Stair v. COM. DEPT. OF TRANSP.

OPINION BY

Kevin Scott Stair (Licensee) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County (trial court) denying his appeal and reinstating the one-year suspension of his operating privilege imposed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) pursuant to the provisions of Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code. 1 We affirm.

By official notice of suspension mailed October 19, 2005, Licensee was informed by the Department that his operating privilege was being suspended as a result of his September 6, 2005 conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code. 2 The notice further informed Licensee, inter alia, that due to his conviction, his operating privilege would not be restored until he equipped all vehicles that he owned with an ignition interlock system. 3 , 4

*1016 Licensee appealed the official notice of suspension and a trial de novo proceeded before the trial court. Licensee challenged the imposition of a one-year license suspension under Section 3804(e)(2)(i) because, pursuant to the plea agreement for the DUI conviction underlying the suspension, the DUI conviction was designated and reported to the Department as a first DUI offense. Licensee also challenged the requirement that he install an ignition interlock system on all of the vehicles that he owned under the recidivist provision of Section 3805 because, again, the DUI conviction underlying this requirement was designated and reported as a first DUI offense.

In support of the imposition of the one-year license suspension and the ignition interlock requirement, the Department submitted into evidence a packet of certified documents which contained a record of a prior conviction by Licensee on June 19, 1995 for a DUI which occurred on February 11, 1994. 5 The Department argued before the trial court that it could impose the suspension under Section 3804(e)(2)(i), and the ignition interlock requirement under Section 3805, because Licensee had a prior DUI conviction within the ten years preceding the occurrence of the instant violation.

The trial court agreed with the Department’s interpretation of the Vehicle Code and entered the instant order denying Licensee’s appeal from the Department’s official notice imposing the one-year suspension and the ignition interlock requirement. Licensee then filed the instant appeal. 6

*1017 In this appeal, Licensee claims that the trial court erred in denying his appeal from the Department’s official notice imposing the one-year suspension and the ignition interlock requirement. More specifically, Licensee contends that: (1) the Department could not impose the suspension and interlock requirement as it was bound by the plea agreement under which Licensee pleaded guilty to violating Section 3802(a)(1) as a first DUI offense; and (2) the Department could not impose the interlock requirement under the recidivist provision of Section 3805(a) based upon his present DUI conviction or his prior DUI conviction in 1995.

Licensee first claims that the Department could not impose the suspension and interlock requirement as it was bound by the plea agreement under which Licensee pleaded guilty to violating Section 3802(a)(1) as a first DUI offense. Specifically, Licensee asserts that “[DOT] is bound by the record of Stair’s conviction and sentence for violation of § 3802(a)(1) as a first-time offender. That judgment is as final and binding upon DOT as upon Stair. And, as a first-time violator of § 3802(a)(1), Stair is not subject to suspension or the interlock requirement.” Brief for Appellant at 10. We do not agree.

As noted above, Section 3804(e)(1) of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he department shall suspend the operating privilege of an individual under paragraph (2) upon receiving a certified record of the individual’s conviction ... for ... an offense under section 3802.... ” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(l)(i). In turn, Section 3804(e)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that the “[sjuspension under paragraph (1) shall be ... 12 months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(i). In addition, Section 3806(b) provides that “[t]he calculation of prior offenses for purposes of section[ ] ... 3804 (relating to penalties) ... shall include any conviction ... within the ten years before the present violation occurred for ... an offense under former section 3731....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(b)(2).

Likewise, Section 3805(a) of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f a person violates section 3802 ... and has a prior offense as defined in Section 3806(a) ... and the person seeks a restoration of operating privileges, the department shall require ... [e]ach motor vehicle owned by the person or registered to the person has been equipped with an ignition interlock system and remains so for the duration of the restricted license period....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(a)(1). In turn, Section 3806(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he term ‘prior offense’ as used in this chapter shall mean a conviction ... before the sentencing on the present violation for ... an offense under former section 3731 — ” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a)(2).

As also noted above, the Department’s records demonstrate that Licensee has had a prior conviction on June 19, 1995, for a DUI which occurred on February 11,1994, a prior conviction on July 25, 1989 for a DUI which occurred on February 25,1989, and a prior conviction on March 9,1989 for a DUI which occurred on July 16, 1988. Thus, pursuant to the foregoing explicit provisions of the Vehicle Code, in this case it was the Department’s duty to impose both the one-year license and the ignition interlock requirement upon receiving the report of Licensee’s latest DUI conviction from the Clerk of Courts for Bedford County.

It is true that the instant DUI conviction was designated and reported to the Department as a first DUI offense; however, the designation was not based upon Licensee’s driving record. Rather, the designa *1018 tion of the instant DUI conviction as a first offense was the result of a plea agreement entered into by Licensee in the underlying criminal proceedings. 7

It is well settled that the Department’s suspensions are independent civil proceedings separate and apart from the criminal DUI matters. Commonwealth v. Wolf, 534 Pa. 283, 632 A.2d 864 (1993). The license suspension is a collateral civil consequence of the criminal conviction. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174 (1994).

Therefore, regardless of whether a plea agreement existed in the underlying criminal proceedings, it has no effect on the Department’s duty under the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code to impose the instant license suspension and ignition interlock requirement. Crawford v. Commonwealth, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 657, 582 A.2d 95 (1990); Department of Transportation v. Lefever, 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 105, 533 A.2d 501 (1987).

In other words, as we noted in Lefever, “neither the district attorney in plea bargaining, nor the court of common pleas when deciding a criminal matter, has jurisdiction to bind [the Department] to withdraw a civil license suspension.” Id. at 503. “The statutory suspensions following ... a conviction for driving under the influence are not bargaining chips to be traded in exchange for criminal convictions; rather, they are mandatory civil penalties, imposed not for penal purposes, but ‘to protect the public by providing an effective means of denying an intoxicated motorist the privilege of using our roads.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Ebert, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 82, 375 A.2d 837, 839 (1977)). As a result, the trial court properly denied Licensee’s appeal and reinstated the one-year suspension and ignition interlock requirement as neither the Department nor the trial court were bound by the provisions of the plea agreement in the criminal proceedings in the instant civil proceedings. 8

*1019 Finally, Licensee claims that the Department could not impose the interlock requirement under the recidivist provision of Section 3805(a) of the Vehicle Code based upon his prior DUI conviction in 1995. More specifically, Licensee contends that the explicit provisions of Section 3805(g) preclude the Department from imposing the requirement because neither his prior DUI conviction in 1995, nor his present DUI conviction in 2005, was accompanied by a court order directing the installation of an ignition interlock system.

Section 3805(g) of the Vehicle Code provides:

(g) Prohibition of authorization.— This section shall not give the department authorization to impose an ignition interlock requirement on a person that has committed an offense under former section 3731 prior to October 1, 2003, without the issuance of a court order.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(g). Thus, under its express terms, Section 3805(g) merely prohibits the Department from ordering the installation of an ignition interlock system, in the absence of a court order, for a conviction under the former Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code that occurred prior to its enactment. Id.

In Alexander v. Department of Transportation, 583 Pa. 592, 601, 880 A.2d 552, 557 (2005), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the “substantive issue” of whether, under the former version of the Vehicle Code, “[a] driver whose previous DUI convictions predate the effective date of the Interlock Law, but whose latest DUI occurred after the effective date, may, as a consequence of the latest conviction, be subject to the recidivist provisions of the Interlock Law, or whether the imposition of the interlock requirement in such an instance constitutes an impermissibly retroactive application of the statute.... ” In disposing of this issue, the Supreme Court stated the following, in pertinent part:

The General Assembly did not expressly state that the Interlock Law is to be applied retroactively. Thus, an ignition interlock requirement could not be imposed as a licensing restriction for a DUI conviction which occurred before the effective date of the Interlock Law-such as, for example, appellee’s second DUI conviction in 1994. But that is not the issue posed in this appeal. The Department’s interlock notification in this case was occasioned by appellee’s third DUI conviction, which arose after enactment of the Interlock Law.... It is not the two previous DUI convictions that have exposed appellee to the interlock requirement; it is his third conviction, occurring after passage of the Law, which brings him within its purview.

The statute does not reach into the past and increase the punishment, or the civil consequences, of concluded DUI convictions. Rather, it takes the recidi *1020 vist DUI defendant as it finds him after the post-interlock Law DUI conviction .... There is no doubt that the Interlock Law imposes a licensing consequence for recidivist DUI offenders that is greater than the licensing consequence such recidivist offenders faced prior to the enactment of the statute. However, the statute does not look back and enhance the punishment recidivist DUI offenders received for their prior DUI convictions. Instead, the enhanced consequence applies solely with respect to those DUI convictions occurring after the effective date of the law....

Alexander, Id. at 605-606, 880 A.2d at 559-560 (emphasis in original). 9

Likewise, in the instant case, the Department ordered Licensee to install an ignition interlock system under Section 3805(a) due to his September 6, 2005 DUI conviction for the offense that was committed on January 19, 2005, and based upon the fact that he had a prior DUI conviction in 1995. Thus, Section 3805(g) does not preclude the imposition of an ignition interlock requirement in the absence of a court order as both the violation and conviction underlying its imposition were based on a violation of Section 3802(a) and occurred after the enactment of this section. As a result, Licensee’s claim that the trial court erred in this regard is patently without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of September, 2006, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, dated January 19, 2006 at No. 1088 for the year 2005, is AFFIRMED.