the consents to
adoption, and this Court must grant relief. We agree with AFTH and Pre-
Adoptive Parentsâ position.
At the outset, we note:
The aim of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of our General Assembly. The plain language of a
statute is the best indicator of the General Assemblyâs
intent, and only where the language is not clear and free
from ambiguity do we turn to principles of statutory
construction to aid our interpretation. When interpreting a
statute, we must always read the words of a statute in
context, not in isolation, and give meaning to each and
every provision and our interpretation must not render any
provision extraneous.... We must presume that the General
Assembly did not intend a result that is absurd or
unreasonable or which violates the Constitutions of the
United States or this Commonwealth, and that it intend for
the entire statute to be effective and certain.
In re J.W.B., 659 Pa. 561, 577-78,232 A.3d 689
, 698-99 (2020) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 2504 of the Adoption Act describes the procedure whereby a
parent executes a consent to adoption, and an agency or adoptive parent files
a petition to confirm that consent:
§ 2504. Alternative procedure for relinquishment
(a) Petition to confirm consent to adoption.âIf
the parent or parents of the child have executed consents
to an adoption, upon petition by the intermediary or, where
there is no intermediary, by the adoptive parent, the court
shall hold a hearing for the purpose of confirming a consent
to an adoption upon expiration of the time periods under
section 2711 (relating to consents necessary to adoption).
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The original consent or consents to the adoption shall be
attached to the petition.
(b) Hearing.âUpon presentation of a petition filed
pursuant to this section, the court shall fix a time for a
hearing which shall not be less than ten days after filing of
the petition. Notice of the hearing shall be by personal
service or by registered mail or by such other means as the
court may require upon the consenter and shall be in the
form provided in section 2513(b) (relating to hearing).
Notice of the hearing shall be given to the other parent or
parents, to the putative father whose parental rights could
be terminated pursuant to subsection (c) and to the parents
or guardian of a consenting parent who has not reached 18
years of age. The notice shall state that the consenting
parentâs or putative fatherâs rights may be terminated as a
result of the hearing. After hearing, which shall be private,
the court may enter a decree of termination of parental
rights in the case of a relinquishment to an adult or a decree
of termination of parental rights and duties, including the
obligation of support, in the case of a relinquishment to an
agency.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a) and (b).
Further, Section 2711 of the Adoption Act governs the content, form,
and validity of consents necessary for an adoption. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711.
Regarding the validity and revocation of a consent for adoption, the statute
provides:
§ 2711. Consents necessary to adoption
* * *
(c) Validity of consent.âNo consent shall be valid if it was
executed prior to or within 72 hours after the birth of the
child. A putative father may execute a consent at any time
after receiving notice of the expected or actual birth of the
child. Any consent given outside this Commonwealth shall
be valid for purposes of this section if it was given in
accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was
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executed. A consent to an adoption may only be revoked
as set forth in this subsection. The revocation of a consent
shall be in writing and shall be served upon the agency or
adult to whom the child was relinquished. The following
apply:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (3):
(i) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth
father or a putative father, the consent is irrevocable
more than 30 days after the birth of the child or the
execution of the consent, whichever occurs later.
(ii) For a consent to an adoption executed by a birth
mother, the consent is irrevocable more than 30 days
after the execution of the consent.
(2) An individual may not waive the revocation period
under paragraph (1).
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the following apply:
(i) An individual who executed a consent to an
adoption may challenge the validity of the consent
only by filing a petition alleging fraud or duress within
the earlier of the following time frames:
(A) Sixty days after the birth of the child or the
execution of the consent, whichever occurs later.
(B) Thirty days after the entry of the adoption
decree.
(ii) A consent to an adoption may be invalidated only
if the alleged fraud or duress under subparagraph (i)
is proven by:
(A) a preponderance of the evidence in the case of
consent by a person 21 years of age or younger; or
(B) clear and convincing evidence in all other
cases.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c). â[T]his Section describes the timeline for revocation
of a consent to adoption, as well as a challenge to its validity (and only on the
grounds of fraud or duress). This Section further makes clear that a
revocation and/or a challenge to the validity of a consent to adoption must be
in conformity with the Act.â In re Adoption of J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 407- 08 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied,598 Pa. 750
,954 A.2d 577
(2008)
(internal citations omitted).
In In re Adoption of J.A.S., the birth mother revoked her consent to
adoption 100 days after she had authorized an amended consent. The
Orphansâ Court determined that birth motherâs consent to adoption was void
ab initio, because it had originally omitted information required under Section
2711(d) (detailing content of consent to adoption). 7 âEssentially, the court
____________________________________________
7 Section 2711(d) provides in full:
(d) Contents of consent.â
(1) The consent of a parent of an adoptee under 18 years of
age shall set forth the name, age and marital status of the
parent, the relationship of the consenter to the child, the
name of the other parent or parents of the child and the
following:
I hereby voluntarily and unconditionally consent to the
adoption of the above named child.
I understand that by signing this consent I indicate my
intent to permanently give up all rights to this child.
I understand such child will be placed for adoption.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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____________________________________________
I understand I may revoke this consent to permanently give
up all rights to this child by placing the revocation in writing
and serving it upon the agency or adult to whom the child
was relinquished.
If I am the birth father or putative father of the child, I
understand that this consent to an adoption is irrevocable
unless I revoke it within 30 days after either the birth of the
child or my execution of the consent, whichever occurs later,
by delivering a written revocation to (insert the name and
address of the agency coordinating the adoption) or (insert
the name and address of an attorney who represents the
individual relinquishing parental rights or prospective
adoptive parent of the child) or (insert the court of the
county in which the voluntary relinquishment form was or
will be filed).
If I am the birth mother of the child, I understand that this
consent to an adoption is irrevocable unless I revoke it
within 30 days after executing it by delivering a written
revocation to (insert the name and address of the agency
coordinating the adoption) or (insert the name and address
of an attorney who represents the individual relinquishing
parental rights or prospective adoptive parent of the child)
or (insert the court of the county in which the voluntary
relinquishment form was or will be filed).
I have read and understand the above and I am signing it
as a free and voluntary act.
(2) The consent shall include the date and place of its
execution and names and addresses and signatures of at
least two persons who witnessed its execution and their
relationship to the consenter. The consent of an
incarcerated parent of an adoptee may be witnessed by a
correctional facility employee designated by the correctional
facility. Any consent witnessed by a correctional facility
employee shall list the address of the correctional facility on
the consent.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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concluded a âvalidâ consent to adoption was a necessary predicate under the
statute before the timeliness provisions for revoking and/or challenging the
validity of the consent were triggered.â Id. at 408.
On appeal, this Court reversed, explaining:
The statute does not explicitly state it is subject to strict
construction; but it does plainly provide for time constraints
to revoke and/or challenge the validity of a consent to
adoption. The practical consequence of the courtâs
interpretation effectively permitted Birth mother to
challenge the validity of her consent to adoption at any time,
based upon the existence of a technical omission in the form
of the initial consent. This lack of finality is exactly the
mischief the legislature intended to remedy with the revision
to Section 2711 of the Adoption Act in 2004, the purpose of
which was to afford finality to the adoption process.1 Hence
the statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable more
than thirty (30) days after execution. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2711(c)(1)(ii).2 Additionally, the statute precludes a
challenge to the validity of the consent to adoption after
sixty (60) days following the birth of the child or the
execution of the consent, whichever occurs later, and only
upon the grounds of fraud or duress. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2711(c)(3)(i)(A). Thus, the unambiguous language of the
statute required the Orphansâ [C]ourt in this case to
consider the timeliness of Birth motherâs petition to revoke
and/or challenge the validity of her consent before it
considered the merits of her claim. Contrary to the
courtâs interpretation, the threshold act that triggers
these provisions of Section 2711 is the timely filing of
the petition to revoke and/or challenge the validity of
the consent to adoption. Whether Birth motherâs
consent to adoption was valid could be addressed
only if her petition had been timely filed. Essentially,
the untimeliness of Birth motherâs petition precluded
____________________________________________
(3) In lieu of two witnesses a consent may be acknowledged
before a notary public.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(d).
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the court from addressing the issue of validity.
1 The legislature rewrote subsection (c), effective May
24, 2004, which applies to all adoption proceedings
initiated after that date.
2 Nothing in the statute presupposes the âvalidityâ of
the consent.
Here, Birth mother signed a consent to adoption on April 12,
2006. She signed an amendment on July 12, 2006.
Assuming without deciding the later date triggered the
statutory time limits, Birth motherâs petition was still out of
time with respect to both her attempt to revoke her consent
and her attempt to challenge its validity. The Orphansâ
[C]ourt erred when it reached the validity issue first, found
the âformâ of the consent flawed, and refused to address the
timeliness requirement, under the guise of strict
construction. We hold Section 2711 required the court first
to review the timeliness of Birth motherâs petition before
addressing whether the consent to adoption technically
conformed to the statute. Accordingly, we reverse the
courtâs order overruling Appellantâs preliminary objections
to Birth motherâs petition to revoke and/or challenge the
validity of her consent to adoption and remand for further
proceedings.
In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra at 408-09(emphasis added). See also In re R.I.,172 A.3d 665, 667-68
(Pa.Super. 2017) (vacating order which
dismissed fatherâs petition for voluntary relinquishment of parental rights and
consent to adoption based on fatherâs verbal revocation of consent made 72
days after he executed consent to adoption; fatherâs oral revocation of his
consent to adoption that occurred more than 30 days after his execution of
petition for voluntary relinquishment did not meet requirements of Section
2711(c) and court erred in considering its merits).
In In re J.W.B., supra, the father told the mother of his children that
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he wanted to terminate his parental rights and that the motherâs husband
could adopt them. The father executed the consent document and returned
it to their attorney. Nevertheless, the father later told the attorney that he
changed his mind and no longer consented to the adoption. The mother and
the father subsequently obtained separate counsel, and the mother filed a
petition to confirm the fatherâs consent to adoption. The father opposed the
petition, claiming that his consent was invalid because it did not meet the
requirements of Colorado law (where the father was residing) for a consent to
adoption. The court held a hearing, at which time the father conceded that
although he verbally had informed the attorney that he wanted to revoke his
consent to the adoption, he never reduced his revocation to writing. The
father also presented testimony from a Colorado attorney, who testified that
the consent the father had executed would not be valid and enforceable under
Colorado law, because Colorado law imposes requirements for a consent to
adoption that are not required by Pennsylvania law. The Colorado attorney
further testified that Colorado law provides that consents to adoption may be
revoked at any time prior to the adoption.
At oral argument, the father suggested that because the consent was
invalid under Colorado law, it could not be deemed valid under Pennsylvania
law, and he was not required to comply with the timing requirements under
Section 2711(c) governing the revocation of consent. The mother relied on
In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra, to support her argument that the filing of
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a timely revocation petition triggers an inquiry into the validity of a consent,
and the fatherâs failure to file a timely revocation precluded his challenge to
the validity of his consent. Ultimately, the Orphansâ Court agreed with the
motherâs position and found that the fatherâs failure to timely revoke his
consent or challenge the validity of his consent barred his challenge to the
validity of his consent.
The father appealed, and this Court affirmed, relying on its prior decision
in In re Adoption of J.A.S. The Supreme Court subsequently granted
allowance of appeal. Our High Court disagreed with the Orphansâ Court and
this Courtâs analyses, explaining:
The Superior Courtâs ruling that the merits of Fatherâs
arguments regarding the validity of his consent could not be
considered because he failed to comply with the timing
requirements in Section 2711(c) ignores the timing
requirement in Section 2504(a), which provides that a
hearing on a petition to confirm consent cannot take place
until after the expiration of the time periods under Section
2711âthirty days for revocation and sixty days for a validity
challenge based on fraud or duress. Despite the
requirement that the court must confirm consent at a
hearing after the expiration of these time frames, the
Superior Court effectively concluded that a relinquishing
parent could not be heard at the Section 2504(a) hearing.
Under the Superior Courtâs interpretation, there is no
opportunity to challenge, or the court to confirm, that the
previously executed consent complied with the
technical requirements to effectuate a legally
sufficient consent, including those set forth in
Sections 2711(c) and (d) or in the adoption laws of
another state. Here, Father has not attempted to revoke
his prior consent and he has not alleged that his prior
consent was the result of fraud or duress. Instead, Father
contends that his execution of the consent document
prepared by Attorney Wiest did not constitute a legally valid
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consent under Colorado law and was therefore void ab initio,
thereby precluding any need to revoke or otherwise
challenge it. In other words, there was no consent to
adoption. The Superior Courtâs conclusion that there is no
opportunity to raise this challenge does not comport with
the Adoption Act.
Although the exclusivity language in Subsection 2711(c)(3)
suggests that challenges to the validity of a previously
executed consent are limited to those timely filed and based
upon fraud or duress, thereby precluding a challenge to the
sufficiency of the consent, we decline to so interpret the
statutory framework of the Adoption Act. Because it is our
obligation to give meaning to all provisions of the statute,
we must read the time frames in Section 2711(c)(3) in
harmony with Section 2504(a), which provides a different
time frame for the court to confirm a consent to adoption.
In conducting statutory interpretative analysis, the General
Assembly has instructed that courts must presume that it
did not intend a result that violates the Constitutions of the
United States or this Commonwealth. Termination of
parental rights implicates due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children, and before
those rights are terminated the person must be given due
process of law. On at least two occasions, this Court has
held that due process requires that the grounds for
termination of parental rights must be established by clear
and convincing evidence. As such, consistent with the
demands of due process, a parent must be provided with an
opportunity to raise a challenge to the fact of consent, in
accordance with applicable law, to the termination of his
parental rights before the entry of a decree of adoption.
The Adoption Act expressly provides a forum to raise such a
challenge. Section 2504(a) of the Adoption Act provides
that if a parent or parents of a child have executed consents
to an adoption, the adoption intermediary or the adoptive
parent shall file a petition requesting that the trial court hold
a hearing âfor the purpose of confirming a consent to an
adoption.â 23 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). The hearing may not take
place until after the thirty and sixty day time periods in
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Section 2711 have expired. Id. The consent or consents to
be confirmed must be attached to the petition. Id. The
parties must be provided with notice of the hearing by
personal service or registered mail, and the notice must
advise the consenting parent that his or her parental rights
may be terminated as a result of the hearing. 23 Pa.C.S. §
2504(b).
Section 2504(a) is entitled âPetition to confirm consent to
adoption,â and as this title makes clear, it requires the trial
court to confirm the validity of consent(s) to an adoption.
While the statute requires that the hearing may not be held
until after the expiration of the time limits in Section 2711,
it does not indicate that the trial courtâs function at the
hearing is limited to confirming that those time limits have
passed. If the trial courtâs task was so perfunctory, no
hearing would be necessary because a certification would
suffice. Instead, the consent(s) at issue must be attached
to the petition, and the obvious import of this
requirement is that the trial court must review the
consents and consider any and all arguments raised
by the parties challenging their conformity with the
Adoption Act. For instance, Section 2711(c) includes
timing requirements (no consent is valid if executed within
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child, although a
putative father may consent at any time after receiving
notice of the expected or actual birth), and Section 2711(d)
includes an exhaustive list of the information that must be
included in the consent document. In this regard, if Fatherâs
hypothetical text message: âIâm tired of the little monsters,
you can have themâ was advanced in a petition to confirm
consent, it could be challenged at the Section 2504(a)
hearing for lack of conformity to the statuteâs requirements.
Such a challenge goes to compliance with the
statutory mandates for a valid consent, which are
designed to assure the relinquishing parentâs
understanding of the nature of the proceedings and
the consequences. The specific provisions of Section
2711, including in particular the time limitations for
revocation or a validity challenge based upon fraud or
duress, are premised on the execution of a consent
that complies with the legislatureâs statutory
requirements. Otherwise, there is nothing to
invalidate.
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While the Superior Court should not have disregarded
Fatherâs challenge to the validity of his consent on timeliness
grounds, we take no issue with that courtâs determination
that Father has not presented any grounds for relief in this
appeal. âŚ
* * *
[A] consent executed outside of Pennsylvania will be
deemed to be valid in a Pennsylvania adoption proceeding if
it complies with the consent requirements set forth in either
Sections 2711(c) and (d) or the Adoption Act or the laws of
the state which the consenting parent resides at the time of
the execution of the consent. Pennsylvaniaâs validity
requirements do not yield to those of the state in which the
consenting parent resides; instead the laws of both states
provide alternative means to effectuate a valid consent to
terminate parental rights and permit an adoption in
accordance with Pennsylvaniaâs Adoption Act.
For these reasons, we must reject Fatherâs argument that
the Superior Court was required to consider whether his
consent was valid pursuant to Colorado law. Father does
not contest that the consent that he executed complied in
all respects with Pennsylvaniaâs validity requirements,
including the inclusion of the necessary understandings and
acknowledgments set forth in Section 2711(d) of the
Adoption Act. Because the consent that Father executed is
valid under Pennsylvania law, it is immaterial whether it is
also valid under Colorado law.
In re J.W.B., supra at 578-83, 232 A.3d at 699-702 (some citations and
quotation marks omitted; some emphasis added; internal footnote omitted).
In In re C.P.R., No. 726 MDA 2021, 2021 WL 5314743 (Pa.Super. filed
Nov. 16, 2021) (unpublished memorandum),8 the mother appealed from the
____________________________________________
8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (explaining that we may rely on unpublished decisions
of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).
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trial courtâs decree confirming her consent to adoption. The mother argued
that her consent was invalid as it was signed pursuant to an ex parte
communication with opposing counsel when she was represented by her own
counsel. The mother further maintained that if she knew she had
representation at that time, she would have sought counselâs advice before
deciding to sign the consent. The mother further testified that she believed
that by signing the documentation she would still be able to see her child. The
trial court decided that it could not reach the merits of the motherâs challenge
to her consent because the challenge was untimely. Even if she could
establish fraud or duress, the trial court noted that she was foreclosed from
raising such claims by the statutory time limits.
On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court. In doing so, this Court
noted that the mother did not file a praecipe with respect to revocation of
consent until six months after initially executing her consent and almost two
months after the maternal grandparents had filed to confirm said consent.
âThis was beyond the statutory limits at which time [the m]otherâs consent
was irrevocable.â Id. at *8. See also Interest of A.H., Nos. 266 MDA 2021,
267 MDA 2021, 268 MDA 2021 (Pa.Super. filed Aug. 13, 2021) (unpublished
memorandum) (holding motherâs attempt to revoke consent to adoption was
untimely under Section 2711 where mother filed petition to revoke 98 days
after signing consent; noting that motherâs reliance on In re J.W.B. afforded
no relief; In re J.W.B. was distinguishable because father in that case argued
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that execution of consent document did not constitute legally valid consent
and was void ab initio; thus, issue in that case did not involve revocation of
consent, but whether there was legal consent at all).
Instantly, the Orphansâ Court explained:
Although ⌠Father testified that he attempted to revoke his
consent in writing, and attempted to deliver a written
revocation to the offices of AFTH, and was prevented from
delivering it, after extensive consideration of the conflicting
testimony, this [c]ourt determined that [Mother and Father]
did not establish that they had revoked these consents in a
writing delivered to AFTH within the 30 day period following
the execution of the consents on October 27, 2020.
* * *
As noted in this [c]ourtâs prior Opinion, dated May 13, 2022,
⌠Fatherâs account of when and to whom he attempted to
deliver a written revocation of his consent changed
significantly each time he recounted it and was contradicted
by the testimony of witnesses who had been employed by
AFTH and who could document that they were not present
at the offices on the dates he testified that he saw them and
spoke to them about his revocation.
(Supplemental Orphansâ Court Opinion, 11/30/22, at 6-8). As well, the
Orphansâ Court conceded that Mother and Father âdid not file a petition
challenging the validity of their consents within 60 days following the
execution of the consents, alleging fraud or duress in accordance with 23
Pa.C.S. [§] 2711(c).â Id.
Notwithstanding its findings regarding Mother and Fatherâs failure to
comply with the procedures outlined in Section 2711(c), the Orphansâ Court
relied on In re J.W.B., supra to hold that Mother and Father were still
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permitted to challenge the validity of their consents to adoption. (See id. at
9). The Orphansâ Court opined:
Pursuant to [In re J.W.B., supra], this [c]ourt properly
held a hearing as required under [S]ection 2504(b) of the
statute, and properly provided an opportunity for [Mother
and Father] to be heard with respect to their assertions that
their consents, when signed on October 27, 2020, were
invalid and void ab initio.
(Id. at 10).
In deciding that Mother and Fatherâs consents were invalid, the Orphansâ
Court reasoned:
In this case, [Mother and Father] understood that they were
promised a PACA with respect to [Child] and this enforceable
agreement was a condition of their decision to sign their
consents to the adoption of [Child]. Both Ms. Lovell and Ms.
Bendig also understood that a PACA was so important to
[Mother and Father] that it had to be prepared to be signed
on the same date as the consents to adoption. In this case,
the promise of a PACA with respect to [Child] was met;
however, the fact that this promise was met does not mean
that the consents to adoption were unconditional.
To compound the concerns in this case, [Mother and Father]
also both had an understanding that AFTH was committed
to assisting them in obtaining a PACA with respect to their
younger daughter. This was also a promise, and although
she tried to distinguish this as unrelated to the adoption of
[Child], Ms. Bendig acknowledged that this was important
to [Mother and Father] and that she had made a promise to
them to help them obtain this other PACA. This promise
was not met.
In light of these promises to [Mother and Father], which
[they] considered to be essential, the consents signed on
October 27, 2020 by [Mother and Father] were not
unconditional and therefore are not valid and cannot be
confirmed.
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(Orphansâ Court Opinion, 5/13/22, at 19-20).9
For the following reasons, we cannot agree with the Orphansâ Courtâs
analysis. As this Court has stated, Section 2711 âmakes clear that a
revocation and/or a challenge to the validity of a consent to adoption must be
in conformity with the Act.â In re Adoption of J.A.S., supra.Indeed, the statute renders a consent to adoption irrevocable more than 30 days after its execution. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1)(ii). Further, the statute precludes a challenge to the validity of the consent (which may be based only on grounds of fraud or duress) after 60 days following the execution of the consent. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(3)(i)(A). This statutory language is clear and unambiguous. See In re J.W.B., supra. As this Court has previously held, âthe threshold act that triggers these provisions of Section 2711 is the timely filing of the petition to revoke and/or challenge the validity of the consent to adoption. Whether [Mother or Fatherâs] consent to adoption was valid could be addressed only if [a] petition had been timely filed. Essentially, the untimeliness of [a revocation] petition precluded the court from addressing the issue of validity.â In re Adoption ofJ.A.S., supra
at ____________________________________________ 9 In so holding, the Orphansâ Court relied on two cases involving a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights wherein this Court stated that the parentâs purported voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was not intelligent or voluntary where it was conditioned on the promise or belief of a PACA with the child. See In re Adoption of A.W.,230 A.3d 1139
(Pa.Super. 2020) and In re C.M.C.,140 A.3d 699
(Pa.Super. 2016), which we discuss in greater
detail infra.
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409. Thus, this Court has consistently declined to address a challenge to the
validity of a consent to adoption where the proffered revocation of consent
was not timely filed in compliance with the statute. See id. See also In re
R.I., supra; In re C.P.R., supra; Interest of A.H., supra.
Although we recognize the Orphansâ Courtâs reliance on In re J.W.B.,
supra, we disagree with the courtâs interpretation of our Supreme Courtâs
pronouncements therein. We reiterate that the Supreme Court clarified that
at a hearing to confirm a consent to adoption, âthe trial court must review the
consents and consider any and all arguments raised by the parties challenging
their conformity with the Adoption Act.â In re J.W.B., supra at 580-81, 232
A.3d at 700. The Supreme Court went on to state that â[t]he specific
provisions of Section 2711, including in particular the time limitations for
revocation or a validity challenge based upon fraud or duress, are premised
on the execution of a consent that complies with the legislatureâs
statutory requirements.â Id. at 581, 232 A.3d at 701 (emphasis added).
Thus, our Supreme Court held in In re J.W.B., that at the hearing to confirm
the adoption consent, the Orphansâ Court must consider whether the consent
complies with the statutory framework delineated in Section 2711.
Here, the record makes clear that neither Father nor Mother revoked
their consent to adoption in writing within 30 days, or alleged fraud or duress
within 60 days, of execution of their consents. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(c)(1),
(3). Further, there is no dispute that the consents complied with the statutory
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mandates of Section 2711, including the contents of the consents. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(d). See also In re J.W.B., supra. Therefore, Mother and
Fatherâs belated attempt to revoke their consents to adoption was time-barred
under the statute, and the court could not consider challenges to the validity
of the consents that were not based on non-conformity with the statute. See
id. We agree with Pre-Adoptive Parents that âif [Mother or Father] felt that
[they were] under duress to sign the consent due to a fraudulent
misrepresentation of securing a PACA, [they] had to file a petition to revoke
the consent challenging the validity of the consent within sixty (60) days of
its execution.â10 (Pre-Adoptive Parentsâ Brief at 40-41). Based upon the
____________________________________________
10 Moreover, we disagree that Mother and Fatherâs consents were necessarily
invalid based on promises of a PACA concerning Child and Mother and Fatherâs
younger daughter. In re C.M.C. and In re Adoption of A.W. (the cases on
which the Orphansâ Court relied) are distinguishable from the case at bar
because the cases governing voluntary relinquishment implicate different
statutes than Section 2711 which could be relevant to a PACA.
Notably, the Adoption Act provides two alternative procedures for voluntary
relinquishment of parental rights: (1) by the parent filing a petition to
relinquish parental rights under Sections 2501 (relinquishment to agency) or
2502 (relinquishment to adult intending to adopt child); or (2) by the adoptive
parent filing a petition to confirm a birth parentâs consent to adoption under
Section 2504âthe procedure which took place in this case. Under Sections
2501 and 2502, âthe natural parent first files a petition in the trial court
seeking permission to permanently relinquish his or her parental rights to the
minor child. The Adoption Act[, per Section 2503,] requires the trial court to
hold a hearing, and for the relinquishing parent to ratify his or her consent to
termination, no less than ten days after the petition is filed.â In re C.M.C.,
supra at 708-09. The comment to Section 2503(a) explains that â[t]he
petitionerâs in-court ratification of consent assures due process requirements
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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foregoing, we disagree with the Orphansâ Courtâs denial of the petitions to
confirm Mother and Fatherâs consents to adoption. Accordingly, we affirm the
involuntary termination of Fatherâs parental rights, but we vacate the orders
denying confirmation of Mother and Fatherâs consents to adoption.
Decrees affirmed in part; vacated in part. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Date: 9/6/2024
____________________________________________
in view of the finality of the termination decree as to the parent.â Id. at 709
(citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(a), Comment).
As discussed in In re C.M.C., the principal holding of this Court was that the
motherâs voluntary relinquishment of parental rights was invalid because the
court failed to comply with the statutory procedures mandated in voluntary
relinquishment cases. Specifically, the court did not provide the mother with
the requisite ten-day notice period so that she could consider her choice before
ratifying that decision. Conversely, in this case, the parties proceeded under
Section 2711 of the Adoption Act, which permits the parent 30 days to revoke
a consent to adoption for any reason, and 60 days to file a petition to revoke
based on fraud or duress. Thus, a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights
filed under Section 2501 or 2502 that is conditioned on a PACA may constitute
an invalid relinquishment where the petitioner would be deprived of an ability
to revoke the relinquishment based on non-fulfillment of the PACA. Under
Section 2711, however, the same concerns are not necessarily present
because the petitioner would have 30 or 60 days to revoke the adoption
consent if the agreed-upon PACA did not come to fruition.
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