In re the Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland County

OPINION BY

Carl F. Miller (Miller), pro se, appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (trial court) granting the Westmoreland County Tax Claim Bureau’s (Bureau) Motion to Dismiss his Petition to Vacate Judicial Tax Sale unless he obtained counsel within 60 days of that order. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

The matter arises out of a judicial tax sale of property of the Estate of Anna S. Rowley (Estate) on May 15, 2012.1 Miller, Rowley’s son in-law and the Administrator of the Estate, filed a Petition to Vacate Judicial Tax Sale (Petition) alleging various procedural deficiencies by the Bureau. The Bureau then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, arguing that Miller was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by representing the Estate, and requesting that the trial court dismiss the Petition or, alternatively, compel Miller to obtain counsel. By order dated February 28, 2013, the trial court, holding that an estate must be represented by a licensed attorney, granted the Bureau’s Motion to Dismiss. However, the order provided that the Petition would be dismissed only if Miller failed to retain counsel within 60 days of the date of the order.2

Miller appealed the trial court’s February 28, 2013 order to this Court on March 16, 2013, prior to the expiration of the 60-day period for obtaining counsel. On appeal, Miller argues that he should be permitted to proceed pro se to represent the interests of the Estate.

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over Miller’s appeal. The Bureau argues that because the trial court’s order did not dispose of the case but merely directed Miller to obtain counsel within 60 days, it is an interlocutory order that is appealable only by permission.3 Miller contends, however, that the trial court’s order is a collateral order appealable by right.4

*340As a general rule, an appellate court’s jurisdiction extends only to review of final orders. Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association, 602 Pa. 65, 71, 977 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (2009); Pa. R.A.P. 341.5 However, Pa. R.A.P. 313 permits appellate review of collateral orders. An order is an appealable collateral order if it is “(1) separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, (2) implicates rights which are too important to be denied review, and (3) the appellant’s claim as to that order will be lost if postponed until final judgment.” Rae, 602 Pa. at 69-70, 977 A.2d at 1124. As an exception to the rule of finality, the collateral order doctrine is to be interpreted narrowly, and each prong of the doctrine must be clearly present before an order may be considered collateral. Brophy v. Philadelphia Gas Works and Philadelphia Facilities Management Corp., 921 A.2d 80, 87 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007).

In this case, the order at issue pertains to whether a non-attorney can represent an estate. It meets the first prong of the test because it is clearly separable from and collateral to the substantive issue of whether a particular judicial sale should be vacated due to alleged procedural defects. As to the second prong, Miller’s challenge to the trial court’s order raises an important question regarding the scope of and a possible exception to the general rule that a non-attorney may not represent a party in court, i.e., may a non-attorney administrator represent an estate. Finally, the third prong of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied because Miller will either retain counsel and lose his opportunity to assert his alleged right to represent the estate or not retain counsel and allow the trial court to dismiss the action without ruling on the merits of the propriety of the tax sale.6 Accordingly, because the order from which Miller appeals is a collateral order, we will address the question he raises on appeal— whether he may represent the Estate as a non-attorney.

It is well settled that with a few exceptions, non-attorneys may not represent parties before the Pennsylvania courts and most administrative agencies. Spirit of the Avenger Ministries v. Commonwealth, 767 A.2d 1130 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). See, e.g., id. at 1131 (Pastor, a non-attorney, could not represent Church in appeal of denial of its application for tax exempt status as a charitable organization); Westmoreland County v. RTA Group, Inc., 767 A.2d 1144, 1151 (Pa. Cmwlth.2001) (real estate consulting service engaged in unauthorized practice of law by processing clients’ tax assessment appeals); Smaha v. Landy, 162 Pa. *341Cmwlth. 136, 638 A.2d 392, 397 petition for allowance of appeal denied, 539 Pa. 660, 651 A.2d 546 (1994) (nonprofit medical corporation must have counsel in order to proceed in court action as a corporation and cannot represent itself.); Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 331 Pa.Super. 137, 480 A.2d 281, 284 (1984) (corporation may not appear in court and be represented by a corporate officer and shareholder who is not an attorney).

Our Supreme Court has held that what constitutes the practice of law must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and explained that in making such a determination, a court “must keep the public interest of primary concern, both in terms of the protection of the public as well as in ensuring that the regulation of the practice of law is not so strict that the public good suffers.” Harkness v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 591 Pa. 543, 551, 920 A.2d 162, 167 (2007). In Harkness, the factors our Supreme Court considered in determining whether a person should be able to represent the interests of another before an administrative agency were whether the proceedings by design are intended to be brief and informal, not intended to be intensely litigated; whether the evidentiary rules apply; the amounts generally at issue in proceedings of that type; whether there is prehearing discovery; whether normally only questions of fact and not complex legal issues are involved; and whether the fact-finder is not required to be a lawyer.7

Although no Pennsylvania state court has applied the Harkness factors or even addressed whether a non-attorney may represent an estate, federal courts have addressed the issue.8 First, in Williams v. USP-Lewisburg, No. 3:CV-09-1715, 2009 WL 4921316 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 11, 2009), the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, in holding that a non-attorney could not represent a family member’s estate, explained:

Like a corporation, an estate can only act through an agent; in this case, an administrator. An estate by its very nature cannot represent itself and, therefore, must be represented by a licensed attorney, regardless of the relation between the administrator and the decedent. To permit an unlicensed lay administrator to appear pro se would be to permit the unauthorized practice of law.

Id. slip op. at 3 (citing McCants v. Village of Broadview, No. 93 C 3657, 1994 WL 117478 (N.D.Ill., March 28, 1994), slip op. *342at 1-2). Moreover, in Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391 (2nd Cir.1997), also cited by the trial court, the Second Circuit held that “an administratrix or executrix of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.” Id. at 393. The Court explained that in such instances, “the action cannot be described as the litigant’s own, because ‘the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors will be affected by the outcome’ of the proceedings.” Id.

The trial court’s decision to not allow Miller to represent the Estate is consistent with the principles expressed in those cases, as well as our Supreme Court’s analysis in Harkness. Administration of estates involves court proceedings as opposed to informal administrative agency proceedings. As in this case, where the trial court specifically found that there are other parties that will be affected by the outcome of these proceedings — Miller’s brother-in-law and a creditor — estates also normally involve third parties and payment of estate taxes to the Commonwealth. While the Harkness Court found that prohibiting non-attorneys from representing employers in unemployment compensation hearings would create an undue burden for employers, the factors emphasized by the Court in that case (informal nature of proceedings, minimal legal analysis required, minimal amounts of money in controversy) are not applicable to estate representation. Given the complex legal issues that may arise during the representation of an estate, such as challenging a judicial sale, prohibiting a non-attorney from representing an estate is essential to protecting the interests of the public, and we agree with the trial court that, regardless of his relationship to the decedent, Miller may not represent the Estate.9

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of December, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, dated February 28, 2013, at No. 1380 of 2011, is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction relinquished.