Allen v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
William ALLEN v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DELAWARE COUNTY SPCA, INC.)
Attorneys
Arthur G. Girton, Chester, for petitioner., Jennifer Chun Strawn, Philadelphia, for respondent Delaware County SPCA, Inc.
Full Opinion (html_with_citations)
William Allen (Claimant) petitions for review of the portion of the June 3, 2011, order of the Workersâ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) that reversed the decision of a workersâ compensation judge (WCJ) to reinstate Claimantâs benefits on January 29, 2008, following a suspension of his benefits on January 3, 2008. We reverse.
On August 24, 2007, Claimant injured his right shoulder while working as a kennel attendant for Delaware County SPCA, Inc. (Employer). (WCJâs Findings of Fact, No. 4.) Claimant continued to work for Employer and received his pre-injury wages at all times. (WCJâs Findings of Fact, Nos. 5-6.) On January 3, 2008, Claimant quit his job because of the âdeterioration of a relationship between the Claimant and upper management and the Claimantâs continuing treatment for the work injuries, or for increased right shoulder pain as a result of the work injury in accordance with these findings.â (WCJâs Findings of Fact, Nos. 8, 30.)
On January 29, 2008, Claimant was examined by William C. Murphy, D.O., who found a change in Claimantâs condition and determined that Claimant was disabled from his pre-injury job as of that date. (WCJâs Findings of Fact, Nos. 18, 19.) Claimant filed a claim petition, which the WCJ granted based on Dr. Murphyâs testimony. The WCJ suspended Claimantâs benefits from August 24, 2007, to January 28, 2008,
Employer appealed to the WCAB, arguing that the WCJ erred in failing to suspend Claimantâs benefits as of January 3, 2008, the date that Claimant quit. (R.R. at 20a.) The WCAB did not directly address this issue, perhaps because Claimantâs benefits had actually been suspended through January 28, 2008. The WCAB believed that Employer was, in effect, challenging the WCJâs reinstatement- of Claimantâs benefits on January 29, 2008. Although it is not clear from the record, the WCAB apparently reversed the reinstatement of Claimantâs benefits as of January 29, 2008, because of Claimantâs quit on January 3, 2008, for reasons unrelated to his work injury. Claimant now petitions this court for review.
Claimant argues that the WCAB erred in reversing the WCJâs decision to reinstate Claimantâs benefits as of January 29, 2008. We agree.
Here, Claimantâs benefits were suspended on January 3, 2008, after he quit his job with Employer for reasons unrelated to his work injury. In other words, Claimantâs benefits were suspended because, in effect, Claimant failed to pursue
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the WCABâs order reversing the reinstatement of Claimantâs benefits as of January 29, 2008.
. We note that the WCJ confused the years that some events occurred, stating 2008 when it should have been 2007 and stating 2009 when it should have been 2008. These errors were corrected by the WCAB and by this opinion for clarification purposes only.
. It is apparent that the WCJ suspended Claimantâs benefits from August 24, 2007, to January 3, 2008, because Claimant suffered no loss of wages and that the WCJ suspended Claimantâs benefits from January 3, 2008, to January 28, 2008, because of Claimant's quit.
. Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law and whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.
. Employer argues before this court that Dr. Murphy's testimony in this regard is not competent. However, Employer failed to raise that issue in its appeal to the WCAB; thus, the issue is waived. (See R.R. at 20a.)
. We note that Claimant actually bases his argument on our Supreme Court's decision in Bufford v. Workersâ Compensation Appeal Board (North American Telecom), 606 Pa. 621, 2 A.3d 548 (2010). In that case, the court pointed out that a claimant may seek reinstatement following a suspension where the claimant proves that his earning power is once against adversely affected by his disability through no fault of his own. Id. at 627, 2 A.3d at 552. The court then held that "faultâ refers to a claimant's failure to pursue work in good faith. Id. at 632-33, 2 A.3d at 555. Bufford also supports Claimant's position because, although Claimantâs loss of earning power as of January 3 was due to his failure to pursue an available job, i.e., his fault. Claimant's loss of earning power as of January 29 was due to his work injury.